Academy Papers

2016

Lead   *Mentor*   *Train*

Foreword from the Commanding Officer

Welcome to the inaugural edition of the Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Academy (WONCO-A) Papers; a collection of short essays from the 2016 Officers and Soldiers of the Academy.

WONCO-A is headquartered at Kokoda Barracks in Canungra; with Wings in Darwin, Townsville, Brisbane, Canungra and Adelaide. WONCO-A is the principal Australian Army warrant officer and selected senior non-commissioned officer training establishment for All Corps soldier training. During the training year 2016/17 WONCO-A, will train over 2000 soldiers; which equates to approximately 11% of Army's soldiers. At some point in their career, every Australian Regular Army soldier will undertake a career promotion course at WONCO-A.

The WONCO-A Papers serve a variety of purposes; firstly, to present my team members with an opportunity to make incremental improvements to their analytical and written technique. The ability of an officer or warrant officer to express themselves - to write persuasively, with clarity and conviction - is a necessary skill that both individual, and organisation, must invest in.

Secondly, the WONCO-A Papers provide my team members with an opportunity to share their thoughts, opinions or concerns with each other, and with a wider audience. I have been genuinely impressed with some of the ideas that have been raised in these pages, and the clarity with which these ideas have been raised.

Thirdly, the WONCO-A Papers provide me, and others, with an opportunity to harness these ideas and roll them into daily business and future planning. Within these pages, the reader will find some exceptional essays; some I would wish to see expanded and submitted for consideration to the *Australian Army Journal*.

Many of the Academy's officers and warrant officers are from a different generation to me, and are generationally removed from Army senior leadership. These members bring with them new and innovative solutions to some of the challenges that confront Army, as an organisation. I unashamedly leverage their thoughts and ideas, almost daily.

The officers and warrant officers of WONCO-A are charged with an important responsibility, both now and into the future. They, and their peer group—who together, will become Army's future leaders—must ensure that contemporary ideas mesh with, and enhance, those time proven tactics, techniques and procedures. This process is essential to keep the Academy and Army adaptive and innovative.

Having read through their thoughts and ideas, I am confident that the future of Army remains bright.

Michael Scott
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer / Chief Instructor

September 2016

Editorial Note

The thoughts and perspectives that follow are expressed through the medium of a short essay: 1000 words for WO2; 1500 words for WO1; and 2000 words for officers. WONCO-A members were deliberately constrained in length to avoid the production of a tome.

With a constrained word limit, detailed academic analysis, or explanation, was prevented. Members were challenged to pique interest, to generate discussion or to shape a debate; and to do so while remaining brief. It is often true that more value may be derived from less written product.

All essays have been included, unchanged, as they were originally submitted. Some expression, grammar and spelling, is want of change; but to do so would deviate from the tone and purpose of the Warrant officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Academy Papers and, incidentally, encumber me with a significant task.

Not everyone will agree with all that is written herein. Certainly, I do not agree with a number of the ideas and recommendations made within, but of course, that is largely irrelevant. I welcome debate and condone intellectual controversy. For Army to move forward, and to remain adaptive, the requirement occasionally exists to draw people out from positions of 'comfortable conformity' and to critically analyse; what we know, what we think that we know and what we perhaps do not know.

While some risk does exist—risk that controversial opinions may be exposed 'above the detection threshold', or be taken out of context—I opine that the reward to the Academy, and to wider military circles, is greater in the long run. In Army, we must never be frightened to express our ideas. Great strength often flows from an organisation with plurality of thought. Should controversy follow, or unintended consequences arise, as Editor and Commanding Officer, I assume full responsibility.

It is my fervent belief that time and effort invested in the professional development of officers and soldiers, in rank-specific, in-unit training, is our panoply for the challenges of tomorrow. As a whole, I am delighted with the effort of the Academy's warrant officers and officers. I would hope to see some of the names, within, feature prominently in our debates, and intellectual discussion, in the years ahead.

Michael Scott
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer / Chief Instructor

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LEADERSHIP

INTRODUCTION

1.   Leadership is a much talked about quality that is at the heart of the Military profession, pivotal to what is an important part of the curriculum in all courses conducted at the Warrant Officer and Non Commissioned Officer Academy. It is an element of life that can inspire men and women to do great things or equally acts of evil. At every step of a soldier's career, we strive to refine the characteristics that each possesses. Throughout history there have been many examples of leaders that have led their countries whether that is in political, community or a military orientated environment. There are the ones that come straight to mind such as Napoleon and Rommel and then there are many more tales of extraordinary leadership and courage in times of war and everyday life. The foundations of leadership can be based on professional mastery, and education based on the most modern and current doctrine available.

2.   **Scope.** This paper will discuss and explore the characteristics that make a good leader by discussing prominent historical examples and linking with lessons that are delivered today through Doctrine, Professional Mastery and Leadership taught at the Warrant Officer and Non Commissioned Officer Academy. It will also incorporate recommendations to improve and cement the Australian Armies standing as a modernised centre of excellence for leadership, mentoring and professional development.

AIM

3.   The aim of this paper is to discuss and analyse the characteristics of leadership and the way in which it is currently taught in the Australian Army and at the Warrant Officer and Non Commissioned Officer Academy.

HISTORICAL LEADERSHIP

4.   There have been several leadership figures that have had a profound effect on my career and I would like to discuss them in their levels of importance to me.

5.   **Harold Moore.** The first historical case of Leadership that has had an impact on my career to be discussed is Hal Moore. He came from Kentucky and worked his way through finishing high school at night whilst working in the US Senate book warehouse. He was determined to achieve an appointment to West Point Military College. After finally gaining a place at West Point in the summer of 1942, academics were not his strong point and he worked extremely hard to ensure that he made the grade. He graduated in the bottom fifteen percent of his class.

6.   He is a prominent figure in leadership lessons taught to staff cadets at the Royal Military College-Duntroon. One of Hal Moore's leading principles in reference to leadership is when he is briefing his troops prior to their departure for Vietnam that still resonates with me every time I am asked to lead Australian soldiers. Hal states "I will be the first onto the battlefield and the last one off"[1]. I believe that is how a leader should approach their duties whether it is an operational environment or training and shaping the Armies future leaders which links with the Lead by example principle.

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[1] Harold Moore said "I will be the first onto the battlefield and the last one off" and this was one of the leadership principles he lived his life by, prominent in the movie We Were Soldiers (story of the Battle of La Drang Valley – Vietnam War).

7.   **Field Marshal Erwin Rommel.** Over time most reputations tend to diminish. Rommel is a revered figure by both sides of the conflict known as the Second World War, whose reputation has grown exponentially since this period. He was a bold and fearless leader who was prepared to accept risk across all aspects of his role as leader and commander. This quality is central to in relation to becoming a successful and respected commander.

8.   He displayed remarkable foresight to see the broader strategic picture which translated into success on the battlefield for the Forces under his command and the German Army. His efforts in North Africa occupied the British Land forces for a substantial period and allowed the AXIS powers to distract the main effort away from Europe. He was a brilliant tactical and charismatic leader who inspired those around him to great things.

9.   **Chauvel.** Late in the afternoon on the 31 October 1917 Lieutenant General Sir Harry Chauvel issued the words "put Grant (Brigadier General William Grant) straight at it'[2] in the bid to take the small town of Beersheba in the Turkish defensive line in Palestine. These words would only seek to immortalise the Australian Light Horse through their actions at Beersheba and cement Chauvel as a legendary leadership figure in Australian Military history. He was mentored early in his career by General Sir John Monash in the steep rocky ravines of the Gallipoli Peninsula.

10.   The invaluable advice and experiences passed on by Monash, gave Chauvel the self-confidence, assurance and knowledge to lead his soldiers in combat. Chauvel was a brilliant tactician and the mentoring and guidance provided by Monash, early in his career would prove to be priceless in his professional development. Doctrine was not available to the leaders within the early stages of the profession of arms in Australia.

11.   **Wellington.** The Duke of Wellington lived in the shadow of one of the greatest military leaders of all time, Napoleon. Wellington was an exceptional leader and was beloved by his troops. He inspired his troops by example and leadership demonstrated in the heat of battle. He was cool and decisive in character and valued the lives of his soldiers. The Duke of Wellingtons leadership and ethical beliefs would see him become one of the most successful military commanders of all time.

12.   He treated all his subordinates equally and did not delineate between officer and soldier. This could sometime be mistaken for rude behaviour. He utilised clear, concise directions and would pour over mistakes or losing his men in battle. This was demonstrated when upon receiving the casualty list from the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, he broke down distraught. He readily accepted responsibility for his mistakes and learnt from them, never making the same mistake twice.

LEADERSHIP

13.   **Leadership** by its very nature is a quality that is always in demand as discussed in the historical examples above. The Army must continue to grow leaders at all levels of rank and through many different pipelines. Successful leaders strive to lead by example stimulating growth and reinforcing established qualities within the individual. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel wrote "in moments of panic, fatigue or disorganisation or when something out of the ordinary has to be demanded from them, the personal example of the commander works wonders"[3]

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[2] This quote was taken from the movie "The Lighthorsemen" made in 1987 which covered the story of Australian cavalry unit fighting the Turkish and German forces in the Sinai and Palestine campaign of 1917.

[3] Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (German Officer) was a charismatic and a brilliant tactical leader from the First and Second World War who is still revered today.

14.   There has been some discussion that the positive reinforcement of leaders has been shown to produce results rather than focusing on the negative aspects of the individual's performance. It also helps to avoid fatigue and burn out by generating an emotional connection. The use of an individuals own strengths to influence and enhance subordinates leadership qualities is a tried and tested way of producing the best results. It is believed by most different industries that the best approach however is combining a wide range of Leadership pathways that enhances the individuals overall capability. One of the essential elements of instilling leadership is sourcing and teaching from current Doctrine.

15.   **Doctrine** by definition is a set of principles learnt from historical examples of battles won and lost, as mentioned in the previous paragraphs. These doctrinal lessons are instilled into today's generation through instruction and lectures. Doctrine provides a valuable input into capability and the continual need for ensuring the modernisation of the current fighting force. The current Doctrine is not only difficult to access but it is complicated and not relatable to today's fighting force, which is constantly being modernised.

16.   The application of doctrine in today's military environment outside of the training environment is limited. It is not actively encouraged by commanders at all levels. 'There is restricted access to doctrine that is easily understandable by all ranks, due to limited computer or online means'[4]. This is being mitigated to a degree by the direction taken by some units towards the use of Tablets, IPad and online means for further develop professional mastery.

17.   **Professional Mastery** can be defined as acquiring and the development of a specific set of skills relevant to your profession. The individual makes decisions and judgement based on situations and issues in their experience and education up to that point. The Australian Army has set education standards for entry, which depend on the particular role being applied for. The education standards for entry have actually risen over the last decade, requiring civilians to have a pass in the core subjects of English, Maths and Science for year ten instead of the previous level of year nine secondary education.

18.   The rise of organisations or positions within and outside of Defence placing an emphasis on Tertiary study as a prerequisite for employment is rising. One option to implement is that entrance requirements facilitate all personnel applying for officer entry must have Tertiary qualifications. This will however significantly narrow the field of recruitment to potential leaders. The Australian Army must ensure that it keeps pace with current requirements in the civilian space and develop programs and schemes to ensure defence personnel are not disadvantaged. One way this can occur is by establishing a mentoring program within Defence.

19.   **Mentoring.** The application of mentoring is an important element in successful leadership within the Military. The relationship between a more experienced person providing essential guidance and advice to a less knowledgeable person to make improved judgement and subsequent decisions. There are many different types of mentoring and associated techniques, they are not all applicable to every individual.

20.   Effective mentoring offers guidance allowing us to realise where we fit into the broader scope of the organisation and life. Thus demonstrating to us as individuals where our strengths and weaknesses lie. There is an element of trust and truth that both parties need to accept to form an effective mentoring partnership.

21.   The most efficient way to select a mentor is to work out what works best for the individual, and who they can learn from. The Army's current centre for mentoring and shaping

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[4] This was a key finding from the Director General Training (BRIG Michael Ryan) report tabled in April of 2016.

our future leaders is WONCO-A. There are five Wings located throughout the country which professionally develops mentors and further educates their soldiers.

WONCO-A

22.   **Subject Courses.** The Warrant Officer and Non Commissioned Officer Academy's motto is Lead, Mentor and Train. This is the theme by which the military staff posted to the Academy operate, aiming to instil and shape the leadership qualities in the trainees, who attend the courses ranging from Subject One Corporal to the Regimental Sergeant Major course for the Australian Army. There is a limited timeframe available with which to achieve the aim of shaping the future leaders of the Australian Army and community due to the short tenure of the respective courses. The wider Army community needs to assume a level of responsibility and ownership in mentoring their personnel. The current program of innovative and creative training postures the WONCO-A as the centre of excellence for the Australian Army.

CONCLUSION

23.   Leadership is a pivotal element of military life, there have been many examples throughout history that can be analysed and learnt from. There are many aspects that go towards the making of a great leader. History has demonstrated that the Australian Army has proven to be an elite fighting force and we enjoy a respected reputation worldwide. However there is a fundamental need to ensure that the modern generation of Australian Military leaders are best equipped to lead through revolutionising the way we utilise doctrine and developing a professional mastery/mentoring program throughout the Army.

Recommendations

24.   The analysis of the characteristics of leadership in the modern military environment in this paper have produced the following recommendations to ensure that the Australian Army remains the centre of excellence for the instruction in leadership, mentoring and professional development:

a.   Doctrine is reviewed across all spheres, analysing and providing new methods of the way we instil leadership.

b.   The establishment of mentoring program for the Australian Army; units are to keep details in a local registry to be audited by DGT.

c.   Development of pre-course leadership programs to incorporate aspects of professional development and mentoring whilst conducting all corps courses, across all ranks.

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THE PROFESSIONAL PORTFOLIO:
SETTING THE STANDARD TODAY BY INVESTING IN TOMORROW

Every soldier has an individual responsibility to study the profession of arms. A soldier without either interest in, or knowledge of, the history and theory of warfare - the intellectual content of the military profession - is a soldier in appearance only.

LWD 1, *The Fundamentals of Land Power*, 2014

INTRODUCTION

1.　　As a learning organisation, Army must have robust frameworks for ongoing development and continued education programs to ensure knowledgeable and competent staff.[5] Professional Military Education (PME) develops soldiers and officers to contribute effectively to Army in peace and war. It underpins the profession of arms and develops skilled learners who are self-directed, self-disciplined, self-monitored, self-corrective, and are moral and ethical thinkers.

2.　　The 2016 Defence White Paper states that attracting and retaining the future Defence workforce will be a major challenge. It further states that our rapidly changing strategic environment requires us to continually build the skills of our people. This guidance reinforces the need for Army to improve PME.

3.　　Army must embark on a learning renaissance if it is to remain contemporary and agile in the future operating environment. Historically, organisations have only evaluated their foundational assumptions when forced by crisis situations or major failures.[6] Army must establish frameworks that attack inertia and mitigate competency traps. The capacity to learn and evolve is not only a way to reduce organisational trauma, but it is a primary way of securing advantage.[7] The unintended consequence of doing nothing is that a significant gap of knowledge will arise in Army's majors and warrant officers that left unattended will be polarising.

4.　　**Scope.** This paper will discuss the benefits of a professional portfolio being introduced for all Army's majors and warrant officers, regardless of what point in their career they may be. It will outline the requirement for Army to set professional standards to support organisational capacity and resilience, support effective career management and how the professional portfolio can be implemented using existing architecture.

Aim

5.　　The aim of this paper is to propose the introduction of a professional portfolio for all of Army's majors and warrant officers.

MILITARY DEVELOPMENT

6.　　PME consists of the following interrelated elements:

a.　　**Educational foundation.** This includes communication, thinking, culture and character.

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[5] Creth, D.S. (1989), *Personnel Administration in Libraries, Staff development and continuing education*, Shuman Publishers, New York, pp118-151

[6] Kroth, M. and Bochman, M. (2010), *Immunity to transformational learning and change*, The Learning Organisation Vol. 4, Iss. 17, pp. 328-342

[7] Edmondson, A. (2008), *The competitive imperative of learning*, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 86, pp. 7-60

b.   **Military development.** This includes career development courses, foreign military training and exchange postings.

c.   **Further education.** Generally provided by academic institutions and results in the attainment of formal qualifications.

d.   **Personal development.** This includes courses to enhance business skills and to promote personal development.

7.   Of these four elements, it is military development that remains the primary focus of individuals, supervisors and career managers. In most cases, military development is administered by the All-Corps Soldier and All-Corps Officer Training Continuums (ACSOTC). The remaining three elements are addressed by the individual or by astute commanders through unit training activities and the like. Military development is an enduring feature of the profession of arms; however, the ACSOTC only remains relevant if the individual continues to attend courses.

8.   It is inevitable that the major and the warrant officer will exit the ACSOTC once advice is received from their career manager outlining their prospects for further promotion. This is a decision point for most and the need to redefine success will be a key factor if they are to continue serving Army. At this point, Army must set the expectations for ongoing military development so that the workforce can remain agile and adaptive. The major and the warrant officer can then continue to serve Army in a variety of roles until such time they elect to transition out of Army.

9.   The DGPERS-A ARA Workforce Pocket Brief provides personnel statistics as at 1 March 16. Taking into account modest promotion and separation rates, it is expected that over the next three years:

a.   the total number of majors in cohort 7+ years time in rank (TIR) will grow by 15% each year

b.   the total number of warrant officers in cohort 7+ years TIR will grow by 10% each year.

10.   Army has recently introduced a number of career management initiatives to control this phenomenon but the effectiveness is yet to be realised. Based on age upon enlistment, minimum time in rank and attendance on mandatory ACSOTC courses, it is possible that a major or warrant officer could continue to serve Army for up to an additional 30+ years without attending a mandated ACSOTC course. Army must plan for this scenario to ensure that opportunities are given to all majors and warrant officers to undertake ongoing military development.

11.   **The professional standard.** The acquisition of knowledge is best described as a series of peaks and troughs over a period of time. By undertaking military development the learner is equipped and well rehearsed with the skills and knowledge required to execute in today's environment. Over time, skills degrade and knowledge fades if left unattended. This is best described as a knowledge trough. It is not until the learner embarks on a further period of military development that previous learning is refreshed and the learner achieves a knowledge peak. The challenge for Army will be the establishment of ongoing military development opportunities for all majors and warrant officers that have exited the ACSOTC. This ongoing military development sets the professional standard that all majors and warrant officers are to maintain.

12.   Professional bodies such as CPA Australia and Engineers Australia have professional development activities that registered members must complete in order to maintain set professional standards and registration. They ensure quality across the professional body and assist in keeping ethical standards of practice. As a professional organisation - the profession of arms - it is appropriate to direct that a set of standards are introduced and even though the major or warrant officer may have exited the ACSOTC, the obligation to satisfy these standards remains. Given that Army's majors and warrant officers work in a variety of fields and specialisations, it is appropriate to set professional standards centred on the specified outcomes of the ACSOTC. The ACSOTC is designed to provide all-corps knowledge for a particular function at a particular rank and by setting the professional standard as 'all-corps must haves', Army will achieve consistency and equalisation. Army will be able to set and apply professional standards through the application of a professional portfolio.

13.   **The professional portfolio.** The professional standard is achieved by administering military development activities through the professional portfolio. Strategic guidance dictates that the quality of our people is the foundation of Defence's capability, effectiveness and reputation. The professional portfolio provides structured and directed military development as well as incentivising self-initiated activities. The benefits of a professional portfolio are many. It allows Army to direct learning activities orientated towards the needs of the organisation. This gives Army the flexibility to quickly harmonise its majors and warrant officers. This is particularly relevant if employment specification has changed or there has been a significant shift in strategic focus. The professional portfolio also maintains evidence of military development activities to support the ongoing career management of majors and warrant officers.

14.   Below the rank of major and warrant officer the Competency Log Book (CLB) is used to record all military development activities that have been undertaken as part of the ACSOTC. The CLB is also used to maintain records of other activities conducted under the PME continuum. The majority of military development activity that is recorded in the CLB is directed activity that meets specified outcomes. It is not until the rank of major or warrant officer that military development activities become less directed and more self-initiated. It is at this point that the emphasis must shift from the CLB to the professional portfolio. Figure 1 depicts the relationship between directed and self-initiated learning as well as what point in an Army career the balance will shift between the two. It also depicts when a professional portfolio would create value. This shift is necessary because as individuals mature, so too does their aptitude and willingness to learn.

Figure 1: The directed and self-initiated learning relationship

15.   Adult learning is often complex in nature because individual motives and orientations are often unclear; therefore, different methods from those of traditional pedagogy would be likely to be more effective. It is erroneous to speak of the adult learner as if there is a generic adult that can represent all adults.[8] Increasing the individual's motivation for ongoing military development is essential. Supervisors and career managers must make every effort to ensure that majors and warrant officers are recognised for their ongoing military development.

16.   **Career management.** The professional standard will vary depending on many factors. Commanding Officers and Army's Senior Leadership Group must recognise the requirements of contemporary military development activities and implement them across the entire workforce. The Career Management Agency has the responsibility to monitor the outcomes of military development and appropriately recognise majors and warrant officers by considering their participation in ongoing military development. Especially when granting posting preferences, tenure extensions or other career opportunities such as representational duties and overseas secondment. To facilitate such decisions, robust frameworks must be established to administer and capture individual data.

17.   Army has architecture already in place that will support the introduction of the professional portfolio. Online systems such as Campus and the Australian Defence Education Learning Environment (ADELE) have demonstrated that they are more than adequate to support distance learning. Both these systems are also complementary with career management tools, such as PMKeyS, and would assist in capturing accurate data for career management purposes. One system that is beginning to generate significant interest in Army is MOOC (Massive Open Online Course). MOOC is a model for delivering learning content to any person with no limit on attendance. MOOC is an extension to traditional online learning models and offers the learner access to interactive user forums and collaborative communities. Additional systems that have bespoke application are Forcenet and eSchool. Irrespective of the system used to support the professional portfolio, inherent qualities such as friendly user interface, confidentiality and connectedness with Army's current career management tools must exist.

18.   Acknowledging that Army is no longer a job for life, redefining individual success has become a necessary maxim among career managers and planners. It is highly probable that an individual's work experiences will span numerous workplaces and the requirement to attain multiple competencies and skills will remain constant. More than ever are individuals now the masters of their own destiny. Taking an active and self-starting approach to work are determinants of personal initiative and this proactive behaviour[9] will determine how an individual deals with the inevitable separation from Army.

CONCLUSION

19.   As a learning organisation, Army must have robust frameworks for enduring military development. Attracting and retaining the future Defence workforce will be difficult and we must invest in those that have devoted a lifetime of selfless sacrifice to Army. Regardless of what point in their career they are, majors and warrant officers offer Army an experienced and committed workforce who have, in most cases, exited the ACSOTC and are desperately seeking opportunities to continue their military development.

20.   The introduction of a professional portfolio allows Army to support majors and warrant officers by coordinating military development activities that support the needs of the individual

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[8] Galbraith, M.W. (ed.) (1990). *Adult learning methods*, Florida: Krieger Publishing company.
[9] Frese, M. (ed.) Mumford, M. (ed.) (2015), *The Psychology of Planning in Organisations: Research and Application*, Organisation and Management Series

as well as those of the organisation. The professional portfolio sets the professional standard today and is a solid investment in tomorrow. Past success is no guarantee of future victory, and Army's way of fighting must be subject to constant scrutiny and examination. The organisational climate must support, and demand, continuous learning.

Recommendations

21.   In introducing a professional portfolio for all majors and warrant officers, it is recommended that:

a.   The professional standard is set and communicated.

b.   Existing architecture such as Campus and ADELE is used to administer military development activities.

c.   Military development activities are made compulsory and consist of up to 20 hours a year of directed study and assessment.

d.   Military development activities focus on "all-corps must haves'.

e.   Career Management Agencies monitor the results of military development activities and use these to make informed career management decision.

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MENTORS IN VIOLENCE PREVENTION

1.   The Mentor in Violence Prevention Program (MVP) has had international uptake, and was introduced into the Australian Army in 2013[10]. MVP is a leadership program designed to prevent all forms of violence in society. MVP utilises a proactive bystander approach to prevention. The program does not view participants as either perpetrators or victims of violence. It views all participants as empowered bystanders who can *confront*, *interrupt* or *prevent* violence.

2.   MVP seeks to enlist all people in the fight against violence by equipping them with the skills to be effective bystanders.[11]

3.   MVP is comprised of interactive discussion sessions aimed to provide participants with practical and effective skills to employ in social situations of violence. The training sessions also open dialogue regarding participant leadership around issues such as battering, sexual assault, fighting, and bullying. Participants are encouraged to consider the underlying issues and dynamics of social violence in order to become effective leaders with concrete options for intervention in potentially dangerous social situations.

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[10] D.L. Morrison, 'Directive 21/13 Army Values and the Standard of Behaviour Required of Army Personnel', (2013).
[11] Mentors in Violence Prevention Project, <https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/328941/MVP-Flyer.pdf>, accessed 21 June 2016

4.   The Army MVP train-the-trainer courses provide the skills, knowledge and attitudes required by soldiers to become proactive bystanders and agents for cultural change.

5.   Soldiers who complete the MVP training may come to be recognised as the Army's most valued players (MVP) in the area of cultural reform.

CONCLUSION

6.   Domestic and Family Violence is a real issue in Australian Society. It is not simply male violence against female partners. It affects all Australians. The National Campaign to end DV is not 'male-bashing'. It is not anti-male. It is anti-violence. Whilst there are indeed men, boys and girls who are victims of DV, the vast majority of victims are women who have been violated by their intimate partners. While there are indeed women perpetrators and male intimate partner victims, the vast majority of perpetrators are men. Therefore the logical starting point for reform was the area of male dominance of women.

7.   Since the 1970s there have been major changes in provision of care for female victims. In the past decade, there have been changes to legislation to make it easier for victims to receive care and perpetrators to receive corrective training. Various organisations are providing their members with education and training in the recognition of potential victims and perpetrators. Children who have witnessed DV are recognised as victims of child maltreatment.

8.   While the focus still remains on male perpetuated violence against females, efforts have been made to widen the parameters of DV to include any form of abuse by any person against another, regardless of gender. Recognised actions that come under the DV umbrella include carer abuse to the elderly and children, homophobic bullying and adolescent abuse of parents and siblings.

9.   To reiterate, recognition of the gendered patterns of DV, and subsequent response following the feminist movement in the 70s, provided both the starting point and framework for continued responses to DV. However, the vital and primary point for recognition in today's education and response to DV is a conceptual shift from anti-male to ***anti-violence***.

10.   The Australian Army already has avenues in place for addressing the issue of domestic violence in society. Both the White Ribbon Australia campaign and the MVP program offer effective strategies for raising awareness, changing attitudes and behaviours that perpetuate domestic violence. Both promote the development of effective proactive bystanders willing to make a difference in keeping with Army Core values and our Contract with the Australian people.

11.   In order to create change, Army members must experience two perceptual shifts (i) DV education and intervention is not anti-male; it is anti-violence, and (ii) Bystanders must be active, not passive.

12.   To encourage these perceptual shifts in Army members, there must be clear acknowledgement that: (i) ***While most perpetrators are men, most men are not perpetrators***, and; (ii) Army members who are not directly involved in a situation as either victim or perpetrator can make a difference as active bystanders.

13.   The question for Army members must remain: ***If I am not a victim and I am not a perpetrator, what is my role?***

Recommendations

14.   The recommendations are as follows:

a.   HQ WO&NCO seek volunteers to attend the Army Mentors in Violence Prevention (MVP) Train-the Trainer Course at Gallipoli Barracks in August 2016.

b.   HQ WO&NCO source MVP trainers currently at Kokoda Barracks to conduct MVP training.

c.   HQ WO&NCO, in accordance with Army White Ribbon involvement, support White Ribbon Night Friday 29 July 2016 by inviting a White Ribbon ambassador to address staff about relevant fact sheets; and observe the International Day of the Elimination of Violence against Women, also known as White Ribbon Day, annually on November 25. White Ribbon Day signals the start of the 16 Days of Activism to Stop Violence against Women, which ends on Human Rights Day (Dec 10).

JM Hurren
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Chaplain

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PROFFESIONAL MILITARY DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE WARRANT OFFICER AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER ACADEMY

INTRODUCTION

1.   Professional Military Development (PMD) has been guided over the years by individual Commanding Officer perceptions, ideas and directions. Individuals have often complied without: knowing the fundamental benefit; achieving 'buy in'; or having the ability to continue on a pathway over multiple postings. Each individual within the Academy has potential, as observed by the Commanding Officer of the Warrant Officer and Non Commissioned Officer Academy (WONCO-A) (Scott, Jun 2016) 'when you acknowledge your weaknesses and continually work toward improving them, your potential is endless.' Who better to understand an individual's keen interests and ability than the individual themselves? However; who better to test and advance this ability than an invested Commander?

> *Don't measure yourself by what you have accomplished, but by what you should have accomplished with your ability.*

John Wooden

2.   **Scope.** The scope of this paper is to consider what the Academy could develop in order to enhance each individual's PMD experience whilst meeting the current and future Ryan Review implementation direction. It will review the current PMD initiatives and direction, look at the Academy's resources to implement individual PMD strategies and assess the by-products that would result. From this, a number of recommendations for enhancing, developing and capturing individual's education and development experiences are suggested.

AIM

3.   The aim of this paper is to identify the future for PMD within the Academy in order to leverage the opportunity provided in the Ryan Review[12], enhance the outcomes of the Army's Campaign Plan to improve Education, Training and Doctrine[13] and underpin the Lieutenant Colonel Scott's assessed Academy Centre of Gravity (COG) – Credibility (individual and unit).

CURRENT DIRECTION AND INITIATIVES

4.   **The Ryan Report.** Brigadier Ryan details a PMD concept in his study on Army's education, training and doctrine needs for the future. The view expressed is that 'a development program needs to be auditable and accountable' (Ryan, 2016, annex C) and he recommends:

a.   A system that is self managed and completed by individuals

b.   Uses simple summary sheets for self management

c.   Rolling proof kept by individuals over a two year period, showing participation in:

(1)   Self study programs

(2)   Unit Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer development activities

(3)   Participation in external development activities such as conferences, seminars and representational activities

(4)   Writing and publishing on professional topics

(5)   Attendance on formal courses

5.   This evidence would then be scrutinised in audits by Commanding Officers and external audit teams, in addition to being used in promotion boards for Sub-Unit Command.

6.   As evidenced by the Chief of Army (CA) recently released Directive, it is highly likely that these recommendations will be supported and implemented by Army. Although the finer details are unknown, utilising the initial guidance allows for early advancement for the Academy in Officer, Warrant Officer and Senior Non-Commissioned Officer PMD.

7.   CA Directive 09/16[14]• Tranche Two, task 15 directs an Army Officer and Enlisted Professional Development Framework be established in 2017. Although this framework is yet to be defined, the Academy has the opportunity to develop the foundations in order to mitigate future effects through command levels investing and developing individual PMD opportunities, allocating time and capturing the outcomes. This PMD program can be

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[12]   Ryan, Brigadier M, *DGT Study -A Study of Army's Education, Training and Doctrine Needs for the Future,* 21 Apr 2016, Forces Command, Sydney.

[13]   Campbell, Lieutenant General A 2016, *Chief of Army 's Directive 09l16, Implementation of the Ryan Review -Army's campaign plan to improve education, training and doctrine,* Army Headquarters, Canberra.

[14]   Campbell, Lieutenant General A 2016, *Chief of Army 's Directive 09l16, Implementation of the Ryan Review -Army's campaign plan to improve education, training and doctrine,* Army Headquarters, Canberra.

developed as part of the WONCO-A individual development Line of Operation (LoO), in conjunction with the innovation and continual improvement LoO and built to support and underpin the Academy COG.

8.   WONCO-A LoO and COG[15]• All four existing supporting effort Lof the Academy provide synergy for developing individual focussed PMD;

a.   **Individual Development.** Enhancing the Professional Military Education (PME) of Academy personnel. An individually developed and Command supported PMD program for each member of the Academy would be the basis for this LoO.

b.   **Massaging and Engagement.** Raising the profile of the Academy. Through knowledge development, interaction with flanking units and subsequent movement in the Planned Posting Cycles (PPC), the key messages of the Commanding Officer are provided the best opportunity to proliferate. Subsequently, achieving ongoing enhancement of the profile of the Academy to attract the quality of personnel envisaged to enhance the training provided. Social media and information campaigns are a fix for the present; a PMD program supports this intuitive messaging into the future.

c.   **Innovation and Continual Improvement.** Ensuring the Academy remains at the forefront of innovation in training. Individuals learning and actions in support of this LoO could contribute to PMD and be recorded as such.

d.   **Corporate Governance and Management.** Arguments could be put forward that the fourth supporting LoO also will have links to individually developed and Command supported PMD, in particular the fields of Logistics and Workplace Health and Safety (WHS). Workshops, forums and seminars are regularly held in support of these specialities.

9.   The Academy COG is articulated as 'the credibility of its instructors and the standard of the training and instruction delivered to Army'. Through the conduct of planned individual PMD, the COG is enhanced at the individual level, with succeeding concepts underpinning the credibility of the Unit.

ACADEMY RESOURCES

10.   **Academy maxim.** Lead, Mentor, Train. Although likely evolved to specify actions relating to trainees, through focusing the maxim on the Academy personnel and analyse individual requirements and situations, gaining their 'buy in' and developing specific and supportable learning opportunities, the Command teams of the Academy are setting the example of leading and mentoring for all personnel of the Academy.

11.   **Seniority.** The Academy's manning is Warrant Officer and Senior Non-Commissioned Officer heavy. Leveraging this asset as a resource to enhance the learning and development outcomes for all is an appropriate use of the human resource. Most Sergeants are competing for Company or Squadron Sergeant Major positions, most Warrant Officer Class Two are seeking competitiveness for Regimental Sergeant Major Positions and those at

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[15]   Scott, Lieutenant Colonel M 2016, *Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Academy Operations Order – Training Year (TY) 16l17,* WONCO-A, Canungra.

the rank of Warrant Officer Class One are competing for tier advancement. Through specified and supported development, opportunity exists for: accurate Performance Appraisal Reporting; development of the knowledge base on Army and Academy initiatives and projects (future Army); intuitive development of their subordinates, particularly those in Corps (leading and mentoring); and to re-enforce and spread the key messaging of the Academy upon posting.

12.   **Networking.** As detailed above, the Academy has a preponderance of Warrant Officer and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers that through future PPCs will move into wider Army positions. All come to the Academy with established networks that can be leveraged to source information. All should develop a greater All Corps network through working within the Academy. Utilising these links to the wider Army, relevant, current and accurate information can be sourced to add value to the PMD program. Enhance this networking ability with visiting lecturers in all locations, the subject matter knowledge depth, value and credibility across specified PMD is increased greatly.

13.   **Time.** Although PMD programs would not assume a main effort within the Academy, all current supporting efforts are assessed as being able to contribute to effective PMD. Designing specific individual PMD programs and assessing the outcomes will, as has always been, the remit of the Command teams. Tracking and recording aspects is the only impost, an output that aligns with the current practice for all Qualified Instructor and Assessor assessments conducted in the Wings for Registered Training Organisation (RTO) compliancy.

14.   **Objective.** Although an Army resource, if used correctly Objective can be the repository for all PMD. Correct use will allow for tracking of PMD tasking, recording of achievements, the passage of information across the Academy and development of an individual portfolio for transfer during the PPC. The use of Objective aligns with current practice for compliancy with assessment storage as an RTO.

BY PRODUCTS

15.   **Strategic perspective.** Performance Appraisal Reporting requires input at Officer, Warrant Officer and Senior Non-Commissioned Officer levels on strategic perspective. Through a relevant PMD program on Army initiatives and projects, Assessing Officers are able to more accurately gauge the individual's knowledge, understanding of the strategic goals (Army and Academy) and whether the individual is able to assess the effects beyond their immediate job. There is also the ability to set tasks aligned to the Academy's initiatives and assess each individuals understanding of those broader goals.

16.   **Oral communication.** If an individual has an identified weakness in oral communication, an individually tailored PMD program with briefing and presentations as an output adds value to both the development of the individual, the reporting parameters available to the Assessing Officer when recording performance in Performance Appraisal Reporting and to the means of which the information is passed onto others within the Academy.

17.   **Written communication.** Where written communication is assessed as an individuals perceived or actual weakness, an individually an individually tailored PMD

program with written briefs and papers as an output adds value to both the development of the individual, the reporting parameters available to the Assessing Officer when recording performance in Performance Appraisal Reporting and to the means of which the information is passed onto others within the Academy.

18.   **Networking.** Underpinning the current and future propagation of the Commanding Officer's key messaging through researching and development of individual products, seeking subject matter expert visiting lecturers and by way of normal interaction with wider Army, the messaging intuitively spreads. This then supports the current messaging and engagement LoO by raising the profile of the Academy across wider Army.

CONCLUSION

19.   Being invested in the specific development of your subordinates goes ways to meeting the Academy maxim of lead, mentor and train. Commanders should aim at 'executing now and investing in the future' (Scott, 2016 page 3) through supporting and investing in each individuals development and personal journey. By working toward implementing the recommendations outlined, it will enable an opportunity and the Command climate where every individual's knowledge strengths are exploited and real or perceived weaknesses are addressed .Enabling individual PMD and subsequently a greater collective knowledge will also successfully underpin the Academy's current, and suggested future COG. John Wooden, speaking winning versus success (2001, TED2001) defined success as:

> *Success is peace of mind which is a direct result of self-satisfaction in knowing you made the effort to become the best of which you are capable.*

<div align="right">John Wooden</div>

RECOMMENDATIONS

20.   Opportunities exist to focus PMD at the individual level, this in turn will underpin the development of the Academy COG and support PMD implementation outcomes, it is recommended that:

a.   PMD strategies focus on innovation in a training establishment and Corps or Army level projects, initiatives and innovation

b.   individuals annual PMD development strategies are developed in consultation with the individual by Command teams

c.   the by products are used as further evidence for accurate annotation of performance in annual reporting

d.   individual outputs are captured in instructor portfolios in Objective for future reference and portability until a directed tracking tool is specified

e.   generic PMD tasking is planned in concert with individual strategies and contain traceable and specific outcomes

f.   all individual PMD outputs are distributed throughout the Academy.

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A YEAR IN THE WILDERNESS

'The unexamined life is not worth living'

Socrates

INTRODUCTION

1.   As of 13 April 2016, the ADF clearly defined its policy on the Exchange and Secondment of Australian Defence Force personnel with Non-Defence Organisations by releasing DEFGRAM 170/2016. The policy discussed has been incorporated into the Military Personnel Manual. This policy coupled with the ADF Total Workforce Model, needs to be communicated widely in order to ensure army attracts and retains good people in an increasingly competitive employment market.

2.   The above mentioned DEFGRAM outlines policy in regard to exchange and secondment, where particular skills, knowledge or experiences are critical in enabling Defence to perform its mission are not readily available within the organisation.[1] The policy also describes the intent of authorised exchanges or secondments as facilitating the exchange of ideas and development of new skills, practices and knowledge. This policy incorporated with the ADF Total Workforce Model, enables the ADF to offer flexibility in employment options in order to retain its workforce. In 2013, the author utilised long service leave to work for a civilian company, for a period of twelve months, and gained an insight in to how exchanges and secondments may foster greater understanding between industry, government and the wider business community, and may ultimately serve as a retention initiative for the services.

3.   **Scope.** This paper will explore what drives the desire to seek an alternate work experience. Compare some of the differences that exist between the military and corporate cultures, utilising Army's core values as a baseline. It will also examine the benefits delivered to Army by enabling generalist officers the opportunity to undertake a professional exchange or secondment, with non –defence industries, utilising the flexible work arrangement espoused within the ADF Total Workforce Model (TWM).

AIM

4.   The aim of this paper is to propose that commanders actively support opportunities for Generalist Officers to be seconded, or seek periods of professional development within non-defence organisations, in order to gain valuable contemporary operational planning and management experience, and broaden both business and organisational skills without detriment to their career.

WHY SEEK AN ALTERNATE WORK EXPERIENCE

5.   Mid-life crisis[2] is a term Elliott Jacques introduced to popular culture in 1965. In the military context, a mid-life crisis may represent a perception by the member that their career is stagnating, the onset of career fatigue, or a realisation that an individual is no longer competitive.

When a professional soldier is confronted with these situations they will often take the plunge into the wilderness that is the civilian sector.

6.   Confronted with a combination of the above, the author decided to explore options outside of Army. This was not driven by a desire to separate, but rather a longing to experience an alternate work environment. Moving into the civilian sector provided a new perspective on military culture and the meaning of ethos. Navigating this newly discovered "wilderness" proved to be cathartic and eventually produced tangible benefits for the author's military career.

CORPORATE CULTURE VERSES MILITARY CULTURE

7.   **Military Service.** Writing for the atlantic.com, Scott Beauchamp defined the notion of military service:

> 'Military Service provides a sense of meaning beyond what any corporate culture is capable of creating. Human beings derive a higher sense of self from risky, physically dangerous sacrifice in the service of a higher ideal. Plato knew it as *thumos* or *thymos*, Attic Greek translating roughly to "spiritedness." People don't just want to satisfy their own physical needs—they want to contribute to something larger than themselves'[3].

8.   Most military members are familiar with a career model that invests time and money in them, whilst ensuring individual and team welfare is paramount. This ideal can be taken for granted when the military work environment becomes the norm and the member has not worked in an organisation where profits are often the number one priority. Tracking work outcomes as billable or non-billable and by the hour would be foreign to many in the Army. Military members are required to exercise fiscal constraint in maintaining capability; however, it is rarely the primary driver for outcomes.

9.   **The Civilian Experience**. Corporate values are a set of guiding principles that drive an organisation's culture, including what guides employee priorities and actions within the organisation[4]. This is not dissimilar to the military model; corporate values are considered an increasingly important component in strategic planning, they drive the intent and direction of the organisation's leadership. Plato's higher ideal of "spiritedness", although considered, is often lost when the individual ultimately only seeks financial gain for their enterprise.

10.   Many civilian corporations preach team culture and high ethical standards; however, what often differentiates military and civilian corporate values is profit and budgetary constraint. It is important that these subtle differences are understood by military members as they increasingly work within the whole of government environment, joint interagency task forces, and non-government Agencies. These 'cultural nuances' need to be considered in order to integrate the civilian and military members into a cohesive team.

11.   The author found his civilian employment experience fundamentally dissimilar from the military, as the company's strategic goals and value statements did not prioritise the workers' well-being and the higher ideal was directed towards maintaining a healthy bottom line. The result, for the author, was a feeling of precarity.

12.   Scott Beuchamp describes precarity as an all-inclusive term that describes a lack of predictability, stability, and sense of security in the workplace[3]. The signing of short term employment contracts and loyalty to the organisation solely based on financial gain can be quite confronting to someone who has spent an extended period within the Defence Force. This feeling of precarity, coupled with a lack of spiritedness ultimately led to the author re-defining his own

motivation to serve in the Army. This manifested in a comparison of the civilian organisation against Army's values. The following offers a snapshot of some differences experienced:

a. **Courage**. The author discovered that in the civilian work environment courage is essential and required when dealing with precarity. Jobs were not guaranteed if capital was not forthcoming as opposed to the job security offered by the ADF. Professionalism and ethics balanced with the will to win was at times skewed, as remuneration and profits equated to opportunity. Boldness was required when attempting to seize opportunity and improve a client base and was similar to the army concept of seizing the initiative.

b. **Initiative**. The author found innovation to be essential within the civilian sector. With the rapid expansion of mobile work solutions and collaborative software driving down overheads, it was essential for business to adapt at a more rapid rate than experienced in technical and non technical branches of Army.

c. **Respect**. Respect existed in the context of equity and workplace diversity; however, the author found it fundamentally different to Army. The respect was at an individual level and not based around a sense of pride or rite of passage, inherent in the military culture.

d. **Teamwork.** Teamwork was also an area that was fundamentally different, the team existed only within the confines of working hours, and it was difficult to engage those below executive level in crisis planning, outside of work hours. Teamwork was a core enabler; however, finding leaders for that team often proved problematic as there was a perception of direct accountability for failure. The military has time to nurture leaders; this was not the case when you are hired to lead in the civilian sector.

