Tactical and Technical
The Anti-Armour Capability GapBy Justin Petersen April 2, 2019
According to the 2017 Concept for Employment of Army’s Combat Brigade,
“Army must possess a force able to deploy rapidly to austere areas whereupon they are capable of immediately commencing decisive land combat operations….Army’s ability to effectively operate in an urban, littoral and highly-lethal land environment is an absolute imperative for successful close combat. Army must be adequately protected, armed and mobile to function against these threats.”
I would like to highlight the “armed” and “mobile” components of this quote. We have certainly sought to protect our Army through the acquisition of heavier, more cumbersome vehicles. Yet I would submit that we have done, and continue to do, little to increase the lethal effectiveness of our increasingly mobile force, particularly against armoured threats in the littoral environment.
In the following paper, I aim to provide a history of the anti-armour weapon, information on our current and projected force structure, and a proposed revision to introduce a more versatile anti-armour capability. I’ll note that I have not dived thoroughly into the tactical application of my proposed organisational revision, but I am hoping to at least generate discussion on our aversion to mounting anti-armour weapon systems to our more versatile platforms such as the Hawkei.