13. Although the above are limited observations, there were many positive experiences and lessons that enhanced the author's operational planning abilities. Of note, dynamic planning on multiple fronts when actively seeking clients and preparing work tender responses. This was often achieved in a very short timeframe and equated to multiple Staff Military Appreciation s activities being conducted simultaneously by a single group of employees. These experiences have provided ongoing benefit to the author in his subsequent military appointments.

14. The period spent working in the civilian environment awakened in the authors mind the feeling of wanting to continue to contribute to something more important and larger than self. A subsequent period of self reflection enabled the author to determine what drove his desire to serve and a rediscovery of ethos. This awakening was linked to the values and cultural beliefs inculcated over an extended period of service.

15. The author came to realise that affiliation and contribution to a greater good drove his motivation, more than money and personal achievement. McClelland's Human Motivation Theory states, every person has one of three main driving motivators: the needs for achievement, affiliation, or power[5]. These motivators are not inherent; we develop them through our culture and life experiences. The feeling of affiliation had been diminished over an extended period of service, however, during the time spent working in the corporate environment the author was reminded of the less tangible benefits of wearing a uniform in the service of ones country. Pride, belonging and thymos.

16.   In a report outlining the benefits of the ADF Total Work Force Model, MAJ GEN Rick Burr stated:

> 'Increased flexibility in our working arrangements helps us to retain competent personnel and attract those who possess high-value skills'.[6]

17.   Dual employment is described in the ADF TWM as Permanent/Regular or Reserve members who are rendering service to Defence and working for a civilian employer under a formal shared service/employment arrangement.[7] The Defence and civilian employer arrangement is set out in an agreement between the Service and that industry partner. The model could be widened to include approved employers not actively partnered with Defence. This model should also be managed to allow the Generalist Officer, pursuing the OPS Plans Training career stream, employment opportunities outside the confines of an industry partner. In the author's experience, working within a small/medium business enterprise as an Operations Manager, there was much to be gained by looking beyond industries already partnered with Defence.

18.   The level of flexibility offered under the ADF-TWM does offer the opportunity to seek alternate employment options and enhance skill sets, without sacrificing leave entitlements or being branded as being disloyal to defence. Hugh smith, writing for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute stated:

> 'The lingering attitude that only full-time personnel are 'real' members of the ADF – because they have more training, more experience and more commitment to serve needs to fade away completely.'[8]

19.   This statement should not only be applied to the reservist, but also permanent members seeking opportunities away from Defence. This level of flexibility also provides financial benefits to Defence as the average cost of losing just one ADF member has been estimated at over $600 K[8]. Therefore, keeping the door open, for those who pursue temporary opportunities outside the ADF, to return is highly cost-effective.

CONCLUSION

20.   This paper has discussed that in order for Defence to continue to retain quality people, it must encourage flexible work arrangements as outlined in the TWM. Embracing the ADF TWM and changing the service culture of Defence is no easy task; however, by stepping outside of Defence the author rediscovered what is special about serving as a military member and perhaps others will come to a similar realisation, from undertaking an alternate work experience.

21.   The flexibility offered by the ADF TWM should be seen as a tool for retention not an avenue for transition. There will always be a risk that members will not return; however, the authors new found desire to serve did result in a jumpstart of his career and a period of success not foreseen prior to spending 'a year in the wilderness'. The ability to provide this opportunity to other Defence members (if desired) should be seen as a positive and embraced by all levels of command.

RECOMMENDATIONS

22.   The following are suggested in order to enable others the opportunity to pursue a similar experience as the author:

a.   Commanders at all levels inform and educate members on the ADF TWM frame work.

b.   Defence explore partnering options with civilian companies not considered Defence industry partners.

c.   Develop criteria for authorised exchanges or secondments for Generalist Officers within the OPS, PLANS and Training career pathway.

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ADVANCING THE PROFESSION OF ARMS – A WAY AHEAD

'Professions and professionals produce uniquely expert work, not routine or repetitive work. Medicine, theology, law, and the military are 'social trustee' forms of professions. Effectiveness, rather than pure efficiency is the key to the work of professionals – the sick want a cure, the sinner wants absolution, the accused want exoneration, and the defenseless seek security.' [16]

INTRODUCTION

1.   The Australian Defence Force (ADF) necessarily espouses a broadly defined warrior code across all ranks, trades, specialisations, corps and musterings. The Australian Army is an adherent to this code and labels it the 'Profession of Arms', yet fails to properly define, set, maintain, continually refine or enforce the standards of its membership. Prima facie, membership is based solely on the concept of deference to a military chain of command and, when compared to civilian professions, fails to sufficiently or adequately prescribe the requirements of its adherents.

2.   **Scope.** This paper will discuss the way forward for the Profession of Arms in the Australian context. Through highlighting four targeted areas of concern in education and training, professional development, the ab-initio training institutions and exclusive standards, recommendations will be made to invigorate discussion and further analysis.

AIM

3.   This paper aims to commence and inspire a deeper analysis and critical thought into what the Profession of Arms must become and how it must develop to fulfil our responsibility to the Australian people, to prosecute and win the land battle in concert with the other arms and services.

A COMPARATIVE DEFINITION

4.   **A definition.** There is no widely accepted general or definitive definition of what constitutes a 'profession' or, for that matter, a 'professional'. Due to the nature of this paper, which seeks to identify the practices and methods of other professions as exemplars in suggesting a way forward for the Australian Profession of Arms, an Australian civilian industry body's definition is cited. 'Professions Australia' defines a profession as:

5.   *'… a disciplined group of individuals who adhere to ethical standards and who hold themselves out as, and are accepted by the public as possessing, special knowledge and skills in a widely recognised body of learning derived from research, education and training at a high level, and who are prepared to apply this knowledge and exercise these skills in the interest of others. It is inherent in the definition of a profession that a code of ethics governs the activities of each profession. Such codes require behaviour and practice beyond the personal moral obligations of an individual. They define and demand high standards of behaviour in respect to the services provided to the public and in dealing with professional colleagues. Further, these codes are enforced by the profession and are acknowledged and accepted by the community.'* [17]

6.   **A comparison**. The Profession of Arms generally fits this definition. Exponents of the Profession of Arms are disciplined; they adhere to ethical standards, exhibit special knowledge and skills, and apply that knowledge and exercise those skills in the interest of the Australian people. Furthermore, adherents are governed by a code of ethics, and apply those ethical

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16 Andrew Abbot, *The System of Professions*, University of Chicago Press, 1998.
[17] http://www.professions.com.au/about-us/*what-is-a-professional.*

standards rigidly. Our codes are self-enforced and are acknowledged and accepted by the Australian community. It is evident, however, that exponents of the Profession of Arms fall short in the development of learning derived from **research**, **education** and training at a high level, in particular, research and education.

THE PROFESSION OF ARMS – FOUR AREAS OF CONCERN

7. **Training well, educating poorly.** Training is the development in oneself or another of certain skills, habits, and attitudes.[18] Education is defined as the act or process of imparting or acquiring specified general knowledge, developing the powers of reasoning and judgment, and of preparing oneself intellectually.[19] Officer trainees in the Australian Army do not require an undergraduate degree to gain entry into Australia's most prestigious ab-initio leadership institution, the Royal Military College of Australia (RMC-A). A 'snapshot view' of the tertiary pathway of any highly skilled professional such as a Doctor of Medicine, a Lawyer or an Educator reveals highly prescriptive post-graduate qualifications. Charged with comparable (in scale of importance) responsibilities to treating patients, defending and demonstrating an individual's probity or educating people, it is clear that exponents of the Profession of Arms must aspire to a similar academic educational pathway. Whilst the Australian Army officer will undergo at least 3 years of cumulative military training on the path to achieving the rank of LTCOL, that same individual may not have completed an undergraduate tertiary qualification of any type. Both 'under' and 'post' graduate academic education must garner a greater focus.

8. **A generic approach to professional development.** The Profession of Arms must adhere to the acknowledged doctrine that a professional contributes to an intrinsic body of learning derived from research, education and training at a high level. Membership of the Profession of Arms cannot be developed or inculcated through the study of generic degrees of an unrelated nature to the profession, particularly in the context of post-graduate study. Whilst current and past programs such as the Defence Assisted Study Scheme (DASS) and the Junior Officer Professional Education Scheme (JOPES) have sought to achieve the aim of providing a pathway to a generic tertiary education, there are few or no constraints regarding appropriate or approved fields of study. For a member of the Profession of Arms to contribute effectively to the forecited *'body of learning'*, that individual must have undergone relevant and specialised studies at a post-graduate level and have commensurate experience in a field of application. This expectation is a codified and highly governed convention within other professions - the Profession of Arms must apply comparable standards and similar rigour.

9. **Academic deference.** The Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) is a University College of the University of New South Wales (UNSW), and has been since the commencement of tertiary undergraduate instruction at ADFA in 1986. This necessarily coincided with the cessation of tertiary tutelage at RMC-A, whose subsequent role it became to run (exclusively) a vocationally-focussed (training-centric) commissioning course, now known as the General Service Officer First Appointment Course (GSO FAC) amongst other courses for reservists and Specialist Service Officers (SSOs). The subjugation and deference of holistic tertiary-based military education to a civilian tertiary institution staffed by academics with little or no military experience does nothing to foster integral academic excellence and development within Army. UNSW lists no ADFA graduates as noteworthy or honourable alumni, despite there being many of note. The United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point is an exemplar of the necessary fusion between military and academic tertiary education. U.S. Army Officers (04 level) selected to become academic instructors at USMA are sent to graduate school prior to assuming instructional duties in order to acquire necessary and relevant post graduate academic

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[18] *Macquarie Essential Dictionary,* Fourth Edition, 2006.
[19] *Macquarie Essential Dictionary,* Fourth Edition, 2006.

standing.[20] It is acknowledged that Australia has neither the resources or the personnel throughout to justify the establishment of an institution on a similar scale to the USMA, however the wresting of control from UNSW and the re-establishment of ADF sovereignty over officer candidate tertiary education is a necessary step on the path to establishing a military-focussed, military-driven confluence of the two fundamental elements of a developmental grounding in the Profession of Arms – a relevant tertiary education alongside military studies and training. This outcome would fulfil the original aim of Major General Sir William Throsby Bridges KCB, CMG for RMC-A as a West Point-like institution[21], where future proponents of the Profession of Arms are tertiary educated and trained, and military academia directly attributable to Army, not a civilian institution, is allowed to flourish. A centre of military academic excellence and a true home of the Profession of Arms is envisaged.

10. **Dilution of the profession through a lack of exclusivity.** Unlike other societal professions, membership of the Profession of Arms is seemingly afforded to a far broader exponent-base by definition (or lack thereof) than is reasonably practicable. The nature of a profession, at the core of which is expert work and high ideals, means it must apply the rule of exclusivity. Doing so ensures that professional standards are maintained across a known and clearly defined experience and educational basis. This has the secondary effect of ensuring that talented and driven individuals will aspire to become exponents of the Profession of Arms through a desire to achieve the very standards that would otherwise exclude them, thereby attracting motivated and talented individuals. Membership to the profession cannot simply be afforded automatically. Professional standards must be achieved, then consistently developed, improved upon and maintained in order for an individual to be considered a continuing, valued, contributing member of the Profession of Arms. Analysis must be conducted into where admission into the Profession of Arms in the Australian context is most appropriate. For example, graduation from the Combat Officers' Advanced Course (COAC) or the Logistic Officers' Advanced Course (LOAC), having achieved an undergraduate degree and commenced a post-graduate degree in a relevant field may be the commissioned officer standard. The completion of Subject One Sergeant Army and the commencement of an undergraduate degree may be the Other Rank standard. Regardless of the form the standard takes, a defined standard is needed.

CONCLUSION

'We must renew our commitment to the Profession of Arms. We're not a profession simply because we say we're a profession. We must continue to learn, to understand, and to promote the knowledge, attributes, and behaviours that define us as a profession.'[22]

11. A greater level of conceptual discussion across Army is required in order to properly define the standards for membership of the Profession of Arms. This paper has addressed four distinct areas of concern in an attempt to broaden analysis and invigorate discussion on how Army can advance the Profession of Arms and establish the way ahead. Those four areas of concern are:

a. an unbalanced focus on training over education

b. unspecified and irrelevant-to-profession tertiary education

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[20] Cavanaugh, Matthew Major U.S. Army, *The Decay of the Profession of Arms*, Foreign Policy Magazine, undated (circa 2014).
[21] Moore, Darren, *Duntroon: The Royal Military College of Australia 1911-2001,* Royal Military College of Australia, 2001.
[22] Dempsey, Martin General U.S. Army, *America's Military – A Profession of Arms (Joint Chiefs of Staff) White Paper,* Undated (circa 2015).

c.   the partial lack of sovereignty over the ADF tertiary training institution (and lost opportunity to develop an Army-attributable centre of tertiary excellence)

d.   the dilution of professional standards through either a lack of definition or outright apathy.

12.   Army must lead the way for the ADF in renewing its commitment to the Profession of Arms. It must be further defined, refined and made relevant in the Australian context. The Profession of Arms must adhere to recognised standards, approved study programs and enforce a unified approach in balancing both vocational training and education, in its approach to the cognitive development of its proponents.

Recommendations

13.   It is recommended that:

a.   The Profession of Arms is further defined in the context of what Army requires of its adherents.

b.   A professional council with the remit of furthering the Profession of Arms and establishing a professional developmental framework be established.

c.   The educational entry standard for direct entry (non-ADFA) officer-applicants is raised to include the completion of a tertiary undergraduate degree.

d.   Threshold training courses and experience levels for admission into the Profession of Arms be investigated further and subsequently established.

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LEADERSHIP VS LIKERSHIP – THE CHALLENGE FOR ARMY

"Being responsible sometimes means pissing people off".
                                                    – General Colin Powell (US Army)

INTRODUCTION

1.   Leadership is defined as '*the art of influencing and directing people to achieve willingly the team or organisational goal*'.[23] Whilst there is no documented definition of 'likership', it could perhaps best be described as 'doing what is popular in order to be liked or avoid confrontation'.

2.   The challenge for the contemporary leader is what style to employ to effectively influence their peers and subordinates to willingly do what they otherwise may not chose to. The effectiveness of a good leader is often measured by the morale of an organisation; however, this doesn't necessarily present a direct link to the effectiveness of that organisation. In an Australian Army context, a good leader is able to practice multiple leadership styles in order to facilitate the development of a force with the morale necessary to take the fight to its enemy, and the capability to defeat him.

3.   **Scope.** This paper discusses challenges for the contemporary leader and the need for leadership over 'likership'. It explores the issues associated with officers and soldiers practicing 'likership' as a command philosophy and its effect on capability or culture.

AIM

4.   This paper aims to invigorate discussion on the application of leadership in Army and any action that might improve its leadership culture.

THE CHALLENGE FOR CONTEMPORARY LEADERS

5.   What motivates us to take certain actions? Is it a desire to be noticed by others, a want to be liked, a determination to do what is right, or a passion to be the best at what we do? Generally it is a combination of these because that's what gives us gratification. The difficult task is to understand and apply the appropriate weight to these motivators to ensure the action is aligned to the requirements and expectations of our commander or the organisation.

6.   A leader needs to understand the different leadership styles and which of these is dominant in their own style. They must realise that there is no 'one size fits all' solution to leadership and be able to adjust their style and apply the appropriate leadership traits to suit the problem they are faced with. Doing what everyone else wants will usually achieve sub-optimal results and, although morale may be high, effectiveness will not. A considered command philosophy is necessary so that the organisation has clear goals that are measurable. A leader needs to be supported and trusted because they are respected and capable of making the right decision, not because they are liked.[24]

ARMY'S LEADERSHIP TRAINING

7.   **Model.** The Army Leadership Model (ALM) provides a framework for leadership behaviour. Effective leadership depends on a complex pattern of interactions among the leader,

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[23]   Australian Army Land Warfare Doctrine, *LWD 0-2 Leadership,* 19 Jul 13, pp 1.9
[24]   http://gregmowbray.com/2015/01/13/are-you-choosing-leadership-or-likership

subordinates and the situation[25]. The model provides underpinning doctrinal concepts but lacks detailed information on the effects of exercising good or bad leadership.

8.   **Training.** The Army continues to invest heavily in preparing its leaders. Officer Cadets attending the Royal Military College undertake tailored training to establish them as Army's future leaders. Why is it though, that many of these junior officers have a tendency to demonstrate 'likership' rather than leadership when they are eventually placed in positions of command? Our training has always been considered effective but does it need a review in order to confirm that it is best practice in training the current demographic of cadets? Maybe these junior officers revert to 'likership' as a means to establish relationships but then find it difficult to maintain the necessary command presence to reinforce their leadership.

9.   To a far lesser extent, recruits at Army's Recruit Training Centre and trainees undergoing Initial Employment Training at corps schools are given some training in leadership. However, at this early stage in their career, the focus for these individuals is to follow the direction and examples of their superiors. For this reason it is critical that Army's senior soldiers and officers are exemplars for junior soldiers. The Warrant Officer and Non-commissioned Officer Academy (WONCO-A) influences approximately ten percent of Army's soldiers each year through the All Corps Soldier Training Continuum so is in an advantageous position to be exemplars for Army.

WHY 'LIKERSHIP' MIGHT DOMINATE IN ARMY

10.   The ALM requires Leadership Training and Development of its people. It also expects an active rather than passive approach to learning leadership and assumes requisite opportunities are provided by units to practice leadership. Despite promoting themes and phrases such as 'empowering the commander' and 'mission command', we continue to operate in a risk averse environment that often does not lend itself to allowing individuals to really practice leadership.

11.   **Allow and accept failure.** If a leader is unable to gain the respect of their subordinates through opportunities to demonstrate leadership, they are prone to turn to 'likership' to illicit that respect. Many commanders are too afraid to allow subordinate leaders the necessary freedom of action for fear that failure by their subordinates will reflect negatively on themselves. Unfortunately, this fear is not unfounded, as too often commanders are held directly responsible for the actions of their subordinates. Application of the tests of culpability would soon determine who (if anyone) is at fault and comfort commanders in the knowledge subordinate failure will not effect their own career or aspirations, but rather provide a learning opportunity and enable them to earn the respect of their own subordinates.

12.   **Professional not personal.** Anytime a relationship between Leaders and Subordinates is 'perceived' as being a friendship it needs to stop. Leaders must always foster a professional environment with a focus on working relationships. Professional and personal are two different and distinct relationships. You must distinguish between the two and if this isn't possible the only acceptable relationship is the professional one.[26]

13.   Effective leadership requires the development of a bond with your subordinates. The art is being able to find the balance and adjust your style and tone as necessary to maintain standards, discipline and train your subordinates. Being a leader during the work day and a mate after hours is difficult because at some point you will have to implement a decision that has undesirable or unintended consequences on a friend. History tells us that upon return to work it becomes very difficult to re-establish the necessary command relationships. Leaders faced with

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[25]   Australian Army Land Warfare Doctrine, *LWD 0-2 Leadership,* 19 Jul 13, pp 7.18
[26]   http://www.licencetolead.com.au/inspiring-leadership-blog/tag/leadership

the challenge of friendship Vs leadership have only one option; maintain a strong command presence through doing what is right despite any undesired effect it may have on their likability.

THE OFFICER

14.   **Experience.** Officers are routinely placed in positions where they are in command of soldiers many years their senior. This may cause them to question whether their role can be anything more than figurehead since they are so inexperienced compared with their subordinates. This lack of experience should instead force junior officers to be attune to expertise and learn to recognise the talent around them and what it can do to contribute to organisational goals. Officers who are new to a unit or position will often take a period of time to 'assess the landscape' before asserting themselves and freely exercising their command. This presents risk as the officer may appear to subordinates as being unprepared and simply following a subordinate agenda. Whilst this in itself is not 'likership' it can lead to unnecessary familiarity and difficulty re-asserting authority as their knowledge grows. Many will then turn to 'likership' in an attempt to regain subordinate approval, in fact then distancing themselves further from being the leader Army expects them to be.

15.   **Example setting.** Soldiers tend to emulate the favourable leadership styles of their commander. In almost all cases the commander is an officer, making it imperative that our officer's conduct themselves beyond reproach. The best leadership training delivered to soldiers risks becoming ineffective if our officers fail to set and adhere to the standard. Soldiers who respect an officer for making the right decision (and understand the reason for the decision) are more likely to exercise and enforce the same leadership expectations among their peers and subordinates.

16.   **Engagement.** Social interaction where officers and soldiers are present is also more common than in the past. Too often our junior officers remain engaged with soldiers in a social context in a poorly considered attempt to be their mate. An officer is charged with the responsibility to lead and, when the situation requires, make difficult decisions such as sending soldiers to a potential death. The ability to make these judgements is quickly clouded when friendship is involved. Officers should always assume a mysterious air and must maintain an appropriate separation from their subordinates.

THE SOLDIER

17.   **Maintenance of standards.** It is often noted that our corporals, sergeants and warrant officers will accept a lesser standard from subordinates. This is generally because correcting poor behaviour means these individuals might become less liked, but also indicates a lowering of their own standards. To a lesser extent, it may also be because many of our standard bearers have lowered their expectations in an effort to be liked by their own subordinates. Each time this effect is realised we experience further reduction until, at some point, we no longer resemble the sharply drilled, strongly lead Army of generations past. Many would argue that we already don't. Exercising 'likership' is the biggest contributor to this degradation so must not be a prevalent trait.

18.   It is mostly the remit of our ranking enlisted personnel to execute commander's intent and maintain discipline. The desire for acceptance that comes with generational change has seen a decline in the motivation to abide by Army's four core values and execute duties within intent of the ten core behaviours. Adherence to, and a thorough knowledge of, these tenets are the first step in remediating the standard. The standard we walk past is the standard we accept - has become a popular cliché, and one that must be applied in our daily routine. If we continue to accept a lower standard of discipline, conduct and professional mastery among our soldiers (and

officers) this will quickly become the new standard and over the next generation, is likely to be lowered even further. The end result is an Army that is less disciplined, has reduced professional mastery and is therefore less effective than the Army of today.

19.   **Relationships.** Senior soldiers are also responsible for mentoring and advising our officers. Army's senior soldiers must shape officers away from becoming too friendly with their subordinates. Equally, they must maintain a professional relationship with the officer themselves. Practicing 'likership' up the chain of command is just as dangerous as practicing it downward. Army's senior soldiers must have a respectful relationship with their officers but don't have to like them. The soldier must be honest with the officer, provide tactful advice when necessary and question intent when appropriate. A command climate where officers and soldiers are mates will foster complacency and is unlikely to yield effective outcomes as there is likely to be unquestioning agreement rather than robust discussion that leads to an informed decision.

THE EFFECTIVE LEADER

20.   Effective Army leaders know they must strategise carefully, then act aggressively. Every interaction involves influencing and persuading others in order to get what they want. Great leaders understand the importance of persuasion and that, in addition to a sound work ethic, you also must exhibit the ability to have relatable, effective, and influential relationships.

21.   A good leader is firm, fair and consistent – they will punish you when you are wrong (correctly) and reward you when you excel. A leader will ensure they and their subordinates do everything to the standard, even if it's painfully tedious. We need to return to an era where leaders truly live the Army Values and are fair and impartial with both rewards/awards and punishments, and bystander behaviour is unacceptable

22.   We owe it to those we lead to help them perform at a high level. We need to point out where an individual needs to change or improve. In rare cases where the individual is knowingly underperforming or demonstrating a poor attitude, we owe it to the rest of the team to resolve the situation.

CONCLUSION

23.   Leadership requires the courage to do things every day that you don't want to. Making decisions that you know are right, but that people aren't necessarily going to like. You make them anyway, because you chose leadership.

24.   The contemporary Army must find new methods to foster the traits and behaviors it desires in its soldiers. Re-establishing the standard throughout our current workforce is only a small component, but one that might be effected through the All Corps Soldier (and Officer) Training Continuum. Leadership comes with responsibility. Strong leaders do things every day they don't like, whereas weak leaders put things off, are satisficing[27] and pretend problems don't exist.

Recommendations

25.   Although the trend toward 'likership' is a behaviour Army needs to address, WONCO-A's opportunity to influence around ten percent of Army's soldiers each year provides a sound basis from which to contribute. The following recommendations are made:

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[27]   Satisficing is a decision-making process in which the consideration of alternatives stops when the first minimally acceptable (satisfactory) solution is found. LWD 0-2 Leadership, Glossary

a.   Improve leadership practices among Army's soldiers through targeted training and exemplary mentoring of soldiers undertaking courses delivered by WONCO-A. Officers and soldiers posted to WONCO-A must lead by example, always 'do what they ought' and not accept bystander behaviour.

b.   As part of ongoing curriculum review, adjust Learning Support Material where appropriate to include a stronger focus on the importance of effective leadership and the risks associated with practicing 'likership', including the responsibility to provide upward leadership to officers.

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LEARNING STYLES ARE A 'NEUROMYTH': IT IS TIME ARMY MOVED ON

INTRODUCTION

1.   The term 'learning styles' refers to the view that different people learn in different ways and, by extension, tailoring instructional methods to meet learning preferences results in tangible improvements to individual learning outcomes. The learning styles concept has wide acceptance among educators and the general public (Pashler et al. 2009, p. 105). Unsurprisingly this broad acceptance extends into Defence and Army education and training. Despite such broad acceptance there is a significant lack of rigorous research to support the learning styles proposition.

2.   A cursory search of scholarly journals and commercial websites reveals numerous learning styles models. Army has adopted and advocates the 'VAK Learning Styles Model', which asserts people prefer to learn through either visual, auditory or kinaesthetic (VAK) means. A thorough search and analysis of peer-reviewed psychological and education studies shows the

use of learning styles in all forms of education 'has been thoroughly and repeatedly discredited in the research literature' (Newton 2015, p. 1). There is no reason for Army to continue to propagate the learning styles 'neuromyth'. Our finite resources would be better employed on teaching methods that truly improve adult learning outcomes.

AIM

3.   This paper will explore the validity of learning styles in general, the VAK Learning Styles Model in particular and will propose means of improving learning outcomes for trainees across Army. The intended outcome of this paper is increased discussion amongst instructors, assessors and training supervisors on how residential course training can be improved.

ORIGIN OF LEARNING STYLES

4.   Most learning styles are 'type' theories. A type theory is one which assigns people to distinct groups rather than grading them along a number of different dimensions. Type theories emerged from the work of German psychiatrist Carl Jung (a WWI German Army doctor and contemporary of Freud) and become popular in the 1940s following the development of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator test in the US (Cassidy 2004). Despite their popularity there is very little objective evidence that people actually cluster into distinct groups as measured by type tests (Pashler et al. 2009, p. 107).

5.   **VAK Learning Styles Model.** Confusion and false claims regarding the origin of the VAK model were the first red flags to trigger the author's scepticism. An internet search reveals a number of businesses which claim the VAK model was developed as early as the 1920s. Such claims are patently false, Jung's *Psychological Types*, being the original type theory, that categorised people as either introverts or extroverts, was first published in 1921. The concept of learning styles certainly did not emerge that same decade.

6.   Discovering the origin of the VAK model has proven problematic; however, one credible study identifies the work of Alistair Smith published from 1996 to 2001 as the origin (Sharp et al. 2008, p. 89-90). More recently the VAK model has been expanded to the VARK (R for read-write) by New Zealand educator Neil Fleming (Bennett 2013). Even the founder of the VARK model urges caution stating 'I sometimes believe students and teachers invest more belief in VARK than it warrants… Some also confuse preferences with ability and strengths. You can like something, but be good at it or not good at it or any point between' (Fleming and Baume 2006, p. 6). Flemings own comment illustrates the lack of correlation between learning style preferences and tangible learning outcomes.

ARMY APPLICATION OF LEARNING STYLES

7.   Learning styles are presented as fact in a number of Army documents and instructors are directed to consider them. LWP-G 7-1-2 *The Instructor's Handbook* details the VAK model and suggests teaching styles to suit each type of learner. The doctrine does; however, state 'while learning styles must be considered, the selection of an instructional strategy that is not consistent with the learning outcome will result in ineffective instruction, regardless of a trainee's learning style.' That is the instructional style must suit the subject material and learning outcome.

8.   ATI 1-14/2015 *Instructor and Assessor Development Program* directs all training establishments to cover learning styles during instructor induction no later than 01 Mar annually. The Instructor Orientation Course on CAMPUS covers learning styles and the VAK Model in particular in detail. The TAE10 Qualified Instructor and Training Supervisor courses also treat learning styles and the VAK model as fact.

THE LACK OF SUPPORTING EVIDENCE

9.   No scientifically rigorous test has shown a correlation between instruction tailored to an individual's specific learning style and improved learning outcomes (Pasher et al., 2008 and Cuevas, 2015). Of all the credible academic literature on the topic only one experiment conducted in 1999 shows any benefit in matching instruction to students preferred learning styles. That test; however, is of dubious evidentiary value due to flawed methodology in its execution and statistical analysis as detailed by Pashler et al (2009).

10.   The continued support of learning styles and the VAK model in education circles is a surprise given the lack of objective evidence. Ongoing support is likely due to anecdotal evidence that supports educators' confirmation bias. While there is no evidence to support the idea that matching instruction to a trainees learning preference improves outcomes there is evidence that all students benefit from 'multiple means of representation' (Gargiulo et al., 2013), hence those educators who strive to present information by multiple means (as a teacher employing the VAK model would) reduce physical barriers to learning as well as 'sensory, perceptual or other learning "road-blocks" students may have' (Gargiulo et al. 2013, p. 45). This effect should be seen as a positive, but unintended, consequence of employing the VAK model.

WHY MOVE ON AND TO WHAT?

11.   If employing learning styles, the VAK model in particular, has a positive, but unintended, benefit why should Army cease employing it? Cuevas answers that question clearly, 'when educators insist on advocating for discredited hypotheses that have not been shown to work, it takes the focus off interventions and instructional strategies that have a stronger scientific basis and are more likely to help learners in their development' (Cuevas, 2015). Army training establishments have limited resources, including instructors and educators time, we are best to focus finite resources on instructional strategies that produce results.

12.   Discarding the learning styles hypothesis and the VAK model only presents minimal time efficiencies, but importantly aligns our methodological frame-work with evidence-based learning theories. Three strategies that have been proven to enhance learning outcomes are discussed below.

13.   **Adjusting Structure in Relation to Aptitude.** While apparently difficult to apply in a military setting, there is credible evidence that adjusting the level of structure in instruction, according to trainee aptitude, has a positive effect on learning outcomes. Studies from 1977 and 1985 have shown 'students with high ability tend to fare better in less structured learning environments than in highly structured learning environments' and furthermore 'highly structured situations might reduce the performance differences between students with high and low abilities' (Pashler et al. 2008, p. 113).

14.   The majority of current instruction given across the all-corps soldier training continuum and all-corps officer training continuum fits the highly structured criterion; learning is largely instructor centred, with the instructor setting the pace and lessons delivered in large-group lecture fashion. In a low structure learning environment trainees would be given an introduction to the material by an instructor, provided a variety of learning resources, be given questions to guide them toward discovering the key concepts and given the latitude to do so under their own initiative. Low structure learning environments accord with the description of adult learning provided in LWP-G 7-1-2, specifically 'most adult learners have a strong desire to… control their learning, and to set their own pace for learning' (2008, p. 40) The recommendations below will suggest one means of adjusting structure in relation to aptitude on all-corps soldier training continuum courses. In part this could be achieved by implementing some of the innovative

teaching methods discussed in the Ryan Review (2016), specifically 'flipped classrooms' (see Ryan 2016, p. 82 for description) and the delivery of digital material via a 'bring your own device' system. Doing so is likely to result in a greater deviation of results, highlighting those truly high performing individuals, and encourage enthusiastic high aptitude soldiers to extend themselves well beyond the baseline skills and knowledge required to pass courses.

15.   **Employ Multiple Means of Representation.** Multiple means of representation can be thought of as the educational equivalent to superimposition of offensive support; it involves presenting lesson content in a variety of ways. Typically lesson content can be delivered: orally by the instructor, by trainees reading, through videos, by role-playing or group discussion and by projector or electronic whiteboard. These modalities should be combined in any one lecture and key points presented bi-modally (Gargiulo and Metcalf 2013, pp. 44-45).

16.   To a large extent any instructor attempting to employ the VAK model is already employing multiple means of representation. Discarding the notion of learning styles and the VAK model does not mean doing away with multiple means of representation. The distinction is that advocates of multiple means of representation argue all students have improved learning outcomes when they receive information through multiple means or information is delivered through parallel systems (Gargiulo and Metcalf 2013, p. 45). Expecting instructors to employ multiple means of representation should not create undue burden on training establishments and is likely to lead to increased learning outcomes.

17.   **Increase Narrative.** The majority of military theory training is overly reliant on PowerPoint presentations. This reliance on PowerPoint reduces instructor engagement with the training audience and often results in large-group lectures that are little more than blocks of text and lists. While the human brain does not efficiently remember lists (Ranpura 2013), our brains do remember stories. This is evidenced in the long and extremely detailed oral tradition of Indigenous Australians who have sung stories to pass vital information from generation to generation for at least 42 000 years. Recent work by academic Lynne Kelly links the story telling of ancient cultures with the narrative techniques used by modern memory champions (Fidler and Kelly 2016). Linking information to a narrative, or imaginary journey are both common techniques used by the types of people who can recite pi to the thousandth decimal place.

18.   Narrative allows us to communicate and understand the world around us. Including narrative in instruction 'is essentially an experience-based, constructivist approach to teaching that helps learners connect new knowledge with lived experiences' (Killen 2013, p. 77). That is presenting new information through narrative better enables trainees to absorb that information and incorporate it with their own experiences. This is likely to aid in retention and recall of information and increase trainees ability to apply the information to new life experiences. Effectively increasing the level of narrative in instruction will be reliant on instructors having sufficient knowledge and personal experience and a reduction of reliance on aids like PowerPoint.

CONCLUSION

19.   Although Army advocates learning styles and the VAK model as proven methodologies, there is stark absence of credible evidence to support either the theory or practise. If we are to be responsible educators and instructors we should cease applying a clearly discredited hypothesis and focus our finite training resources on proven education strategies. Three powerful strategies are adjusting: structure in relation to aptitude, employing multiple means of representation and increasing the use of narrative in instruction. These strategies align with current innovation at the Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Academy and could be trialled on all-corps soldier training continuum courses.

Recommendations

20.	In support of improving learning outcomes for trainees on Army courses, it is recommended that:

a.	Army remove all reference to learning styles and the VAK model from doctrine and policy.

b.	Army insert multiple means of representation as an instructional strategy in doctrine and policy.

c.	WONCO-A trial the implementation of adjusting the level of structure in relation to aptitude on Subject One Sergeant Army through:

   (1)	creating a digital pre-course pack encapsulating revision and an introduction to some course material

   (2)	conducting a diagnostic exam, based on the content of the pre-course package, in the first 48 hours of course to determine the trainees with the highest level of motivation and aptitude

   (3)	providing those indentified trainees with the option to lead their own learning in a less structured environment by providing them a variety of learning support materials (doctrine, notes, videos, etc) to explore rather than attend large-group lectures

   (4)	conducting daily 'flipped classroom' style syndicate discussions with the identified trainees to answer the questions that have arisen through their own knowledge discovery and conduct collaborative activities.

d.	Army include the benefits of narrative in education in LWP-G 7-1-2 and instructor development programs, encouraging instructors to increase the amount of narrative in lectures and decrease reliance on PowerPoint for displaying large amounts of text.

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CORPORATE INFANTRY ~ SHOULD PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTS BE PART OF THE ARMY'S FUTURE FIGHTING FORCE?

Written by: Captain Frederick Clark (Royal Australian Regiment)

"…organised violence will, just like its production and distribution, become the product of a hybrid state-market model: partially made and partially bought."

James Cockayne, 2009

INTRODUCTION

1.   As the July 2016 election approaches its close there is an increasing volume of debate at a federal level focused in on the budget, the Australian economy and the national accounts. Regardless of which political party holds the balance of power after the election in the upper or lower house, it would be naive of us not to expect that 'bean-counters' in Canberra will be diving into the various portfolios (including Defence) to find expenditure cuts in an effort to return the budget to surplus.

2.   The Royal Australian Infantry Corps (RAINF) is without doubt the best corps of the Army and has invested significant time and intellectual rigor to maintaining relevance now and into the future through technical (emerging technologies) or non-technical (training methods and physical employment standards) advancements. As officers and soldiers employed by the government we should be actively pursuing synergies between more efficient use of limited resource and becoming more lethal in the battlespace; raising the Corps' profile as the capability of choice for future governments.

3.   **Scope.** This paper will discuss some of the prejudice against the use of Private Military Companies (PMC). Some of the benefits and negatives of contracting combat solutions are outlined with a number of suggested mitigations. And from this, a suggested model for the Contracted Rifleman will be presented to commence debate into the potential methods to create RAINF capability into the future.

AIM

4.   The aim of this paper is promote discussion within the Royal Australian Infantry Corps of alternative options to the current four year minimum service for Riflemen. The purpose of this discussion is to ensure that the Corps remains adaptive to the fiscal and economic demands of the future.

5.   **The stigma of the label 'mercenary'.** As discussed by LTCOL Wing (Wing, 2010) and Dr Suter (Suter, 2012), the stigma associated with the label 'mercenary' has been politicised through after-action reviews of private military companies involved in battlefield incidents; the most infamous of recent history would be Blackwater. The public opinion of private military companies is now bias by the belief that sovereign states should possess a monopoly over the legitimate use of force (Chesterman & Lehnardt, 2009); therefore, rational consideration of the opportunities and capabilities that PMC provide in the modern battlespace is consistently overlooked due to perceived public backlash. This fear of public backlash is creating situations within Army where decisions made at higher levels prioritize the consideration of public opinion rather than capability (Terrace, 2016). A good example of this is that in 1996 Kofi Annan did not hire a PMC to secure a refugee camp in Goma because he believed 'the world may not be ready to privatize peace' (Chesterman & Lehnardt, 2009).

6.   **Perspective.** PMC and contractors are an enduring element in the battlespace throughout the history of warfare, such as at the Battle of Hastings where the majority of the Norman forces were mercenaries (Suter, 2012). It is only in recent history that nation states have been able to financially maintain a full-time professional fighting force (Suter, 2012); particularly during peacetime. Considering that ADF personnel are renumerated for the performance of their duties, are they not mercenaries of the Australian Government?

7.   **Fiscal demands**. Defence expenditure in 2014-15 made up approximately 1.6%, 26.3 billion dollars (Department of Defence, 2015), of GDP Expenditure (Australian Beaurea of Statistics). In 2014-15, the government also spent 13.2 billion dollars on the Personal Benefits and Health Care Payments sections of the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) portfolio (Department of Veterans Affairs, 2015). This shows that for every dollar that the government spends maintaining the military; it spends an additional 50 cents in social obligation to veterans. Can the government afford the social cost of veterans into the future? Is there a more economically viable method to generating capability without the enduring social cost?

CONTRACTED SOLUTIONS – BENEFITS AND NEGATIVES

8.   **Combat capability**. PMC often facilitate non-combat solutions for state militaries. The ADF currently tenders contacts to a variety of PMC in the barracks (messing and accommodation), whilst on field exercises (Training support provided by Cubic) and on operations (Aspen Medical). PMC are often overlooked when it comes to providing combat solutions in the battlespace due to the aforementioned stigma associated with privatization of fighting forces. There are examples throughout recent history where the use of PMC in combat has been a very positive and successful venture.

9.   One of the most poignant examples would be Executive Outcomes and the company's valuable contribution to the democratic process in Sierra Leone (Chesterman & Lehnardt, 2009).

10.   **Fiscal prudence**. Finance officers in both the public and private sectors often use contracts as a tool to accurately forecast costs and make organisations accountable for unexpected expenditure. Contracting or outsourcing combat solutions has benefits for the ADF at the departmental level, however the key risk is that poorly drafted contracts allow a contract party or parties to divulge themselves of the responsibility to achieve the contract's desired outcome, regardless of remuneration.

11.   In their purest form, contracts also eliminate costs that are not specified within the signed contract. The government is currently obligated to absorb significant costs specifically

relating to service in the ADF. Examples of these costs, mostly held in the DVA portfolio, are war-widow pensions and veterans' health care payments. Contracts could be used as a method to control these costs in the future.

12.   Contracted forces could be used as a just-in-time or surge capability to support ADF operations. Given this surge capability, the Army may not need to maintain its current peacetime manning, which will also draw down departmental expenditure.

13.   The fiscal negatives of using contracts is that the overall dollar value of the contract (therefore cost to Defence) will fluctuate depending on the availability of suppliers, and that contacts, on face value, are often expensive in the short term. The face value of contracts will be relatively high because the contract will seek to balance out, through financial remuneration, the loss of future benefits such as those outlined above (i.e. veterans' health care payments). Poorly drafted contracts may also encourage operations to be protracted in order to encourage keep contracts coming in.

14.   **Political outcomes**. Using contracts to enhance Defence capability allows governments to tender for mission and task specific capabilities that are deliberately trained, specific to the theatre of operations. Surge capability (Chesterman & Lehnardt, 2009) in Iraq could be ineffective without the utilization of PMCs. The use of contracted solutions could also provide a simple tool for the government to create a surge and/or drawdown effect in relation to ADF operations. Contracts between states and PMC have also been used to create political distance from the state of unpopular incidents such as the Blackwater shooting in Nisour Square in 2007.

15.   Whilst there are political benefits to contracted combat solutions, there can also be a perception that PMC are un-controllable and a law unto themselves. The public belief is that PMC are motivated primarily by financial remuneration rather than service to the nation or greater good. Given this, it is politically irresponsible in today's global operating environment to employ PMC that are unable to be held accountable for their actions.

MITIAGTING THE NEGATIVES OF CONTRACTED SOLUTIONS

16.   The belief that nation states are the only battlefield element that can effectively organise and control violence in the battlespace is unfounded. Poorly structured, trained and led state militaries are responsible for some of the most atrocious war crimes such as the 1975 invasion and occupation by Indonesia into East Timor. Currently the Australian Government mitigates the risk of the ADF being involved in incidents and war crimes (an ever-present and enduring risk to all combat forces) through deliberate investment of resources and intellect to the training, organisational structure and leadership of the ADF.

17.   **Training.** The quality and volume of training provided to military forces throughout history is directly correlated to their ability to be controlled on the battlefield. Examples of this training are the formations used by the Romans through to current day doctrine. Through training military personnel are taught to think, act and respond to direction in a particular way that is aligned to the organisational requirement. Good examples of this training within the Australian Army are drill movements and the basic drill taught at the Army Recruit Training Centre (ARTC) or the Royal Military College Duntroon (RMC-D); particularly lessons and training delivered by the Army on the topic of the Laws of Armed Conflict. This training mitigates the 'behaviour risk' of officers and soldiers being involved illegal acts in combat and could easily be provided to an audience of PMC with the same endstate.

18.   **Structure.** The structure of any public or private organisation will affect how it conducts operations. Militaries are known for their hierarchal organisational structure and rigid

internal justice system. The ADF currently mitigates the 'decision risk' of illegal behaviour in combat through the effective use of its hierarchy (commanders) who make decisions utilising information provided to them by human and technological enablers (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). When the hierarchy is undermined by the behaviours and/or attitude of any element within the organisation, the military justice system is used to ensure accountability and punish offenders in order to maintain the integrity of the organisation. The nature of the military justice system is that it is transparent (where appropriate) and able to be reviewed at multiple levels internally and externally. The use of decision making authorities (hierarchies) and behaviour standards (justice system) is common among most large public and private organisations and could be applied easily to PMC as well.

19.   **Leadership.** Arguably the most important mitigation against illegal activity within militaries is strong and ethical leadership. The Australian Army uses a very deliberate and structured method to identify who it recruits, how they are trained and when they are promoted. The recruitment process eliminates those who are unsuitable for service and therefore militates against 'leadership risk'. The training provided reveals character and provides the skillsets required to perform the duties expected of them. And the use of internal promotions ensures that the most appropriate soldier or officer will be in command of the team. The result of this ongoing process of internally identifying and selecting the personnel for promotion into command positions ensures that when in a combat and high stress situations, the team will have a leader who has the courage to lead and control the team in such a way that they achieve their mission without committing crimes or creating unfavourable incidents.

ECN 342 RIFLEMAN (CONTRACTED) – BALANCING BUDGETS AGAINST SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS

20.   The contracting of combat operations to PMC does have negatives that, regardless of the quality of a contract, are unlikely to be palatable to the Australian Government or the Corps in the foreseeable future. However, the author believes that the concept of a contract between the ADF and an individual could be a successful 'middle ground' for generating a surge capability for the RAINF Corp at the private soldier level as an 'ECN 342 Rifleman (Contracted)'. The broad concept would be as follows:

a.   The contract is between the RAINF Head of Corps (as the ADF delegate) and an individual Australian Civilian who may or may not have prior military service. They are contracted for a period of 18 months; 6 months of training and 12 months on operations. On return from operations the contractor would either receive an offer of full-time employment, another 18 month contract or no offer for further contracts; dependant on their performance and ADF capability requirements.

a.   The tendered contracts would require contractors to achieve and maintain the current measurable standards expected of ECN 343 Riflemen; such as PESA, shooting and training assimilation. Failure to achieve or maintain these standards would result in contract termination at the Head of Corps' discretion.

b.   The contractor's employment specifications would be the same as the current Rifleman ECN 343; however, without any requirement or prospect of fulfilling leadership or command positions. A contractor would only be employed within a callsign commanded by a full-time, non-contracted RAINF Chain of Command (CoC); RAINF Officer, Senior and Junior Non-Commissioned Officers. Preferably it would be the same CoC from day one of recruit training through to the end of the contract (including operations).

c.   The contractor would receive a compressed version of the current recruit and initial employment courses in order to allow time for some pre-deployment training before deploying on a 12 month operational deployment.

d.   The contractor would not be entitled most of the conditions of service that their non-contracted peers would. For example, family housing, various types of leave, post contract health care and other DVA benefits. The face value of the contract would be such that they were remunerated appropriately for not receiving these entitlements.

21.   The broad concept described above could significantly reduce the social obligation, specifically enduring duty of care to veterans, whilst producing a combat ready platoon for a 12 month deployment. The use of contracts between the government and individuals enables the military to retain control of contractors. The training provided would be dissimilar to that already provided to ECN 343 Riflemen prior to arriving at a Battalion, again mitigating behavioural risk. To mitigate leadership and decision risk, the contractor would only be employed in a callsign with non-contracted RAINF commanders to lead, train and mentor them through training and in combat.

CONCLUSION

22.   In the current fiscal climate, the Corps should be exploring all methods for refining the how it produces battlefield capability. One method of achieving this is debating the merits of the RAINF Corps using contracts to facilitate a surge capability at the Rifleman level. The behavioural, structural and leadership risks that are enduring in the use of PMC could be mitigated through contracting individuals rather than corporate entities. The use of contracts could also be used a tool to decrease or eliminate the enduring social obligation to veterans.

Recommendations

23.   It is recommended to the RAINF Corps that:

a.   Deliberate discussion and intellectual rigor be given to considering unconventional methods for recruiting human resources into the RAINF Corps in an effort to efficiently generate operational capability for the Australian Government.

FA Clark
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CULTURAL REFORM

DV OR NOT DV, THAT IS THE QUESTION

INTRODUCTION

15.   In December 2015 the Chief of Army announced that all Army members were expected to view the "Hitting Home" documentary on Domestic and Family Violence (DV) as part of Army's Cultural Reform initiatives to: (i) Support White Ribbon; and (ii) Reinforce our core values. "Hitting Home" was intended as a starting point to establish awareness, ongoing discussion and "work towards changing the attitudes and behaviours that allow violence against women to occur both within the workplace and the wider community."[28]

16.   It seems the viewing failed to reach the intended goal. Some members were offended by the perceived 'male-bashing/anti-male' aspect of the mandatory viewing. The primary focus of "Hitting Home" was male physical violence towards women and indicated that victims are female while perpetrators are male. There was little acknowledgement of non-physical violence, and no direct acknowledgment that most males are not perpetrators. As Army members considered themselves not directly involved in DV, and male members considered themselves unfairly placed in the category of "perpetrator", they denied the social problem of domestic violence and opted out of discussion.

17.   Appropriate DV education is not 'anti-male', it is anti-violence. Though most DV is perpetrated by men, most men do not perpetrate DV. To increase Army members' engagement with DV education, we require a different approach. Following serious officer misconduct of the so-called Jedi Council which brought us into disrepute, the Army introduced a number of initiatives that remain available.[29]

18.   The purpose of this paper is to widen the perceived parameters for DV beyond 'gender' to empower the silent majority of respectful non-violent men and women to: (i) Recognise victims and perpetrators and (ii) Safely speak out against attitudes and behaviours that perpetuate societal violence. Such empowerment may be achieved through existing training initiatives including the Mentors in Violence Prevention Program (MVP) and the White Ribbon Campaign, both of which now have an Australian Army focus.

19.   **Scope.** This paper addresses what is meant by the terms DV, victim, perpetrator and bystander. Consideration is given to ways of raising awareness and initiating cultural change.

AIM

20.   The aim of this paper is to educate soldiers and officers about DV and steps required to reduce DV, thereby making them agents of cultural change in the Australian community.

THE REALITY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

21.   Domestic and Family Violence (DV) in Australia has become a media focal point especially since family violence campaigner Rosie Batty was named 2015 Australian of the

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[28] A.J. Campbell, 'Minute: Viewing of the Domestic Violence Documentary "Hitting Home"', (2015).

[29] For example, SeMPRO; see also: S. Crompvoets, 'Development of a Domestic Violence Framework for Army (Draft)', (2015). Australian Defence Force, 'Pathway to Change: Evolving Defence Culture Strategy', <http://www.defence.gov.au, Defence Community Organisation, 'A Commanders and Managers Guide to Responding to Family and Domestic Violence, First Edition', in Defence Community Organisation (ed.), (Canberra, 2016).

Year. In 2009, Federal, State and Local Governments began a national campaign to raise social awareness, change societal attitudes and so end violence against women. [30] DV is not restricted to particular areas or groups. It occurs across all socio-economic and geographic strata, regardless of religious beliefs, level of education, sexual orientation, occupation, community position, or cultural/ethnic background.[31] DV is widely considered a devastating social problem that denies basic human rights.[32]

22.   DV is at epidemic proportions. Police in Australia attend a DV incident every two minutes. Each week in Australia one woman dies at the hands of a violent partner, 56 women are hospitalised, and hundreds are treated in emergency rooms. The One in Three advocacy group says that one in three victims are male. Whilst men and children are indeed victims of DV, and women are indeed perpetrators, statistics show that victims are mainly female, and perpetrators mostly male.[33]

23.   To deny involvement and seemingly overlook the scandal of widespread societal violence is to take a passive bystander approach. This not in keeping with Army core values.

24.   Many incidents of DV go unreported[34]. DV is a silent, behind-closed-doors wide-spread societal disease. It exists wherever there is any denial of equal rights. It is any behaviour used to control, dominate or coerce, and puts family safety at risk.

25.   A major problem in Australia is defining DV[35]. In some areas DV is limited to physical assault between intimate partners. However, the wider view encompasses any acts that institute an imbalance of power, including physical, sexual, verbal, emotional, psychological, financial, spiritual or social abuse and isolation by any person against another.[36] DV involves bullying and controlling through fear. The legislation in NSW, VIC, QLD, WA, ACT, NT and SA now includes intimate partners, relatives, family members, carers and children.

26.   A broad definition of DV resonates very well with Army core values and should encourage Army members to "come on board" as the non-perpetrating majority who refuse to be passive bystanders. Army members should ask the question: ***"If I'm not the victim and not the perpetrator, what is my role?"***[37] This proposed shift in perspective may address the problem of Army members disregarding domestic violence education as "male bashing" or "anti-male".

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[30] Council of Australian Governments, 'National Plan to Reduce Violence against Women and Their Children: Including the First 3 Year Action Plan', in Department of Social Services (ed.), (Canberra: Australian Government, 2010), Council of Australian Governments, 'Second Action Plan 2013-2016: Moving Ahead of the National Plan to Reduce Violence against Women and Their Children', in Department of Social Services (ed.), (Canberra: Australian Government, 2013).

[31] White Ribbon Australia, 'White Ribbon Australia Fact Sheet 6: Family and Domestic Violence', (White Ribbon Australia, 2013).

[32] Australian Human Rights Commission, 'Australian Study Tour Report: Visit of the Un Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women.', in Australian Human Rights Commission (ed.), (Canberra: Australian Human Rights Commission, 2012), 7.

[33] Natalie Dragon, 'Stand by Me: Nurses and Midwives Putting a Stop to Domestic Violence', *Australian Nursing and Midwifery Journal,* 23/2 (2015), 16.

[34] Australian Bureau of Statistics, '4529.0.00.002 - Bridging the Data Gaps for Family, Domestic and Sexual Violence', (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013).

[35] Ibid.

[36] Queensland Government, 'Queensland Says: Not Now, Not Ever: Domestic and Family Violence Prevention Strategy 2016-2026', (Queensland: Queensland Government 2016b), Queensland Government, <https://www.qld.gov.au/community/getting-support-health-social-issue/dfv-taskforce/>

[37] S. Murdoch, 'A Round Table with Associate Professor Annabel Taylor and Dr Sarah Murdoch', <http://www.noviolence.com.au/news/round-table-associate-professor-annabel-taylor-and-dr-shannon-murdoch>, accessed 12 June 2016

27.   Reconceptualising Army members as the non-violent majority who have a valuable role in preventing and intervening in domestic violence by the problematic minority will honour the Army contract with Australia.

MAKING A DIFFERENCE

28.   In the past, DV was considered a private matter between husband and wife. The term "rule of thumb" dates back to 17th century England where a man could beat his wife as long as the stick was no thicker than his thumb. Even police officers hesitated to interfere in 'family matters' and any perceived blame, shame or humiliation belonged to the wife. Communities were comprised of silent, passive bystanders. During the 1970s, women's groups protested the behaviour, introduced the concept of perpetrators and victims of violence and created shelters for battered women and their children. The focus was on male perpetrators and their female victims.

29.   For decades, various organisations have tried to provide protection to victims. Most organisations focus on ending men's violence against women as statistics indicate that 85% of victims are women. Strategies include the provision of emergency accommodation, care and counselling for the victims as well as anger management courses and counselling for the perpetrators. This was the *starting point* - Society is becoming more aware that the problem needs to be addressed at all levels. Some organisations offer training to members to this end.[38] For example Gold Coast University Hospital conducts training for midwives to recognise and respond to victims, as research indicates 30% of women experiencing abuse for the first time are pregnant[39]. Organisations such as Better Men Australia provide parenting programs for fathers. The One in Three Advocacy Group raises awareness of male victims of violence, and homophobic violence against the Gay community.

30.   The National Campaign is focussing on awareness of the issue, and changing attitudes and behaviours. The vision is to educate from cradle to grave in order to end violence. Police are trained to support and advise victims as well as submit protection orders. Attitudes have changed to the point of insisting that DV is a criminal offence, that perpetrators accept responsibility for their criminal behaviour, serve their sentence and undergo mandatory counselling to change said behaviour of bullying and controlling by fear.

31.   The Queensland Centre for Domestic and Family Violence Research has produced fact sheets[40] to explain abusive behaviour in its many guises including carer violence against the elderly, and adolescent violence against parents and siblings. They acknowledge DV as any imbalance of power, including physical, sexual, verbal, emotional, psychological, financial, spiritual or social abuse and isolation by any person against another. The three categories of abuse are clearly defined: Verbal abuse includes yelling, screaming, swearing in an abusive manner and making intimidating comments; Emotional/psychological abuse includes playing mind games like threatening to leave, hurting themselves or telling lies to control parents or the household; Physical abuse includes pushing, hitting, kicking, throwing objects around the house, breaking family property and hurting family pets.

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[38] Department of Defence, 'Support to Employees - Domestic Violence', in Department of Defence (ed.), (Canberra: Australian Government, 2016).; Kelsey Hegarty et al., 'Identifying and Responding to Men Who Use Violence in Their Intimate Relationships', *Australian family physician,* 45/4 (2016), 176.

[39] Kathleen Baird, 'Midwifery: Midwives Empowered through Domestic Violence Training', *The Queensland Nurse,* 35/1 (2016), 34-35.

[40] Queensland Centre for Domestic and Family Violence Research,
<http://noviolence.com.au/resources/information-services/fact-sheets>, accessed 12 June 2016

32.   More recently, consideration has been given to the wider ramifications of DV, including homelessness, financial costs, and physical, emotional and mental health of victims.[41] Children who witness or experience DV are more likely to experience anxiety and depression, suffer learning difficulties and be socially insecure. Such children are now recognised as victims of child maltreatment.

33.   Education is seen to be a key factor in cultural reform. Programmes such as Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST), Keep Your Mates Safe (KYMS) and the Mental Health First Aid course (MHFA) were designed to raise awareness of the taboo subjects of suicide and mental illness, to educate participants to recognise, intervene and support at-risk members. Similar programmes are being applied to the problem of DV. The Army is currently utilising two programmes, the White Ribbon Campaign and MVP.

WHITE RIBBON AUSTRALIA

34.   The White Ribbon organisation originated in Toronto Canada in 1991 and was introduced to Australia in 2003. White Ribbon Australia is a non-profit organisation that seeks to end men's violence against women. It is primarily a male-led campaign that aims to educate boys and men to change attitudes and behaviours that perpetuate disrespect, inequality and bullying[42]. It encourages them to take the oath: ***I will stand up, speak out and act to prevent men's violence against women***.[43] The White Ribbon Campaign focuses on the positive role that men play in preventing violence against women. By living the oath, they are no longer silent, passive bystanders but rather vocal, active bystanders forcing positive cultural reform. Because most men are not violent their efforts to prevent violence against women will change society for the better.[44]

35.   White Ribbon Australia provides many resources and education programs for cultural reform.[45] Multiple fact sheets provide data to dispel current misinformation.[46] As the Australian army is now an accredited White Ribbon workplace, it would seem we have a great opportunity to encourage members to embrace the White Ribbon Three-Step Plan to end violence: (i) Live the White Ribbon Oath (Stand up, speak out, act); (ii) Break the silence about violence; and (iii) Grow the campaign.

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[41] Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 'Specialist Homelessness Services Report 2014-15 (Web Report)', in Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (ed.), (Canberra: Australian Government, 2016).
[42] White Ribbon Australia, <http://www.whiteribbon.org.au/>, accessed 21 June 2016
[43] Ibid.http://www.whiteribbon.org.au/myoath-popup
[44] Ibid.http://www.whiteribbon.org.au/why-engage-men
[45] Ibid.http://www.whiteribbon.org.au/prevention
[46] Ibid.http://www.whiteribbon.org.au/resources/facts

REMOVING LEARNING STYLE THEORY FROM ARMY

"Occasionally, I would run across articles and books that made startling claims based on "recent advances" in brain science about how we should teach people and do business. The Mozart Effect comes to mind: the popular idea that listening to classical music makes students better at math. Or the notion that analytical people are "left brain" people and creative people are "right brain" people, and each must be managed accordingly. Sometimes I would panic, wondering if the authors were reading some literature totally off my radar screen. I speak several dialects of brain science, and I knew nothing from those worlds capable of dictating best practices for education and business. In truth, if we ever fully understood how the human brain knew how to pick up a glass of water, it would represent a major achievement. There was no need for me to panic. Brain research still cannot without equivocation tell us how to become better teachers, parents, business leaders, or students". — **John Medina, Brain Rules**

INTRODUCTION

1.   Firstly, a definition of what is meant by learning styles: "different students have different modes of learning, and their learning could be improved by matching one's teaching with that preferred learning mode" (Riener & Willingham 2010). At last count, there were around seventy such theories 'on the market' (Pashler, H. et al 2008, p 106). From Kolb to kingdom come, it seems there is an endless procession of theorists claiming to have unlocked the secret to learning. Roll-up, roll-up! We have VAKs and VARKs, LSIs, LSQs and LSPs, each as technical and flashy as your latest LCD HDTV. And that's just the start. There is a veritable alphabet soup of options out there. Hell, some clever bugger has even come up with an iWAM, which I assume can be downloaded from the Apple App store anytime soon.

2.   And what marvellous things these fancy tools can purportedly do. They can turn little Johny into a Diverging Assimilator, which is a lot less nasty than it sounds, and quiet little Sally into a Visual Concreter (not to be confused with a city council foreman). If you are brave enough, you can even give yourself the quick learning style once over, and…voila!... you're suddenly on a first-name basis with your inner-learner, and you didn't even need any candles or rainforest music.

3.   The truth is learning style theories make us feel powerful as educators and trainers. Like the first kid in kindergarten to work out the shape box, you look at the poor chumps around you, trying to teach that big old *square* into that frustrated learner's little *triangular* brain. Can't they see it just doesn't fit?

4.   But like any new toy, the novelty can start to wane. Some of those amazing functions that were on the box don't seem to be working. As many times as you read the instructions and call the support line, you can't help but feel that maybe—just maybe—it's not me and the damn thing just doesn't work! And little by little, that great learning style theory, the one that was going to change the way you teach and train forever, gets tucked away deeper and deeper, used less and less; until, like the latest ab-machine you just had to have, you dump the idea all together.

5.   **Scope.** This paper will discuss:

   a.   how the myth of learning styles is a common one amongst education professionals
   b.   how the theory has been embedded into the training cycle of every soldier and officer in Army
   c.   the unintended harm in promulgating the theory
   d.   some of the reasoning why the Visual, Auditory, Kinesthetic (VAK) model— selected due to its popularity in Army—simply does not work.

AIM

6.   "There is no credible evidence that learning styles exist" (Riener & Willingham 2010). Unfortunately, these theories, in particular the VAK model, are so pervasive in Army training that they are all but unescapable for trainees and trainers. It is therefore the aim of this paper to advocate for the removal of learning style theory from Army.

LEARNING STYLES

7.   **Popularity.** As is often the case, the popularity of an idea does not always correlate with truth. Concepts such as 'the brain only uses 10% of its capability' are widespread, yet have little scientific basis. Undoubtedly, the most 'in vogue' such brain pseudo-science is learning styles. However, it is not only laymen that are susceptible to common myths regarding the brain. Over 90 percent of education professionals believe (incorrectly) the premise of learning styles theories to be true (Dekker 2012). With continued integration of 'real' neuroscience into education, these beliefs may begin to dwindle. However, in many ways, learning style theory currently has a ubiquitous presence in education and training no matter where learning is taking place. Given this, it is unsurprising that Army has unwittingly incorporated this 'neuro-myth' into training and education.

8.   **Context within Army.** Learning style theory is indoctrinated within Army training and culture. The following courses list learning styles as part of the curriculum materials (often citing the VAK model specifically):

   a.   the Qualified Instructor Course

b.   Instructors Handbook
c.   Training Design Course
d.   GSO FAC
e.   Subject One CPL Army.

9.   As an example, the Training Design course lists the VAK model as one of the learning theories most relevant to training in the military. These curricula cover all instructors, training designers, soldiers (CPL and above) and GSO officers. It may not be correct, but the theory of learning styles has certainly made a foothold in Army training.

10.   **Detriment to capability.** Learning styles are not just a harmless fallacy; it has a negative influence on Army training. Firstly, there is an opportunity cost of spending time and effort instructing our trainers, training developers and junior leaders on a defunct theory—far better to teach principles of good instructional design, the limits of cognitive load, and other well established credible educational theory (Willingham 2005). Secondly, Army is fostering a culture where trainers and trainees are labelling themselves as a particular learning style; ie, *"I'm more of a kinesthetic learner, so I probably won't get much out of doing this reading"*.

> *"If I as a teacher think that you have a particular learning style and that you only learn in one way, that might prevent me from trying other strategies that could otherwise help you learn the information better. Likewise if you as a student believe that you have a particular learning style, that could cause you to shut down or lose interest when a teacher isn't teaching in a way that is consistent with your preferred style. That might actually perpetuate your failure but it's not because you couldn't learn that way; it's because you gave up and you stopped trying"* (Oxeham 2015).

11.   Finally, learning styles are often used to justify the educational merit of important initiatives in Army training. A common example of this is the claim that e-learning will deliver superior outcomes because it meets the needs of auditory and visual learners. Again, the opportunity cost is that more important theories and principles which could have been helpful in shaping educationally sound proposals have been negated in favour of a popular but flawed theory. Ultimately, the embedding of learning styles into Army training is a waste of resources, can reduce trainee performance and is a detriment to the intellectual rigor of new initiatives and proposals in Army training and education.

THE VAK MODEL

12.   **Memories can be stored in different modalities…**It is true that memories can be stored in certain modalities. For example, if asked to recall the metallic taste of a battery or coin, one would likely access a '*taste*' memory (in this case, a memory likely dating back to childhood). Or if asked to recall the smell of garlic cooking in butter, one would likely access a '*smell*' memory. Interestingly, there is no learning style theories advocating taste or smell learners (Willingham 2005). Similarly, if asked to recall the shape of an emu's beak (visual memory), the sound of a Sir David Attenborough's voice (auditory) or the feeling of sand beneath your bare feet (kinesthetic); visual, auditory and kinesthetic modes of memory will be accessed.

13.   **…but most 'learning' is not stored this way.** Conceptual memories important to classroom and workplace learning are typically stored in terms of meaning. "Visual, auditory, and kinesthetic information is processed in different parts of the brain. However, these separate structures in the brain are highly interconnected and there is profound cross-modal activation and transfer of information between sensory modalities" (Gilmore, et al 2007, p589). Take for example, the concept:

'wearing wet boots for extended periods of time can lead to foot rot'.

14.   The modality in which you first received this information may have been visual (seeing pictures of trench foot at the Australian War Museum), auditory (hearing a 'war story' from a DS at Kapooka), or kinesthetic (the itch and pain of your own feet when you did not air out wet boots for a number of days). However, the conceptual memory—*'wearing wet boots for extended periods of time can lead to foot rot'*—is not a photographic memory of the image you saw in the museum, the tone and pitch of the DS's voice or an itchy feeling in your feet. Instead, it is a learnt concept far more complex than a single sensory memory.

> "An important clue that memories are stored by their meaning is the types of errors people make on memory tests. People who listen to a story will later confidently 'recognize' sentences that never appeared in the story—so long as these new sentences are consistent with the story's meaning. The same phenomenon is observed with purely visual stimuli. People rapidly lose the memory of the precise images that make up a picture story (e.g., whether a character faced left or right), but they retain the meaning or gist of the story." (Willingham 2005).

15.   While there is undoubtedly much to be learnt about memory and learning, it is clear that the brain rarely stores and retrieves learnt concepts in the form of visual, auditory or kinaesthetic memories.

16.   **VAK aptitude is rarely helpful.** Naturally, a variation in learners' aptitudes in retaining visual, auditory and kinesthetic information is to be expected. It is one of an infinite number of factors that contribute to the individuality of the human mind—just not a very important one when considering Army training and education. Imagine for a moment, trainees attending a promotion course and learning the Military Appreciation Process (MAP). A trainee with a good visual memory may excel in remembering the shapes of military symbols. A trainee with a better auditory memory might have a better pronunciation of the word 'coup d'état', and the trainee with the keenest kinesthetic memory may best remember their tired legs and the feel of the ground as they did a recon of their defensive position. Of course, all of this provides little to no advantage to the trainee coming to grips with the concepts and meanings of the MAP.

17.   **The fallacy of catering to learning styles.** It is a mistake to suggest that learning performance can be improved by matching the '*right VAK style*' to the '*right type of learner*'. "The idea that people may differ in their ability to learn new material depending on its modality—that is, whether the child hears it, sees it, or touches it—has been tested for over 100 years' (Willingham 2005). The results are clear, "the learning styles hypothesis has been refuted by empirical research to the extent that it may be considered irresponsible for teacher education programs and public educators to apply the method in practice" (Cuevas 2015, p330). For those interested, there are some great videos on Youtube and TED that discuss these tests and how they are conducted in detail, but delving deeper into these is outside the scope of this paper. Howard Gardner, Professor of Cognition and Education at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, probably states it best, "Sometimes people speak about a 'visual' learner or an 'auditory' learner. The implication is that some people learn through their eyes, others through their ears. This notion is incoherent" (Strauss 2013).

CONCLUSION

18.   This paper has discussed the popularity of learning style theory, its pervasiveness in Army training and the unintended harm that results. It has also scrutinised the VAK model in the hope of spreading awareness that the concept is flawed. Learning styles, including the oft cited VAK model, are a myth that Army would be well advised to unfetter itself from. Of course, this

might read as all very negative. This could not be furtherer from the truth. "This whole idea that learning styles don't exist in many ways should be further good news. It means all of us are capable of learning in a variety of ways. We are not as limited as sometimes we think we are" (Oxeham 2015). There is so much valuable education theory which could be transformative if applied to Army training and education—let's get our teeth into these and leave learning style theories in the past.

Recommendations

19.   It is recommended that:

a.   RMC-A (and it sub-units) remove learning style theory from all TMP/LMP curricula (as listed in the bibliography)

b.   AKG remove learning style theory from the Instructor's Handbook.

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TRAINING THE MODERN DIGITAL AGE

Technological progress has merely provided us with more efficient means for going backwards.

Aldous Huxley

INTRODUCTION

1.   Twenty years ago, clouds were only found in the sky. Command and control was achieved through simple, analogue radios, K-phones and messaging.[47] Leaps in technology have resulted in substantial growth in Information Communications Technology (ICT) sector. Effective use of technology aids Defence's decision superiority and the timely prosecution of targets, but with a transient workforce, inadequate procurement processes and inefficient training methods, Army risks impotence in pursuit of cutting edge technology. A balance must be achieved between modernising with technology and developing and retaining the humans who employ it.

2.   Synchronised digital systems will enable commanders to detect, discriminate, track, analyse and interface into higher strategic networks allowing superior and faster appreciation and decision making. The Army Modernised Mission Command Implementation Plan (MMCIP) aims to 'synchronise deliverables and initiatives from various sources into coherent Army digitisation phases, decisive events, milestones and actions required to transition to a digitised Land Force, as part of a Joint Force, during the period 2015-2020.'[48]

3.   The Defence White Papers and Defence Investment Plan express modernisation activities. Those activities endorsed for implementation are managed through coordination of Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC) changes. 'FIC comprises the physical elements, the functional groupings and other activities that are required to achieve endorsed capability requirements.'[49] The purpose of this paper is to examine training specific elements of the FIC as they apply to the Army MMCIP and address any perceived shortcomings.

4.   **Scope.** The scope of this essay is to consider the human aspects of the FIC. This paper will address the human factors and the training considerations of the Personnel and Training FICs. Much of analysis and accompanying examples are based on RA Sigs, as digitisation has a large effect on this corps, but bears relevance across wider Army. A number of methods for developing a smarter, more sustainable and capably prepared workforce are presented and seven recommendations are made.

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[47]   Signals were hand written then typed, transmitted, received and dispatched by signals operators.

[48]   Department of Defence 2015, *Army Modernised Mission Command Implementation Plan 2015-2025,* Version 2.0, p 2, para 1f.

[49]   Department of Defence 2015, *Army Modernisation Plan 2015 - Vol 2, Army Modernisation Coordination Information*, p 5, para 25-29.

5.   The aim of this paper is to identify the human areas of the FIC that lack focus in the Army MMCIP and identify factors that require consideration in regards to who and how we train in order to produce a capable and modern, integrated digitised force.

PERSONNEL FIC – WHO WE RECRUIT, TRAIN AND EMPLOY

6.   **Cognitive ability.** The complex human landscape will feature ambiguity as a constant where personnel will need to operate in a high technology, information rich and relentless high tempo environment. Without the right people with the appropriate training, Army's ability to generate combat power will suffer. Aptitude testing is one method to measure the cognitive ability required for technically complex tasks, but it is currently only used for ab-initio recruiting, trade transfer and officer selection. When a trade up-skills, entry standards should be raised, and the wider effects. Those already within the trade may no longer possess sufficient cognitive ability and will struggle to up-skill. Those who trade transfer or discharge will create a hollowness that will take years to fix through recruiting alone. [50] Up-skilling a trade needs to include a plan for the retention of these members and that allows them to become masters of their environment.

We must achieve mastery of this environment. [51]

MAJGEN FA McLachlan, HMSP-A.

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50   As an example, the RA Sigs trade structure review of 2008 merged the linesman and technician trades; the corps' least technical category with the most technical. No aptitude testing was conducted with issues resulting. Additional cognitive load with more complex systems will further impact this trade.

51   MAJGEN McLachlan 2015, HMSP-A, presentation to the Defence Advanced Signals Operations Course, 19 Aug 15.

7.   **Jack of all trades.** The term 'jack of all trades' is commonly used in a constrained environment where doing more with less is exceedingly the norm. For a RA Sigs tradesman, the specialist and all-corps skills required to achieve mastery of the environment pictured above and perform all rank related functions, are extensive. [52] It includes managing/engineering ICT systems with expertise in radios, RATEL, cryptography, antenna theory, frequency agility, waveforms management, tactical satellites, radio mission planning, path profiling software, IP networking, battle management systems, spectrum management, electronic counter measures, information management and trade supervision. All-corps requirements demand expertise in command, management, leadership, operations and training. Extra regimental appointments may include equity and diversity, WHS, committee appointments and security. They must understand Defence policies and procedures (doctrine, manuals, instructions, directives, orders and SOPs) and be proficient in weapons, an expert in close combat and physically fit.[53] Though not exhaustive, it questions whether mastery is achievable across such a breadth of skills and RA Sigs are certainly not alone. Digitisation is only one aspect of the MMCIP and is not confined exclusively to RA Sigs, nor is the expectation of an exceedingly broad skill set.

8.   **Competency based skills.** It is generally accepted that training delivered solely on courses is sufficient to impart competence infinitum. A gauge of degradation in skills is rarely conducted before employment in a new role. In comparison, the civilian accredited Training and Assessment qualification (TAE10) required by instructors, assessors and training supervisors, applies a two year proof of currency when recognition is sought.[54] A test of current competence—or period of retraining—should occur periodically for all specialist skills, not just those with regulatory oversight. Individual readiness demands that basic skills and fitness are regularly tested, but very few trades require the same proof of readiness/currency for specialist skills.

9.   **Who we train.** The Ryan Review notes that the Australian Army training and education system is well positioned to exploit advanced learning techniques and delivery.[55] Studies have also shown that lengthy training on courses at training establishments is ineffective due to the science behind how young adults learn (Ilic, unpub). Until the age of 25, young adults have a short learning loop and require immediate contextualisation of training by way of practical on-the-job (OJT) application. Current methods result in skills taught within the first few months of lengthy courses usually being forgotten. Long courses need to consider conducting training in smaller portions with periods of OJT. Just as RAEME have long recognised the importance of OJT for technical trades, the complexity of the digital age would see other corps—particularly RA Sigs—benefit from this approach. It was implemented by the ECN 662 trade[56] in 2008 where initial employment training was split with a period of OJT before completing the advanced components of the course. The financial liability for travel and disruption to high tempo units detract from this approach, but for long term efficiencies—including enhanced motivation and retention—this method should be embraced more widely. Regional based training, recognition, coordination of the force generation cycle and change management are means of addressing cost and disruption.

10.   **Civilian workforce.** Army understands that it requires a diverse workforce in order to operate in a complex human landscape. 'Army's capability is enabled by the wider Defence

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52   The following example is for ECN 662—Communications Systems Manager/Engineer at the WO2/WO1 rank.
53   Department of Defence, RA Sigs Employment specifications Communications Systems (ECN 662), DPS, Canberra, 2009, Annex A-11-1 – A-13-3.
54   CAPT L Birchley 2015, Regional Education Detachment, QI Course, 01 Mar
55   Ryan Review – CASAC submission 29 Apr 16
56   RA Sigs Communication Systems Operator

civilian and contractor workforce.[57,] An advantage of civilians filling specialist jobs is the longevity of the workforce when compared to the transient nature of Service personnel. The training and/or OJT of specialist skills can consume up to two thirds of a member's posting. The problem is compounded when an individual's portfolio must demonstrate employment across a number of commands/specialties. They therefore learn a technical and often perishable skill that is rarely employed in future postings. The solution may therefore be a combination of employing civilians on a permanent or contracted basis (much like the United States model) and creating stovepipe specialties that provides a sustainable career path[58] whilst retaining the trained workforce within that specialty.

TRAINING FIC – HOW WE TRAIN

11.   **Training distractions.** Defence continues to waste resources developing and delivering unnecessary training, particularly on obsolete equipment and redundant skills. Cumbersome and unnecessary training mechanisms delay modernisation and can impact preparedness and capability. Limiting the impact can be achieved by defining at an early stage what equipment is necessary, what personnel and skills are required and how they must be recruited and trained.[59] Failing to define the parameters of digitals systems resulted in the delivery of disparate systems into a networked environment. The result was the requirement for additional research, development and training—inefficiencies that delay progression on other modernisation and educational activities. The move away from defining fixed performance specifications and the revised One Defence approach to processes of the First Principles Review[60] will enable faster development and delivery of integrated systems, but the development of the training for the new capabilities must keep pace with capability delivery. Failure to deliver timely training has flow on effects to other FIC as capability bricks are just bricks without the humans to operate them.

12.   **Category sufficiency**. The multitude of career paths in the ICT industry have grown as new technology emerges and complexity increases as shown in figure 1, but conversely, there are corps that are shrinking their trade structures. For RA Sigs, the restructure of 1998 was deemed necessary in order to train for new technologies, trade sustainability and to reflect true trade positioning and progression and to remove redundant trades but saw the employment structure reduce from 17 categories to six.[61] It further reduced to four following the 2008 review. The next review should determine if four is sufficient or if specialisation in fields such as networking, spectrum management, Electronic Counter Measures (ECM), cyber operations and information management will require additional trades.

13.   **Training efficiencies.** The training liability of keeping pace with technology, the changing needs of Army and alignment with civilian accredited training warrants a revised approach to training. RA Sigs—for example—largely conduct training at the DFSS whereas nationally recognised training for ICA11 can be accessed from 765 training facilities throughout Australia.[62] Efficiencies also need to be implemented to reduce the duplication of skills and knowledge that are gained in the workplace against the training formally delivered on courses. The priority tasks within the tranches of the Ryan Review implementation directive should conclude that exported and on-line training, simulation, the use of external facilitators such as the

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[57]   Department of Defence 2015, *Army Modernisation Plan 2015 - Vol 2, Army Modernisation Coordination Information*, p 4, para 20.

[12]   Sustainability includes career pathways, promotion prospects and retention issues in accordance with the Defence Strategic Workforce Plan.

[59]   Gilmore, P 2015, *Commander Forces Command's 100 day assessment*, Forces Command, Sydney, p 19

[60]   Minister for Defence 2015, *First Principles Review 2015*, Australian Government, p 17-18

[61]   Department of Defence 1998, Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal, *Royal Australian Corps of Signals Trade Restructure, Reason for Decision,* pp 2-3.

[62]   Training.gov.au, Organisation / RTO search, ICA11.

Box Hill Institute of TAFE and better application of the recognition process requires greater attention by Army.[63]

14.	**Recognition.** Recognition of current competencies or prior learning is underutilised predominantly because of its burdensome nature. Army places the onus of recognition on the individual and has historically made members complete entire courses where only components thereof have been deficient. The difficulty arises from intrinsically entwining components of military attitudes such as teamwork and service ethos within and throughout military courses. In doing so, Army tends to duplicate effort by developing curriculum that already exists within the National Training Framework. Analysis is required to delineate skills and knowledge from attitudinal aspect of training in order to modularise training for the purpose of recognition. Additionally, greater assistance should be provided by training specialists to facilitate maximum use of recognition with the onus taken from the trainee and placed on the trainer. An example of the gains through maximising modularity and recognition would be demonstrated by a substantial reduction of military driving courses if recognition was sought and accepted for civilian drivers' licences.[64]

Figure 1: Areas within the ICT industry and ICT career streams

15.	**Professional equivalence.** Not only is Army poor at recognition, but it has very limited ability to grant management level equivalence. Unlike industry, Defence does not enlist skilled and experienced individuals or industry leaders and place them into similar positions within Defence. Ab-initio enlistment largely ignores qualifications and rarely considers recognition of industry skills except for certain professionals who enlist as Single Service Officers (SSO).

63	Campbell, Lieutenant General A 2016, *Chief of Army's Directive 09/16*, *Implementation of the Ryan Review – Army's campaign plan to improve education, training and doctrine*, Army Headquarters, Canberra

64	Gilmore, Major General P 2015, *Commander Forces Command's 100 day assessment*, Forces Command, Sydney, p 24

Modern society no longer sees only doctors, lawyers and chaplains as professionals. With the First Principles Review advocating behavioural shift to enable a One Defence workforce,[65] scope exists to expand SSOs to include professionals from areas such as ICT and to review the methodology to include the senior non-commissioned and warrant officer ranks (Single Service Other Ranks).

16.   **RTO inefficiency.** Army risks defining training to meet civilian competencies rather than meeting essential military capability requirements with qualifications and compliance being prioritised over professional military education (PME). It is a misnomer that the TAE10 qualification is required to maintain RTO status.[66] Effort is wasted qualify skills that are not required for the instruction/assessment of military specific training as the Army training continuum provides the requisite skills for this purpose. Only those components that attract civilian accreditation require delivery by TAE10 qualified personnel which can be achieved by outsourcing these modules. Duplication of training can be avoided by limiting the TAE10 courses to the personnel who require these skills such as Training Developers and those instructors that deliver civilian accredited courses.

CONCLUSION

17.   The core of the Army's capability is the individual soldier. The delivery of an integrated digitised force is not achievable without addressing the human aspects of the FIC that underpin the Army MMCIP. Efficiencies in the way in which training is delivered and recognised need to be explored and better employment of the wider workforce considered. Commanders should aim at 'executing now and investing in the future'[67]. By producing the efficiencies outlined in this paper, it will provide a climate where every opportunity is exploited to allow members to develop personally and professionally which will aid preparedness and increase capability. Enhancing the Army's capability through modernising mission command can only be achieved by optimising the human-system interaction.

Recommendations.

18.   In order to optimise the human-system interaction, it is recommended that:

a.   up-skilling of trades include a plan for personnel lacking cognitive aptitude

b.   long courses delivered in smaller blocks with periods of OJT

c.   the use of regional training providers is maximised

d.   sufficiency of trades be analysed to determine if the breadth is sufficient to avoid cognitive overload

e.   training efficiencies implemented including a dynamic recognition process to reduce training liability and enable flexibility for the delivery of training

f.   a process of recruiting industry specialists at commensurate ranks investigated

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[65]   Minister for Defence 2015, *First Principles Review 2015*, Australian Government, p 78.
[66]   Gilmore, Major General P 2015, *Commander Forces Command's 100 day assessment*, Forces Command, Sydney, p 24
[67]   Scott, Lieutenant Colonel M 2016, *Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Academy Operation Orders – Training Year (TY) 16/17*, WONCO-A, Canungra, p3

g.   CMAs consider stove piping specialist technical positions, articulate career paths and amend policy regarding restrictive service

h.   unnecessary RTO training overheads be removed.

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IMPLEMENTING MOTIVATIONAL BEHAVIOUR AS A JUNIOR LEADERSHIP SKILL

INTRODUCTION

1.   The motivation of personnel serving in the military, specifically the Army, is malleable. Motivation fluctuates significantly throughout the duration of service and differs across trades and professions. The motivation to seek education and perform to a high standard is an imperative trait of good leadership and one that needs to developed and encouraged in junior leaders throughout Army.

2.	The Subject One Corporal - Army (S1CA) course is the initial leadership training and assessment course for junior soldiers in the Army. It provides the basic skills and knowledge necessary to promote through the ranks as a junior leader. Soldiers are trained and assessed on numerous leadership activities and skills throughout the course. Motivation is a component of leadership that is not taught, assessed or developed on the course. Understanding motivational behaviour and being able to apply it can directly increase an individuals and organisations performance (Milne 2007).

3.	Through interaction and discussion with trainees and directing staff, complemented by evaluation of training reviews for the S1CA courses, it is evident that there is a general lack of motivation and desire in junior soldiers to conduct all corps training and professional development courses (Langston 2016, a & b).

4.	Junior soldiers are more motivated and inclined to pursue specialist courses or deploy on operations. Many fail to identify and link the skills and professionalism developed on these courses to achieving a high standard of performance during military operations. This trend and attitude towards junior leadership and training raises the question, does the Army correctly motivate junior soldiers to pursue a high standard of performance; and should more emphasis be placed on developing motivational behaviour.

5.	**Scope.** This paper identifies and defines the current model and methods of motivation used by Army to motivate personnel. It examines the effectiveness of the techniques and incentives used, and provides an explanation as to why some incentives fail to achieve the intended effect. It identifies methods to implement and create an environment conducive to leadership training and it states a process to implement training and assessment of motivating behaviour within the junior soldier training continuum.

AIM

6.	This paper aims to identify influences on junior soldiers, their motivation for leadership and proposes a strategy to implement training and assessment of motivational behaviour to improve leadership and increase performance of junior soldiers.

MOTIVATION

7.	**Defining Motivation.** Motivation is the driving force behind behaviour that leads to the pursuit of some things and avoidance of others (Western 2002). It is the combination of desire and commitment demonstrated by effort (Whetton & Cameron 2011). Motivation is studied comprehensively in an endeavour to identify and quantify why people are driven to act in a certain way. In many industries and organisations understanding and encouraging motivation leads to an increase in performance and success.

8.	Motivation directly correlates to performance. Whetton and Cameron (2011) explain motivation as the combination of desire and commitment (Motivation = Desire x Commitment). The level of motivation directly influences performance through the combination of ability and motivation (Performance = Ability x Motivation). By influencing a person's desire and commitment to act in a certain way, motivation, and in turn performance, can be influenced and increased (Whetton & Cameron 2011).

9.	Army doctrine defines a number of motivational theories that have been developed over time. LWD 0-2: Leadership defines motivation as a needs or satisfying process. It describes theories such as:

a.   Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs - The theory that a person always wants more, and that a satisfied need is not a motivator of behaviour, only an unsatisfied need motivates behaviour.

b.   Alderfer's Existence, Relatedness and Growth Theory - Argues three groups of core needs: existence, relatedness and growth that all operate as motivators at the same time.

c.   Vrooms Expectancy Theory - Argues that the willingness to apply effort depends on expectations about the future and the value placed on achieving specific outcomes. This theory contains clear implications for leadership. Effort that leads to the desired level of performance must be proportional to the system of reward.

d.   Locke's Goal Theory - Argues that setting goals that are specific and challenging increases performance. Participation in establishing goals and timely feedback has shown to result in a better performance.

10.   Motivating Behaviour is the behaviour used to persuade people to act willingly to achieve a group and organisational goal and exceed their normal level of performance (Leadership 2002). Motivating behaviour encompasses a combination of theories and practices that significantly contribute to effective leadership. The two methods defined in LWD 0-2: Leadership are:

a.   Incentive Based Behaviour - This involves providing rewards for good performance, and if required, punishment for bad performance. It is commonly used in traditional management functions.

b.   Transforming Behaviour - The behaviour displayed by a leader to subordinates that is charismatic and emits a strong sense of self confidence, purpose and style. This behaviour motivates and encourages change and innovation in subordinates.

ARMY'S METHODS OF MOTIVATION

11.   **Applying Motivation.** The Army is a diverse organisation that often applies standards, procedures or practices equally throughout the whole organisation, applicable to large groups (i.e. corps/regiments). Due to the nature and variation of its tasks, duties and individual preference, a one size fits all approach to motivating personnel does not work or encourage high performance.

12.   Instigating motivation in the workplace and creating a motivating environment is a function of leadership and requires an understanding of dynamic and multiple personalities (Colquitt, LePine & Noe 2000). A good leader needs to employ a balance and mix of incentive based and transformational behaviour at the right time, place and for the correct duration.

13.   The correlation between leadership, motivation and performance emphasises the need to educate, train and assess Army's junior soldiers in understanding and exhibiting motivational behaviour. This commitment to training will improve the performance and leadership of junior non-commissioned officers throughout Army.

14.   There are two main aspects required to be addressed to implement a focus and training outcome relating to motivational behaviour;

a.   Create a motivating environment that encourages and develops junior leaders. This addresses the external factors that impact trainees' desire and willingness to attend the course; and

b.   Implement a system to educate, train, practise and assess the motivational behaviour of junior soldiers.

15.   **Teaching motivation.** Motivation is seldom taught or addressed throughout the Army's soldier training continuum. It is discussed to a limited extent before and during arduous activities such as the food and sleep deprivation exercise on the S1CA course. However there is no formal teaching or assessment of motivational behaviour and traits throughout any all corps training curriculum.

16.   Army's training and assessment methods focus on assessing tangible and quantifiable attributes. Qualities such as leadership and attitude are more difficult to quantify, however are still evaluated. Training and assessment of motivational behaviour can be implemented in the same way. Being a key component of leadership and performance, it would be advantageous to teach, practise and assess junior soldiers' understanding of motivation and ability to exhibit motivational behaviour.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMY'S INCENTIVES

17.   Army implements a range of incentives to motivate personnel. Incentives range from pay, leave, awards and citations to corrective action involving arduous tasks, discipline, fines and restrictions. Incentives and punishments over a long duration helps maintain compliance, however it does not encourage exceptional performance or the will to exert effort beyond the average.

18.   To continually improve organisational performance a mixture of performance based incentives and transformational behaviour from leaders needs to be developed and promoted. This requires investment in training and educating to develop leaders that are able to project charismatic leadership and high standards of performance.

19.   The underlying theme of disinterested soldiers when questioned about their motivation to attend the S1CA course was that the trainees simply did not value the incentives the course provided (Langston, 2016 (a)). Some trainees where not interested in promotion, which comes with extra responsibility as well as financial incentives. Others were not motivated by the intrinsic incentives such as the feelings of accomplishment or satisfaction with achieving a goal (Discussion with trainees on S1CA course, 04 Jun 16).

20.   When questioned, the majority of motivating incentives involved simple comforts and wants. Things such as an early knock off or takeaway food in the field. A question put to soldiers that appeared to be unmotivated was "What is the most satisfying thing you have done in the Army? The thing you were most proud of?" The answer was usually along the lines of completing recruit training, initial employment training or deploying and returning from overseas. All of the common answers usually involved conducting arduous and difficult tasks (Discussion with trainees on S1CA course, 04 Jun 16).

21.   This raises the question, if the most satisfying thing soldiers experience in the Army is the most challenging and arduous, why are junior soldiers unmotivated to pursue and conduct challenging tasks that are satisfying? This relates to the lack of association between the task and motivational incentive to the individual. By understanding individual motivations, incentives can be tailored and targeted towards individuals that would result in an improvement of performance.

22.   **The Motivation to Lead.** Chan and Drasgow (2001) discuss the 'motivation to lead' and identify the understanding and relationship between leadership and the motivation to be a leader. It identifies that the motivation to accept and pursue leadership is multifaceted. The

approach is based on the premise that leadership skills and style are learned and that the motivation to lead can be changed.

CREATING A MOTIVATING ENVIRONMNENT

23.   Motivation cannot be forced. It can be influenced by external factors that aim to fulfil a need. Successful NBA coach Phil Jackson was asked, "What was his method of motivating professional basketball players?" after winning an unprecedented seventh NBA championship. He replied "I don't motivate my players. You can not motivate someone, all you can do is provide a motivating environment and the players will motivate themselves" (Jackson 2000, as cited in Whetton & Cameron 2011).

24.   The aim to improve the desire of junior soldiers to pursue leadership and professional development opportunities is achieved by creating an environment that motivates and appeals to them. This involves developing and creating appealing external factors that surround the training. Theories and methods listed below can be implemented and developed to create a motivation environment;

a.   Interview trainees - Identify what motivates students, develop goals and a plan to achieve them

b.   Display positive leadership - Allocate instructors according to their ability to display leadership and encourage motivation

c.   Reinforcement - Tailor intrinsic and extrinsic rewards and punishment that appeal to the trainee and relate to the goals they themselves establish

d.   Timely Rewards and accurate feedback - Rewards and accurate feedback need to be presented in a timely manner. The sooner awards or feedback is presented after conducting the positive behaviour the more likely it is to be repeated.

IMPLEMENTING AND TRAINING MOTIVATION BEHAVIOUR

25.   Knowledge and understanding of motivation is essential in being able to practise and apply it positively as a leader. Training motivation can be implemented as an assessed aspect of the S1CA course to further develop and train junior leaders. The characteristics listed below would implement a base knowledge of motivational behaviour to trainees;

a.   Theory - Develop and deliver theory lessons on the motivation and motivating behaviour in the junior soldier training continuum

b.   Practical - Teach and demonstrate examples of motivating behaviour methods to positively influence subordinates

c.   Case studies - Implement case study examples based around positive motivational behaviour and lessons learnt, particularly in military leadership

d.   Assessment - Develop and apply a fair and accurate assessment to rate and rank trainees on their ability to demonstrate motivational behaviour

e.   Reporting - Report on the ability of soldiers to influence peers and display motivational behaviour whilst on course. Possibly implement throughout annual performance appraisals.

CONCLUSION

26.   The capabilities provided by the Army often require its personnel to conduct arduous, challenging and undesirable tasks. It is essential that Army and its leaders are motivated to perform at a high standard at all times. Motivation is a fundamental component of leadership and performance. In order for the Army to perform to a high standard as an organisation it is essential that it invests in training junior leaders to understand and exhibit motivational behaviour.

Recommendations

27.   To implement motivational behaviour as a junior leadership skill, the following recommendations are proposed:

a.   Implement methods discussed in para. 24 to create and develop a motivating environment within the S1CA training establishments; and

b.   Identify the desired outcomes of adding motivational behaviour training to the S1CA training package and implement elements of theory, practical, case studies, assessment and reporting to train and assess junior soldiers on their ability to exhibit motivational behaviour.

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AUFTRAGSTAKTIK AND JUNIOR LEADERSHIP

INTRODUCTION

1.   *Auftragstaktik*[68], a term not in common usage, is synonymous with 'mission command' and also a more holistic approach to leadership. It is a system where emphasis is placed on the initiative of those in command positions at all levels. The ADF needs to practice *Auftragstaktik*, due to the limited manpower available, in order to maximize our combat potential.

2.   **Aim.** This document discusses *Auftragstaktik*, illustrates how it can be applied, and how junior leaders can create teams that can implement *Auftragstaktik*. The purpose of this defence paper is to generate thought and discussion. It is not expected that everyone will agree with this perspective.

3.   **Background.** In 1866, a conflict occurred in Europe which generated little interest as far as the English-speaking world is concerned. Sandwiched between two greater conflicts it is known as the Seven Weeks War or Austro-Prussian War, and those conflicts which tend to overshadow it were the American Civil War (1861–1865) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71).

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[68] *Auftragstaktik:* A German word comprising of two German terms, *Auftrag* translated to English as "task", and *taktik* referring to military tactics.

4.	So what is the significance of this conflict? It could be considered a relatively small regional conflict, as opposed to the greatest bloodletting on American soil and, in the case of the Franco-Prussian War, the capture by the Prussians of the Emperor Napoleon III and the collapse of the French Second Empire. The Austro-Prussian War is of interest because of the first use of 'mission command' by the Prussians.

5.	General Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder) recognized that the days of a general/commander directly controlling the field of battle were gone due to the distances involved and the number of troops deployable, due to the advent of industralisation. The Prussians were to deploy 221 000 men, from up to 400 lilometres away, to the decisive Battle of Konigsgratz. Instead of issuing direct orders, von Moltke issued a series of directives containing his intent (mission command), to his subordinate commanders. For comparison Wellington, Blucher and Napoleon between them commanded 141 000 men along a front of only four kilometres.

6.	The battle of Konigsgratz saw the implementation of von Moltke's ideas. The army commanders were allowed latitude in their execution of the given directives, and, although far from perfect (with one army turning up later than expected), led to the defeat of the Austrians. The battle of Konigsgratz effectively ended any chance of Austria winning the Austro-Prussian War, resulting in the 'Peace of Prague' 23 August 1866.

7.	Post-conflict, von Moltke carried out a major review of the performance of the Prussian forces and implemented corrective actions and reforms. These were implemented before the Prussian army next took to the field against the French in 1870. Interesting is the fact that the French were keen observers of the Austro-Prussian War. The French, however, failed to implement an effective staff system and the concept of mission command in time for the Franco-Prussian War.

Auftragstaktik

8.	The word *Auftragstaktik* first appeared in German doctrine during the Second World War. The concept, although attributed to von Moltke and his writings as Chief of the Prussian General Staff (Nelsen 1987, pp 21–22), in fact predates his service in the Prussian Army. Although von Moltke never used the term *Auftragstaktik*, he described orders as either a direct order or *Befehl*, which gave detailed instructions on task and method, or a directive or *Direcktiven,* conveying the task and higher commanders reasoning to the subordinate but allowing some freedom of action.

9.	Von Moltke envisioned orders that explained the 'why' rather than the 'how', writing, 'It is crucial for the subordinate to understand the purpose of the operation, and then work for realization, even if working against the actual orders. Within the higher commander's intent, it is necessary to tell the subordinate only what is necessary to accomplish the purpose' (Gunther 2012, p 9). Von Moltke also argued that large number of orders, or verbose orders, could confuse subordinates as to the commander's true intent.

10.	Orders should convey the commander's intent and be clear, but make allowance for the subordinate to have a degree of freedom of manoeuvre, in fact, allow subordinates to show initiative. Here is the crux of the matter: how does the ADF create the conditions where junior

officers and JNCOs feel that they can make decisions based on their intuition, without fear condemnation from above?

11.   **Doctrine.** It is a central tenet of all militaries that there is a common doctrine, so that units can be attached and detached at will with the minimum impact operationally. The Wehrmacht and Waffen SS of the Second World War were particularly adept at this; especially on the Eastern front from 1943 onwards, forming *Kampfgruppe* (adhoc combined arms units for particular missions).

12.   Doctrine must not be allowed to stifle initiative, to quote General Mattis, USMC, 'Doctrine is the last refuge of the unimaginative' (Wright 2004, p 9). Having stated above that during the Second World War, the German Army had excellent doctrine allowing the rapid formation of units for short notice taskings, yet this did not stop them from showing great initiative. Joachim Peiper of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (LAH) had a meteoric rise through the ranks, due to unconventional tactics and his use of armoured infantry (Panzer Grenadiers) in direct support of his Panzers as part of his operations (Werner and Brooks 2014). Peiper actively encouraged his subordinates to use their initiative during the German retreat on the eastern front, when command and control was fluid to say the least, inflicting heavy casualties on the Russians.

13.   German JNCOs were trained to assume command at least two levels up, for example 'No 14 Company was often commanded by JNCOs and from 1943 had no officers as platoon leaders' (Werner and Brooks 2014, chap 10, para 41), and they were expected to take the initiative. The German *Landseer* (other ranks) was no better a soldier than the Aussie Digger or the British Tommy, but they were allowed a degree of freedom that enabled them to make rapid tactical decisions that increased their combat effectiveness.

AUFSTRAGSTAKTIK AND THE ADF

14.   There is a lot of discussion about mission command and the ADF has some very good doctrine, but does the ADF practice it or allow initiative in subordinates? Some would argue that it does, others will disagree. In order to implement *Auftragstaktik*, we need to look at the basics of team building. This requires commanders to get to know their soldiers. It requires effort on behalf of both junior officers and JNCOs to seek out the strengths and weaknesses in the team.

15.   **JNCOs.** It is incumbent on JNCOs to form a working relationship with their subordinates, to gauge their strengths and weaknesses. It is a reality that the working day can be busy and that there are numerous tasks to perform, but JNCOs need to take time and sit down and chat. There is no order that states work must finish at 1600. Teams are built on trust, and if time is taken to get to know the team members, it can soon be established which members can be relied upon to use their initiative wisely. A JNCO must take every opportunity to enhance personal and professional development, and take time for self-reflection with regards to decisions they have made.

16.   Although JNCOs are taught about initiative on subject courses, are they truly allowed to demonstrate this under test conditions? When trainees are under assessment, assessors should use their experience to consider not just the pass/fail criteria, but in the event of an assessment not going as expected (e.g. the QDEs on Ex ANZAC), assess whether the trainee has used their initiative based on a logical thought process.

17.   **Junior Officers.** There is a story that encapsulates *Auftragstaktik*. Following a battle Prince Frederick Karl reprimanded a major for a tactical error. The major responded that he was following orders from his superior officer and that constituted an order from the King himself. The prince replied, 'His Majesty made you a major because he believed you would know when not to obey his orders' (Dupuy 1977 p 116). Although this story is about senior officers, it can still be applied to junior leaders and junior officers. It neatly demonstrates that junior leaders and officers be allowed the independence to interpret the situation and execute actions that fulfill the commanders' intent, rather than adhering to the letter of the order.

18.   As previously stated there is a lot of discussion with regards to mission command, but how many times are junior leaders allowed to display initiative, without the fear of retribution should things not work out to the commander's satisfaction? German pre-WWII officers were actively encouraged to show initiative on exercise, so long as they used doctrine as a basis for their decisions, and if things did not go according to plan, an AAR was conducted as to what went wrong. This was used as a learning tool. The ADF, from my experience fails to do this effectively.

19.   Exercises need to allow for junior leaders to take the initiative and make mistakes. It seems every exercise must be a victory no matter what. Anything that detracts from this is frowned upon, and as junior leaders must adhere to the plan regardless, initiative is stifled. Let the ADF as an organistion and command be mature enough to let the red forces win if the conditions are there, learn from the mistakes, and let junior leaders have a fair go. Exercises at regimental level and below should be planned with enough time to allow for 'hot' resets, so that after a quick AAR that particular element of the exercise that went wrong can be addressed. Making mistakes are what generate the best learning points.

20.   The ADF regularly conducts AARs and they are of a high standard, but how many are drawn from the archive and actively studied before the start of the next exercise season. This must be done as a group to engender discussion and the way forward and not merely given to the new junior officer to read in isolation.

21.   Once junior officers and JNCOs have established efficient working teams, they will know who can be relied upon to make those intuitive decisions that are the basis of *Auftragstaktik*, allowing a tactical freedom that is a force multiplier.

Auftragstaktik: is it still relevant?

22.   As early as the Vietnam War, company commanders in a firefight could look to the sky, not in the hope of close air support, but to see helicopters orbiting. These helicopters contained battalion, brigade and sometimes corps commanders all giving the man on the ground advice, sometimes conflicting, as to how to fight the battle.

23.   With advances in technology, commanders no longer have to be near the battlefield in order to view what is going on. Though this technology does offer significant advantages, it also means those on the ground can be under greater scrutiny. This is all very well in asymmetric warfare in which we hold all the advantages, control the airspace and electromagnetic spectrum. The problem will be if we are required to fight an enemy that can negate these advantages and has superior numbers. The aim of our training should be that we produce JNCOs and officers

that can negate the numbers of the enemy through initiative and, therefore, become a force multiplier.

CONCLUSION

24.   *Auftragstaktik* and mission command are inherently the same. They are based on subordinates correctly identifying the commander's intent and conducting the mission in order to achieve that intent.

25.   Junior leaders and junior officers must be given the opportunity and time to develop their teams, and they must endeavour to utilise that time effectively.

26.   JNCOs and junior officers must be trained to take initiative, and the fear of the 'strategic corporal' minimised in higher command. Exercises must be used as learning tools, and mistakes allowed for. While current conflicts allow an unprecedented level of control, we still need to train for the next war, when events may not be to our advantage.

27.   The ADF understands and would like to implement the concepts of *Auftragstaktik*, but it dabbles on the edges. There is a fear factor that prevents it being utilised to the full, and therefore inhibits the ability of our Junior Leaders to achieve their maximum potential.
Recommendations

28.   Previous AARs to be reviewed in a formal setting before an exercise begins, as the regimental staff will change significantly due to the career management cycle. This enables the junior staff to learn.

29.   A greater emphasis on the use of initiative in training, utilising doctrine as a basis, but allowing the trainee latitude in decision making. The lack of success in a training exercise should not be seen as a 'failure', so long as the trainee/junior leader/exercising unit can express a logical thought process behind decisions made.

30.   Major exercises must make allowance that the 'Red Forces' may win. The reason for exercises should be about identifying what happens when the enemy adapts *Auftragstaktik*, and not their doctrinal approach, and, therefore, how we can counteract it.

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BALANCING THE USE OF PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL METHODS IN THE DELIVERY OF POST AB-INITIO JUNIOR LEADERSHIP TRAINING VIA A GREATER USE OF CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

1.   The Australian Army is one of the Nation's foremost leadership training institutions. The various organisations which deliver the suite of all-corps and corps specific training together provide a robust education and instruction in leadership theory and practice the likes of which is matched by few. Although Army excels in this capacity when compared to other institutions throughout the nation, improvements must still be sought. Continuous growth is enabled by identifying areas of deficiency and implementing incremental changes. By identifying areas for change, Army can ensure it is doing its utmost to best prepare the young men and women of our nation prior to placing them in harm's way in the service of Australia.

2.   Organisations around the world have identified the development of leaders at all levels as an imperative for increasing organisational effectiveness.[69] Most organisations however, fail to determine if their development programs really work.[70] The effective development of leaders at all levels is of particular importance to the Australian Army which looks to generate opportunities and advantage from mission command.

3.   There exists an opportunity to enhance the outcomes of the leadership training provided to junior leaders via the implementation of a greater level of practical training, as opposed to the current dominance of theoretical instruction. Current feedback from graduates of the Subject One Corporal -Army course includes that the leadership component of the course delivers too much theory, and would benefit from a greater quantity of practical components.[71] Anecdotally, a large

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[69] Leslie, K., & Canwell, A. (2010). Leadership at all levels: Leading public sector organisations in an age of austerity. European Management Journal, 28(4), 297-305
[70] Weinstein, M. (2012). *The Bottom Line on Leadership* (Vol. 49, pp. 49). Minneapolis.
[71] Langston, T (2016) Post Activity Report – Subject One Corporal Army Course Session 0242, 18 Apr – 10 Jun 16, WONCO-A and Langston, T (2016) Post Activity Report – Subject One Corporal Army Course Session 0244, 02 May – 24 Jun 16, WONCO-A

portion of Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers do not find such feedback particularly surprising. The ease at which such empathy is forthcoming points to an understanding that they perhaps shared similar views when receiving their junior level leadership training some years ago.

4.   **Scope.** This paper will discuss the greater implementation of the case study method in to junior leadership instruction provided to Army's future Section Commanders in the Subject One Corporal – Army Course (S1CA).

5.   Although this paper will refer specifically to S1CA, the recommendations may be useful to a wider training audience such as the All Corps Platoon Commander's Course and the Subject One Sergeant Course – Army.

AIM

6.   This paper details the benefits which can be derived from the implementation of high quality case studies, and the method by which they can be implemented into the leadership module of the S1CA.

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR JUNIOR LEADERSHIP TRAINING

7.   The art of influencing others to accomplish team or organisational goals, otherwise known as leadership is a skill that can be taught. Leadership requires the synthesis of cognitive, emotional and social intelligence into the analysis of a situation and the development of an action to influence that situation.[72]

8.   Some leadership skills transcend the organisational level of the leader, such as the ability to inspire and motivate. There is however, some divergence in the skills required to lead teams as compared to organisations. Team leadership is characterised by attention to detail and a focus on driving for results, while successful organisational leadership is more reliant on the development of a strategic perspective and in the development of effective policy and culture.[73] It is intuitive that the latter requires a thorough theoretical grounding in order to competently carry out one's duties as an organisational level leader. Extending this same theoretical leadership training to the team leader level assumes the skills required are similar, this assumption is not correct. Practical lessons delivered and analysed via the case study method are a more effective vehicle by which team level leadership training may lead to useful outcomes.[74]

9.   The use of the case study method makes the relevance of training clear and valuable to trainees, which enhances the effectiveness of the training.[75] Gegenfurtner *et al.* found that trainees who perceive the utility of training to be high and relevant to their circumstances transfer a high level of training content and have higher levels of self-motivation to continue with their future development.[76]

10.   **The Leadership Component of the Subject One Corporal – Army Course.** The leadership component of the S1CA course is currently comprised of twenty-six hours of training. This is spread across approximately eighteen hours of theoretical instruction, and approximately

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[72] Weinstein, M. (2012). *The Bottom Line on Leadership* (Vol. 49, pp. 49). Minneapolis.

[73] Zenger, J. and Folkman, J. (2014) *The Skills Leaders need at Every level* (30 July), Harvard Business Review

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[75] Weinstein, M. (2012). *The Bottom Line on Leadership* (Vol. 49, pp. 49). Minneapolis.

[76] Gegenfurtner, A., Festner, D., Gallenberger, W., Lehtinen, E. and Gruber, H. (2009), *Predicting autonomous and controlled motivation to transfer training*, International Journal of Training and Development

eight hours of practical activities and practice. The current use of cases is restricted to the ethics component of the leadership module of the S1CA. These cases however, could be further developed in order to require thorough analysis methods in order to draw maximum trainee benefit. Given the objective of the leadership module being the development of junior leadership skills, the effectiveness of this training can be enhanced by increasing the ratio of practical to theoretical instruction.

11.   Certainly, one of the advantages the S1CA course has over other leadership courses in Army is the ability to practice team leadership skills both in a barracks and field environment as soon as they have been taught.[77] The case method, however, will allow a bridge between the delivery of theoretical instruction and practice.

THE CASE METHOD

12.   The case study method has been adopted by the United States Military Academy at West Point as a primary means for the delivery of leadership training.[78] Following the theoretical instruction on leadership topics, cases are analysed with the teachings in mind. This method fills a gap between theoretical teachings and practice in the field or barracks environment. It allows trainees to conduct their own analyses of situations and apply problem solving techniques in an environment where mistakes have no impact. In moving through cases which relate to trainee's future areas of responsibility, trainees develop a toolbox of leadership skills which they may draw upon in future situations.[79]

13.   The use of cases provides four primary benefits:[80]

a.   They can help students to develop skills in critical analysis and problem solving

b.   They encourage the development of higher order thinking

c.   They can foster habits of reflection

d.   They can help present a realistic picture of the complexities which the trainees are likely to face once in leadership positions.

14.   Cases help build on prior knowledge, integrate knowledge, and consider application to future situations. They encourage teamwork and accountability, and are realistic and motivating to adult learners.[81] The use of the case method on the leadership component of S1CA would enhance the overall module delivery by drawing on benefits of the case method.

15.   **The Case Method Process.** Although trainees will come to differing conclusions on what the right or ideal actions are in the situation, the process for analysing and solving the case will be the same. The procedure is as follows:

a.   Identification of the symptoms of the leadership case. These may be current or future effects - "What is the issue and impact of this situation"

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[77] Allen S., Miguel R., Martin B., (2014) *Know, See, Plan, Do: A Model for Curriculum Design in Leadership Development,* Advanced Management Journal; Spring 2014
[78] Devine, J. A. (2012). *Case-Study-Driven Leadership Training from West Point*. Public Manager, *41*(4), 25-29
[79] Ibid
[80] Lundberg M., et al. (1999) *Who Learns What from Cases and How?* Mahwah, NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
[81] Tomey, A. (2003) *Learning With Cases,* The Journal of Continuing Education in Nursing; Jan/Feb 2003

b.   Understanding a succinct chain of events of the situation, which allows the identification of cause and effect relationships – "How did this occur"

c.   Identification of which teachings relate to the case at hand – "Why has this occurred"

d.   An explanation of the how the application of the identified approach will remediate the symptoms identified in the first step – "How can the situation be remediated; what actions are required"

16.   Alternatively, the use of cases is an opportunity for the use of the Military Appreciation Process.

17.   **Writing Case Studies.** A variety of case studies exist with the Centre for Army Learning and other sources. Although some of these may be useful, the development of specific case studies for use on S1CA topics will allow for subject matter to be unambiguously targeted.

18.   In order for the case study method to be effective on the S1CA, the plots of case studies would require sufficient detail in order to allow a meaningful level of discussion and analysis to occur. WONCO-A is well placed to easily develop a library of case studies by virtue of the quantity of SCNOs and Officers who are posted to the Academy. Case studies can be drawn from previous experiences of Academy staff and be written to target specific topics or outcomes. The use of a wide variety of case facilitators including SNCOs, Officers and visiting lecturers would allow for trainees to be exposed to a wide range of outlooks.

19.   Case studies should be written much like a short story, with the plot designed in order to lead to the emphasis of specific teaching points. [82] Case studies should include:

a.   Written dialogue which presents a leadership challenge or dilemma

b.   Sufficient information to allow for a specific problem to be identifiable to the trainees (motivational issue, rank relationships, etc)

c.   The setting must be clear (i.e. barracks, field, social function, family issue)

d.   Language used should allow for all trainees to understand and relate to the case study

e.   The narrative of the case should be followed by the questions to be answered.

20.   The story like nature of the case should include detail on the characters, including descriptive and realistic dialogue, their personalities and their long-term behaviours. The sequence of events should be easily followed and should be presented in chronological order. If it is relevant to the teaching points, the case may include supplementary documents including orders, policies, procedures, reports, or quantitative data. The use of cases which are controversial and allow for individual interpretation are highly effective in stimulating group discussion.[83]

21.   As well as the development of new case studies, it is possible to use other methods which allow for a case analysis process. Alternatives include the use of videos, role-plays and already available case studies. The development of case studies by staff however, will ensure case studies remain relevant to the topic and are contained in an appropriate setting.

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[82] Devine, J. A. (2012). *Case-Study-Driven Leadership Training from West Point*. Public Manager, *41*(4), 25-29
[83] Tomey, A. (2003) *Learning With Cases,* The Journal of Continuing Education in Nursing; Jan/Feb 2003

CONCLUSION

22.   The Australian Army is a revered national institution of leadership training and development. The opportunities Army has for the delivery of leadership training and development are vast, and the organisation achieves what many organisations cannot, the development of leaders at all levels. The development of effective section commanders is essential to Army's ability to effectively fight war, and enables mission command. The development requirements of team leaders are divergent to the development requirements of higher level leaders. Where significant theoretical knowledge is necessary for organisational leaders, junior team leaders require support in developing a skills tool-box from which they can draw upon. S1CA must re-focus its leadership training at the team level by integrating a greater amount of practical leadership training in the place of some of the theoretical components. The case method is a highly effective method of achieving this re-focus and allows trainees to analyse and solve a wide range of problems which will allow them greater future utility than theoretical knowledge alone.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

a.   The leadership module of the S1CA course integrate a larger quantity of case studies in to its training program

b.   A case study library is developed by WONCO-A for use throughout the All Corps Solider Training Continuum

c.   Once well developed the library should be published for broader use by Army for junior leadership development.

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Improving retainment: Examining the administrative issues impacting the retainment of skilled soldiers within the Australian Army

INTRODUCTION

1.   The Australian Army is a mobile organisation. In order to maintain mobility, personnel postings are determined in accordance with Army priorities, in descending order: service needs, career needs, and then soldier needs. This approach has a number of advantages for Army. However, the practice of placing the needs of personnel last on the priority list has a number of implications for retention.

2.   In order for Army to meet the recruitment goals outlined within Plan Beersheba, it must reconsider its current administrative processes, while still ensuring that it continues to maintain a flexible workforce and meeting Army's requirements to have the best trained, deployable and knowledgeable individuals.

3.   **Scope.** This paper will discuss the current and alternate strategies Army has adopted to retain its soldiers, issues in current administrative reporting processes for soldiers and outline strategies to retain soldiers within Army longer; utilising methods that make Army an attractive organisation to work for.

AIM

4.   This paper will identify administrative advantages and disadvantages which effect retaining soldiers within Army by discussing three key areas of current and proposed retention concepts for soldiers, personnel management across a broad base and specific affects on the soldier.

RETENTION

5.   **Skills and personnel.** A previous minister for Defence, the Honourable Joel Fitzgibbon PM, made the following comments to Service Chiefs, "the single biggest challenge facing the Australian Defence Force into the future is our people and skills shortage...".[84] The Defence Minister of the time clearly understood that people are the backbone of Defence; that the people of the organisation are a critical component in providing the Army capability for Defence. There have been a number of smaller reviews completed by Defence, culminating in a large review called the Australian Defence Force Retention and Recruitment Program (R2) which was released in 2010[85]. From this review a number of initiatives have been implemented within the Australian Army with many programs being moderately successful in retaining soldiers for longer periods of service.

6.   **Resources and initiatives.** Through this review process the Army has demonstrated a clear requirement to retain personnel and in particular skilled personnel within the organisation. In the last 15 years Army has made an effort to engage currently serving personnel and provided different resources and incentives to assist soldiers to stay. Retention resources such as the 'Stay

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[84] Retention of medical officers in a combat support-only health service,
[85] Review of the Australian Defence Force Retention and Recruitment (R2) Program

Army'[86] website, provide information to assist soldiers in extending their careers and provides a multi pronged approach by offering different methods for soldiers to stay within Army. It does this through providing information into different trades and roles within Army and provides other information on incentives and advantages of staying within Defence. Incentives are another key tool that Army have used in an attempt to keep personnel within Army. Some of incentives that have been utilised in more recent times include providing excellent super benefits for Defence members and providing civil accreditation for training achieved on some courses.

7.   **Bonuses and allowances.** In addition to the aforementioned initiatives, Army has identified that competitive pay is often a key incentive to try and maintain personnel, particularly within the technical trades. They have used multiple methods in an attempt to better compensate personnel, including 'sign-on' bonuses (such as the Army Rank retention Bonus)[87], or other cash incentives (such as the Defence Home Owner Assistance Scheme or the Army Military Instructor Allowance)[88]. There are also various bonuses to critical skills trades. All of these methods have targeted specific audiences in order to extend careers within specific roles and trades of Army in order to fulfil capability shortfalls of critical trades where a gap is now present of a future shortfall has been identified.

8.   **Shortfalls.** However, there is anecdotal evidence that suggests that whist many of the incentives are good, they do not in fact target some of the core issues to retention; moving location and career prospects. For example, one incentive offered is for personnel who have served 15 years in Defence. It is often the case that these soldiers are already committed to a Defence career, therefore is there really a need for a sign on bonus scheme. This is particularly contentious when many senior ranks often become stagnant at the one rank, making it difficult for promotion of subordinate staff. This forces many to leave Army looking for alternate career options. Another example the DHOAS scheme. Many soldiers either can't afford to or don't want to buy a house, and the rent offered by Defence is not overly attractive in many locations, therefore negating another key incentive that Defence offers.

9.   Although Army has worked hard to develop a number of initiatives in an attempt to retain its soldiers, the retention rates for Army and Defence have largely remained the same. Separation rates have fluctuated, and year on year, Officer separation rates have fluctuated at around the 6% mark whilst Other Ranks have fluctuated between 10-12% over the last eight years.[89] This is despite the many new or updated initiatives Army has implemented in order to retain its soldiers. Whilst it is acknowledged that many of the independent programs have been moderately successful, one of the difficulties in maintaining the Army workforce may in fact be as a result of the difficult bureaucratic processes of the organisation.

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

10.   **Bureaucracy.** The Australian Army is the largest organisation within Defence with over 29,000 permanent and 14,000 reserve personnel serving in 2015.[90] Whilst this seems a large number, Australia maintains one of the smallest standing armies in the world.[91] With thousands of personnel it, not all personnel are going to be satisfied with their employment opportunities. However, Army as an organisation doesn't help itself and is a bureaucratic organisation[92]. Issues

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[86] Stay Army intranet site
[87] PACMAN Ch 3 Part 5, Division 2
[88] Army Retention and completion bonuses
[89] Complete workforce planning
[90] Defence Annual Report 2014-2015.
[91] Worldatlas
[92] Key Issues about Australia's defence and strategic security

are deeply engrained into the culture of Army. The posting and promotion process is slow and cumbersome and administration processes are often complex.

11. **Accessibility.** Due to the bureaucracy of Army it can be difficult for personnel to access the multitude of initiatives on offer. There is clear evidence that Army offers many incentives in an attempt to sustain its workforce; however, they can be difficult to find or understand and access to a number of schemes are approved only after stringent guidelines are met. The Pay and Conditions Manual, a very large and complex document is just one such example of how difficult finding and interpreting information can be, particularly for more junior soldiers and officers.

12. **Administration.** Another contributing factor to the bureaucracy is the reduction of administrative staff within units. This has become a problematic issue with the loss of expert staff functions adding to the administration burden of many units. The shortfall of dedicated administrative staff, combined with a high turnover of staff within units, has resulted in substandard administration for many units. Without the expert knowledge of a clerk within a unit, units now appear to struggle with many processes the clerk used to complete on an everyday basis; the specialised administration expertise a clerk provides can not be underestimated.

13. Additionally tools that have been implemented to assist with administration are in many instances poorly understood and utilised; only adding additional complexity for units. Objective is a good example of this. It is slow and cumbersome and units often have their own file system that can run 10 folders deep; making it difficult to find information quickly. However, as previously suggested, by keeping staff in postings for longer administration could be completed quicker due to base knowledge being retained and keeping clerks in units longer should be considered to help streamline much of the bureaucracy faced by units.

EFFECTS ON THE SOLDIER

14. **Posting length.** Army soldiers also don't feel that their career is in their own hands. In the recent YourSay Long term attitudinal trends: Army 2001-2015 survey, participants were asked if 'Individual posting preferences need to have more influence'. 61% of participants responded 'yes' to this question. [93] Whilst this percentage has fallen by 15% over the past 15 years (2002), it clearly indicates that there is still further development in the posting process required in order to give soldiers more freedom of action. This is also evidenced in what soldiers think of their work-life balance, with Army ranking the lowest in the services at just 47% satisfaction compared to Defence civilians averaging approximately 70% satisfaction[94]. As Army has had to adapt to Plan Beersheeba through the re-positioning of personnel, they may have ultimately placed an even greater strain both on its units and its personnel.

15. **Flexible working practices**. Further analysis and improvement of the implementation of the flexible workplace arrangements and family friendly policies must be completed as this would assist in mitigating the large number of personnel who cite family considerations as their reason for leaving Defence.[95] Army is generally still perceived to be inflexible for families and both men and women may achieve a better work-life balance with more back to back postings in the same locality as well as additional freedom to work alternate hours. Currently this process is very much based on an individual commander's perspective and it can be difficult for soldiers to justify why they should be allowed this perceived 'privilege'. Through better understanding and

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[93] Yoursay Long Term Attitudinal Trends: Army 2001-2015.
[94] Yoursay Long Term Attitudinal Trends: Army 2001-2015.
[95] Deputy Chief of Army, (2011), p.11.

accessibility the current workforce could become more productive and more likely to stay if a better work/life balance was offered.

16.   **Personnel assessment report**. Reporting in Army has been seen as a constant issue. Both the Directorates of Soldier and Officer Career Management hold regular workshops and documents in an attempt to provide support to commanders in how to write reports[96] and more recently new reporting forms have been implemented in an attempt to provide a more regulated and even process. However, many soldiers still believe they don't progress for two key reasons: Many people receive either over inflated reports and/or receive written reports that have been written to a substandard level. Soldiers indicated in the Yoursay survey that they believe they are unfairly judged within the promotion process[97]. Soldiers and officers are less likely to stay in a job where they don't feel like they have the opportunity to advance, whether real or perceived, this is an issue Army has to continue to address.

CONCLUSION

17.   Raineri proposes that, "through a change of management practices, including a variety of organisational interventions that, when executed properly and consistently with appropriate internal and external organisational events, will facilitate the enactment of organisational change and processes".[98] Defence strives to ensure that its soldiers are managed in a fair and equitable way; and will struggle to achieve Raineri's bold and thought provoking statement. However, Army through the use of data gathering of many years has developed and implemented a variety of good schemes, bonuses and incentives in an attempt to retain its highly skilled soldiers. Unfortunately, bureaucracy has ensured that administration is cumbersome and therefore many schemes are only moderately effective and many schemes have lost some of their intended punch. Many of the good initiatives are seen to be difficult to attain for many soldiers, particularly those with little experience in the process. Additionally, Army has continued to fall short in giving personnel what they want; more choice in where they are posted, how they are employed, a fair promotion system and more recourses in order to achieve a better work life balance. Army needs to continue to engage soldiers of all ages and ranks to move forward to change its culture to match the ideals of modern society; otherwise many soldiers simply cannot, or choose not to, stay in Army. The motto of 'Army First' may not fit the new generation of soldiers joining the Australian Defence Force.

RECOMMENDATIONS

18.   To better manage work life balance and enhance retention and personnel management, it is recommended that:

a.   Personnel are offered the choice of extending their current posting in location and/or unit rather than being posted to a new location unnecessarily.

b.   Postings are extended to three years for all ranks, unless all parties agree to a shortened posting.

c.   Existing incentives and sign on bonuses to retain personnel within critical trades are offered earlier than current time periods.

d.   Each unit be provided with a dedicated clerk (Army or APS), to improve unit administration and internal management of personnel.

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[96] SCMA and DOCM intranet sites.
[97] Yoursay Long Term Attitudinal Trends: Army 2001-2015.
[98] Raineri, (2011), p.267.

e.   Reporting processes are made transparent to personnel - to create less reliance on personal opinion influencing soldier career paths and posting locations.

f.   All personnel be provided with annual training and options to establish a flexible work arrangement.

g.   Junior commanders are to be given more mission command within the approval process by reducing the delegation approval one level lower for most documents.

h.   Administration processes to be actioned and approved internal to units in order to streamline wait times.

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Who asks Jeeves? Just Google it – Issues with access to Australian Army Doctrine

Knowledge is of two kinds. We know a subject ourselves, or we know where we can find information on it.

Samuel Johnson

INTRODUCTION

14.   Military doctrine and the supplementary publications, both supporting and subordinate, are the foundations of the Profession of Arms. Defence uses doctrine to guide the conduct of war. Doctrine underpins training in structured and unstructured environments. Doctrine is also the impetus for self learning and development.

15.   A common misconception is that doctrine is becoming irrelevant in the Contemporary Operating Environment. This cultural shift has permeated because of deployments to non conventional theatres of operations, the proliferation of theatre specific TTPs and SOPs and cumbersome doctrine. The debate is growing surrounding the contemporary nature of the doctrine library, even with the constant updating and reinvigoration. The Chief of Army has recently **Adressed** this issue and directed that doctrine be reviewed and refreshed.

16.   Is the Army looking for an answer to the wrong question – should the question be; is Defence doctrine readily accessible given today's omni-channel information environment?

17.   **Scope.** This paper will discuss why Defence needs readily accessible doctrine and how best it should be structured, what the current structure of Doctrine an how it is stored on the DRN, the search functions available and how it creates social engineering and real word search tools that make searching efficient. From this, recommendations for the improvement on accessing Doctrine will be provided.

AIM

18.   The aim of this paper is to propose a change to the current state of our doctrine, from the user interface perspective, and to discuss solutions that will make doctrine more accessible to the next generation of military personnel.

ACCESS TO DOCTRINE

19.   The Ryan Review[99] discusses accessibility to doctrine as unintentionally hindering its use in training. As well as external access and metadata issues within PDF documents, there is an issue with using the DRN to get to the desired publication. Users accessing doctrine on the DRN use a search bar function and a side menu. The sidebar has a link to 'Policy and Documents' which has a drop down to doctrine. It make sense to collocate Army doctrine within the policy framework, as there is overarching Defence doctrine and the other services are in the process of creating their own doctrine from their existing publications.

20.   The search bar is usually the first point of contact for a user – it is the easiest contact point that does not require any interrogation of menus. A search for 'Doctrine'[100] provides some interesting results. The top four results provides a database index of doctrine, (useful if you know the number of the publication you want) a doctrine web site that does not work, a doctrine note and the AAP Online Library. The first 10 results do not provide links to Doctrine online or iArmy products. This creates a dilemma, as the user now has to find another way to access their

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[99] BRIG Mick Ryan, AM, 2016, Ryan Review *A study of Army's Education, Training and Doctrine Needs for the Future,* Section 6: Doctrine pp 55

[100] Search on DRN conducted 28 1415 Apr 16

desired content. This can be problematic for users who try to use a natural speech search[101] for doctrine content.

21.   A search for 'detention management doctrine' brings up LWP-G 0-1-7 (*Internment and Detention*) as the sixth search result, a search for 'ISTAR Doctrine' only brings up LWD 3-0-3 (*Land tactics*) 2009.[102] This increases the time required for a user to find the information they need.

22.   Going through the 'Policy and Documents' link to 'Doctrine Online home'[103] displays a group of very eye catching buttons that draws the user's attention. The main problem with this is that there is not an immediately apparent link to doctrine. The left sidebar provides a link to Doctrine and Procedures but this not presented as the main function of the website.

23.   SharePoint provides a better interface with Doctrine Online coming in as the second search result when searching for the word 'doctrine'. This is an improved user interface but since SharePoint is not the initial interface on Defence networks the functionality is lost. Integration between the homepage search function and SharePoint needs to be explored. This lack of being able to search for doctrine leads to less use and scrutiny of the publications. This creates and element of social engineering[104] not only does it deters users from sourcing their information from doctrine and when the user does eventually find the source material they struggle with navigating within doctrine itself.

ACCESS WITHIN DOCTRINE

24.   The structure of doctrine also has an impact on how the user interacts with the information, much like a user interface on a computer. Doctrine is the collection of fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in achieving objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.[105] Single service doctrine is subordinate to the Australian Defence Doctrine Publications, which stand as the conceptual and philosophical premise that frames Army's doctrine.

25.   The current structure of Army doctrine has two levels, Doctrine and Procedures. This provides a set of publications have the over arching philosophical ideas specific to Army (doctrine) and then the procedures that provide the 'how'. This then informs unit specific SOPs that suit the unit's fighting capability. There should be a fundamental leap between doctrine and procedures. However, these publications have become intertwined over the years with some information that is contained in doctrine being more suited contained within procedures. This doctrine has a logical external structure but the information throughout should be split and structured to provide a more logical structure for search purposes.

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[101] Online Learning Library Centre, http://www.usg.edu/galileo/skills/unit04/primer04_09.phtml accessed 14 June 16

[102] Search on DRN 28 1505 Apr 16

[103] Doctrine Online, http://drnet.defence.gov.au/ARMY/Doctrine-Online/Pages/Home.aspx accessed 28 April 16

[104] Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_engineering_(security) accessed 14 June 16

[105] The nature of military Doctrine, Chapter 3, ADDP-D Edition 3 2012

RESTRUCTURE

26.　　　Through a discussion with Major Michael Deer[106], the idea was raised that the structure of doctrine could be streamlined with the inclusion of a doctrinal 'stepping stone' publication positioned between LWD and LWP. This could be filled by a 'Land Warfare Tactics' series. This would therefore filters out the principles that are used in the conduct of war from the philosophical ideas of some doctrine. Furthermore this would align more of the principles of certain tactics with their procedures as it provides a logical step from doctrine to procedures. LWD 0-1-3 *Employment of Military Police* contains all the broad fundamentals of employing Military Police[107] at the strategic level down to tactical planning considerations for various environments.[108] This could be split with a defined gap between the fundamentals and the planning considerations. This would then be followed by LWP-G *Internment and Detention* as one of the Military Police procedural publication.

27.　　　This logical function would support the ability to search through these publications, as a user can see how the doctrine flows from LWD 1 to the procedure publications. Within each publication, a link can be embedded in the preface which would direct the user to the more relevant level – a link to the other related publications and a preface with words to the effect of ' For information on the procedures of X got to [inserted hyperlink]'. So if the user is looking for tactics when in the doctrine above, they can then instantly move the next relevant publication. This is not a new concept as ADDP-D has links to other ADDP and ADFP built into the amendment list.

28.　　　To ensure that information is placed in the correct publications, a 'how to write doctrine' publication should be developed to provide strict guidelines to what type of information is placed in each publication. This would be a standard to which any person who could to contribute to these bodies of work must adhere to. This would help maintain delineation between each doctrine type.

GOOGLE AND OTHER SEARCH ENGINES

29.　　　Keyword search is one of the basic methods that support the search algorithms that are run by search engines such as Google and Bing. Being able to search using a common phrase or a series of relatable words, increases the likelihood that the user will connect with the information they want. The current system on the DRN has a level of functionality that does provide mostly relevant information, but does not present it in an effective manner.

30.　　　Google maintains a search database of all information openly accessible on the internet. This provides the most relevant and up to date information to the user. The method Google uses to make information easier to search is called 'crawling with an index'.[109] This method is where all accessible websites are scanned by an algorithm and all key words/phrases are indexed in a database to make searching more efficient. This method simplifies how information on the web is referenced (through indexing) so it can be easily accessed when searched. Defence needs to

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[106] Conversation with Major Michael Deer, April 2016

[107] LWD 0-1-3 *Employment of Military Police Chapter 1*

[108] LWD 0-1-3 *Employment of Military Police Chapter 9*

[109]Google, https://www.google.com.au/insidesearch/howsearchworks/thestory/ Accessed 21 May 16

review how it stores and retrieves information in the most efficient and cost effective manner. There is no benefit to having information stored within the DRN construct that cannot be easily accessed by those who need it.

31.   To put this into perspective, Apple Inc has invented very few new technologies, Steve Jobs himself said, in 1996, Apple was 'shameless about stealing great ideas', but they created such intuitive and user friendly virtual ecosystem, especially the IOS operating system that any individual can pick up and use any of their devices, no matter their technical abilities. This shows how building a system with the role of the user in mind, makes a far better system to interact with.[110]

32.   Despite there being numerous other devices out there, people are drawn to the user friendliness of Apple products. This has created, over the decade, a user base that is always willing to go to Apple's virtual ecosystem for their information needs. This demonstrates how creating an environment that people are comfortable using at all levels will encourage them to not only embrace the system, but will be able to use and navigate that system to use and find information.

33.   This is a concept that needs to be embraced to keep doctrine relevant, by having doctrine easy to access and search, it will become second nature for people to reach out and use it. Army has the database of information that is critical to how future wars will be fought; it just needs to simplify how people access doctrine in the digital age.

34.   An example of embracing outside ideas is how the US Army released their doctrine publications on to the internet.[111] This allowed the Google algorithm to construct a more in-depth index of the US Army doctrine. Anyone can now access the online US Army doctrine on an internet enabled device. Through this information efficiencies are gained through some risk of making doctrine open source.

CONCLUSION

35.   The Army and Defence as a whole have a large collection of information that is essential to winning future battles. To keep that knowledge in circulation, it must be placed within an ecosystem that is easily accessible by those who need it. This can be achieved through not only a restructuring of doctrine itself to be more defined, but also easier to search for through current interfaces on the DRN. The combination of these two changes could lead to more functional publication that are designed for the digital age and the use becomes a cultural norm. Limiting the number of barriers to accessing doctrine will create this effect.

36.   If the user does not access doctrine then the quality of the doctrine Army writes will be irrelevant. Ultimately, in this fast paced society the personnel within the Army need Army's corporate knowledge at their fingertips, as quickly as possible.

Recommendations

37.   To improve Army's access and use of doctrine it is recommended that:

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110 Micheline Beaulieu, (2000),"Interaction in information searching and retrieval", Journal of Documentation, Vol. 56 Iss 4 pp. 431 – 439

[111] US Army doctrine online: http://www.armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/

a.   Army develop a policy or doctrine that dictates the structure and content of each type of doctrine.

b.   Restructure Army doctrine into three levels of publications being the Doctrine, Tactics and Procedure series.

c.   For access, redevelop how the DRN search engine functions and provides information to users.

d.   An alternate line would be to follow the American example and declassify all non-sensitive doctrine and publish it on the internet.

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DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION IN DEFENCE: IS IT THE ROLE OF THE ADF TO

BE A REFLECTION OF AUSTRALIA'S DEMOGRAPHIC MAKE UP?

The worst form of inequality is to try and make unequal things equal.

Aristotle; Greek Philosopher

BACKGROUND

1.   In 2014, as a result of incidents involving unacceptable behaviour towards women, the Australian Government commissioned a review into the treatment of women in the ADF[1]. Elizabeth Broderick, in her capacity as Sexual Discrimination Commissioner was appointed to conduct the review and subsequently published four papers on the topic[2]. The findings of the Commissioner's reviews established that not only did the ADF have a culture problem relating to its treatment of women but that claims of inappropriate conduct were rife throughout defence[3]. One of the main recommendations to come from the review was for the ADF to implement "affirmative action", now referred to as "positive discrimination" in order to ensure diversity within the ADF. This recommendation was fully endorsed by the Government and implemented by Defence shortly therafter[4]. Since the release of this report, Defence has initiated a cultural shift aimed at rectifying perceived discrepancies concerning the number of women and minorities in Defence compared to Australia's social demographic profile.

AIM

2.   This paper does not seek to demonise this review. Rather, it is intended to discuss the merits of forcing unnecessary diversity onto the ADF and how this may affect its capability.

SCOPE

3.   This paper bring into question whether actively recruiting minority groups as a means of increasing diversity will raise the capability of the ADF or will it have a negative impact. Should the ADF sway from its extant policy of maintaining an effective and cohesive Defence Force free from partisan political bias[5] or should it now be used as a political arm by the Government to pursue topical agendas?

THE ROLE OF THE ADF

4.   The ADF's mission is to defend Australia and its national interests; its primary role is to defend Australia against armed attack[6]. With such an important mission and role it has always been imperative that the ADF recruits the best available recruits regardless of gender, race, religion or any other discriminating means. This has served the ADF well and has seen Australia take a central role in global conflicts around the world and forge an excellent reputation amongst its allies, partners and even its adversaries. Nowhere in the ADF's charter does it state that it must reflect the society that it protects. The push for the ADF to conform to society's current diversity and inclusion charter will only serve to weaken its capability as more suitable candidates are overlooked in order for the ADF to conform to political pressure. In order to pursue a cultural shift the ADF has commenced actively targeting minority groups such as women, indigenous Australians, people from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds, people with a disability, LGBTI people, mature age and youth[7]. While there is no problem in the recruitment of those listed, and nor should there be, Defence must take care to ensure that they are not recruited at the expense of a more suitable and capable applicant simply because they do not fall into the category of a desirable minority.

DIVERSITY IN THE ADF

5.	Is the ADF lacking in diversity? Reports such as that released by Elizabeth Broderick would say yes; however, what these reports fail to recognise is that the ADF is already a very diverse organisation within a diverse industry that's landscape is ever-changing, sometimes at break-neck speed. There are hundreds of jobs across the spectrum of Defence that caters to all types of people, backgrounds and personalities. Without diversity, the ADF would fail in its mission. However, compared to the wider community, the ADF is an Anglo-Australian, male dominated organisation. According to Dr Elizabeth Thompson, in her 2014 commissioned study of diversity in the ADF, "this demographic profile is no longer desirable or sustainable"[8]. This statement identifies a dangerous trend in the ADF's future recruiting strategy, which will see it do away with its proven recruiting demographic in favour of a more politically correct and social appeasing one. Even more so when you consider the ADF's role of defending Australia against armed attack. In fulfilling this role, members of the ADF have been, and will be again, called to engage in close hostilities, kill and be killed and suffer enormous physical and mental damage. This requires that Defence select the strongest most resilient candidate, best suited for the job regardless of race, gender or religion.

6.	Currently, there is no evidence that a Defence Force with greater numbers of minorities drawn along gender, religious, sexual orientation or ethnic lines possesses a greater capability. The Australian Government and its military leaders owe it to its officers, soldiers, air men and women and sailors to ensure that the leaders in place are the ones best suited, with the relevant qualifications and experience, for the job. The metric of success of any policy in the ADF is its ability to improve warfighting capability. If a policy does not improve capability it is a distraction. True capability is extricably linked with identifying and rewarding the most prodigious talent regardless of gender, race or any other quality. 'The best person for the job' should be the mantra overriding any selection decision. Capability is not improved through rewarding those who are mediocre but possess a given desirable trait. To accept mediocrity is to accept coming second; not a desirable trait in the profession of arms.

DIVERSITY FOR DIVERSITY'S SAKE

7.	In order to achieve a politically correct diverse Defence Force, capable of reflecting Australia's demographic profile, discrimination is the only tool available. Webster defines diversity as "the condition of being different or having differences".[9] The ADF describes diversity as "broader than the labels of gender, age, language, ethnicity, cultural background, disability, sexual orientation and religious beliefs; it is a way of thinking and an approach to delivering the best results".[10] When used appropriately, diversity is a valuable tool for problem solving. Having the ability to tackle a problem from a range of different view points can be highly advantageous for commanders. But at what price? How will political adherence affect the ADF's capability, or its ability to achieve its mission?

8.	In its 2014 edition of the Defence Diversity and Inclusion Strategy 2012-2017[11], the ADF set about detailing its plan for becoming a diversity and inclusion leading organisation in Australia. The report highlights that 86.05% are male. Of that 86.05% only 0.97% are from an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander background and only 5.4% come from a non-English speaking background. Yet despite this reliance on Anglo-Saxon males, the ADF still manages to be a highly respected and effective fighting force.

9.	In an article published in the Sydney Morning Herald, "*ADF needs to change to survive*"[12], Elizabeth Broderick states that:

"Warfare has changed. Increasingly, it requires new and different abilities such as technological skills, rather than simply manual or physical strength…..an increase in the number of women at all levels is also about lifting the capability and operational effectiveness of the organisation."

10.   This statement is partly true. Warfare has become far more technological, but there is no evidence or research to validate her opinion that an increase in minority groups in the ADF will increase capability and operational effectiveness. According to this logic, our military's capability is diminished because there are too many male Australians in it. Perhaps if they were less willing to sign up and serve, the Australian Defence Force would be able to do a better job.

11.   In the same article, Broderick admits that she found ADF women to be highly resistant to any initiative being directly solely at them. These women view identical, not differential treatment, as the path to delivering equality. Broderick disagrees and insists that, in spite of the feelings of serving ADF females, they are disadvantaged and require preferential treatment. This will be at the cost of their male counterparts or future male recruits.

A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME

12.   Affirmative action or positive discrimination is still discrimination. It is predicated on the provision that the preferential selection or opportunities afforded to a group who has a perceived disadvantage will ultimately rectify that inequality. Affirmative action has been utilised for these reasons extensively in the private sector, public sector and educational institutions to correct for race and gender underrepresentation[13]. But the ADF is a unique institution in that it purposely puts its employees in harms way. The consequences of ill fated policy are exponentially drastic for Defence.

13.   Research into affirmative action has demonstrated support for the obvious contention that it is an effective mechanism for increasing representation of minority groups within the workplace[14]. However, this research has been at the expense of a wider review of second order effects following the implementation of affirmative action policies[15]. It has been posited that the magnitude of these second order effects are such that they far outweigh the value of a targeted recruitment policy[16]. Recent studies into affirmative action have also revealed that affirmative action has led to effects such as creating disharmony, generating ability mismatch and contributing to a degradation of performance.

14.   **Creating disharmony.** A common belief relating to affirmative action speculates that the implementation of such policies would generate animosity and give a perception of perceived favouritism thereby engineering enmity from those who do not benefit from the policy[17].

15.   **Mismatching.** Researchers of affirmative action have also observed a trend which is known as mismatching. Mismatching occurs when beneficiaries of affirmative action are afforded the opportunity to undertake tasks beyond their demonstrated capacity and as a result are disadvantaged as they simply do not have the capacity to complete them[18].

16.   **Degradation of performance.** A number of studies have conducted longitudinal analysis on corporation performance following the induction of affirmation policies. This research as consistently demonstrated a loss in profit and an increase in labour costs following gender based affirmative action[19].

17.   If standards are lowered in order to hire and or promote less qualified people based on race or gender, you erase whatever benefit you may have gained by adding diversity. When you

undermine the tenets of meritocracy and personal accountability by giving unfair advantage to some chosen group, it breeds resentment and diminishes organisational performance.

DIVERSITY MATTERS

18.   Diversity of skin colour, gender, race, religion or sexual orientation is inconsequential. It seems that the idea of diversity triumphed by Dr Thompson and Ms Broderick is less about celebrating the tremendous diversity already within the ADF and more about the inclusion of minorities. An idea that has no basis in fact.

19.   In his book "Bowling Alone[20]", Robert Putnam carried out several studies on social diversity. What he observed was that racial and ethnic diversity was not strength. What his studies identified was that racial and ethnic diversity, which these days comes along with diversity of fundamental values, didn't lead to better, or more cohesive and tolerant communities. He states "*The only two things go up as the diversity of your census track goes up is protest marching and television watching, (people becoming less social)"*. Putnam concluded that the only way to build social capital and true cohesion was to ensure that there was a strong emphasis on shared values, not diversity of values, not diversity of skin colour or gender. Shared values.

20.   Diversity of view point and experience is the only diversity that should matter, especially in the defence of the nation. The colour of your skin, the god you believe in, your genetic makeup should be of no significance and should not be used as a selection criteria. Science demonstrates that diversity of view point is a highly useful thing. New takes on old ideas are productive to growth. If we all have the same goals and fundamental values, any diversity other than viewpoint diversity is a complete waste of time. Diversity of viewpoint makes things better and ultimately leads to progression, development and improvement. It is why trench warfare is no longer employed as a satisfactory means of combat; someone with a different (diverse) view came up with a better way of engaging in warfare.

CONCLUSION

21.   The treatment of all personnel within the ADF and future representatives should be the focus, not singular groups identified for preferential treatment. Ensuring that all are treated fairly and afforded the same opportunities should be a priority to increase capability, as opposed to attempting to grow numbers of specific groups. The battlefield is no place to be experimenting with new social expectations nor is it a place to ensure that every part of Australia is represented. Discrimination, be it good or bad, positive or negative shouldn't be used to grow and develop the ADF. Due to the pure nature of its service, it should always be the best candidate, best suited to the role that is chosen. Placing discriminatory markers such as race, gender, sexual preference will only seek to degrade its capability.

22.   If you want a high-performance team, simply hire the best people for the job, treat them fairly, and encourage them to openly question the status quo and each other. That's all the diversity and inclusion you really need.

RECOMMENDATIONS

23.   In order for the ADF to build a strong and united force capable of fulfilling its role in an ever-changing world, the following is recommended:

(1)   The ADF continue its policy of ensuring a fair workplace for all.

(2)   The ADF resist political and social pressure to conform to practices of hiring or promoting personnel based on gender, ethnic, race or religion grounds.

(3)   The ADF continue its policy of promotion based on performance and suitability to the role.

(4)   The ADF realise that the practise of positive discrimination or affirmative action is still discrimination, and will employ the same practice they are trying to remove but with far more potentially dire consequences.

AL Terrace
CAPT
ADJT

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BRILLIANT AT THE BASICS?

The soldier is the Army. No Army is better than it's soldiers.

George S. Patton Jr.

INTRODUCTION

1.   In the Message from the RSM-A, one of the headings is 'Be Brilliant at the Basics (an expert in close combat)' (Spinks, 2015). It then goes on to point out that all of us are required to be brilliant at what we do. There are numerous other commander and unit web pages / documents that contain the same statement or sentiment. This clearly demonstrates the importance placed on the maintenance of our basic skills.

2.   On completion of Recruit Training, all soldiers have been taught and assessed as at job standard on the knowledge and skills required of them as an all corps soldier. It begins with the individual having the knowledge of the basic skills; living in the field, weapon handling, shooting, navigation, etc. They must then be able to effectively apply this knowledge in the real world. Based on the assumption that all soldiers have maintained their knowledge and skills at job standard, we conduct collective training and deploy on operations. Yet continually it is stated that soldiers lack the required knowledge, skills and/or abilities. Therefore, are we brilliant at the basics? If our soldiers are not performing at job standard then Army's capability is significantly reduced.

3.   The purpose in writing this paper is to improve awareness of the current shortfalls in maintenance of all corps soldier knowledge and skills. It will also identify some of the factors that effect and/or hinder soldier's ability to maintain this knowledge and skills.

AIM

4.   The aim of the paper is to propose actions to increase the retention of basic (all corps soldier) knowledge and skills.

THE ALL CORPS SOLDIER

5.   **Employment specifications.** The opening page on the Directorate of Workforce Management – Army, All Corps web page for the Employment Specification of the All Corps Soldier states 'This specification details the skills, knowledge and attributes that are required by all non-RFSU soldiers that underpin the capability required in a military environment'. The specification lists 58 tasks that the All Corps Soldier is required to perform at all ranks, correctly and effectively. These then are the 'basics'. The list reads like a mini RAINF job description; however, as stated in the 'I'm an Australian Soldier Nine Core Behaviours', every soldier an expert in close combat. The knowledge and skills required to complete the tasks and be an expert are all perishable. They require regular revision and practice.

6.   **Shortfalls.** Is it all soldiers that lack the required knowledge and skills? Of course not. Exact numbers of personnel that have demonstrated a lack of skills and knowledge (or the application there of) on any particular activity are not available. However, it is a constant theme of the CTC Trend Reports and Subject 1 Corporal Army Course Post Activity Reports meaning it is consistently significant enough to mention. The main areas are generally related to weapon handling and field skills (hygiene, routines, battle drills, and navigation). During the conduct of the SUBJ 1 CPL ARMY Courses at NQ Wing, WONCO-A, it has been surprising to see the number of soldiers that are unable to perform basic drill movements to the required standard, or dress themselves correctly in polyesters. These soldiers come from all areas of Army. For some soldiers the shortfalls are minor, while with others the level of knowledge and skills is extremely poor.

FACTORS AFFECTING

7.   **Attitude.** The first factor can be with their attitude towards being a soldier and the requirements. On most SUBJ 1 CPL ARMY Course sessions; there will be at least one person that will complain long and loud saying *'why am I doing this?'*, and *'this has nothing to do with my job'*. Generally during the operations phase, but it will also occur during Deliver Army Training on weapon or drill lessons. Some soldiers despise repetitive training, not understanding that the knowledge and skills are perishable. As a PL SGT, my soldiers complained that the training program was boring, repetitive, and that they already knew how to construct a range card. The challenge was set that if the majority of the platoon could correctly construct a range card then and there, we would knock off and the program would be changed. The program remained as it was. Junior leaders need to mentor their subordinates so that they understand that knowledge/skills are perishable. This will ensure they also understand the importance of maintaining currency in the all corps soldier requirements, which will in turn improve their attitude toward the effort required.

8.   **Primary employment.** For many, one of the main factors affecting their all corps skills currency is their primary employment. The non-arms corps personnel (clerks, movers, craftsman, etc) make up the majority affected by this. The requirement to complete tasks related to their

primary role as opposed to maintaining all corps skills will generally be their unit's priority. This can mean there has been no opportunity for the soldier to revise or practice these skills. The centralisation of some capabilities has exacerbated the issue. One example (not meaning to single them out) is APAC. Personnel posted to these units are highly unlikely to go to the field during their time allowing their knowledge and skills to perish. Over SUBJ 1 CPL ARMY Courses sessions 0237, 0239, 0241 and 0243 there have been from two to five soldiers, each course, that have stated they have not been field since completing basic training. In one case this was a period of six years. While the completion of tasks within a soldier's area of primary employment is important to maintaining Army's capability, so is soldiers having the time and activities to maintain their basic all corps knowledge and skills.

9.   **Competing interests.** At unit level there are always numerous competing interests that tend to take precedence over individual all corps skills training. Many are directed from higher headquarters, for example external support tasks, mandated training activities, governance requirements, etc. Sometimes, the focus of the unit itself will detract from the ability of personnel to maintain skills. The focus will be purely on the team and collective environment with an assumption that individual skills will be maintained by a soldier's participation in the activities. However, as stated by BRIG Ryan 'It [individual training] is the precursor to an individual's ability to participate in collective training' (Ryan, M, 2016) Direction from higher whether a requirement of policy or an order must be adhered to, units need to train in the collective and team environments, but these competing interests can not be allowed to remove individual training from the program.

10.   **Resource constraints.** The ability to maintain skills may be affected by a lack of physical resources. The biggest resource constraint though is normally time. The main factors that deprive us of this valuable resource are the previous two points, primary employment and competing interests. A lack of time allocated to the maintenance of all corps soldier knowledge and skills is the main reason many personnel are unable to complete the required task correctly or to the expected standard. All units need to allocate a reasonable amount of resources to the maintenance of the all corps soldier requirements.

EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE

11.   **Pre-course training.** It has been identified and recognised that many trainees are inadequately prepared to attend SUBJ 1 CPL ARMY Courses resulting in poor performance.[6] The majority of the areas of concern are a lack of knowledge and/or ability in the all corps soldier requirements. There are several initiatives being developed to improve the preparedness of trainees to attend the course, which is a good start and is required. However, it does not address the issue that the all corps soldier knowledge and skills are required by all soldiers on completion of recruit training, not just those preparing to attend SUBJ 1 CPL ARMY Courses.

12.   **E-Learning and simulation.** Defence now has several simulation systems and E-Learning programs. These mainly concentrate on revising/improving theoretical knowledge. They are good tools to assist in the maintenance of knowledge and in some cases for assisting in maintaining practical skills (i.e. the WTSS). The role of a private soldier in the required all corps soldier tasks is mainly practical in nature though. Nothing beats getting out in the dirt and carrying out the tasks for maintaining the knowledge and the ability to apply it.

CONCLUSION

13.   Shortfalls in the individual skills in the ceremonial arena can damage Army's reputation. Shortfalls in the ability to apply skills in the field directly degrades Army's

capability. As stated in the opening quote 'No Army is better than it's soldiers'. Greater emphasis must be placed on the maintenance of the all corps soldier knowledge and the ability to apply it in practice for all personnel. A balance between this requirement and the many competing interests needs to be maintained for the long term. We must be brilliant at the basics so that Army can continue to excel.

Recommendations

14.   The following recommendations are made:

a.   Units must continually allocate sufficient resources, especially time, to junior leaders to allow them to conduct training on the all corps soldier knowledge and skills.

b.   All soldiers take part in a directed one week session twice a year that is purely focused on the revision of knowledge and skills required by all corps soldiers. Soldiers posted to NAG positions be required to participate with units in their local area.

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HISTORY OF THE WARRANT OFFICER AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER ACADEMY

Lead, Mentor, Train

The beginning

1.   The Army has always delivered leadership training for its non-commissioned officers and warrant officers. However, it was not until the establishment of the Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer (WONCO) Wing in 1985 (Hamilton 2002, p.52.) that all-corps leadership training was centralised. Under the command of the Land Warfare Centre, the WONCO Wing was responsible for delivering specified all-corps leadership training to Army's non-commissioned officers and warrant officers. The courses being delivered were the Subject One Sergeant Army course and the Subject One Warrant Officer Army course. Colonel P Amison, the Commandant of the Land Warfare Centre between 1985 and 1986, commented that the Wing provided '*a common basis of training irrespective of the soldier's Corps, which ensured a uniformly high standard across a range of fundamental military disciplines for the Australian Army's Non-Commissioned Officers'* (Hamilton 2002, p.51.). In 1993 the Wing expanded its training responsibility to include the Regimental Sergeant Major course (Hamilton, 2002, p.54.).

2.   To support the implementation of all-corps training, Regional Training Centres (RTC) were raised in 2001 throughout Australia and were responsible for the delivery of the Subject One Corporal Army course (Hamilton 2002, p.64.). It was not until 2008 that both the WONCO Wing and the RTCs were combined under the name of the Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Academy (WONCO-A). The Academy is now responsible for the entire all-corps leadership training from Corporal to Warrant Officer Class Two and Regimental Sergeant Major. WONCO-A was officially recognised as a Unit on the Army Order of Battle in January 2016 under command of the Royal Military College of Australia. The Academy's direct Headquarters is the Land Warfare Centre.

Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Academy

3.   WONCO-A Headquarters is based in Kokoda Barracks, Canungra. The Academy has five Wings dispersed throughout Australia that deliver all corps soldier training. The Wings are located in Canungra, Brisbane, Townsville, Darwin and Adelaide. Brisbane, Townsville, Adelaide and Darwin deliver the Subject One Corporal Army course with Adelaide and Darwin also delivering the Subject One Sergeant Army course. Canungra delivers the Subject One

Sergeant Army course and is the only Wing to deliver the Subject One Warrant Officer course and the Regimental Sergeant Major course. Up until 2014 the Academy also had Wings in Melbourne and Sydney that delivered the Subject One Sergeant Army course and Subject One Corporal Army course; however, these were disbanded to allow for the Academy's structural reorganisation.

4.   The courses conducted at the Academy have remained largely unchanged and are focussed on improving individual aspects of command, leadership, operations, management and training. Approximately 10 per cent of Army soldiers are trained by the Academy each year and this equates to a Brigade's worth of soldiers. Those that attend courses at the Academy can expect to be challenged and extended by the course curriculum.

5.   The Academy also offers training opportunities to regional and international partners. The Academy has hosted trainees from Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Fiji, Jordan, United Arab Emirates and Malaysia. In 2015, an agreement was reached to train Marines from the United States Marine Corps who had only recently arrived in Darwin as part of the Marine Rotation Force. The hosting of regional and international trainees on Academy courses is another way for the Army to strengthen bonds with close friend and allies. The Academy has also host Royal Australian Air Force Warrant Officers on the Regimental Sergeant Major course.

Initiatives

6.   The WONCO-A Unit logo, as depicted in figure 1, consists of the Rising Sun representing the Army and the badges of rank for Warrant Officer Class One (Coat of Arms), Warrant Officer Class Two (Queens Crown), Sergeant (three stripe chevron) and Corporal (two stripe chevron). These indicate the level of courses being conducted. Additionally, there is also a Pacestick and Cane which represents the Regimental Sergeant Majors and Company Sergeant Majors (equivalent) that they carry in accordance with their appointments.

Figure 1: WONCO-A logo

7.   The Unit motto was initially Proficiency Through Knowledge, which was subsequently changed in 2009 to Lead, Mentor, Train. In 2015, the Rising Sun on the logo was also enlarged to bring it into line with the updated Army branding requirements.

8.   The Unit Flag is rectangle in shape and consists of the training colours of green, yellow and green stripes with the Unit logo proportionately in the centre. Based on the Unit flag, a Unit Shoulder Patch was also approved in 2015 and is worn by all personnel posted to WONCO-A. Whilst the WONCO-A Unit Flag and Unit logo were first constructed in 2008, they were officially approved by Army Headquarters in 2015. The Unit celebrates its birthday on the 10 April each year.

9.   In 2015, South Australia Wing and South Queensland Wing buildings were officially named as Sanananda Lines and Isurava Lines. The Battle of Sanananda took place in Papua New

Guinea over the period 19 November 1942 – 22 January 1943, and saw Australian and American forces overcome heavily fortified Japanese defensive positions, entailing some of the most ferocious fighting in the whole of the Papua New Guinea campaign. The Battle of Isurava took place in Papua New Guinea over the period 26 August – 31 August 1942, and saw Australian forces, poorly equipped and supported, overwhelmed by superior numbers they could never match and yet display such courageous courage in delaying the Japanese until reinforcements could make their way forward along the Kokoda Trail.

10.   The Academy is considered the spiritual home of all senior non-commissioned officer and warrant officers in the Army. Regimental Sergeants Major of the Army, both past and present, are remembered in the recently opened Wally Thompson Memorial. Warrant Officer Class One Wally Thompson, OAM was Army's first appointed Regimental Sergeant Major of the Army in 1986 and after his passing in 2012, his family bequeathed his military medals and pacestick to the Academy in remembrance. Fittingly, the Regimental Sergeant Major course duty trainee carries Wally's pacestick during his duties.

11.   The Academy is also the home of the ANZAC mural, figure 2, depicting 100 years of service since the Gallipoli beach landings. The mural was commissioned in 2015 and officially opened by the Academy's Commanding Officer/Chief Instructor, Lieutenant Colonel Troy Francis and the Regimental Sergeant Major – Army, Warrant Officer Class One Donald Spinks, OAM. The mural was funded by the Army Amenities Fund.

Figure 2: ANZAC mural in the Jack Kirby Theatre

Conclusion

12.   The Academy is a professional organisation and centre of excellence in the delivery of all corps soldier training. At all times the Academy strives to lead, mentor and train. The Academy aspires to a culture of innovation where individuals are enabled and empowered to achieve excellence in all that we do. Trainees who attend these courses are challenged and extended. They are enabled and equipped for promotion. They are readied and prepared for the opportunity, responsibility and privilege of serving as junior leaders, and appointment holders, within the Australian Army.

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A ONE OFF VS PROGRESSIVE

"I am nervous about life after uniform. I'm not ready to crawl under a rock and expire when I separate with dignity from Army, whenever that may be. I will take charge of my future and control what I can. ………………. will assist my family and I with employment opportunities / financial stability post transition"

LTCOL M. Scott, Commanding Officer WONCO-A 2016

INTRODUCTION

1.   There are a number of services available to Defence members who have submitted their discharge/transition paperwork and are already on their way out of Defence and into the civilian world. These services should be made available to current serving Defence members how have not indicated their intent to discharge.

2.   **Scope.** The scope of this paper is to look at four services that are currently available for those members, who have indicated that they wish to discharge/transition out of Defence. This paper will provide recommendations for changes to be made to the following service:

        a.   Curriculum Vitae coaching
        b.   Veterans' Vocational Rehabilitation Scheme
        c.   Financial Advisers/Education
        d.   Career Transition Assistance Scheme.

"Strive not to be a success, but rather to be of value."

Albert Einstein

AIM

3.   This paper proposes a broad strategy for introducing a progressive approach to services for current serving members as they move up through the ranks and with time served, rather than having the services available only for those members discharging / transitioning out of Defence.

CURRICULUM VITAE COACHING

4.   The Pay And Conditions Manual (PACMAN)[112] currently states that access to Curriculum Vitae coaching is a level 2 and 3 assistance through Career Transition Assistance Scheme, and forms part of the financial services available to members as a one off service during his/her career. To be entitled to this service the member has to have indicated, by submitting the required paperwork that they intend to separate from Defence. It also states that members are advised to access the benefit within 12 months of intended separation. The value of this service

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[112] PACMAN Chapter 2 – Part 2 Division 8 - 1

is a maximum cost of $253.00 as a one of payment and is available to members with 12+ years of service.

VETERANS' VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION SCHEME

5.   According to the ADF Transition Handbook[113] there is a Veterans' Vocational Rehabilitation Scheme (VVRS) available through DVA under the Veterans' Entitlement Act, but once again this is only available once discharged / transitioned. The VVRS is a voluntary scheme operated by DVA to help eligible veterans, with or without a disability, which need assistance to obtain or hold suitable paid civilian employment. The question you have to ask yourself when considering discharge / transition, "Is the VVRS[114] appropriate for me?" The scheme might be appropriate for you if you are a veteran and:

   a.   about to leave the Australian Defence Force (ADF) with eligible service and feel you need special assistance to move into civilian employment
   b.   want to increase your hours of paid employment
   c.   want to return to paid work
   d.   feel at risk of losing your job
   e.   find it increasingly difficult to keep up the hours you are working.

FINANCIAL ADVISER VS FINANCIAL EDUCATION

6.   The ADF Financial Services Customer Centre conducts a during career financial education seminar[115]. This is a very basic presentation and does not allow for individual education on his/her situation but covers financial advice. The ADF Services Customer Centre webpage[116] also allows access to limited resources such as transition checklists and presentations, but once again does not allow for individual situations to be discussed.

7.   Open for discussion is the argument of "Financial Adviser" vs "Financial Education". Having a service were members are provided Financial Education, were some company/organisation can discuss with members financial realisms on leaving the Army. For example, you will have $xxx,xxx amount of dollars and that will be expected to last you XX amount of years, up to and including retirement. Therefore you should budget for $xx,xxx a year to make it last. Or have a substitute salary to bolster/maintain the members' current life style. Compared to Financial Adviser who provides a service/advise to you, that allows you to in invest your well earned funds. For example if you invest $20,000 into a Blue Chip investment company today, you will have a return of $50,000 after 10 years (example only).

CAREER TRANSITION ASSISTANCE SCHEME

8.   Career Transition Assistance Scheme (CTAS) is a condition of service available to members who have access to benefits within a window of 12 months before or 12 months after transition from Defence. It is not available outside of that window. The highest level of CTAS is level three and is only open to people who are full time and have reached Compulsory Retirement Age (CRA) or with 18+ year's service. Even then under this eligibility the member does not have access to the benefit of financial counselling.

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[113] http://intranet.defence.gov.au/DCO/Transitionds/ADF-Transition-Handbook.pdf
[114] http://factsheets.dva.gov.au/Factsheets/documents/HSV108%20Veterans%60%20Vocational%20Rehabilitation%20Scheme.pdf
[115] http://www.adfconsumer.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/During-Career-Seminar-September-2012-for-website.pdf
[116] http://www.adfconsumer.gov.au/

9.   CTAS Level three under a Management Initiated Early Retirement (MEIR) is the only level that allows members full access to all benefits including financial counselling up to $518.00 on top of all of the other benefits, being, approved absence for interviews, training or even on-the-job experience. Career Transition Training or Career Transition Management Coaching and CV Coaching. These benefits have limited dollar value and once they have been extinguished then no other funds are available.

RECOMMENDATIONS

10.   The services in this document are those that I feel would assist current serving members with development of a CV, preparation for an interview and financial advice/education, so that they can transition from Army with dignity and confidence. The following paragraphs will provide recommendations for a progressive approach to services that are available to members throughout their career. Theses services include the development of their CV, training on attending an interview and how to respond to questions during an interview. These recommendations will set them up for success outside of Army as they progress through the ranks.

11.   The overall cost to Defence for these recommendations has not been calculated or detailed as the data on how many members access these services is unknown by the author. More detailed research in to the overall cost to the government will be required if these recommendations are to be considered.

 "What you do today can improve all your tomorrows."

Ralph Marston

12.   **Curriculum Vitae Coaching**. This service as detailed previously is only available to members who have indicated that they are intending to discharge within the next 12 months. This service is a one of service and is available to anyone at anytime, but if you take it now, before discharge, then it is not available once you reach that point of transitioning out. My recommendations for this service are a progressive approach and are detailed in the following table:

Rank	Time in Service	Benefit
SGT	15 years	Level two assistance ($253.00)
WO2	20 years	Level three assistance ($253.00)
WO1	25 years	Level three assistance ($253.00)
	Every 5 years after 20 years	Level three assistance ($253.00 every five years)

13.   This recommendation is not a one off service for members; it is progressive as they move up the ranks with promotion and time. For example, a SGT with a minimum 15 years service and is planning to reach the ranks of WO1 with over 25+ years can have access to this service a minimum of three times, but each time developing the members CV to suit updated qualifications and rank. This then will allow members to be ready for transition when that time arrives.

14.   Veterans' Vocational Rehabilitation Scheme. This service is only available to members who intend/are/have transitioned out of Defence. Once again this service should be open to members in the later portion of their career and be progressive, but have not indicated their intent to discharge / transition. My recommendations are as follows:

Rank	Time in Service	Benefit
WO2	20 years	Covert military skills/qualifications to civilian equivalent.
WO1	25+ years	Full access to the scheme, without indicating their intent to discharge.

15.   This recommendations are also progressive, as most members that have reached 15+ years have some level of knowledge decay in writing a CV, how to conduct themselves suitably in an interview etc. The suggested start point would be the target rank WO2 with minimum 20 years service. This service could be conducted in or at the same time as the CV coaching package is being conducted. Having these schemes available will allow members to develop their CV as they progress throughout their time in Defence. Once members have reached the decision to transition / discharge then the full services can be accessed either through the two previous discussion points or through CTAS.

16.   **Career Transition Assistance Scheme.** The Career Transition Assistance Scheme (CTAS) is a suitable service; however, it needs to expand to allow a broader range of appropriate members discharging / transitioning. CTAS Level Three for example is only available to those members who have been presented with a MIER, level three CTAS being made available to a broader range of members would include financial counselling. CTAS would help build on the level of education and training of the member progressively throughout the members' career. Services available at level 3 should not be only accessible to those members who have been presented with a MIER but open to everyone that includes financial advice/education.

17.   **Financial Adviser vs Financial Education.** At the point that a member elects to discharge / transition then access should be made to a suitable Financial Educator rather than a Financial Advisor. This would then help members make a suitable assessment on their financial situation and then shape them towards suitable civilian employment to maintain their current life style.

"By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail."

Benjamin Franklin

CONCLUSION

19.   This paper has highlighted a number of services that are currently available to members who are intending transition/discharge from Defence. I personally am having some trouble getting a suitable CV written and understanding the process of applying for civilian employment.

Even the conduct of being in an interview is a challenge as I have been out of the civilian system for over 28 years. I feel if these services were made available through the latter part of my career then I would feel more comfortable with the transition to life outside of Defence, once that time has been reached with little or no cost to me.

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STRENGTH OF MIND OR HARD AS NAILS

INTRODUCTION

Resilience isn't a single skill. It's a variety of skills and coping mechanisms. To bounce back from bumps in the road as well as failures, you should focus on emphasizing the positive. Jean Chatzky

1.　　Recent combat operations of the ADF have not been without significant sacrifice. Sadly in Afghanistan forty one Australian soldiers have lost their life's and a total of 249 ADF personnel have been wounded. The risk of losing a life during operations is only but one aspect of military service. There are now numerous soldiers who have returned from lengthy deployments bearing physical and physiological scars. As more and more soldiers rise to the top with mental illness, questions are being asked as to how they may have been better prepared. Defence Science and Technology Organisation will conduct detailed studies and data collection to provide Army with information on how to best prepare soldiers mentally and physically for operations.

AIM

2.　　The aim of this paper is to focus on the current resilience training regime in particular those methods and techniques which have proven results in building mental toughness.

OLD SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND TRAINING

3.　　**Men of yesteryear.** It is not uncommon to hear comments made about our forbearers and the men of ANZAC as being "as tough as nails" or "he came from the school of hard knocks". Is it fair to suggest that the men of yesteryear were tougher because of their general upbringing? There is an endless library written across hundreds of cultures which provide solid evidence that as little as a century ago men and women were extremely tough both physically and mentally. A study by Gen Y expert Paul Harvey (2014), assistant professor of management at the University of New Hampshire observed that "in previous times the framework that people were given was not just a humbler one, but one that understood how unpredictable and inexplicable the world could be". Mentally strong people recognize that their entire life plans, and life itself, could be derailed at any moment and they don't waste their effort feeling wronged by destiny when things don't quite go their way.

4.　　**Not everyone can be a winner.** Participation in sporting activities at school has always been an important way of building a young child's confidence and tolerance. Some schools sporting events are now conducted with all children being awarded a ribbon for participation. The reason for the "everyone's a winner" approach is to try and avoid disappointment. In a recent article by Lauren Knight (2015) she claims, "the everyone is a winner mentality does not build true self-esteem; instead, it builds this empty sense of 'I'm just fantastic, not because I did anything, but just because I'm here." Life will have moments of disappointment and unless an individual experiences this then their ability to deal with it becomes harder. Therefore a training standard which demands excellence is imperative. For example promotion courses must have high standards to help build toughness to succeed not by just achieving competence but by striving to achieve distinction. This became evident to me during my time as the SI for the Warrant Officer Course. In some cases sergeant trainees who failed to achieve competency on a summative assessment would display open emotion and burst into tears or sulk for days after being told their results.

5.   **Train like the first grade.** If the Army is going to be mentally tough and the best it can be then it must train hard. A first grade rugby league team does not become a winning side with a less than tough approach. Coaches and training staff are always investigating new training techniques to keep players at their peak performance. This being said, many of the training techniques have not changed since the inception of the game. This is because the training methods of previous years worked and still remain effective today. If you have a winning formula and the results are proven then it may not be beneficial to change for the sake of it. A fine example of this is the recent winning formula of the Queensland State of Origin Team which has remained largely unchanged for close to a decade. This view is supported in research conducted by Stephan Nuesch and Harmut Haas titled Empirical Evidence (2012) on the never change a winning team heuristic does not improve a teams performance. The Army has felt the need to change some methods which were in place to build mental toughness and resilience. I will now discuss methods of training which have proven results in building both individual and collective mental toughness.

TRIED AND TESTED METHODS

6.   **Basic training.** Putting trainees in positions of high stress early in their career will help build a strong mind. It is not a matter of breaking their will through bastardisation but rather it's about putting them in a place where they may be uncomfortable and maybe even be slightly intimidated. This technique can be easily achieved by delivering well structured verbal criticism. Tone and delivery are key and NCOs must be taught how to do this effectively. Sadly junior NCOs are losing the art of fault correction and some have now chosen a path of liker-ship over leadership. The technique does not need to be personal or derogatory but rather simply inform soldiers that they have under achieved or have not performed to a good enough standard is all it takes. So how does this continue when the basic training is over? The NCOs are the key and they must be encouraged to conduct fault correction in a manner which helps educate soldiers to build mental toughness.

7.   **Battle fitness.** Its common knowledge that a robust physical routine will assist in building mental toughness. Aerobic based fitness is useful in the maintenance of personal fitness; however, battle PT is essential in building mental toughness. The conduct of minor team battle PT and activities such as bayonet fighting has considerable influence on developing soldiers mentally and physically. If used effectively minor team battle PT can help inspire a desire to win. The development of the core value of working as a team is best taught during recruit training. The recruit training package must use the power of team work to encourage soldiers strive to win. Its about teaching soldiers to push through the wall when they may think they have nothing left to give.

8.   **Field training.** The Army's approach to field training has changed from periods of five or six weeks to periods of seven to ten days. Only major exercises such as EX HAMEL see soldiers in the field for extended periods of time. Short periods of training have little impact on developing a soldiers ability to endure hardship. In fact, short periods of field training have little effect on producing high standards in general. Generally by the seventh day the soldier will have come to terms with being in the field and away from home. It is after this point that the real value of training is best seen and the psychological impact helps prepare the soldiers mentally.

9.   It is critical that field training is planned and conducted in a manner which does not accept poor outcomes. For example a Platoon which conducts a poor attack must receive a detailed AAR and another attempt until perfection is achieved. Mental toughness is enhanced by demanding high standards in all training. Sub-unit training at wings such as Tully and the former Battle Wing Canungra remain the bench mark for high standard training in resilience.

10.   **The unit's role.** Units must take the lead in building resilience as this is where the troops will spend most of their time. It should not be a mind set that training establishments and course packages be solely responsible for the building of resilience. Simple activities such as unit military skills competitions, sporting events such as blood weeks, adventure training and long route marches are all excellent examples of how to best prepare the troops. This has been reinforced by psychologist F.C. Bartlett (1989) who emphasised the connection between physical fatigue and psychiatric breakdown in battle. A units moral is critical to how the soldiers respond when times are tough. Units which are successful in terms of performance and hold bragging rights such as the rugby champions or best unit for the brigade are more likely to have soldiers who will work hard to maintain that status. Some unit commanders believe that the best way to keep the troops happy is to deliver "soda pop moral". In other words if they give the troops creature comforts such as soft drinks out field then they will become happy and work harder. This is a false understanding of how to build moral. Moral is best developed when soldiers are made to push through tough training exercises both individually and collectively.

11.   **Specific training.** The science in relation to building resilience and mental toughness requires knowledge and education. It may now be time to further develop a specific training package to teach and train specific ranks. Captain O'Donnell (2016) from the School of Artillery recently wrote a blog on the FORCOM Resilience Portal which mentions the US Army's 10 day Master Resilience Training Course targeting NCOs. This training is designed to equip junior NCOs with the tools and knowledge to further build resilience in their troops.

CONCLUSION

12.   The building of resilience and mental toughness is nothing new and has been at the forefront of soldiering for hundreds of years. By following simple proven training techniques the Army may recover lost ground in further developing mental toughness and therefore strengthens its combat effectiveness.

Recommendations

13.   I offer the following recommendations in support of Army developing a strategy to best prepare troops with resilience:

a.   Analysis of resilience training methods and techniques conducted in the past to determine their effectiveness.

b.   Design a specific course package LMP to equip junior NCOs with the knowledge, skills and attributes required for resilience training. The targeted instructors for this course should be senior WO1 and WO2 personnel.

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DECENTRALISATION OF POST COURSE REASSESSMENT PROCESS WITHIN THE WARRANT OFFICER AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER ACADEMY

INTRODUCTION

1.   The Warrant Officer and Non Commissioned Officer Academy (WONCO-A) is responsible to conduct the subject one promotion courses as part of All Corps Soldier Training Continuum (ACSTC).

2.   Historically, WONCO-A provides Army with 2095 positions across all ACSTC promotion courses as part of the Direct Training Requirements (DTR)[117]. Not all trainees who attend one of these promotion courses are successful. Trainees who have attempted an assessment and a reassessment are deemed 'Not Yet Competent' (NYC) for that Learning Outcome (LO) and are subsequently managed by the OPSWO1 as a Post Course Reassessment (PCR) to return on a future course to reattempt those NYC LOs .

3.   **Scope.** This paper outlines; the recognition process, provides the reader in-site to current PCR management processes, details inefficiencies in the current process, provides considerations and constraints for a new decentralised process and recommends a new PCR management process that is decentralised to key personnel within WONCO-A wings.

AIM

4.   This paper's aim is to propose a PCR management process that has central oversight but decentralised management by key personnel within WONCO-A wings that will better the Academy by providing organisational efficiencies in processes, management and information flow to units, trainees and WONCO-A staff.

POST COURSE REASSESSMENTS

5.   **The Army Training Continuum (ATC).** The ATC is covered in an ATI [118] released by HQ FORCOMD in Nov 14. One aspect of the ATC provides Army with "*the ability to maximise opportunities for recognition of prior learning and competence through greater use of modulated courses, **enhanced recognition processes** and assessment of competence in the collective environments.*"

6.   **WONCO-A recognition procedure**. WONCO-A has a robust recognition procedure that is managed through the Training Development (TD) section of WONCO-A - Training, Systems and Development cell.

7.   PCR personnel utilise the opportunities for recognition of prior learning and competence by submitting a recognition package through the TD section. This firstly recognises training and competencies gained from previous course attendance and assists to reduce the time away from their home location (family) and unit, to realise a solution to be qualified in the subject/course as quickly as possible for which they have been deemed NYC. In the case of a PCR, the submission of the recognition pack is generally done by the OPSWO1 on behalf of the member.

8.   **Course location attendance**. For a majority of PCR soldiers, they return to the same location in which they initially commenced their training. Where a soldier commenced a course in one location and is subsequently posted, that soldier would return to the course location in which his/her unit is managed IAW ATI 1-5/2014 Directed Training Requirements In-year Management Processes of 23 Feb 15, e.g. soldier A commences a course at SQ Wing, is deemed NYC and returns to his/her unit, is then posted to a unit in NQ region, soldier A once ready to re-attend would attend a new course to be conducted in the NQ Wing location.

9.   Attendance location is not so much of an issue for soldiers having to re-attend for SUBJ 1 SGT ARMY and SUBJ 1 WO ARMY as these courses are conducted in limited localities and the solider would attend at a course closest to his/her home location.

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[117] DTR is determined by AHQ. Training Establishments are directed to meet the DTR each training year. The DTR process is described in more detail in ATI 1-5/2014 Directed Training Requirements In-year Management Processes of 23 Feb 15.

[118] ATI 1-1/2015 Army Training Continuum of 10 Nov 14

10.   **Current PCR process**. The current process for managing a PCR is as follows:

a.   DSCM-A or Unit identifies a soldier that has not completed training and requires a PCR. DSCM-A/Unit point of contact (POC) emails OPSWO1 with details of member and preferred session to be nominated against.

b.   OPSWO1 confirms the status of soldiers PCR requirements and informs unit that receipt is acknowledged.

c.   OPSWO1 liaises with Wing SI to determine dates for attendance and ability to accommodate PCR Trainee.

d.   OPSWO1 informs DSCM-A/Unit POC to confirm exact dates and reporting requirements for soldier and provides the Wing POC to allow DIRLAUTH.

e.   OPSWO1 will raise the panelling amendment signal and enrol the soldier to the session, this is normally done on day one of the course. DSCM-A/Unit will not get a panelling signal for a PCR any earlier because WONCO-A does not take over as the Panelling Authority until day one.

11.   Additional to the above process, the OPSWO1 engages with WONCO-A TD Cell so that a recognition board is conducted on the PCR soldier and ensures the results of the recognition board is known to the Wing SI. He/she is also responsible to update the PCR tracker spreadsheet with current information of attendance.

12.   **Inefficiencies in current process.** In the current PCR management process there are inefficiencies of effort in such that the OPSWO1 is effectively a mailbox and go between for PCR attendance requests. This is an inefficient use of time and only prolongs the time it takes for a PCR request to be processed, due to the two levels of liaison required – wing level and to DSCM-A/the requesting unit level. This effort could be divulged down to the wing level, therefore removing a layer of inefficiency.

13.   Additionally, each wing has all resources and access to information that the OPSWO1 utilises, (access PCR soldiers assessments checklist, ROA on DRMS, ability to draft and release signals etc). In a majority of cases, the Wing SI will have dealt with the PCR soldier from their previous attendance on course and can be a valuable first up source of assistance to the member's unit in providing information on areas to concentrate on when formulating a retraining/revision plan.

14.   **Suggested amendments to the PCR process.** The following sub-paragraphs describe the suggested amendments to the PCR Management process:

a.   remove the OPSWO1 as the central point of contact for DSCM-A/unit and empower the Wing SI as the POC for DSCM-A/unit to liaise with.

b.   the training administrator (TA) at the wing where the PCR soldier will attend releases the attendance signal on day one of the course commencing.

c.   OPSWO1 remains responsible with oversight of the PCR tracker, Wing SIs responsible to update the tracker as PCR events occur.

d.   The oversight responsibilities of the OPSWO1 can be achieved via the last day return requirements from each course, which details any PCR soldier from that course.

15.   **Suggested new PCR process**. The following sub-paragraphs describe the suggested revised process to the PCR Management process:

a.   DSCM-A/Unit contacts the Wing SI in the location of which their soldier will attend IAW the area of responsibility (AOR) of the Regional Panelling Coordinator (RPC) as designated in ATI 1-5/2014 Directed Training Requirements In-year Management Processes.

b.   Wing SI determines capacity to accommodate the PCR soldier, attendance dates, reporting requirements and informs the members unit of attendance.

c.   Wing SI informs WONCO-A TD Cell of a requirement to conduct a recognition board and upon completion of the board, the Wing SI is informed of the outcome.

d.   Wing SI updates the PCR tracker with attendance information.

e.   Wing TA, in consultation with the Wing SI, on day one of course releases the panelling signal for the PCR soldier.

16.   **Extant responsibilities**. The OPSWO1 would remain overall responsible for oversight and auditing the PCR tracking spreadsheet.

17.   **Organisational efficiencies.** The efficiencies gained across the Academy and Army are:

a.   removal of a layer of unnecessary liaison/administration.

b.   the PCR soldiers unit deals directly with the wing that their soldier will be attending and receives immediate information regarding attendance and reporting.

18.   **Amendments to doctrine.** Their will be some minor amendments required to the WONCO- A SOP 1.9 Management of Post Course Reassessments.

19.   **Information/messaging strategy.** A procedure change information strategy can be achieved through WONCO-A SharePoint site to all user units along with information being sent from the OPSWO1 directly to the Regional Panelling Coordinators (Bde RSM) for dissemination to all units within their AOR.

Conclusion

20.   Some soldiers who attend promotion courses at WONCO-A are not successful and are subsequently deemed NYC. The ATC allows Army to maximise opportunity through an advanced recognition process and the extant WONCO-A recognition process is a robust and reliable recognition system utilised by the PCR soldier.

21.   The current process for managing a PCR has two levels of liaison and is inefficient. The process can be conducted more efficiently that will provide organisational efficiencies by the removal of a layer of liaison and allowing direct liaison between the PCR soldier's unit and the respective WONCO-A wing SI. HQ oversight is still achievable through the last day returns submitted by each course.

22.   Soldiers who are deemed a PCR and are subsequently posted to a new locality will attempt their PCR at their new posted locality as determined by the AOR in ATI 1-5/2014 Directed Training Requirements In-year Management Processes.

23.   A change to the PCR process will require minor works to the WONCO-A SOP for PCRs, along with information/messaging to inform all users of the process via the WONCO-A SharePoint site and through the RPCs.

Recommendations

24.   To support the suggested changes to the PCR management processes it is recommended that:

a.   Amendments are made to WONCO-A SOP 1.9 Management of Post Course Reassessments as shown in paragraph 15 a-e.

b.   The OPSWO1 becomes responsible to monitor and audit the PCR tracking spreadsheet.

c.   The OPSWO1 is tasked to ensure that the process changes are messaged out to the RPC for dissemination to their units IAW their AOR.

d.   The OPSWO1 is responsible to ensure a messaging strategy is achieved via the WONCO-A SharePoint site and the RPCs.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF BASIC SOLDIER SKILLS IN JUNIOR LEADERSHIP

INTRODUCTION

1.   Leadership in the Army demands that a leader is technically proficient in their chosen field as well as being able to command subordinates. The art of leadership is something which can, to an extent, be taught, however, without the advantage of mastery of basic and specific skills, the command presence and credibility of a leader is diminished.

2.   Although it is not the remit of the all corps training environment to ensure technical proficiency in corps or trade specific skills, we are in a position to demand mastery of the basic soldier skills. Trainees attending the Subject One courses delivered by Warrant Officer and Non-commissioned Officer Academy (WONCO-A) are expected to be technically proficient in these basic skills prior to arrival on the course.

3.   Pre-course training requirements are supposed to ensure a standard start state for trainees attending Subject One training courses. Whilst this is somewhat effective, there is little oversight of the training or the standards achieved. Anecdotal evidence suggests pre-course training is conducted at varying standards across units and therefore preparedness for courses

also varies widely. In addition, soldiers, who are carrying injuries or physically unsuitable to participate in training, are gaining waivers to attend the course. This adds further burden to the instructional staff to modify training to ensure inclusivity, sometimes to the expense of training value.

4.   Whilst it is understood that units have differing roles and the level of basic soldiering may vary, it does not offer an excuse for trainees to arrive at the course underprepared or not proficient in the basic soldier skills expected of their current rank. This puts the trainee under additional pressure to master those skills in a training environment, whilst being assessed for progression to the next level, rather than using their experience as soldiers to enhance the training and learn new skills.

5.   **Scope.** This paper will define basic soldier skills and explain the importance of these skills in a junior leader. Considerations and constraints regarding the baseline of trainees are discussed. The current pre-course and entry requirements are examined and the limitations and restrictions highlighted. Recommendations to improve the current model will be provided in detail.

AIM

6.   This paper proposes strategies to assist in enabling WONCO-A to focus on instruction and delivery of new leadership skills and knowledge to common standard trainees.

BASIC SOLDIER SKILLS

7.   Basic Soldier Skills can be described as those skills assessed as graduation standard of recruit training. These skills, such as competency with weapons, drill, navigation and basic fieldcraft are the fundamental skills in which every soldier is proficient prior to attending corps specific training. Although it is understood that corps and units will place different emphasis on the importance of these skills based on their role or responsibilities, they remain the essential skills required of every soldier.

8.   Basic soldier skills should be developed both by the individual and their units to a point that the soldier has achieved a level of professional mastery. The ability of a soldier to perform basic skills should be a discriminator for their potential advancement, or appointment as a leader within an Army organisation. Without mastery of these basic skills, soldiers merely become employees of the Defence Force and not potential junior leaders.

LEADERSHIP

9.   Leadership is defined as: The art of influencing and directing people to achieve the team or organisational goal[119]. To be effective, our leaders must lead by example. Only when you are able to gain the respect of your team by your actions and deeds, will they respect you as a leader. Without mastery of the basic skills, a soldier will not be equipped to lead others. Not only must a junior leader be adept with these skills and those of their chosen profession, they must also be able to impart their knowledge and motivate those under their command to do the same.

10.   Although there is no archetypical model of a leader, each will develop their own style, it is however, essential that those who lead have the respect and confidence of their team. A leader must be part of the team, but should also be the exemplar to which the team aspires. A leader

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119   LWD 0-2 Leadership, Chapter 1 Section 1 paragraph 1.9 refers.

must be able to understand the team role and the individual responsibilities of their subordinates to best manage that asset.

ENTRY STANDARDS AND ESTABLISHING A BASELINE FOR TRAINEES

11.   The training standard for candidates seeking to attend the Subject One Corporal – Army (S1CA) course is set as the graduation standard of recruit training. The skills attained through initial recruit training are the minimum standard expected of any soldier serving within Army. Through either a lack of training opportunities or conviction, it has become apparent that the atrophy of basic skills has become a significant issue across wider Army.

12.   Although pre-course requirements are well articulated within the joining instruction and correspondence with trainees and parent units, it is evident that preparation for the course is not always optimal[120]. The fault can be attributed to both the unit and the individual as both are equally responsible. There are many contributing factors to poor preparation and this paper does not seek to address all of the issues that trainees may endure prior to arriving on course, however, there are several key factors that should be addressed to reduce the time and resource wastage.

    a.   **Army Individual Readiness Notice and Waivers**. The majority of medical withdrawals are a direct result of pre-existing injuries, for which a trainee has sought and been granted a waiver. As a result of these injuries, trainees are disadvantaged by requiring extended rehabilitation for their injuries or they are required to return on a later session to complete missed training.

    b.   **Pressure to fill Directed Training Requirement[121]**. There is a perceived pressure on Regional Panelling Authorities to ensure that the Directed Training Requirement (DTR) is met for each session of the course. Units are contacted directly to ensure that soldiers are made available to attend the course, sometimes at very short notice, to ensure DTR is achieved. This can result in soldiers being panelled for the course, regardless of their suitability, because they are available.

    c.   **Completion of pre-course preparation and training.** Course preparedness data sheets indicate that approximately 30 percent of trainees have not met the pre-course requirements prior to the D-21 cut off. Furthermore, the questionnaire issued to trainees on day one of the course reveals that a significant percentage of trainees assert that their unit provided little or no pre-course training opportunities prior to attending the course.

13.   It is vital that a baseline is established, and more importantly enforced, to ensure time and resources are not wasted to accommodate those who are not adequately prepared. Candidates who are poorly prepared or not suitable to attend training should be returned to their units, as is articulated in the joining instruction.

BARRIER ASSESSMENT

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120   For specific prerequisites refer to SUBJ 1 CPL Army course joining instruction, dated 04 Mar 16, http://legacy/TeamWeb2010/ARMY/forcomd/RMCA/Training%20Centres/LWC/WONCOA/JLC%20Joining%20Instructions/202960%20Subject%20One%20Corporal%20Joining%20Instruction%20-%20Main%20Body.pdf

121   Discussions will the current and former unit RSM have indicated that there is pressure from regional training authorities to ensure that DTR is met regardless of suitability. Although this has improved locally it still remains a potential issue in the future.

14.   Prior to 2007[122], the candidate's mastery of the basic soldier skills was assessed prior to attending the S1CA course by attending a barrier assessment. Soldiers were assessed against the entry criteria, including; basic fitness assessment, weapons handling, drill, general military knowledge, navigation and dress and bearing. Those found unsuitable were returned to their units, with successful candidates progressing to attend the course. This resulted in a baseline of skills across the course.

15.   An advantage of a barrier assessment is that it would enable instructional staff to gauge the standard of trainees prior to course commencement. The observation of candidates under assessment conditions will provide the opportunity to identify potential strengths and weaknesses, gauge fitness, and gain a better appreciation for determining optimal course and section composition. It also enables staff to address any outstanding administrative issues prior to the commencement of training.

16.   A barrier assessment also provides a snapshot of individual and unit preparedness. The development and maintenance of basic soldier skills should be the cornerstone of unit training. Trends could be identified, which in turn would provide formation level commands with credible and actionable information regarding their current preparedness status. Due to potential negative perception of a unit based on their candidate's results, units would be more likely to be actively involved in preparing their soldiers for the course.

CONCLUSION

17.   There are many contributing factors which relate to a soldier's preparedness and suitability to be a junior leader. Although certain elements of leadership can be taught, it is only through development and experience that a soldier gains the necessary skills to become an effective leader. In order to ensure that only suitable soldiers are identified for advancement, there is a need for greater scrutiny of and mastery in basic soldier skills across our workforce. Barrier assessments and enforcement of entry requirements would have the flow on effect of establishing a baseline for trainees, thus allowing instructional staff to focus on their core business – training.

RECOMMENDATIONS

18.   To improve the standard of trainees attending the S1CA course, the following recommendations are made:

a.   Reintroduce barrier assessments for attendance on S1CA courses. The barrier assessment should focus on the basic soldier skills expected of every soldier. It should be conducted by the regional panelling authorities, with oversight and support provided by LWC/WONCO-A.

b.   The waiver process for attendance by trainees with a MEC status of J2 or below should be more critically scrutinised. This will reduce the likelihood of exacerbating existing injuries, which results in potential time and resource wastage during the course and for the soldier's unit.

c.   Enforce prerequisite entry requirements for the Subject One Corporal Army course. In the event that soldiers are not adequately prepared to attend the course, they should be removed from the panel. It is not the remit of a training establishment to conduct pre-course administration on behalf of units.

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122   2005/1002445 HQ LWC/OUT/2006/1266 LWC Commander's Directive 17 /06 - Implementation of trial on the removal of barrier assessment for the Subject One for Corporal (ARA) course.

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**Joint and Interagency Professional Military Education
and Training and the All Corps Soldier Training
Continuum**

INTRODUCTION

"We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with
the designs of our neighbors."

Author: Sun Tzu

1.   The Asia-Pacific region is a major centre of geostrategic interest, representing 60% of the world's population. Shaped by accelerating levels of economic growth and deepening levels of integration, these and other influences are generating a shift in the distribution of economic, political and military power across our region. This causes an unstable security environment presents major challenges, reflected in diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME) effects.[123]

2.   The Centre for Strategic and International Studies based in Washington DC has examined these concerns over the last 50 years. This analysis is valuable to our Defence, principally regarding security, regional stability and trans-national involvement. In particular, build, strengthen and renew relationships, presence and capabilities.[124]

3.   China's economic and military prominence, especially in the South China Sea, and North Korea's threats of violence, has resulted in the United States (US) developing a Force Posture Strategy for the Asia-Pacific Region. The US increased investment in diplomatic, economic and strategic partnerships in the region with the aim to strengthen bilateral security alliances and

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[123] Asia-Pacific Countries Military Power Ranking
[124] Berteau, Green, & Cooper, 2014

enhance working relationships with these emerging powers, including China.[125] There is currently no such strategy involving Australian Stakeholders.

4.   **Scope.** This paper will discuss key initiatives, that the Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Academy (WONCO-A), are capable of implementing in support of the Directorate of Army's Strategic Communication narrative. It will define a requirement for Professional Military Education and Training (PMET) at the joint, interagency, inter-governmental and multinational levels of the All Corps Soldier Training Continuum (ACSTC). It will outline a program of strategic thinking incorporated into WONCO-A PMET through international engagement to support the objectives of the Defence International Engagement Plan (DIEP).

AIM

5.   The aim of this paper is to propose the introduction of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational levels of PMET that will further enhance the level of training provided by the WONCO-A in the ACSTC.

JOINT EDUCATION

"Alliances and international organizations should be understood as opportunities for leadership and a means to expand our influence, not as constraints on our power."

Chuck Hagel[126]

6.   **Current joint education**. Army's strategic narrative describes Army's readiness for the future as "experts at integrating with our Navy and Air Force, and other parts of Government"[127]. Presently there is no opportunity for joint training in the ACSTC. It is important to note Australian soldiers operate daily within this environment, for example Ships Army Detachments (SAD), or on joint United Nations deployments. Extremely limited opportunities currently exist for enlisted soldiers to attend joint training with exception of the Introduction to Joint Operations (IJO) conducted for Sergeants to Major and the ADF Joint Warrant Officer Course to prepare Tier B Warrant Officer appointees.[128]

7.   **The future.** LTGEN Morrison addressed the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in 2014, and stated, "We are a trading state, enmeshed in the global economy and we survive and thrive as a state because of it".[129] The strategic importance of this statement identifies Australia's prosperity as a nation relies with our unimpeded use of our maritime waterways.[130]. MAJGEN McLachlan predicted new cyber challenges that will move past the Australian Signals Directorate, described as the "fifth domain" with "emerging cyber challenges that will present themselves across the three services". [131] The author believes there will be a future requirement

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[125] This has resulted in the United States developing a *Rebalancing Strategy for the Asia-Pacific Region*. In November 2011, US President Obama delivered an address before the Australian Parliament, describing US "efforts to advance security, prosperity, and human dignity across the Asia Pacific"
[126] Hagel, Jan 28, 2005
[127] Army strategic communication narrative, 2015, p. 2
[128] Australian Defence College website
[129] Morrison, 2014, p. 2
[130] Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade website - Seven of Australia's top 10 trading partners are located within the Asia – Pacific region. Eight of Australia's top 10 goods and services exports and imports rely upon our maritime waterways.
[131] McLachlan, 2015

to establish a Joint Cyber Command requiring a joint ADF workforce, with a liability to provide joint PMET. BRIG Ryan identified future requirements in his report regarding the ACSTC; "A mechanism built around formal and informal leadership development, as well as demonstrated strategic to tactical level experience will be important for the Army to be well integrated into future joint operations and inter agency policy development and execution".[132] These examples highlight the significance of providing joint and interagency training opportunities to enable the ACSTC to support commanders.

8.   **Current PMET**. In an address to the ASPI, on 26 June 2015, MAJGEN McLachlan stated, "Army expects to be part of joint and coalition operation system in which asymmetric advantage is achieved through the use of joint effects".[133] Since the introduction of the Canberra Class LHD, Amphibious Task Force (ATF) and implementation of Plan BEERSHEBA, there have been no attempts through the ACSTC to conduct PMET for enlisted soldiers in the joint or coalition environment.

INTER-GOVERNMENTAL EDUCATION

"Men act only in a state of necessity and usually only recognize necessity in a situation of crisis"

Jean Monnet

9.   **Current continuum**. The ACSTC Learning Management Packages (LMP) do not include operating within the inter-governmental context. Currently, units operate extensively with Australian Federal, State, Territory, Non-Government and Aide agencies. Regional Force Surveillance Units (RFSU), and units involved with the Army Aboriginal Community Assistance Program (ACAP), require all ranks to interact with agencies at both a strategic and operational level. BRIG Field wrote "…these organisations will judge the Australian Defence Force's (ADF) knowledge, skills and capabilities largely on (our soldiers) attitude and behavior. Set conditions early through positive engagement." [134] This supports Army's strategic narrative describing readiness for the future operations as "being committed to providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to Australians and others in times of need." Therefore, the need for deliberate PMET, should be a priority to compliment After Action Reviews (AAR), which are currently the only learning tools.[135]

10.   The importance of this training cannot be understated, as disconnect between the objectives of the military and humanitarian assistance can at times, place the military and Non-Governmental Organizations at odds with each other.[136]

11.   **The identified need**. PMET through the ACSTC is important as soldiers represent the ADF, operating at the coal face with these external organizations. The importance of understanding primacy of command, control, coordination and legal powers once a disaster has been declared cannot be underestimated. PMET will enhance the continual development of cohesive support, particularly operating within constrained time frames in the in civil

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[132] Ryan, B. (2016). *A Study of Army's Education, Training and Doctrine Needs for the Future* [Paper] p. 6.
[133] McLachlan, 2015, p. 3
[134] BRIG CA Field CSC, & WO1 DR Lehr OAM. *The Major and Sergeant Major Leadership Team* (2016)
[135] Army Strategic Communication Narrative, 2015
[136] Greet, 2008

emergencies, facilitating the essential conditions required to operate successfully within a complex environment.

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INTERNATIONAL ENGAGMENT

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12.   **Current continuum.** The ACSTC does not contain PMET on international engagement, despite numerous bi-lateral agreements with other countries to enhance defence cooperation. For example, the Australian and US Government US Force Posture Initiatives (USFPI).[137]

13.   **Current tempo.** Engagements conducted by the ADF, are past the point of simply requiring units to conduct 'cultural awareness' training for our soldiers. Our position within the Asia-Pacific region contains many, widely diverse cultures with long histories. We have limited commonality with other local states, with exception of New Zealand. Through the ACSTC strategic engagement activities, will develop our soldiers as a strategic asset for Australia. This will enable Australia to be the leader within our region and build on developing capacity to support regional forces and Australia's interests. To ensure achievement of strategic outcomes, a similar format as undertaken by the Australian Defence College, should be developed for PMET in the ACSTC.

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ACSTC FRAMEWORK CHANGES

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14.   A number of areas for change have been identified to support this achievement of the afore mentioned end state:

a.   **Training continuum**. Introduce PMET across the ACSTC, developed incrementally for each rank.

b.   **International student management (ISM)**. This will be achieved through liaison with FORCOMD OTE program, targeting countries for foreign trainees and instructor's reciprocal programs similar to Overseas Training and Education (OTE) conducted with the US Army Sergeants Majors Academy (USASMA). Table 1 highlights the current international trainee on Australian courses represents a ratio of 7% foreign to Australian students.

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Table 1: Student / Instructor Ratios Training Year 2014

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Course	Students AUS	INT	INT Representation	Instructors AUS		INT Representation
CDSS[138]	26	24	92%	7	2	28%
ACSC[139]	122	48	39%	19	8	42%
RSM CSE	28	2	7%	5	Nil	0%

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[137] US FPISCT 2016
[138] Australian Defence College, International Engagement Plan 2014-2017
[139] Australian Defence College, International Engagement Plan 2014-2017

SUB 1 WO	267	Nil	Nil%	8	1	12%
USASMA	487[140]	39[141]	8%	29[142]	5	17%

15. The following considerations are integral to any joint or coalition training framework:

a. Religious diversity. The Asian-Pacific region contains the world's largest Muslim population being Indonesia[143]. The key consideration regarding diversity is that some religious differences also inherent synergies when working with other countries.

b. Language barriers. Across the Asia-Pacific region there are over 3572 spoken languages.[144] In order to achieve an increase of foreign trainees and instructors, the Defence Force School of Languages (DFSL) is likely to absorb a larger training liability to achieve competence of written and spoken English prior to undertaking courses within Australia. A reciprocal language requirement for Australian soldiers attending foreign Defence Academies will also be required.

c. Training time. PMET into the ACSTC will require additional training days to achieve the enabling objectives.

CONCLUSION

16. Since the deployment of personnel to Cambodia in 1992, the ADF has consistently deployed forces that operate within a joint, interagency, inter-governmental and multinational environment. To ensure successful execution of future operations both domestically and internationally, it is imperative that soldiers receive an increased level of PMET through the ACSTC to meet the future requirements of the strategic security environment. WONCO-A is an enabling capability that is well positioned; to achieve the end state that the ADF and the Australian Government requires, to ultimately strengthen our productive relationships with other countries.

Recommendations

17. To introduce PMET into the ACSTC, the following recommendations are made:

a. Introduce PME that focus on joint, inter-governmental, multinational and non-government that incorporate operations on disaster management, civil re-construction, disaster relief within Australia and abroad.

b. IP Division facilitate international engagement for foreign Defence Forces to attend courses at the WONCO-A in order to raise the level of foreign attendance on courses to achieve a target of 20%.

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[140] USASMA Class 64-2014 – 487 students (comprised Active Component -Regular Army, Army Reserve, National Guard, US Marines, US Airforce, and US Coast Guard)

[141] USASMA Class 64 – 2014 39 students representing 36 countries from all arms and services

[142] USASMA 2014 US Instructors - 29 (included 1 US Airforce Instructor)

[143] Christensen, D, 2014, *10 Key Facts About Asia Pacific Every Business Manager Should Know,* Company Director and Strategy Consultant

[144] Languages of the World, 2016

c.   Increase positions for Australian instructors at Foreign Defence Academies for reciprocal programs, through WONCO-A conducting a training needs analysis with OTE HQ FORCOMD.

d.   WONCO-A seek Forces Command support for RAN, RAAF and Australian Government Agencies to attend respective ACSTC, in particular the Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) and SUB 1 WO Army courses.

e.   Commence the introduction of PME into the ACSTC through the use of visiting lecturers as subject matter experts commencing with the RSM Course in 2017.

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RETHINKING THE APPROACH TO TRAINING RESILIENCE AND MANAGING WOUNDED ILL AND INJURED

> "We can educate people after the event, to help them understand and heal, but it's much better to do it beforehand. We want a vaccine. Not penicillin. Forewarned is forearmed. If you are warned that these things will happen to your body they won't blindside you."
> LTCOL D Grossman – Retired US Army

INTRODUCTION

1.   The Australian Army has been discussing the impact that resilience is having on capability. Whilst there has been a significant amount of staff effort put into this space, there still seems to be no definite way ahead regarding the education of soldiers on resilience and the management of our wounded ill and injured (WII).

2.   Included in any definition of resilience, is the capacity of individuals, teams and organisations to adapt, recover and thrive in situations of risk, challenge, danger, complexity and adversity. Army has lost focus on the individual part. Individuals' thoughts and emotions must be valued by Army; however, Army should not always take responsibility for the actions that result from these thoughts and emotions (Campbell 2016). That is an individual responsibility.

AIM

3.   This paper will address:

a.   how to introduce resilience training into the All Corps Officer/Soldier Training Continuum (ACOSTC)

b.   how to educate individuals from point of entry through a series of promotion courses throughout their individual career paths

c.   how to introduce education on the management and rehabilitation for these soldiers

d.   how to educate on the management of WII soldiers within units.

AWARENESS

4.   **Current Awareness.** The current awareness of resilience training within Army is conducted annually during force preservation training. The outcomes of this training increase the incidences of suicidal ideation within the following 48 to 72 hours.

5.   A great deal of time is spent within units dealing with issues caused by a lack of resilience. For example, Soldier X's girlfriend of eight weeks has ended the relationship and his/her first thought is suicidal ideation or Officer Y has just failed a BFA and is suffering a degree of professional embarrassment. Many of the resilience issues faced by young soldiers and officers are the result of society not preparing young people for failure and setbacks rather than as a result of their service in Defence.

6.   **Toolbox for Resilience**. Army has an endorsed system for the provision of self help tools to assist individuals with such very problems, BattleSMART. This system allows individuals to test and adjust their initial reactions (BattleSMART 2010) and provides methods for effectively coping with individual adversity.

7.   This training can be conducted at the three points of entry into Army: RMC-D, ADFA and 1 RTB. Each of these training establishments is fully supported by suitably qualified psychological professionals who can deliver this training.

8.   The provision of these basic tools provides an immediate action drill enabling individual resilience and personal management of adversity. These tools can be immediately applied by trainees during those initial weeks away from home.

9.   **Introducing BattleSMART into the ACOSTC**. Under the current model, both RMC-D and 1 RTB place a great deal of focus on values and individual character, 25 periods for RMC-D and 18 periods for 1 RTB (Gallasch 2015). Considering Army generally attracts people with values and character that accord with the Army values some of these periods could be used for increased resilience training.

10.   Time exists in the current training plan to accommodate BattleSMART within the ACOSTC. This could be achieved without great impact on training programmes. The only requirement would be SME support to facilitate the training. The BattleSMART tools would then be able to be employed by all trainees throughout their career progression, whether it be as an officer or soldier. This very same information can be reinforced through activities such as Ex SHAGGY RIDGE for officers and The Challenge for recruits. The initial exposure to BattleSMART during entry level training will enable a resilience training continuum throughout the ACOSTC and better prepare soldiers for operations and personal adversity.

11.   In the all-corps soldier training continuum, for those that are successful and are selected to attend the Subject Once Corporal Course, Ex KOKODA will become another activity where this information can be revised, expanded on and put into practice.

BUILD AND STRENGTHEN

12.   **Enhancing Awareness.** Armed with these basic skills, Army can build on the individual's initial foundations. Within the current training package for the Subject One Sergeant Course the trainee is required to draft a training program. The subject of this training package can be easily adapted to become one which supports a form of resilience training for a platoon/troop organisation. This will require an amount of pre-reading prior to attending the course (professional development) on activities that can be used to support resilience. This pre-reading could be published on the WONCO-A SharePoint page as a resource for all of Army to

utilise (Ryan 2016). The SharePoint area will raise the profile of the Academy, making it the primary source for all-corps training information (Scott 2016).

13.   Based on this pre-reading the trainees will draft a training program using any one of the many resilience training activities supported by Army. Some examples of these are, adventurous training, conduct after capture, sport, military self defence and the bayonet assault course. The level of detail could be adapted to fit into the All Corps Captain Course (ACCC) as either pre-course or as a mix of pre-course and residential training within the leadership/ethics area. After consideration, I see this training as primarily the domain of the sergeant and lieutenant. An understanding of recovery and management of WII would be a better fit in the ACCC.

RECOVERY

14.   **Getting soldiers back to work.** Resilience and recovery are inexorably linked. Recovery can be complex and personally challenging. The role of the OC and CSM/SSM should be to support the individual throughout recovery, with the final aim of returning the soldier to their core skill.

15.   'Those soldiers at the Soldier Recovery Centre (SRC) are just wasting time and bludging' is a common theme made by people who have little understanding of the recovery process. Leaders who have an understanding of the recovery process and timeframes involved can only enhance capability. Understanding can be introduced on the Subject One Warrant Officer course and the ACCC. This will prepare the CSM/SSM and the company 2IC to understand the recovery process and role of the welfare board. This will place them in a strong position to provide advice to the OC.

16.   Training on the procedure of the welfare board should be provided and could be facilitated by BDE welfare officers or SRC supervisors. Such training should aim to remove the negative perception of welfare boards and enable leaders to provide support and encourage an environment of compassion towards the recovery of WII.

MANAGEMENT

17.   **The Hard Conversation.** Sometimes people are not in a position to be rehabilitated and return to work. On these occasions individuals require management and support. This conversation can be daunting for many people. Many of the soldiers who are identified have met all of the requirements for rehabilitation, but are still unfit for continued service. 'But Sir, I still feel that I can do the job I have trained for and my family fully support my service and we really enjoy living here' is often the theme that soldiers will put to their leaders.

18.   Setting the foundations for these discussions at the start of the rehabilitation process will allow leaders to manage expectations. There is a requirement to be honest and, at times, a little brutal with the truth. This can be a difficult time for all involved; however, there are ways to prepare for this.

19.   **Tools to Manage.** There are many tools available to leaders managing soldiers who have been identified for medical separation including:

a.   Long Term Medical Management positions within a unit

b.   ex-service organisations

c.   Army Personnel Coordination Detachment policy advice

d.   regional Soldier Recovery Centres.

20.   Training on these tools can be conducted during the All-Corps Majors Course, the Pre-Command Course and the RSM Course. Better equipping commanders and their senior soldiers to manage WII and medically separating soldiers, will further enhance individual and group resilience and unit capability.

CONCLUSION

21.   By providing people with the tools and education for the self-management of resilience and management of WII personnel will improve the numbers of those returning to work. These tools will also prove to be valuable whilst preparing to support operations. All of these areas are able to be covered within the ACOSTC and thus better prepare leaders and managers.

Recommendations

22.   For Army to increase capability through training and education, the following recommendations should be investigated for implementation:

a.   the introduction of the BattleSMART training package at point of entry training

b.   the design of resilience training within the all corps officer/soldier training continuum in line with Tranche 2 of the implementation of the Ryan review

c.   the introduction of a professional reading list (for each course) within the WONCO-A SharePoint page to assist in the preparation for promotion

d.   the implementation of data from the upcoming DSTG study into Ex KOKODA

e.   the inculcation of a culture toward resilience and the management of WII through the education and training delivered by Army.

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THE GROUP C WARRANT OFFICER

Warfare remains a fundamentally human endeavour making our people central to Army's capability. While the importance of human performance can be overlooked, Army depends on the abilities of professional, innovative, adaptable individuals who can react to changing conditions.

CA Directive 07/15 I'm an Australian Soldier, 2015

INTRODUCTION

1.   The Army is a modern, complex organisation designed to win the land battle in the interests of Australia and its people. To simplify the Australian Army comparisons are made to sporting teams. In this instance the art of boxing will represent Army and its ranks. There are three main components to boxing; the fighter, the trainer or coach and the manager.

2.   The fighter represents privates to corporals. These soldiers hone their skills with repetition and sweat, driving instinct, forming close knit bonds, are disciplined and linked to Army's Core Behaviours.

3.   The trainers are sergeants and warrant officers class two. These men and women enforce Army's values and behaviours, design and assess the training of their soldiers. Scenarios are set that test our soldier's repetitious regimes and expose weakness to be improved. Our trainers set and maintain the stan dards inherent to service.

4.   Our managers are our officers. Officers set tasks for our trainers and determine the effectiveness of their training and the outcomes of their fighters. Analysis of the current fight is their mastery and how we need to improve to win. They look to the next fight, to the next adversary and develop the strategy to win.

5.   The warrant officer class one sits between the manager and the trainer. They have the experience of the fighter and the trainer, but must understand the reasoning and aim of our managers. They acknowledge the ardours of the fighter, guide the trainer and support the manager. They are loyal to all and epitomise Army's Core Values.

6.   The Australian Army spends a large amount of time and resources on preparing its soldiers for promotion at various ranks. The most successful endstate of a soldier joining the Army is to attain the rank of Warrant Officer and to be appointed as the Regimental Sergeant Major of the Army. The senior soldier of the Australian Army has a career spanning decades, full of experience and in a position to counsel our highest leader, the Chief of the Army, and his cohort of leaders.

7.   Soldiers with different career goals may not wish to attain this esteemed position, but if assessed as being of merit will continue to be promoted through the ranks in accordance with their respective Corps' Manual of Army Employment. For those soldiers during their career that reach the rank of warrant officer class one, as a regimental sergeant major (RSM), this is an achievement in itself. However, some warrants officers, as a result of the Senior Warrant Officer

Personnel Advisory Committee, may be classified as Group C. This ends their career as a RSM but not as a soldier.

8.   **Scope.** This paper will discuss the warrant officer class one, the warrant officer who has completed his Tier Alpha appointments, but is no longer competitive for future advancement. It will discuss other avenues open to warrant officers and possible recommendations for continued service utilising the skills, knowledge and attributes gained over years of effective and dedicated service.

Aim

9.   The aim of this paper is to propose alternate employment for warrant officers class one.

ALL CORP WARRANT OFFICER

10.   When a warrant officer becomes a RSM, not only are they the subject matter expert (SME) in their trade, but are also the SME within the All Corp Soldier Training Continuum (ACSTC).

11.   They have been exposed throughout their career to soldiers, units and joint forces not of their corps, but have also completed the suite of Subject One course for corporal, sergeant, warrant officer and RSM. The skills they gain are designed to support the chain of command with leadership, management and command attributes. Although some of these are gained in their specific corps promotion courses, none are encompassed and developed to support Army within the ACSTC. Warrant officers throughout their career will have instructed and assessed within their own corps' trade but more importantly within the ACSTC at the Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Academy (WONCO-A), the Royal Military College Duntroon or at the Army Recruit Training Centre, to name but a few.

12.   **Preparation.** As Army continues to prepare for operations the preparation of soldiers for promotion courses is increasing becoming harder to achieve. Normally a senior warrant officer within their unit would be responsible for the training and preparation for ACSTC promotion courses. Unfortunately, this is not often the case as units struggle to prioritise their effort with soldiers left to prepare individually and without supervision.

13.   **Brigade Warrant Officer.** A warrant officer class one posted within a brigade or formation headquarters would be in a position to provide the supervision and support to brigade units. Having access to Personnel Management Key Solution (in particular Professional Development and Training) they could identify the next suite of ACSTC promotion courses for the next calendar year and forecast the required resources and training. This training would be coordinated through the brigade major and overseen by the brigade or formation RSM. To support the training a number of Army General Reserve personnel could be used. The warrant officer would be the liaison officer between the brigade and the wing of WONCO-A located at each combat brigade location.

14.   In addition, the warrant officer would be required to conduct the WONCO-A instructor and development program. This simple step ensures the currency of information and training delivered to soldiers within their area is consistent, relevant and current.

15.   All necessary documentation could be checked and confirmed. Any training shortfalls, for example the current F88 Steyr drills, could be taught, tested and entered into the soldier's competency log book.

16.   **Training and tenure.** The duration of their posting would be dependent on the brigade, formation and/or soldier's requirements. A two to three year posting in preparation for separation from Army is a viable option for a warrant officer. This opportunity could also be used for the warrant officer to conduct further professional or personal development for future appointments as a captain (staff officer) within a formation headquarters or as a warrant officer under the current employment guidelines. Additional duties allocated to the warrant officer could be, but not limited to, assisting commanders with the care and reintegration of Army's wounded, ill and injured personnel.

17.   **Corp specific warrant officer.** Another option for the warrant officer is to continue to maintain the currency within his corps and assist the combat brigades' in conducting training in preparation for operations. They would be used to assist key staff in the planning and safety aspects on brigade led training exercises or specifically used by the major respective corps units within their combat brigade. An example might include an engineer warrant officer controlling

the safety aspects of demolitions during a situational training exercise. They would also be used during major exercises as referees or observer trainers.

18.   **Selection.** Warrant officers vying for an appointment in these positions would still need to be relevant. Their selection would be based on merit, competitiveness within your group and the position availability.

CONCLUSION

19.   From fighter to trainer / manager, a warrant officer with the necessary skills, knowledge and attitudes can be retained within Army only if they adapt to the changes of a rapidly modern organisation. To do so they must look at effective employment opportunities focusing on the strengths of the warrant rank. Army needs capable contemporary soldiers who continue to professionally serve their country. They may not be able to continue along the tiered path taken by those that are still competitive within the regimental sergeant major stream, but their experience within the ACSTC would make them an asset to any combat brigade.

Recommendations

20.   By introducing an alternate career opportunity for Group C warrant officers recommendations are as follows:

a.   Warrant officers must still be selected for these positions, right person for the right task.

b.   Additional positions are made available within formation and brigade headquarters.

c.   Duty statements and selection criteria are designed and made available to warrant officers deemed as suitable for employment in Group C.

d.   Once established closer ties and understanding is established between formation or brigade headquarters and WONCO-A.

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EMPOWERING THE JUNIOR COMMANDER

INTRODUCTION

1.   The Australian Army's 21st century operating environment requires leaders that are multifaceted, agile and adaptive. The junior commander must be comfortable, confident and capable of executing decentralised operations with no direct oversight whilst possessing the skills and knowledge to lead across the full spectrum of conflict.

2.	The Australian Army does not fully integrate, exercise or empower the junior commander to their full potential on exercises or in the barracks environment. Conversely, whilst on operations it requires the junior commander to operate with full autonomy. In an era where every leader's decision carries a strategic implication, junior commanders must be able to accommodate tactical actions within a larger context. Junior commanders must be calculated risk takers who know not only how to think but what to think.

3.	**Scope.** This paper defines what 'empowerment' is and will examine the concept of empowerment to understand some of the factors constraining the empowerment of the junior commander within Army.

AIM

4.	This paper aims to present strategies to empower the junior commander thus enabling the better preparation of our junior commanders for the future.

DEFINING EMPOWERMENT

5.	Throughout this paper the term Junior Commander is restricted to the ranks of corporal and lieutenant, in the pure form these can be the most influential people within the Army's organisation.

6.	**Empowerment.** Before exploring the factors constraining the empowerment of our junior leaders, empowerment must be firstly defined. Empowerment in its purest form is to give official authority or legal power.[145] The formal definition of empowerment does not completely capture the intent behind empowering subordinates as it fails to express the true essence of empowerment. A much better characterisation advocates that empowerment is a process that challenges our basic assumptions about the way things are and can be. At the core of the concept of empowerment is the idea of power. The possibility of empowerment depends on two things. First, empowerment requires that power can change. If power cannot change, if it is inherent in positions or people, then empowerment is not possible, nor is empowerment conceivable in any meaningful way. If power can change, then empowerment is possible. Second, the concept of empowerment[146] depends upon the idea that power can expand. Power is often related to our ability to make others do what we want, regardless of their own wishes or interests.[147] In the military context this is closer related to 'Command' which is the authority which a commander lawfully exercises by virtue of rank or assignment. Moreover, the ability to exhibit legal power over someone. [148]

FACTORS EFFECTING THE EMPOWERING OF THE JUNIOR COMMANDER

7.	**Trust**. Long standing traditions have conditioned Army leaders to exert oversight as opposed to influence. This does not always indicate a lack of trust in subordinates; rather, it indicates that leaders feel intensely responsible for the overall success of the organisation. These actions; however, may appear to be an issue of trust. For most leaders it is not a matter of trusting a subordinate to make reliable, moral and ethical decisions. The issue centres on leaders

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[145] To give power or authority to; authorize, especially by legal or official means. 2. To enable or permit: Wealth empowered him to live a comfortable life
[146] http://www.joe.org/joe/1999october/comm1.php Empowerment 'what is it?'
[147] http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/empowerment.html A management practice of sharing information, rewards, and power with employees so that they can take initiative and make decisions to solve problems and improve service and performance. Empowerment is based on the idea that giving employees skills, resources, authority, opportunity, motivation, as well holding them responsible and accountable for outcomes of their actions, will contribute to their competence and satisfaction.
[148] http://akgrsn02/Doctrine/htmlbooks/LWD_0-2/ Chap 1, Section 1-1. Leadership in a Command Environment

not being confident in trusting a subordinate to solve a problem or accomplish a task based on that leader's fear of the subordinate failing. For those commanders, it is about a driven desire for success of their organisation and not allowing the organisation to fail. Thus at the junior commander level the reality of these actions is the lack of experiential learning opportunities or the ability to fail. Failure in training is not a significant issue if there is a properly conducted AAR and lessons are learnt?

8.   **Micro Management.** Micro management[149] is another contributing factor why the junior commander is not fully empowered. The issue involves both the perception and reality of being micro managed; we like to preach 'mission command' however, in reality some commanders refuse to ever put it into practice. Is it wrong to let the junior commander plan and execute his/her own training program once or twice a week? This will empower them; thus allowing them to develop and refine their organisational skills for future roles. How many times has the Junior Non-Commission Officer been undermined by the superior doing their job for them? Or worse, being given a task and being monitored 100% of the time with continued interference from the supervisor. It is leadership responsibility to monitor the subordinate; however, this can be done from a distance otherwise the perception of micro-management may arise. For some commanders, the issue of surrendering will and conviction to a subordinate is uncomfortable for a leader because it places their stewardship of their unit at risk. The overwhelming feeling of responsibility that leaders feel for their organisation often constrains their ability to empower subordinates.

9.   **Respect.** Respect is a core element of military professionalism.[150] In the leadership spectrum, respect involves recognising the individual's value within the team and acknowledging that each and every person is unique. It is the ability of a leader to understand and respect an individual's needs, desirers, fears, and shortcomings. However, respect is a quality that is earned, not granted by rank and/or position. Through the other topics discussed above, the junior commander may feel that their judgement is in question, moreover that they are not respected. If the junior commander is placed into a position of trust and are empowered to take charge of the task within guidelines they will develop through their own experimental learning thus gain the skills, knowledge and respect to complete similar tasks.

EMPOWERING THE JUNIOR COMMANDER

10.   Why is empowerment important? Leaders are the ones who take responsibility for making decisions and bringing change. True leaders are the ones who empower subordinates to discover and use their greatest potential.

11.   In order to empower junior commanders we must first assess our leadership style, our own development, review our shortcomings and understand our own actions. Once we have discovered ourselves we may understand how we can empower our subordinates. Trust and the absence of micromanagement is a considering factor as without it empowerment is not possible. We must ensure that the junior commander is enabled and resourced to complete the mission. In training this is ensuring that they have the ammunition to complete the range practice or the physical capability and knowledge to pass to their subordinates through their own development. The development of the potential of our subordinates is a key leadership principal[151]. Delegating

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[149] Control every part, however small, of (an enterprise or activity)

[150] Chief of Army Directive 31/13 The introduction of 'Respect' as the Army's fourth value

[151] http://akgrsn02/Doctrine/htmlbooks/LWD_0-2/ Leadership Chap 3, Section 3-5. Principles of Leadership Behavior

authority enables junior commanders to develop their potential as leaders. When commanders are willing to delegate authority, they indicate trust in the team and foster an environment in which team members seek more responsibility. It is the leader's responsibility to create the conditions in which subordinates' potential may flourish. However, delegating authority should not be confused with command responsibility, which cannot be ever delegated.

12.   Junior commanders who are well informed and empowered will have a greater level of confidence, and moral. The junior commander will look for the logic in the fog and confusion of the battlefield. They will willingly seek guidance and in the absence of none, act with the conviction that their commander trusts them to make ethical, strategically sound decisions. Commanders should work hard at building these relationships through mutual respect and open communication.

13.   A unit that is devoid of strong ethical behaviour is one that has not fully empowered its junior commanders. An ethical unit is one that follows the rules and expectations of the Army whilst maintaining an understanding of the rules of war, and has a positive command climate where it is encouraged to question in order to clarify and develop understanding. To ensure units have positive command climates that foster ethical behaviour, junior commanders need to be empowered to feel that they have the scope of authority to make decisions and act in accordance with military law without being questioned. To ensure that the junior commander feels empowered they must be in a positive command climate that invests time and energy into development and growth aspects of junior command not just the immediate mission.

CONCLUSION

14.   Leadership is the most dynamic element of combat power, the ability of the Army to fulfil its mission is heavily reliant on leadership. In an era where every leader's decision carries a strategic implication, junior commanders must be able to accommodate tactical actions within a larger context. Junior commanders must be risk takers who know not only how to think but what to think. Empowering and enabling junior commanders early in their careers conditions them to rely on their own critical and creative thinking.

15.   Empowering junior commanders who are more than ever the 'on the spot' tactical commander will lead to increasing the Army's success on the battlefield for now and into the future.

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PHYSICAL AND MENTAL RESILIENCE OF SOLDIERS ATTENDING SUBJECT ONE CORPORAL ARMY COURSE

INTRODUCTION

1.   The Australian soldier has always been regarded as mentally and physically tough, capable of performing their duties to the highest level of professional standard. This was due to their resilience, endurance and determination regardless of the environment. This was particularly evident by their mental and physical abilities both on and off the battle field.

2.   In October 2006 the Chief of Army (CA) issued the I'm an Australian Soldier initiative[152] This initiative identified core values and formalised what was expected as the base line for all Australian soldiers.. These four core values were further expanded into nine core behaviours. Of the nine behaviours, "I'm physically and mentally tough" is the most difficult to attain and requires the most effort and continual input by the soldier.

3.   With the introduction of EX Kokoda in August 2013[153] in the second week of training, a physically and mentally demanding activity over 48 to 56 hours of continuous activity. This has highlighted shortfalls in the physical and mental resilience of soldiers. These observations have been recorded over a number of courses.

4.   The name change of the course from a Junior Leaders Course to Subject One Corporal Army course also means that the course is now a prerequisite for promotion to the rank of Corporal, a career milestone for any soldier, where the need to be physically and mentally resilient are of the greatest importance.

5.   **Scope.** This paper will identify current issues with the physical and mental preparedness of soldiers and recommendations in the introducing of a barrier assessment prior to attending the Subject One Corporal Army course.

AIM

5.   The aim of this paper is to identify issues with the current entry standard of soldiers on the Subject One Corporal Army course and propose strategies to assist in enabling Warrant Officer & Non Commissioned Officer Academy (WONCO-A) to implement a barrier assessment package prior to trainees attending the course and to ensure soldiers have the skills required for successful completion of the course.

MAINTAINING PHYSICAL AND MENTAL TOUGHNESS

6.   The Subject One Corporal Army course is an all Corps course,. Soldiers are conditioned during recruit training where they are initially are exposed to the mental and physical requirements of soldiering, this continues through their initial employment training (IET). Dependent on the soldier's specific Corps (Armed or Non Armed CORPS) this can be at a varying level. To facilitate the all CORPS environment of the course the pre-requisite standard for attendance is set to the base level required for any soldier.

7.   The issue with maintenance of a soldier's robust physical and mental resilience begins when soldiers move to mainstream Army life. The combination of a sedentary work environments and the time allocated to developing and maintaining physical and mental

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[152]   Chief of Army Directive 16/06 I'm an Australian Soldier.
[153]   Exercise Kokoda Instructor Handbook version 13.0 01 September 2015

resilience. Current FORCOMD directed tasks and unit priorities significantly influence the ability to maintain high standards of physical and mental resilience, including learned skill sets.

8.   Skills degradation also affects the Core behaviours, including physical and mental toughness. If a soldier does not periodically refresh and practice learned skills particularly weapon handling, field craft and dress and bearing, they will degrade over time. Thus affecting the soldier's ability to perform and be an effective team member.

PREREQUISITE STANDARDS

9.   The Subject One Corporal Army course currently incorporates an entry standard required from soldiers to attend the course. This standard and the skills required are detailed in the Joining Instruction (JI) to the course.[154] This prerequisite is currently dependant on the individual soldier to ensure they are prepared for the course.

10.   The main priority by most units are on FORCOMD directed tasks and ongoing compliance and corporate governance issues. These are having an impact on the unit's ability to provide time and space in supporting the soldiers to be prepared for the course.

11.   **Medical Waivers.** The JI provides guidance on soldiers with Temporary Medical Restrictions (TMR) or Permanent Medical Restriction (PMR). The current system in place does have an effect on employment of soldiers at times. This required WONCO-A staff to manage individual soldiers, thus limiting their ability to mentor and monitor all soldiers under their observation.

12.   A growing trend is that soldiers are not prepared for the course, particularly in physical and mental resilience. This has been indicated in the medical report attached to the Post Activity Reports (PAR) drafted for each course[155].

BARRIER ASSESSMENT

13.   Previously, a barrier assessment was a means of confirming the suitability and readiness of soldiers to attend training. The reintroduction of a barrier assessment would allow instructional staff a snapshot of the standard into the soldiers attending the course. This would allow the development of any retraining, prior to attending the course, saving valuable time and resources during the conduct of the course. The barrier assessment would need to include a physical component as well as a skills set component. This would allow the identification of training shortfalls.

14.   S1CA is an all corps course; therefore, the barrier assessment should include the all corps Physical Employment Standard Assessment (PESA) as this would assist in attaining a physical and mental toughness baseline. The barrier assessment should also include handling drills for the F88 and F89 weapon systems, navigation and basic Infantry Minor Tactics (IMT), with which, all soldiers should be familiar.

14.   The duration and preparation time in conducting a Subject One Corporal Army course would limit the ability for WONCO-A staff to conduct the barrier assessment. The preferred solution would be for the Brigade Training Team (BTT) to conduct the assessment prior to soldiers attending day one of the course.

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[154]   202960 – Subject 1 Corporal Army Course Joining Instruction dated 30 May 16
[155]   The Medical report attached to the Post Activity Reports drafted for every course

CONCLUSION

15.   A soldier develops physical and mental toughness through continual experience, skills maintenance and demanding training that places them out side their comfort zones. The introduction of a barrier assessment would ensure that soldiers have the skill to successfully complete the Subject One Corporal Army course.

RECOMMENDATIONS

16.   To ensure soldiers have the physical and mental toughness for the Subject One corporal Army course it is recommended:

a.   The introduction of a Barrier assessment prior to soldiers attending the Subject One Corporal Army course.

b.   The Barrier assessment to include a physical component the All Corps PESA. The skills component to include weapon handling and IMT's.

c.   The BTT is employed to conduct the barrier assessment and provide written report to WONCO-A in a timely manner prior to the commencement of a course.

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PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

1.   Professional Development has consistently arisen in many different forms, over my military career. More often than not it has not developed my skills for my current position, or eventual transition from the Army

AIM

2.   The aim of this paper is to highlight the differences I have seen when it comes to the profession development of officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers. The majority of the development of officers and other ranks is different and must remain so.

LEARNING

3.   **Officers**. Most Defence Forces in the western world recruit future officers who have completed a high school education with reasonable marks and identified leadership qualities. These officer candidates already have certain personality traits including the ability to study, problem solve and express ideas in the written and oral form. People with these aptitudes are usually curious and eager to study and express themselves either orally or in writing. I have observed this amongst my own children, two of which possess these traits and are studying law, in contrast to another child who does not share the same traits. He is training to be a motor mechanic. He is training through practical experience and competence based training.

4.   Initial officer training is based on learning the theory, studying the theory, writing, presenting a plan (TEWT) to peers and then practicing in a field environment. This happens for the bulk of an officer's career. A lieutenant's first appointment is normally as a platoon commander or troop leader. As the leader.

5.   **Other Ranks.** Young people join the Army as soldiers for various reasons, the majority because it gives them a start in life. In many cases the Army delivers them a set of skills and attitudes that sets them up for life. A soldier during initial training is trained with a very basic skill set which is required to perform a specific job. Those skills are broadened through experience and mentorship. As soldiers gain experience they are given more responsibility and then placed on leadership courses. A soldier will always be held in high regard because of his job knowledge. I have certainly have seen this on ROBC Tk and Sub 4 CPL Tk. A young officer understands tactics and leadership because they have studied it and practised these skills during initial training. Soldiers on the other hand are technically competent because they have lived and breathed the vehicle for a number of years.

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

6.   **Officers.** I have seen officer training on many levels. Officer professional development should be done at all levels and is. During my time as an SSM, I was able to observe two OCs invest an incredible amount of time in developing young officers. This was done by the OC setting tactical or administrative problems. The young officers would write a solution, present it to their peers and OC and in the case of the tactical problem they would often execute their plan in the field at a later date. These young officers are now very capable OCs in their own right and are developing young officers in a simular way.

7.   **Other Ranks.** In the OR stream, a soldier needs to develop a passion. Today's soldiers believe that the Army is just a job. The passion will not come until there is a turning point in the soldiers' careers. That passion for me came when I completed S1CA and realised that I could be an instructor.

8.   To engage young soldiers' professional development in a unit now needs to be something out of the ordinary. It also needs to be relevant to the soldier and not seen to be as needless repetition of previous training. In my personal experience I developed that passion for instruction and this has enabled me pass on knowledge on a very wide number of topics and also

improve a number of other personal skills. Because of this passion I sought to gain more knowledge on that passion and in turn developed that passion even further.

9. Not so long ago a morning was set-aside weekly in the unit training program to ensure that soldiers were refreshed or trained in a number of skills. The JNCOs instructed them and SNCOs assessed them. This was a normal unit routine, which was professional development.

10. Professional development that is well planned and executed in a unit leads to soldier gaining different skills and improving others. From my experience a unit with a well developed and conducted professional program is a unit with confident and capable officers and soldiers. It is also a unit with high morale.

CONCLUSION

11. Professional development needs to be appropriate to the individual officer or soldier. It needs to be job related, develop skills that the individual will use and be beneficial to the Army. Soldiers will do things that they are interested in and passionate about. The unfortunate thing is that the Army Training system is now competency based. The problem with competency base training is that soldiers believe that "I have done that once and passed. Why do I need to it again?"

Recommendations

12. In support of developing a profession development program within a unit I would recommend the following:

a. Consult with key personnel within the unit to see what we need to achieve.

b. Understanding that professional development is a very divisive topic in defence and covers many different subjects, learning abilities and experience levels.

c. Officer training needs to be theoretical and discussed with peers.

d. Professional development for soldiers should be practical, experiential and repeatable.

e. Soldiers should be encouraged to seek out a passion because it is a form of professional development.

f. Professional development needs to be part of normal Unit training.

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THE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER SYMPOSIUM

Introduction

1.   Key to professional military education is small team training. A regular theme in exercise AARs and CTC trends briefs is the lack or poor standard of small team training. The thinking that any soldier, having completed Subject One Corporal Army, can instruct any subject pertaining to their corps or all-corps skill set is misguided. It is often said in messes, hallways and boozers that as an institution we have lost the art of small team training. This is a point that requires deeper consideration and discussions by NCOs at all levels if Army is going to successfully modernise and continue to support operations to the high standard we have set over the last almost twenty years. Having recently attended an NCO Symposium overseas the author believes a similar symposium is the ideal forum to discuss such an issue.

Aim

2.   This paper will suggest some formats for an NCO symposium, examples of key discussion points, the target audience and tangible outcomes for Army.

Background

3.   Earlier in 2016 there were two symposiums held. The first was hosted by the United States Army Sergeant Major Academy (USASMA) in El Paso, Texas. The symposium was titled the 'International Training and Leadership Development Symposium'. This symposium was attended by WO1 Jesenkovic (Command Sergeant Major – Training FORCOMD). The focus of the symposium was on senior warrant officer and warrant officer instructor/student exchanges and aligning officer and NCO training continuums. The second was held in New Zealand at Linton Army Camp Warrant Officers and Sergeants Mess and was hosted by WO1 Mark Mortiboy DSD, Sergeant Major of the New Zealand Army. This symposium was attended by the author and focused on the NCO in instructional positions and what could be expected when posted to these positions. It also touched briefly on generational change in trainees.

NCO Symposium

4.   **Purpose.** To gather together NCOs in a discussion type forum. So that ideas can be shared and some new concepts introduced. The audience will leave the symposium with the feeling that they are involved in the future of training in the Army and share the discussion with their peers and superiors.

5.   **Target audience.** The audience needs to be of a broad Corps demographic so as to achieve maximum experiential feedback during question times or group discussions. The attendees would range from the rank of LCPL to WO1. Subject One Corporal qualified private soldiers may attend, so as to provide a development opportunity for those individuals. International attendees would add a greater depth to the audience and would provide a further opportunity to network and strengthen international relationships.

6.   **Location.** As we well know not every NCO could attend a symposium of this type. However there are two factors to think about when considering the location of such an event. The first is to hold the event in a single location and invite NCOs from unit locations to a singular venue. The second is the travelling/mobile symposium. This format moves to major formation locations thus allowing the symposium to have a deeper exposure to Army. This would also increase the feeling of involvement by NCOs throughout the country and create Army wide discussion on topics raised therein.

Format.

7.   The format of this type of symposium needs to suit the audience. It has to engage the audience as well as provoke thought and possibly introduce some new concepts. The New Zealand NCO symposium was structured with two discussion panels of three members with a single moderator for each discussion panel. This format worked. There are several other formats that could suit:

a.   single speakers with a question and answer period at the end of each speech

b.   numerous speakers (no more than three) speaking on the same topic with a question and answer period after the speakers have completed their speeches

c.   topic debate with question and answer at the end

d.   discussion panel then break down the audience into discussion groups.

8.   The addition of a keynote speaker at the beginning of the symposium will gain the interest of the audience and point them in the direction that the symposium will be taking. The keynote speaker at the NZ symposium was WO1 Wiremu Moffit DSD, RSM of the First New Zealand Special Air service. The addition of a retired veteran as the key note speaker is another option.

Discussion topics

9.   The topics will provide the direction for the symposium and should introduce some new concepts and ideas to the attendees. What should the topics be and who will deliver them? The pool of adequately qualified NCOs in the Army is limitless. Members chosen to speak; however, need to have an expansive subject matter knowledge on the topic that they are speaking on and be able to answer questions in detail.

10.   During the New Zealand NCO symposium CPL R Triadad from The Army Depot (NZ recruit battalion equivalent), spoke about the next generation of soldiers. He outlined the fact that by 2025 all of the soldiers in the Army would be from generation Z. This poses several questions of the training methods that would be used. He spoke of the fact that soldiers from this generation would not have lived without the internet and were continuously connected via social media. Technology and the need to be connected he assessed as the key to engaging this generation. Out of this comes the topic of generations and how to better train soldiers using mediums that they easily understand. Such as the use of apps and computer programs like Modular Object Orientated Learning Environment (MOODLE).

11.   Accelerated learning methodology is an emerging way of teaching, developing and embedding skills at the individual and small team level. Introducing and discussing the key learning principles and techniques of accelerated learning and their application at the individual and section training level will lead into other discussions on experiential learning and reality based training. Examples of the implementation of these training methods could be provided. Ways in which basic training can be conducted in a time compressed work environment could also be linked to these topics.

12.   A historical example of leadership and training at the NCO level. This would be achieved through the invitation of a non-serving veteran. The speaker could talk on peacetime, pre-deployment, operational and post deployment training activities. Also junior leadership on and off the battle field.

Speakers

13.   It is only fitting that the introduction to an NCO symposium be done by the most senior NCO on the Army, The RSM of the Army. The introduction could include some challenges and experiences through the ranks and training methods that have been used to overcome these training challenges.

14.   The key note speaker should be someone who has a multifaceted understanding of training in the small team environment. They may include but are not limited to:

a.   An NCO from an international policing agency, for example New York, Los Angles Police Departments or United States Federal Bureau of Investigation

b.   An NCO from an Australian state or territory police force

c.   A training consultant such as Kenneth Murray author of "Training at the Speed of Life"

d.   An NCO from a special forces unit.

15.   The addition of NCOs from other nations could also broaden the experience had by the attendees. The following is a suggested outline of panel construction:

a.   The first panel would consist of WO1s or equivalent in a current unit RSM position. A suggested make up for the panel could be combat Corps RSM, combat support RSM and combat service support RSM. This panel will be moderated by a formation RSM or tier B equivalent.

b.   The second panel will consist of WO2 and SGT. The panel would consist of a WO2s or SGTs serving at a training establishment. This panel would benefit from the addition of an international NCO.

c.   The third panel will consist of LCPL and CPL. This panel size would be larger than the others and have up to six speakers. This panel could benefit from having an international NCO and a Special Forces NCO. This panel will be moderated by a SGT.

Outcomes

16.   The symposium is not designed as a course or a period of instruction. On the contrary, its content should start a discussion at the JNCO and SNCO level of the Army, about the way that we are conducting training. Then direct that discussion toward better methods of training the basics. Introduce some new training concepts and encourage further professional research on the part of the individual. The outcome for the Army is that JNCOs are talking and thinking of new ways to train their subordinates and better ways of designing training to suit the current training and operational tempo.

<div align="center">

Conclusion

</div>

17.   This paper has outlined some formats for an NCO symposium, examples of key discussion points, the target audience and tangible outcomes for Army. The key is for the symposium to be directed at NCOs and the need for training to be conducted at the unit level. Basic training that can be conducted in the work place that has an outcome on the capability and overall efficiency of the organisation.

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ACCELERATED GENERAL SERVICE OFFICER (GSO) TRAINING

INTRODUCTION

1.   The Royal Military College-Duntroon (RMC-D) was established in 1911 for the purpose of training commissioned officers for service in the Australian Army. Since its inception, the course continuum for preparing young men, and later women, for the rigours of command has gone through many evolutions. In its current form, the training continuum demands a minimum period of 18 months for a direct entry Staff Cadet (SCDT) to complete all three classes, each six months long, prior to graduating as a Lieutenant (LT) in the Australian Army.

2.   **Scope.** For many current serving soldiers within the Australian Army, the thought of gaining a commission as an officer is attractive. Yet the idea of attending RMC-D for a minimum of 18 months with the first six being a repeat of their ab initio[156] training is the deciding factor not to pursue a career as an officer. Due to this, RMC-D, and the officer corps in general, is missing a unique opportunity to recruit some of the most experienced and effective

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[156] Training delivered from the beginning of a soldiers career

junior non-commissioned officers (JNCO) of the Australian Army. This essay will present an alternative to the current system that is more cost effective, attractive for possible applicants and beneficial to the Chief of Army's needs in maintaining capability.

AIM

3.   The profession of arms is heavily populated with customs and traditions. The RMC-D is no different to like training establishments throughout the developed world in their use of tradition as a tool to promote esprit-de-corps within its ranks. Years after graduation, senior officers still look back on their days as a SCDT with a nostalgic over tone and consider fellow graduates to be of equal standing due to having completed the program. However, the military is no different to any other tax payer funded establishment and is required to justify their expenditure, seek ways of maintaining effectiveness and always seek means of gaining greater efficiency[157]. Due to these facts, RMC-D cannot hide behind the excuse of maintaining customs and traditions that lead to inefficiencies and do not generate further capability in regards to these three facts.

4.   RMC-D has the opportunity to recruit more individuals from within the Army that hold the competencies required for the successful completion of III Class. This will then negate the conduct of ab initio training for already competent and proficient junior leaders from within Army. This would decrease the number of direct entry candidates requiring ab initio training, reducing the number of staff required for the III Class training continuum. Furthermore, this reduction in staff numbers would reduce the financial impact on Army as the number of removals conducted as part of the current posting cycle would be reduced. Also, minimising the impact on families and also ensuring that only the best instructors were selected for a position at the RMC-D. The added attractiveness of only requiring 12 months from beginning to end for current serving JNCO would certainly increase the number of motivated soldiers pursuing advancement within the officer stream of the Australian Army. These financial benefits for Army can be achieved if the duplication of ab initio training is removed from the training continuum.

5.   The elimination of duplicated training within Army is mandatory and clearly articulated within the doctrine[158] which provides clear direction on how to design and deliver training at unit and formation level. By RMC-D conducting repeated ab initio training, the unit is clearly not complying with the guidance provided. As the premier instructional establishment[159] within Army, it could easily be expected that RMC-D would lead by example when complying with how training is to be conducted within the Australian Army. By negating the requirement for service personnel to receive duplicated training, the training continuum for SCDT with previous experience would be shorted by six months. This would result in an individual being commissioned and ready for a Regimental Officers Basic Course (ROBC) after 12 months, rather than 18 months. This is a reduction in training liability, rationing, accommodation and resource usage by one third, thus reducing the cost of training a GSO LT even further.

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[157] 2016 Defence whitepaper
[158] Land Warfare Procedures – General 7-0-1 The Conduct of Training.
[159] DSCM-A Guidance for the completion of AE360 Performance Appraisal Report (PAR)

6.   Using the standard Infantry platoon as an example, the most inexperienced member of the platoon is usually the one in command of it. Having completed 18 months at RMC-D, the newly graduated LT then completes their ROBC and are then employed as a Platoon Commander responsible for over 30 lives, usually in their mid twenties. Of course that LT is supported by the chain of command above and below them, but the obvious fact remains unchanged that the least experienced leader in the platoon is the one responsible for the success or failure of the organisation. An opportunity exists for this to no longer be the accepted norm for the Army by harnessing the existing experience from our junior leaders. Experience is not something that can be bought or issued, especially of the operational nature. It is often earned in blood and comes at great personal cost.

CONCLUSION

7.   The Australian Army has a responsibility to provide world class training and education to its junior officers in order to ensure they are equipped, educated and experienced for the rigours of command. Two areas have been clearly identified that provide suitable argument for how this can be achieved. Firstly, by actively recruiting junior leaders from within the Australian Army, thus transferring the current knowledge and experience to the ranks of junior officers. Secondly, by reducing the GSO training for members with prior service by one third will create savings in not only cost, but also training time, staffing requirements and resource consumption. This can be achieved if a change is focussed on increasing capability, reducing costs and is implemented without tradition being taken into consideration.

Recommendations

8.   In order to ensure the future officers of the Australian Army possess the skills, knowledge, attributes and attitudes required of leaders, it is recommended that:

a.   Directorate Soldier Career Management Agency (D-SCMA) commences a talent management program that targets high performance JNCO with the option of commissioning.

b.   Officer training be actively promoted as an option for career progression to JNCO as a component of the AE-360 Annual Reporting process.

c.   RMC-D develops a more robust training framework that recognises previously assessed competencies and proficiencies of applicants from within Army.

SK Camac
WO2
CAN Wing

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DEATH BY POWERPOINT

INTRODUCTION

1.   Since its introduction to the Australian Army in the late 1990's, Microsoft PowerPoint has become the basis for visual and theory presentations. It is widely used across units, training establishments and forces. This application is relied upon instinctively to produce any form of visual aid to a presenter, whether needed or not. The presenter is also deprived of choice as there is little alternative for visual representation of their work.

2.   Training establishments have embraced these types of technology in recent decades and available products have been pushed beyond their original capacity in order to appeal to our audience. As the medium becomes familiar, instructors have been forced to develop new and more appealing PowerPoint presentations to maintain the audience's attention.

3.   Suitable alternatives now exist that allow flexibility for the designer, easier integration across applications and better support of other digital advancements including tablets and wireless networks.

AIM

4.   The aim of this defence paper is to reduce the reliance of PowerPoint and provide alternatives to improve instructional techniques.

WHY USE IT?

5.   Before PowerPoint the overhead projector was heavily relied upon for theory instruction to trainees, but became more of a burden to the instructor. Experienced presenters developed intricate methods of keeping audiences' attention and different ways to present not only written points, but graphics and even animation. These techniques steadily transitioned into what was expected, forcing presenters to develop even more dynamic techniques for fear of loosing the audiences attention.

6.   PowerPoint suits military instruction in many ways. It is a simple user interface that allows a user to deliver a very basic presentation with little experience. Necessary teaching points can be easily covered in a logical order and the presenter can be certain that they have covered mandated instruction. The presentation or lesson can also be heavily controlled allowing for predictable delivery expectations and adherence to timing constraints.

OVER RELIANCE

7.   There are a multitude of reasons a presentation can fail; poor planning, inadequate time for preparation, poor subject knowledge and difficult audiences to name just a few. This list also includes PowerPoint over reliance or 'death by PowerPoint'. It has replaced almost all formal and informal presentations including theory lessons, briefs, reviews, mandatory training and even career acknowledgments.

8.   Face to face instruction relies heavily on subject matter, the instructor and the trainees. It requires knowledge of the subject, a problem or topic, and interaction. Delivering point form knowledge locks the presentation into a predefined path and cuts off the possibility of improvisation or deviation. This in turn leads to a quick assessment by the trainee of the instructors' direction making the lesson predictable and this is what looses the trainees' attention.

9.   With little to no formal training, instructors are applying PowerPoint with the same theory and with little reliance on any other method, have reached capacity with custom animation schemes, animation, media and graphics. Furthermore, the inexperienced instructor is expected to produce an advanced product but is disadvantaged by having little knowledge of the application or how to effectively use it.

10.   It is because of its ease of use, reliability and familiarity that it has been adopted so widely. Almost all classroom or lecture theatre based training is delivered by PowerPoint and it is with this reliance the audience is over exposed and dangerously familiar with every available font, animation and effect.

11.   With no suitable alternative and taking into account the amount of time and determination to make the current option work, it is little surprise that PowerPoint is relied on so heavily to produce visual aids to any form of presentation. Moving into a classroom lecture theatre is almost guaranteed to be met with comments of 'death by PowerPoint'.

ALTERNATIVE SOFTWARE PROGRAMS

12.   PowerPoint has been used by the Army for over twenty years. As part of the Microsoft Office suite of programs and its interoperability with Microsoft Word and Excel, it has been a successful and useful software program. It had little alternative until now, with current equivalents showing far better potential.

13.   Software packages such as Prezi have changed the idea of 'slide' presentation and offer users the ability to easily zoom around the presentation, expand and explore the links between the main topic and the intricate details. This allows the audience to start with single ideas and aid in the building of knowledge through participation.

14.   HaikuDeck allows visual representation of brainstorming sessions and can be quickly modified to show thought patterns and the creation of ideas. This in turn can be presented to other audiences as a collaboration of ideas or culmination of an activity. HaikuDeck is a modern twist on electronic boards and large tear away paper pads.

15.   SlideDog is also a suitable alternative that allows the integration of any type of media file into a single presentation, regardless of the format. You can also combine other presentation formats such as PowerPoint, Prezi and any other into a single presentation allowing multiple options for the user. An added benefit of SlideDog is that older media and file types will be available regardless of upgrades or version changes.

16.   The newest software programs are available as applications and can be used by tablet devices such as the current workplace IPAD. If this was partnered with a wireless network, instructors could move seamlessly between large and small groups. The presentation can be quickly connected to a projector from anywhere in the room and shared with the audience. Small group type activities can be shared with the larger group and knowledge shared quickly amongst the audience.

CONCLUSION

17.   PowerPoint is a valuable and effective program that delivers Army training in an effective and efficient manner. Its widespread use and user knowledge has seen an informal expertise across all rank groups allowing full exploitation of its capabilities. Over reliance on PowerPoint can be defeated by supporting it with new software programs that allow:

a.   alternatives for the instructor that may suit a particular style

b   various different methods to deliver a product

c.   audience participation

d.   better opportunities to keep the audiences attention.

18.   Providing multiple options with the ability to use them separately or together will suit different presenters, audiences and topics will improve instructor techniques and ultimately prevent 'death by PowerPoint'.

RECOMMENDATIONS

19.   When considering the shift to the next generation desktop the following recommendations are made:

a.   Several software programs such as PowerPoint, Prezi, HaikuDeck and SlideDog are made available to the instructor.

b.   Their equivalent applications are uploaded to tablet devices.

c.   Wireless connectivity be utilised as the preferred network medium to allow robust delivery options.

d.   Training packages be constructed to allow formal training in new software.

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RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND CULTURAL CHANGE

"We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them"
Albert Einstein

INTRODUCTION

1.   Australia has a multicultural past, the blend of religions and cultures as a result of a diverse immigrant society which has created the iconic society that is 'Australian'. Diversity embodies an ethic for respect and acceptance for the community which breeds harmony, and cultural inclusion.

2.   The Defence Force is a reflection of society, and as such needs to capitalise on the strengths that a diverse multicultural society offers. If the Defence Force is to continue to be an inclusive, progressive organisation and grow by 2017, it will be required to strengthen its recruiting ability. Currently, it is competing against a competitive labour market. Additionally, the Defence Force must develop strategies to continue cultural change and this, in turn, will strengthen the retention of the diverse group that it has recruited.

4.   **Scope.** This purpose of the paper is to discuss how to increase recruitment, continue cultural change within the Defence Force, and retain the diverse populace in order to further strengthen diversity in the Defence Force.

AIM

5.   This paper aims to explore the significance of embracing diversity in order to create cultural change that will strengthen recruiting and retention.

POINT OF ENTRY

6.   **Recruiting.** Defence must become a more inclusive organisation to attract and recruit the diverse talent from society. A number of strategies have been developed to better

represent the Defence Force as the **"employer of choice"**[1]. These strategies have improved recruiting and have helped Defence to become more diverse in the targeted groups; these include the Indigenous policy now which has initiatives such as:

a.   The **"Recruit when Ready"**[2]. This initiative supports Indigenous candidates that are from a remote areas looking for employment and cannot wait for a particular enlistment date. A few Indigenous communities can suffer from negative influencers some from the community itself and this option is a great opportunity for any candidate wishing to join Defence.

b.   The **"Recruit to Area"**[2], Diversity candidates have the option to enlist into Army and be posted to a specific location for an agreed period of time after recruit and initial employment training. The restrictions on the scheme include certain general enlistment roles and full time single service officer roles and the agreement will be for the first four years following enlistment in an agreed location. These initiatives are important, as they are "Attracting young Australians to an ADF career (which) is a vital investment in our countries future"[3]. The strategies for flexibility and inclusion will lead the way forward for cultural change.

CULTURAL CHANGE

7.   **Cultural change.** Cultural change is driven by people from all backgrounds that want change. "Through our individual and collective actions we will build a strong positive Defence culture and deliver a flexible, adaptable, inclusive workplace and a sustainable workforce"[1], Defence Diversity and Inclusion Strategy 2012-2017. This strategy for cultural change is what will strengthen the diversity across all services within the Defence force.

8.   Defence is clear in its way forward for the future, "We need to be absolutely unambiguous: inclusivity and diversity are crucial to defences ability to operate at peak performance and demonstrate maximum capacity"[5] A person's ability should not be judged by their culture, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or the language they speak it should be judged by the capability one will to offer in the Defence of the country.

9.   Army has commenced changes to include different and diverse backgrounds. All commanders are expected "champion cultural change"[1]. In 2014, then RSM-A   WO Dave Ashley marched in the Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras, he was an exemplar of cultural change and inclusion inclusion. There has been some talk of different groups eroding customs and traditions, these concerns are naive and misinformed, as the inclusion of NAIDOC week and changes in the ADM, in fact are brining the customs and traditions to the standard of society. These strategies compliment and enhance the Defence Forces current policies to strengthen inclusiveness as part of cultural change. This cultural change will lead to retention.

[1] Defence Diversity and Inclusion Strategy 2012-2017
[2] DFR-RECPOL061 Diversity Initiatives Overview
[3] Defence White paper 2016
4 General DJ Hurley, AC, DSC, 2013
5 Pathways to Change 2012

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[2] DFR-RECPOL061 Diversity Initiatives Overview
[3] Defence White paper 2016
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RETENTION

10.   **Retention.** "Retaining the high-quality, experienced staff that Defence has developed over time is as important as attracting new talent"[3]. Defence policy supports the retention of its people through different strategies. One of the key strategies that links all involved is to "provide appropriate and supportive mentoring and network frameworks that meet diverse needs"[1]. The employment conditions that are offered must be flexible and represent all, in particular the targeted groups "Defence should seek to represent the community it represents"[4]. It will ultimately be up to the chain of command at all levels to instil the importance of diversity within its members, thus retaining all members of diverse backgrounds. It will be through cultural change that Defence will achieve retention.

CONCLUSION

Defence can capitalise on the benefits of people of diverse backgrounds by developing reforms focussing on cultural integration and inclusiveness. Defence must continue to evolve with the society it represents. It is must continue to attract, and retain young Australians with the skills and knowledge that Defence will require in the future, this is the challenge Defence faces now and in the future, it must instil cultural change in order to retain its diverse members.

Recommendations

23.   To expedite and reinforce defence direction it is recommended that:

a.   Defence conduct further education on cultural change and awareness through biannual professional development.

b.   Cultural awareness briefs to be introduced to promotion courses to expedite information across Army IAW CA intent.

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HOW MUCH ADMIN IS TOO MUCH? THE CONFUSING MODERN SOLDIERING EXPERIENCE

A wise man once said to me "Unfortunately, Admin is not a place in China".

INTRODUCTION

1.   Over the course of the last 20 years or so, modern soldiering for those in command positions and supervisory roles has largely morphed from being an outdoor activity to an indoor activity. Computers, conferences, spreadsheets, capability management systems, centralised administration facilities, online learning, social media, registered training organisation compliance, endless auditing, discipline statistics, four page-long leave applications, and the like have eroded what being a soldier used to be about – being out in the field getting the job done. All this deskwork is tiring. Exhausting. Depressing. Life as a modern soldier is being tied up in a multitude of inefficient administrative tasks and is not concentrating on the foundation warfighting skills that should be foremost in the minds of all soldiers and officers. Don't get me wrong – without effective administration our Army would fall to pieces in short order; however, I am convinced that we spend too much time talking and writing about what we are going to do at the expense of getting it done.

2.   **Scope.** This paper is seeking to generate discussion amongst those who have a care to read it. I will focus on what is *really* important? What are we doing that is useless time wasting? If it is useless time wasting, why do we feel that it has to be done? And finally, how do we achieve a change to rid ourselves of the useless stuff?

AIM

3.   While this paper is not intended to be exhaustive, its' aim is to generate discussion over what detritus we can remove from our processes. The end result should be for senior soldiers and officers to get out of the office more and revel in the delight of monitoring and participating in training with their soldiers. I will use a few common examples to illustrate my point.

WHAT IS *REALLY* IMPORTANT?

4.   I firmly believe that the question that needs to be answered first is: "what is really important?" I do not have the answer to this question, but if this paper does generate some discussion, perhaps in time we as an Army will develop a solution. Due to the varying nature of different organisations within Army, perhaps the only way this can be answered is at individual

unit level. Regardless, there are a number of issues that can be extrapolated from this. Two that immediately come to mind are:

a.   **Levels of reporting.** Is it really important for a Major General to be informed that a private soldier was a 'no show' for a promotion course? While directed training requirements need to be adhered to, something as innocuous as one soldier not turning up currently generates a large amount of administrative burden at sub-unit, unit, formation and functional levels. Is this really that important an issue to cause so much staff effort?

b.   **Unnecessary detail in basic administrative processes.** Not that many years ago, a leave application was less that the size of an A4 sheet of paper. All the required information was on that one page and the individual soldier tore off the signed slip at the bottom and carried it as his or her leave pass. Today's AD097 is a four page online PDF document that due to the limitations of our system more often than not needs to be printed out and physically signed anyway. If nothing else, we are just wasting paper. Conversely, the use of PMKEYS to approve leave can result in commanders being tied to their computers for the better part of a day just to approve online leave applications. The point of this is that we are overcomplicating many basic administrative requirements.

WHAT ARE WE DOING THAT IS USELESS TIME WASTING?

5.   A perfect example of useless staff effort can be found within my own role as a Course Manager for the Subject One Corporal course. Many hours are spent filling out a preparedness data sheet for the start of each course. The information for this is provided by individual soldiers attending the course, platoon and troop staff, sub-unit Sergeant Majors and myself. The end result is that all of the information contained in this data sheet is sent to our headquarters with no apparent need for it. The perverse twist to this is that *all* of this information is contained within PMKEYS. We are essentially duplicating information that is already available.

IF IT IS USELESS TIME WASTING, WHY DO WE FEEL THAT IT HAS TO BE DONE?

6.   Although I have not conducted any specific analysis into this, I strongly suspect that this falls under the category of the fictitious 'five monkeys in a cage' experiment – we do it this way because that's the way things have always been done. If we are able to look outside the box a little more frequently, we may be able to streamline needed processes and perhaps even eliminate superfluous ones. Perhaps there is a case for looking to civil industry to provide suggestions, or even solutions, to aid Army in this area.

HOW DO WE ACHIEVE CHANGE TO RID OURSELVES OF THE USELESS STUFF?

7.   First of all, I think that the word 'change' should almost always be substituted with 'continuous improvement'. That will automatically get a lot of people onside who profess that they 'hate change'. Paradoxically, perhaps the only way that we will be able to reduce administrative burden is by creating more (in the short term at least). Analysis of our administrative processes, perhaps through a number of lean process reviews, could provide the answers to eliminate many unnecessary tasks.

CONCLUSION

8.   Army as a whole is drowning in a sea of admin. This needs to stop. Excessive reporting, unnecessary detail, useless time wasting and a mentality of 'that's how its' always been done'

result in more work and less time spent training with our soldiers. Although this is a relatively simplistic look at a real problem, highlighting some small aspects of this issue should get people talking about how to start to resolve it.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9.   My recommendations are:

a.   Assess whether a number of lean process reviews would be a viable starting point to improve and shorten administrative processes across Army.

b.   At the higher level, engage with proven industry leaders and examine the successes of their administrative processes.

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BATTLEFIELD SIMULATION - NOT JUST A GAME

INTRODUCTION

1.   The Australian Army has developed and constructed seven operational Battlefield Simulation Sites (BSS) across Australia. All BSS are now fully functional and operate under the control of the Land Simulation Centre (LSC). Four of these training assets are collocated with wings of the Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Academy; NT Wing, NQ Wing, SQ Wing and SA Wing.

2.   BSS support local units through the provision of robust LAN based infrastructure and simulation software packages. The primary simulation systems presently offered by LSC are the Virtual Battlespace System (VBS) and the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS). These simulation systems provide commanders with a synthetic, yet realistic and adaptable, simulation of the modern battlespace.

3.   **Scope.** As Army enlists increasing numbers of personnel from a technologically adept 'millennial' generation it behoves Army to explore innovative enhancements to sequenced training. In a resource constrained environment, Battlefield Simulation provides a low cost computer based option for individual and collective training that embraces technology and may elevate the standard of communication, decision making and teamwork.

AIM

4.   This essay proposes that training establishments should broaden their use of BSS infrastructure and training technology in order to enhance professional development across Army.

INNOVATION IN TRAINING

5.   **Development.** Army has initiated several milestones within the training domain in recent years. The transition to eLearning through the use of 'Campus Online' has resulted in significant improvements in Army's foundational knowledge, the establishment of virtual classrooms that allow geographically dislocated participants can engage with instructional staff and the introduction of a blended learning environment across training establishments. Army also employs a variety of computer-based part task simulation assets, enhancing trade related core skills.

6.   **VBS** provides users with the option of a three dimensional, first person view or a two dimensional tactical overview of the battlespace. It also provides users with Australian Defence Force weapons, equipment, vehicles, aircraft and naval platforms. VBS enables supported units to access a real time, dynamic environment that may be utilised for section level training up to combat team activities. Scenarios can be developed to imitate operational environments or training exercises. Commanders are able to employ the three dimensional, multi angle after action review (AAR) function to capture tailored vignettes for later use as learning support material. VBS is ideally suited to the all Corps training environment.

7.   **JCATS** provides users with a two dimensional tactical overview. The constructive simulation is primarily focused at larger scale simulations, including joint operations activities. The primary function of this system will be training unit CoC with support elements utilised to interact with the simulation scenario.

MENTORING 'MILLENNIALS'

8.   **Generational theory.** The attitude of personnel to innovation and technology may be attributable to generational attitudes and expectations. The period in which personnel were raised can impart a significant influence in the morals, beliefs and behaviours of the individual. Within Army, serving personnel can generally be grouped into three 'generations'. These being the 'Baby Boomers' (born 1946 – 1960s), 'Generation X' (born 1968- early1980s) and 'Generation Y', or 'Millennials' (born from the early 1980s). It is a reasonable expectation that some units are manned by personnel from all three generations.

9.   **Motivating Millennials.** Army has encapsulated the optimum learning methodology for Millennials through the delivery of the approach, as part of the formal lesson structure. Junior personnel, raised with a broad exposure to technology and a complex information terrain, prefer an awareness of the 'why' rather than simply the 'how' of learning. During formal instruction personnel are aware of 'what they are about to learn, why they need to learn it and what standard they will achieve at the end of the period of instruction' (Australian Army, 2014, p 3-4).

10.   In order to enhance the learning experience of personnel it is critical to tailor the learning support material to the learning style of the training audience. The use of simulated assets and environments will maintain the interest of trainees raised in a generation spoiled with rapid advances in technology, information exchange and connectivity.

EMBRACING TECHNOLOGY

11.   **All-Corps training.** The Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Academy delivers training to almost ten percent of Army personnel in any given year. This provides Army with a unique opportunity to expose our future leaders to simulation assets and a simulated battlespace. Newly qualified personnel can relay their recent simulated learning experiences to their peers and superiors. This may assist units, which are co-located with Battlefield Simulation Sites, in identifying contexts for trade specific, simulation assisted learning and training.

12.   **The future.** Simulation assets continue to evolve. There is no limit to the variety or content of training scenarios that may be developed to assist commanders with their training needs. Individual training can be enhanced with classroom based, simulated demonstrations of practical activities. Simulating simple or complex field activities incorporating realistic battle effects can mitigate the safety restrictions, resource constraints and cumbersome administration requirements associated with operating within Defence training areas. Collective training can be facilitated with scenarios incorporating support elements that are generally made available during major activities and exercises. Simulation will never replicate the outcomes of live training; however, optimum levels of performance are rarely achieved without reviewing our methodology during the evaluation phase of the current learning and development model. Simulation can best assist learning and training if it is a consideration during all phases of the learning and development model.

CONCLUSION

13.   Army is yet to fully realise the potential of Battlefield Simulation as a collective training option. Commanders, through liaison and the articulation of specified training outcomes, can

assist BSS staff in the development of tailored training scenarios. Furthermore these simulation scenarios may be distributed electronically, verified by external units and developed further; in consultation with supported units or independently by BSS staff. Learning support material can also be developed to enhance the learning outcomes of trainees and activity participants, through the implementation of simulation imagery and reviews.

Recommendations

14.   In order to increase awareness of the capabilities of Battlefield Simulation across the training domain it is recommended that;

a.   Training establishment personnel undertake familiarisation tours of local BSS in order to gain an appreciation of battlefield simulation infrastructure and capability.

b.   Training establishment personnel undertake a review of Training Management Package content in order to identify Course or Module Learning Outcomes that may benefit from the inclusion of battlefield simulation activities.

c.   Training establishment personnel remain attentive to opportunities where instruction may be enhanced through the use of a virtual battlespace.

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WONCO-A AND THE INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION

Revolution; a dramatic and wide-reaching change in conditions, attitudes, or operation.

INTRODUCTION

1.   The Australian Defence Force and The Australian Army are about to enter a period of intellectual revolution. The Defence White Paper (DWP 16) states that there will be a ten year strategic workforce plan to support the enhancement of defence personnel capability; by recruiting, developing, and retaining the people we need. This is a part of a broader seven step plan under 'personnel', and is primarily due to the anticipated development and acquisition in capability, both strategic and tactical, that will play an essential part in the Government's medium to long term plan to influence our region with a more capable, agile and potent force.

2.   **Scope.** This paper will explore the following; recruiting, and who we should expect to train in the future, and the development of our current and future workforce from an Academy perspective in response to the Government's plan.

AIM

3.   So what will this mean for the Warrant Officer and Non Commissioned Officer Academy, and how can we be expected to contribute in the Government's ten year strategic plan? This I hope to explain by focussing on the recruiting and development aspects of the workforce plan, and what we may need to do differently in order to meet our obligations as a part of the Government's long term strategic goals.

RECRUITING – WHO DO WE EXPECT TO TRAIN IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS

4.   Who will I be expected to teach in the future? This question is fundamentally, the most important question a training establishment should be asking itself.

5.   The Government's plan implies that we will soon be expected to instruct trainees that have been selected with intellectual strengths in science, technology, mathematics and engineering; and others with strengths in technical, analytical and project management skills (DWP 16, p151). Based on this, would it not be unreasonable to expect that the intellectual capacity of the 'future soldier' in accordance with this ten year plan and targeted recruiting may be somewhat higher than 'today's soldier'? It is likely that by virtue of specific intellectual and cognitive requirements through targeted recruiting methods, there will be generally, a higher level of intellect in the trainees of the future, however; to generalise in this instance requires some caution.

6.   Before any perception of intellect is determined of the trainee of the future, there are some other key factors in the DWP 16 that need to be examined. Firstly, the targeted recruiting is primarily based on the Government's capability enhancement and procurement, and is prioritised in chapter four of the DWP 16 as;

a.   Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Space, Electronic Warfare, and Cyber Security

b.   Maritime Operations and Anti-Submarine Warfare

c.   Strike and Air Combat

d.   Land Combat and Amphibious Warfare

e.   Key Enablers, and

f.   Air and Sea Lift.

7.   Land Combat specifically, will see advancements in individual and crewed weapon systems, with the procurement of long range surface to surface rockets and the replacement of ageing armoured vehicle fleets. There will also be a focus on enhancing our information, surveillance and reconnaissance operations, which will include acquisition of medium sized armed unmanned aerial vehicles. And there will also be advancements in riverine patrol boats and attack aviation capabilities. (DWP 16, p 98)

8.   You may have determined already that the majority of these priorities are within niche trades in Defence and Army, and it is here where we will need to exercise our caution; while intellectual and cognitive ability pre-requisites will increase for some trades, not all of the others will increase at the same rate, therefore; despite seeing a marked increase in the ability of some trainees, there will be an increasingly wider intellectual gap between future trainees based on the requirements of their trade. What that means to us is this; there will be an intellectual divide or essentially a persistent element of intellectual diversity, which the future instructor will have to manage with the employment of more adaptive and dynamic teaching methods.

9.   Therefore; and considering the advancements listed above, and the Government's strategic plan, we should generally expect to see a technologically literate individual, with varied strengths in sciences, mathematics, technology. However; there will be three niches that most will fit, those being; the intellectually and technologically superior, the cognitive and mentally agile, and finally the pragmatic and tactile. Of course there will be individuals, who are fortunate enough to have the balance of all three, but the gaps between will still remain and increase continually based on advancements within their individual trades.

DEVELOPMENT – WHAT DO WE NEED TO DO DIFFERENTLY

10.   It was mentioned in the previous topic that instructors will require a more adaptive and dynamic method of instruction in order to teach the future soldier. But before these methods are discussed in more detail, we should take a look at two doctrinal definitions, the first of which relates to training.

11.   Training ensures that personnel can apply standard solutions to predictable circumstances; that is, they can deal with a familiar problem in a familiar context (LWD 7-0 para 8). This is something we do quite effectively, considering the applicable disciplines contained in the course Learning Management Package, and the context in which it is taught and assessed.

12.   However; the second definition Learning, takes place during, and as individuals experience any activity which teaches them to modify their actions or behaviour in any way (LWD 7-0 para6, 7). The Army aspires to be a learning organisation, and adaptive and dynamic instruction can contribute to this aspiration.

13.   Adaptive instruction can be broadly described as understanding what the trainee does know, then determining what they need to know from what you are required to teach, and delivering only the required information in a method and environment suitable for all levels of intellect and experience. The instructor then structures his or her lesson to suite.

14.   Dynamic instruction relates to the activity context in the definition of learning, and can be described as altering the location and methods of presentation, practice and confirmation for a better learning experience. For example, moving away from the doctrinal theoretical instruction method, to other methods like pre-reading, periods of directed study accompanied by a subject

matter expert, and then followed by short written submissions or smart form PDF questionnaires for confirmation.

15.   These are only a couple of examples of how we can be more adaptive and dynamic in our method of instruction, with further examples to be provided in a separate submission later this year.

CONCLUSION

16.   In conclusion, and in order to make it through the intellectual revolution in the near future, staff at WONCO-A will need to have a sound understanding of the future training audience, and recognise some of the intellectual and cognitive disparity between individuals. We will also need to be more adaptive in our approach to instruction, and more dynamic in our methods of presenting information and assessment in order to maintain focus and contribute effectively to the Government's strategic workforce plan.

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EMPLOYMENT OF LOGISTIC OFFICER WITHIN SUPPORT & TRAINING UNITS

INTRODUCTION

1.   **"**In the Defence White Paper, Defence of Australia 1987, The Government indicated that it would need to maintain Defence spending at around 2.6 to 3.0 percent of GDP if it was 'to achieve the levels of Defence and the priorities reflected in this paper. The Government signalled

its intention to rationalise Defence industry and to focus greater attention on the introduction of commercial enterprise into the Defence contracting process". [160]

2.   "From that one paragraph in the White Paper that dealt with commercialisation in Defence, a more detailed commercial support strategy was then worked out in the Wrigley Review of 1990. The intention of the CSP was to generate greater cost savings in areas of Defence acquisition and logistics, with the exception of those areas that were deemed to be of a vital military nature later defined as 'core Defence activities'. These savings, it was claimed, could then be redirected to the 'sharp end' of Defence". [1]

3.   The Defence White paper has changed the way logistic support is provided within Defence within non field force and training units with the inception of contractors providing supply and maintenance support of Defence equipment. Within these units supported by contractors Defence has still maintained uniformed members as logistic officers to provide logistic advice and to fill gaps within the contract.

4.   **Scope**. There would appear to be significant savings to be gained from the CSP, however, this paper assesses the requirement for uniformed logistic members within contracted units

AIM

5.   This paper discusses the validity of the logistic officer position within Defence units and how the CSP can be improved.

LOGISTIC OFFICER

6.   **Uniformed Members**. Units supported by CSP still have uniformed members employed as logistic officers. The logistic officers are Supply Chain Operator ECN 298 or Operator Unit Quartermaster ECN 296 from the rank of corporal to warrant officer. The role of the logistic officer is varied dependent on the unit however generally the logistic officer is the liaison between the unit and the supporting contractors and are required to fill gaps in the supply support contracts e.g. provide field support for course.

7.   **Trade.** Whilst posted to a logistic officer position the members are not fully employed within their trade they do not have full access to the Military Integrated Logistics Information System (MILIS) they are limited to view access only. MILIS is core logistics management system for Defence and the Supply Chain Operator or Operator Unit Quartermaster trade. The logistic officer does not work within the warehouse environment they employed in an office administrative area.

8.   **Monitor.** Logistic officer are required to monitor the contractor contract compliance to fulfil this function knowledge of contract management is required however contract management is not taught on any trade or corps course. Access to contracts is restricted to commercial in confidence and not all information is available. The logistic officer does not have access to the part of the contract that states what function is relevant to particular the unit or which function is survey and quote where the unit is required to pay for the service. This is different for each region and is subject to change dependant on the Product & Service Manager (PSM) interpretation and definition of the contract. The unit logistic officer is not permitted to conducts audits on the contractors as this is conducted by Logistics Assurance Branch Tier 3 Logistics Compliance and Assurance Officer (LAB Tier 3) however the results of the audit are not provided to the unit.

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[160] Research Paper Number 2 1993 The Defence Commercial Support Program

9.   **Contractors.** Commercial companies in accordance with the CSP have taken on the responsibilities of the unit quartermaster under a national contract the contract has attachment of supplementary information which is divided into regions. This information details specific contract requirement for individual units within the region e.g. operating hours. The contract is not consistent or standardised for general or common used commodities e.g. within one unit/region the contractor is responsible for the management of ammunition within another unit/region the contractors does not manage ammunition. This can be rectified by a contract change proposal however this take time and extra cost to Defence and is out of the Logistic officer control and authority.

10.   **Core Skills.** Being posted to a unit as a logistic officer reduces trade core skills. The reduction in trade skills is due to having restricted access (view only) to MILIS and not being in a supervisory role within a warehouse (Q Store) for a period of three year. Some of these members will be disillusioned with the Army and may leave the Defence force prematurely due to not being fully employed within their chosen trade. One of the functions of the unit logistic officer is to maintain the unit corporate governance policies and procedures prior to CSP this was conducted by the unit quartermaster.

11.   **Reduction.** Army is reducing the rank of some positions to corporal and sergeant one of the functions of the position is to provide logistic advice to a CO/OC with the reduction in rank a corporal or a junior sergeant does not have the experience or knowledge to provide accurate and timely advice. Within units which have logistic officers there is no Artificer Sergeant Major (ASM) and the logistic officer is required to provide advice on equipment maintenance.

12.   **Changes.** The CSP contract changes from year to year, in one year the contractor will be funded to support an activity e.g. Anzac Day the next year the PSM will not fund the activity. The unit will be required pay for the support or provide military staff to support the activity. Generally these activities will not be forecasted for and the unit logistic officer will be required to fill the gap. There is no consistency in the contract and it is depended on the interpretation of the PSM from year to year.

CONCLUSION

13.   The concept of CSP was to introduce saving though out Defence and this has been achieved by reducing military positions within non combat units. It appears that the contracted companies do not have the same accountability and responsibility that a military operated quartermaster store however this is not so. Logistic officers are require in a headquarter environment to provide logistic advice to senior officers and to monitor the unit corporate governance. Removing the military personnel from these logistic positions would benefit the Defence by further reduction in Defence spending and improve the contractor's accountability.

Recommendations

14.   In support of CSP it is recommended that:

a.   Logistic Officers positions should be disbanded within support and administrative units.

b.   Contractors assume Logistic Officer responsibilities including field and procurement duties.

c.   CSP contracts be reviewed and standardised.

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DEALING WITH CERTAIN OFFENCES UNDER THE DISCIPLINE OFFICER SCHEME

"Let the punishment fit the crime."

WS Gilbert

INTRODUCTION

1.   In 1982 the Australian Government commenced the introduction of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (DFDA) to maintain and enforce military discipline. This law became

effective in 1985.[1] The Military Justice System is an effective legislative tool for the upholding of discipline and with limitations provides command authority at various levels.

2.   The DFDA does not encompass all possible offences and allows commanders at all levels to create and sign various orders and instructions which give authorative direction and constitute a Lawful Order.[2] An example of this would be a commander ordering that state Road Rules apply to all vehicles and drivers whilst in a Military Area.

3.   Road Rules cover numerous unlawful activities such as driving offences as well as offences based on the vehicles condition. Road Rules set mandatory fines and punishments including the loss of demerit points for offences.[3]

4.   The DFDA has had numerous amendments made since its introduction.[4] One of these amendments introduced the Discipline Officer scheme.[5] This scheme created a disciplinary process where members who admit guilt are not charged but infringed for certain minor disciplinary breaches, they are dealt with by a command appointed member and most dealings are designed to be simple and quick.[6]

5.   Members up to and including LEUT, CAPT and FLLT may be infringed and dealt with under the Discipline Officer Scheme. Only the following offences can be dealt with by a Discipline Officer:

a.   Absence from Duty – DFDA s23

b.   Absence without leave (where the absence is for 3 hours or less) – DFDA s24

c.   Disobedience of a lawful command - DFDA s27

d.   Failure to comply with a lawful general order – DFDA s29

e.   Irregularities on guard or watch – DFDA s32(1)

f.   Negligent performance of duty – DFDA s35

g.   Prejudicial conduct – DFDA s60. [7]

6.   The jurisdiction of the Discipline Officer scheme directs the powers of punishments to be limited to:

a.   Fine not exceeding the amount of the defence member's pay for 1 day

b.   Restriction of privileges for a period not exceeding 2 days

c.   Stoppage of leave for a period not exceeding 3 days

d.   Extra duties for a period not exceeding 3 days

e.   Extra drill for no more than 2 sessions of 30 minutes each per day for a period not exceeding 3 days

f.   Reprimand.[8]

7.   An inbuilt requirement of the scheme is that all dealings are not to be recorded on a Conduct Record or other personnel file and all records of action taken is to be destroyed 12

months after creation. If the member is detached or posted within this 12 month period the records are not to be transferred.[9]

8.   **Scope.** Whilst cognisant of directed brevity, this paper will compare the gap of punishments for Failure to comply with a lawful general order offence that apply the Road Rules and the mandatory state punishment that is applicable to those Road Rules.

AIM

9.   The aim of this paper is to suggest a Discipline Officer regulatory framework option in order to determine the seriousness of the offence and select a course of action when dealing with an infringement.

DISCIPLINE OFFICER DEALING PROCESS

10.   Discipline Officers when selecting a course of action should research the mandatory home state legislation for mandatory penalties that the offence incurs. If on assessment of the mandatory penalty and comparison to the scale of punishment, there is a distinctive gap and the state penalty exceeds the possible punishments the Discipline Officer must refer the offence for a charge.

11.   **Exceed speed.** When a member is detected exceeding the sign posted speed limit on base a Service Police Infringement Notice is sent to the unit reporting the alleged speed and the member is infringed.

12.   Queensland mandatory penalties for exceeding speed are:

a.   Less than 13 kilometres per hour (km/h) over the speed limit is $157 and 1 demerit point

b.   More than 13 km/h but not more than 20 km/h over the speed limit is $235 and 3 demerit points

c.   More than 20 km/h but not more than 30 km/h over the speed limit is $392 and 4 demerit points

d.   More than 30 km/h but not more than 40 km/h over the speed limit is $549 and 6 demerit points

e.   More than 40 km/h over the speed limit is $1099, 8 demerit points and 6 month suspension. [10]

13.   From my experiences the general exceed speed offence range is in the 11 to 25 km/h in excess of the sign posted limit before it is considered a dangerous driving offence under DFDA s40A.

14.   **Fail to wear seatbelt.** A member driving a vehicle on base observed by any person not wearing the seatbelt fitted to the vehicle may be reported and infringed.

15.   Queensland mandatory penalties for a driver failing to wear seatbelt are $300 and 3 demerit points recorded. [11]

16.   **Driver of a vehicle using a mobile phone**. A member driving a vehicle on base observed by any person using a mobile phone while driving may be reported and infringed.

17.   Queensland mandatory penalties for a driver of a vehicle using a mobile phone are $353 and 3 demerit points recorded. [12]

18.   **Failing to stop at a stop sign or line.** A member driving a vehicle on base observed by any person failing to stop at a stop sign or line may be reported and infringed.

19.   Queensland mandatory penalties for a driver failing to stop at a stop sign or line are $353 and 3 demerit points recorded. [13]

20.   **Failing to give way to a pedestrian on a pedestrian crossing.** A member driving a vehicle on base observed by any person failing to give way to a pedestrian on a pedestrian crossing may be reported and infringed.

21.   Queensland mandatory penalties for a driver failing to give way to a pedestrian on a pedestrian crossing are $353 and 3 demerit points recorded.[14]

22.   **Selecting a course of action.** On establishment of lawful authority and assessment that the evidence is substantial[15] and the only monetary punishment a Discipline Officer can only award is 1 days pay. On average of the ranks that the scheme applies, all do not reach some of the mandated state financial penalties the member should be charged and not infringed.

23.   **Recording and Reporting.** To enhance this thought process the Discipline Officer should have regard to the demerit point scheme in force in the particular state and acknowledgement of the difference between the 3 year demerit point removal time line and the 12 month destruction of records requirement of the Discipline Officer scheme.

24.   **Referral**. Once ascertained that the gap between the legislative penalties and the disparity between recording of the offence the Discipline Officer should be able to make a better decision. If it is too serious for an infringement the Discipline Officer should record the decision and not deal with the matter further. Then cause the evidence to be referred to a member authorised to lay charges.[16]

CONCLUSION

25.   The current law manuals are insufficient in providing guidance to Discipline Officers on the nature of the seriousness of the offence.

26.   A unit initiated or self applied regulatory frame work for decision making may be a factor in reducing traffic offences within a Military Area.

27.   A Discipline Officer can readily access state traffic legislation and gain penalty information for the infringement. Once compared to the current possible punishments available a better informed course of action decision can be made.

28.   A Discipline Officer should also be able to make a balanced referral decision having regard to the state demerit point scheme in comparison the defence legislated destruction of Discipline Officer records requirement.

Recommendations

29.   It is recommended that:

a.   Unit Discipline Officers receive guidance on a commander's opinion of seriousness of traffic offences when dealing with an infringement as a Failure to comply with a lawful general order offence.

b.   Discipline Officers receive continual training on their roles and responsibilities including assessment of evidence, the evaluation of offences, the establishment of lawful authority and the recording of the decision making process.

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EXPLOITING TRAINNING

It is a very sad thing that nowadays there is so little useless information

Oscar Wilde

INTRODUCTION

1.   Members of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) obtain numerous skills through their everyday environment and training activities. These skills are not always conducted, captured and exploited as evidence to confirm skills for recognised qualifications. The ADF is a competency based training (CBT) organisation, which focuses on course learning outcomes (CLO) and module learning outcomes (MLO). The outcome of the training is saved within PMKeys and the members Competency Log Book (CLB). The ADF is continually supporting and driving its members to advance themselves in the education spectrum via external education agencies. It could be argued that nowadays in order to progress professionally, a member needs to conduct tertiary education. If the ADF can capture MLOs and, subsequently, provide recognised competency based qualifications, members could get these competencies recognised and applied to a variety of further qualifications.

AIM

2.   This paper proposes a strategy to gather, record and use competencies gained within the ADF, to achieve external educational qualifications.

SCOPE

3.   **Scope.** This paper will discuss the current competency based learning system and its ability to gain ADF members civilian recognised qualifications.

CONDUCT, CAPTURE AND EXPLOIT

4.   **Conduct.** The current training system utilised within the ADF to gain approval to establish a training course and maintain competency, is a strong and robust system. The system allows for training to capture course skillsets that can be stored and retrieved when required.

5.   Currently the system is based on performance descriptors which are linked to a MLO. This allows the ADF to provide a proficiency number for a particular skill set after being signed off by an authorised member. The system provides for recognition of prior learning (RPL) on a full unit of competency only, and not for the MLO. Through mapping the MLOs on courses, against our members, we could capture qualifications from course to training event; this would highlight member's skill sets. Qualified staff could sign off skills utilising competencies displayed through relevant experience and/or on the job training.

6.   The ADF has the ability to capture MLO's in the average workplace. The foundations to achieve this are there, however, it needs refining. On executing this refinement, members could seek out competencies to be signed off within their workplace with a view to capitalising on readily available competencies to attain further vocational qualifications.

7.   **Capture.** The ADF has an obligation through the National Training Framework (NTF) and Competence Based Training and Assessment (CBTA) guidelines to capture, record and provide access to member's competency achievements. The foundations for a good qualification tracking system are in place with the Professional Development and Training (PD&T) computer information system and the current Competency Log Book (CLB) paper based system.

8.   PD&T and the CLB are required to provide capturing strength to the current system. The workability of both systems is proven, however with the ability to capture everyday minor training events and competencies it would allow the system be used to its full potential. If the current PD&T system was modified to allow input of an ROA in electronic form, providing links to proficiency numbers and MLOs. The evidence saved to support the MLO would enhance the current capture of information. The modification of the CLB to support an electronic competency capturing information system would aid in the capture, assessment and auditing requirements. This would create a more usable, solid system that would provide a great deal of information to support the professional development sphere for members and managers alike.

9.   In line with the NTF and CBTA requirements, if the ADF were to modify the current system to capture the skills, attributes and knowledge required to complete a MLO, it could be used to prove, support and build the requirements to satisfy a proficiency number, code and unit. The enhanced system would allow the current training framework to be utilised to its full potential, thereby supporting professional development. Capturing this extra information would aid members to choose the right direction for future development, as well as capturing currently attained skill sets.

10.   **Exploit.** The current system allows the Army to exploit being a Registered Training Organisation (RTO) where current qualifications are mapped out against relevant Corp skill sets, courses completed, and time in rank. An example of this is a Warrant Officer Class 2 (WO2) in the Royal Australian Infantry (RAINF) who has completed over 20 years of service will receive a Diploma in Human Resources. A Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps (RAAOC) peer will receive a diploma in

Materiel Logistics. Both ADF members would have completed, achieved and satisfied elements throughout their 20 years of service to attain their respective qualifications. Both the RAINF and RAAOC WO2 will concurrently satisfy some elements of each other's diplomas, however, currently the Army does not delve into qualifications outside of the defined scope.

11.   Utilising a system that has the ability to track MLOs and competencies identified against the NTF, would allow ADF members the opportunity to source, identify and understand requirements to accomplish further qualifications through competencies the ADF already possesses. An improved system would allow the capability to exploit captured skills achieved away from the normal workplace, such as treasury or secretarial positions within the mess environs. These skills may potentially contribute to a recognised certificate or a diploma.

12.   The ADF is a large diverse organisation possessing the ability to exploit being an RTO and utilising members already attained skills, knowledge and attributes, to gain them external qualifications.

CONCLUSION

13.   The push to achieve education and qualification from external sources almost exclusively, only serves to undervalue or negate the myriad of competencies in a members' work environs. ADF members have many skills which could be conducted, captured and exploited in order to achieve relevant qualifications. Neglecting to capitalise on competency based training already available and/or attained by members within their workplace environs is detrimental to the members and the ADF. Rather than encouraging members to gain external qualifications in their entirety, the ADF should exert a concerted effort to recognise and record skills sets and competencies already provided within the ADF, therefore shaping members to exploit there current competencies in the external educational sphere.

Recommendations

14.   To assist the ADF to conduct , capture and exploit competencies the following should be addressed:

a.   The additional capability for PD&T to be able to capture MLOs is identified.

b.   The CLB to be re-evaluated to be able to capture and reference the computer based information system along the tertiary pathway.

c.   Educate and empower the ADF's qualified members to allow them to understand best practice by designing management material such as pathways to complete qualifications along with the defence instructions that support it.

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FOSTERING INITIATIVE AND OWNERSHIP WITHIN SOLDIERS ATTENDING THE SUBJECT ONE CORPORAL ARMY

INTRODUCTION

1.   **Introduction.** At present there is an expectation within Army that conducting competency based training, reinforced through the Army Individual Readiness (AIRN) policy and time in rank, is adequate to ensure that junior soldiers are sufficiently prepared to attend the Subject 1 Corporal Army (SUBJ 1 CPL) course. It is the author's opinion that the Army premise for preparing soldiers for this course is inadequate. This can be attributed to the fact that there is insufficient collective training occurring as part of the typical unit battle rhythm.

2.   **Purpose**. The purpose of this paper is to improve the preparedness of junior soldiers prior to commencing SUBJ 1 CPL as the entry point to the Army All Corps Soldier Training Continuum (ACSTC).

3.   **Aim**. The aim of this paper is to highlight perceived and actual inadequacies in the collective training of junior soldiers in preparation for the ACSTC and propose a strategy to remediate this issue.

TRANSITION FROM SOLDIER TO A JUNIOR NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER

4.   The SUBJ 1 CPL course Learning Management Package (LMP) described the course as, *training All Corps personnel in the SKA of the Army's potential junior leaders while*

inculcating an attitude that promotes the desire to lead, a sense of responsibility beyond ones personal needs and a confidence and loyalty to undertake the directives of a superior. It evolves a follower into a junior leader.

5. **Defining requirements.** The current skill standard pertaining to a soldier's suitability/readiness to progressing in rank and responsibility is clearly defined in the Manual of Army Employment (MAE) and the SUBJ 1 CPL course LMP. The All Corps Private, or equivalent, is required to correctly and effectively perform no less than 58 non-technical tasks. These tasks encapsulate the Skills, Knowledge and Attitude (SKA) pertaining to every facet of basic soldiering. These skills are first acquired during Recruit Training and are deemed necessary to ensure that unit and Army's capability requirements are achieved.

6. **Transitioning into a leader.** Prior to a soldier undertaking promotion they must understand that the transition from being a follower to leader is a partnership involving commitment from both them and their Chain of Command (CoC). The duration of this learning process is enduring and different for every individual. The author's experience as an instructor at the Army Recruit Training Centre (ARTC) and the School of Infantry (SOI) has revealed the clear correlation between a soldier's desire to learn and their ownership of their training shortfalls. It has also demonstrated to the author that a soldier's learning and development relies on improvement in both an emotional and physical sense; underwriting the development of their leadership style.

7. Understanding how the individual soldier transitions from follower to leader must be fostered within soldiers at the earliest stages of their training. Soldiers, rightly or wrongly, will follow the examples exposed to them. The leadership philosophies they adopt will continue to develop as their professional experience and maturity grows. The Army prides itself on a strong culture of ownership and accountability amongst its commanders at all ranks levels.

8. **Expectation management**. Army has an expectation that soldiers actively maintain their basic skills and continuously seek to develop their knowledge base. Additionally, Army expects units to provide their soldiers with sufficient opportunities and resources to not just maintain these skills, but expand upon them. This standard practice within the unit battle rhythm is essential to soldier development. It is within this framework that motivated and proactive individuals look to set themselves apart from the group by redefining their position within the team through increased responsibility and ultimately promotion. Being 'brilliant in the basics' is not a catchphrase; it is the foundation that will build the required confidence that a soldier must have prior to becoming an effective leader.

9. **What's in a name?** The effect of renaming the SUBJ 1 CPL to the Junior Leader Course (JLC) and presenting the course solely as a professional development course skewed how many soldiers perceive the course. Prior to this name change the SUBJ 1 CPL course was considered a selection course and the first gateway into the CoC. Units with soldiers nominated to attend, set conditions for their soldiers' success through deliberate pre-course training designed around a basic All Corps soldier skills barrier test. The barrier test was a measurable test and was often facilitated by a team from the respective Training Centre who would later conduct the SUBJ 1 CPL course.

10. The process of having firstly been selected as a potential Junior Non-Commissioned Officer (JNCO) by their unit and then having successfully completed the barrier test was an achievements in its own right. This reinforced the soldiers feeling that they were fully prepared and capable individuals representing not just themselves but also their unit; as apposed to simply participating in a professional development course. Most considered themselves ambassadors who were accountable for there performance and understood that they were the direct reflection

of the partnership between themselves and their unit CoC. The recent reversal of the course name back to SUBJ 1 CPL did not change unit or soldier perception, and it is still considered a development course.

EFFECT OF INADEQUATE COLLECTIVE TRAINING

11.   The Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Academy (WONCO-A) collates data through the Post Activity Report (PAR) process for all SUBJ 1 CPL and JLC courses that it conducts. This data has revealed concerning trends that indicate the collective training conducted within the majority of Army units is both inconsistent and inadequate. This is shown through the following trends in the SKA of soldiers arriving on SUBJ 1 CPL:

a.   sub-optimal individual field craft. As a result, instructors have to dedicate time to the revision of basic filed craft

b.   sub-optimal understanding of applying dismounted infantry minor tactics. As a result, instructors have to dedicate time to revision during the course

c.   sub-optimal theoretical and practical navigation skills. As a result of this instructors have to dedicate time to revision during the course and trainees are less able to effectively command a patrol

d.   sub-optimal performance of weapon handling drills, in particular; however, not limited to, the F89 Minimi. As result instructors are often required to re-teach the weapon system

e.   sub-optimal physical fitness. This impacts on soldiers ability built cohesive team dynamics within their section and increases risk of injury during the course

f.   sub-optimal maintenance of issued stores and equipment. As a result time is dedicated to disciplinary action

g.   sub-optimal understanding of wearing and maintenance of military clothing and equipment. As a result, instructors have to dedicate time re-teaching minimum standards of individual soldier dress and bearing in the barracks and the field environment

h.   sub-optimal performing drill with and without weapons. As a result, instructors have to dedicate time to re-teach previously taught drill movements

i.   sub-optimal examination of own character and demonstration of the soldier ethos. A lack of individual accountability for poor performance and acceptance of fault correction undermines team cohesion hinders their ability to display effective leadership

12.   These PARs also articulate that the majority of soldiers with sub-optimal basic soldier skills are from technical trades such as those found in Combat Support and Combat Service Support units. Anecdotally, Soldiers have claimed to have not touched the F89 Minimi since recruit training and had very limited exposure to the new F88 weapon handling drills. In some instances soldiers claim that no pre-course training had been conducted prior to them attending the course.

13.   It is the author's assessment that one of the causal factors behind this issue is that units are not providing the resources and opportunities that soldiers require to adequately maintain their basic skills. When the chain of command fails to empower their soldiers through effective unit training, the soldiers will fail to embody the partnership required for learning. This

partnership is intrinsically important to their success during the ACSTC. Subsequently, soldiers on course will disengage and take limited ownership in developing themselves. This is a self-perpetuating trait of ineffective leadership at both the collective and individual levels.

CONCLUSION

14.   Leaders at every level of command understand the necessity to facilitate constant opportunities to teach, coach and mentor their subordinates through unit collective training. Across Army, some of the existing unit training is inadequate in its ability to prepare soldiers prior to them attending the SUBJ 1 CPL course. This only becomes apparent after the soldier has commenced the course. The continued assertion by WONCO-A instructors is that most soldiers are unprepared for the course. The resulting re-teaching and revision that is required during SUBJ 1 CPL is to the detriment of soldiers who have been adequately prepared for the course. Previously, the ACSTC utilised a quantifiable barrier test for all soldiers nominated for SUBJ 1 CPL to enforce a minimum preparedness standard. Use of this barrier test forced leaders to be accountable for providing adequate training to individuals prior to their attendance on the course. Individual and unit ownership of a collective training environment, driven by the chain of command, will foster aspiration within soldiers and creates a situation that ensures the individual is fully prepared to commence the SUBJ 1 CPL course.

Recommendations

15.   It is recommended to the reader that:

a.   Army develop and introduce a barrier test for all soldiers nominated to attend the SUBJ 1 CPL course, in order to assess the minimum standard for proficiency as an All Corps Private soldier (as described in the MAE).

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BRINGING WONCO TRAINING INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

INTRODUCTION

1.   The Army, and in particular, WONCO-A, has always strived to cater for the many and varied ways that people learn. There are four main types of learning styles which consist of visual, auditory, reading/writing and kinesthetic learners (Shattuck 2016). These different learning styles mean that presentations and information delivered by WONCO-A needs to as much as possible, cater for these learning styles to allow all soldiers the best opportunity to learn. Unfortunately, this is not always able to be achieved due to the content that is delivered and how it can be delivered. Defence has made little to no in roads into investigating how different generations learn and how the styles of learning differ between the various generations.

2.   **Scope.** The current generation of young soldiers belong to Generation Y, while the current Army training system has been setup to train the baby boomers and Gen X. The different generations learn quite differently from each other and have different personality traits which effects how soldiers behave, approach learning and deal with authority. This paper is seeking to generate discussion on how WONCO-A can improve on the training that will cater to all soldiers, young and old.

AIM

3.   While far from exhaustive, the aim of this essay is to generate discussion in ways WONCO-A can improve its approach to training and assessment to better suit the needs of the Army's newest and predominantly youngest junior leaders.

HOW DO THE GENERATIONS DIFFERENTIATE?

4.   **Gen X.** Gen X view their superiors as experts and consider this expertise as hard fought for. The perception of this hard fought for experience means that approach to authority is limited and when it does occur, the feeling is that it must be earned. They are generally very individualistic and independent and reality driven. They live to work and consider success in their profession important. They are usually punctual and structured. When it comes to learning, they are resourceful problem solvers, have a distaste for touchy feely teaching methods and being micromanaged. They are competent with technology, prefer clear instructions with direct feedback and like to use games and case studies. (Zaslove, Mira)

5.   **Millennials.** Millennials have less of an issue with authority. They are more likely to question authority from the beginning and are far more willing to ask why when given tasks that don't seem necessary to them. Millennials are motivated to work to live. They are more focused on the meaning of the work, rather than just making money and many share a desire to work overseas. They are more likely to be unstructured and less likely to clock watch. They are not

lazy but expect greater flexibility in the work place. Millennials prefer to move from one thing to the next at a quicker pace than Gen X and prefer to multi task. Due to the different upbringing, they require more supervision and feedback and require managers to communicate needs more clearly and offer far more feedback and coaching. (Zaslove, Mira)

6.   When it comes to learning, Millennials tend to be optimists who require immediate feedback. They do not deal with negative feedback well due to their sheltered, politically correct view of the world and have a strong sense of entitlement. They are highly visual learners who expect technology in every part of their lives. Their attention span is generally shorter than Gen X, they are opinionated and are often concerned with style over substance. (Griggs, Jason)

CURRENT WONCO TRAINING

7.   **Structure.** WONCO-A training and assessment is very structured and revolves around a timetable laid out over eight weeks. While timings can change to accommodate the unforeseen, the structure of the course is set out by the TMP and doesn't change during a course. The timetable is busy with a requirement for each instructor to ensure they do not extend beyond their allocated time.

8.   **Technology.** The use of technology has increased over recent times but is still not utilised for maximum benefit. All trainees are issued a laptop computer and have access to a Defence Learning Environment (DLE) which enables trainees to access templates, documents and Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP). It also allows trainees to access the DRN through the use of CITRIX.

9.   **Assessment.** Despite the use of the laptops for referencing information, assessments do not utilise the laptops as much as they could or should. Despite many of the forms used during assessments such as the C1 and C2 infringement and charge sheets being utilised electronically in the work place, paper is still in use as assessment tools. This also applies the Local Area Design assessment and the preparation of lesson plans.

HOW TO BEST ADAPT TO TRAINING THE NEW GENERATION OF LEADERS WITHIN ARMY

10.   **Structure.** The course structure is set out to ensure maximum training value from a set time frame. Options are currently being considered however reducing the residential phase and using online resources is a potential way to allow the younger generation to set their own pace. Offering several options within the online resources may also assist in offering the biggest spread of learning styles possible. I have reservations for the CPL course however as external learning at university is successful due to the high level of volunteer participants.

11.   **Technology.** The use of technology is a given for the Millennials generation. The ADF has also become reliant on technology in the work place and it makes sense to bring these resources into the training environment. Universities offer many degrees' part time with much of the content delivered via the internet. Lessons could be delivered via video link or through online conferencing. Homework and assignments could be conducted and marked prior to a residential phase which would include DAT and EX ANZAC. In the early 2000's Sub 1 CPL had a large component of Campus lessons undertaken on computer including the Operations phase lessons.

12.   **Assessment.** Assessments should be as close to work place practice as possible. If forms are filled out using a webform, so should the assessment. Lesson plans can be checked by software to confirm original work. Plagiarism is a concern, however there is a plethora of anti-plagiarism tools on the market that universities use all the time to manage this.

CONCLUSION

13.   In conclusion, the newest soldiers today are wired differently to the soldiers of 15 years ago. They behave differently and learn differently and if the Army wants to get the most out of them, the way they are trained needs to change. An approach to learning that offers flexibility, technology and assessments that better reflect the work place will go a long way to doing this.

Recommendations

14.   My recommendations are:

a.   Examine the mix of residential and non-residential time spent on the course. Is it possible to conduct parts of the Sub 1 CPL Course package prior to attending course? This may however be a better option for SNCO courses rather than the CPL course.

b.   Engage with tertiary educators to examine ways of delivering training by correspondence.

c.   Engage with industry on ways to police plagiarism more effectively to allow greater use of technology to conduct assessment and training.

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LEADERSHIP: UNDER THE ENHANCED CAREER MANAGEMENT MODEL

"Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity!"[1]

General George Patton

INTRODUCTION

1.   The Australian Army's way of war fighting has always rested on the soldier whose individual and collective qualities represent a considerable advantage over potential enemies. Australian soldiers are renowned for being educated, highly professional, courageous and disciplined. The Australian soldier has always placed great emphasis on leadership, teamwork and the mutual support of their mates.

2.   **Scope.** This paper will discuss leadership and the three levels of leadership as defined by Army. It will also discuss the Enhanced Career Management (ECM) model which is being implemented by Career Management – Army (CM-A) and the effect it has on the development of leadership between the ranks of PTE (P) – CPL/BDR.

3.   **Aim.** The aim of this paper is propose that the Average Time in Rank (ATiR) a soldier serves within Army between the ranks of PTE (P) – CPL/BDR be standardised at 4.59yrs.

LEADERSHIP

4.   There are many definitions of leadership. For the purpose of Army leadership training, leadership is defined as: 'the art of influencing and directing people to achieve willingly the team or organisational goal.'[2]

5.   **Levels of leadership.** Within Army, leadership is practiced at three discernible levels. These include the individual, team and organisational level as depicted in Figure 1. The basis of leadership begins with the individual and how they learn to 'be', 'know' and 'do'. The team level of leadership is about the direct relationship between leaders and their subordinates. The organisational level of leadership is about controlling and influencing the larger team. It is at the individual and team levels we develop our leadership style.


Figure 1: Levels of Leadership

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1   365 Inspirational Quotes: Daily Motivation For Your Best Ever, KE Kruse 28 Oct 14.

2   LWD 0-2 Leadership, 2013.

6.   **Effective leadership.** Within the Army, leaders are appointed and thus are able to enforce behavior by virtue of their worn rank, when they are unable to persuade by force of character. However, effective leadership is concerned with influencing subordinates and to a lesser extent peers without the need to use force.

7.   **Trust.** Trust is one of the primary, if not the key, attribute associated with leadership. It is impossible to lead soldiers without first having trust. Soldiers will not put their lives on the line for something in which they do not believe, nor will they for someone they do not trust nor respect. The key elements in the building of trust have been proven to be integrity, competence, consistency and loyalty.

8.   **Know your soldiers.** Success on the battlefield involves understanding your soldiers, not just the enemy. Understanding the individual behavior of your soldiers is a vital element in learning to how to lead them. With a clear knowledge of individual strengths and weakness, and an understanding of how individual differences affect team behaviour. The leader is more likely to work successfully with others and build a cohesive team.

9.   **Experience**. Time allows leaders to gain experience learn and build confidence, and from that a complex leadership personality begins to emerge. This is what those around you take as your leadership style. Learning to lead is for most a journey of discovery the early period being filled with a lot of trial and error. The risk to Army is that under our current career management model we are denying soldiers the time required to gain this experience and to grow as potential leaders.

Average Time in Rank

10.   The Army's ECM model, as depicted in Figure 2, shows that the ATiR is considered to be one of the key lines of operation required to achieve improved capability through enhanced career management. If we know review the Manual of Employment (MAE) for a number of Employment Categories Numbers (ECN) within Army we will identify that the approach to career management is not uniform.

Figure 2: Enhanced Career Management

11.   The Manual of Army Employment (MAE) for a number of ECNs, as listed below, show the disparity within Army in regards to the ATiR that soldiers spend between the ranks of PTE (P) – CPL/BDR.

a.   **RAAC ECN 060 Armoured Cavalry:** PTE (P) – CPL 24 Months
b.   **RAA ECN 162 Artillery Gunner:** PTE (P) – BDR 24 Months
c.   **RAINF ECN 343 Rifleman:** PTE (P) – CPL 48 Months
d.   **RAAOC ECN 074 Operator Administrative:** PTE (P) – CPL 12 Months
e.   **RASIGS ECN 662 Communications Systems:** PTE (P) – CPL 12 Months

12.   The requirement to standardise the ATiR for PTE (P) – CPL/BDR becomes more apparent when you consider that the Australian Regular Army (ARA) – Workforce Pocket Book as at 01 May 16 shows that PTE (P) – CPL/BDR make up 15609 of the ARA total strength of 29677.

13.   The Army ECM model when fully implemented will see a soldier being promoted from PTE (P) to the substantive rank of CPL/BDR in 4.59yrs providing they meet the criteria in accordance with their respective corps MAE. In summary this criteria requires that a soldier:

a.   Is fully qualified for rank and trade
b.   Is PTE (P) if being promoted to LCPL/LBDR
c.   Meets the minimum experience requirement ATIR
d.   Is suitable for promotion in latest PAR (if applicable)
e.   Is AIRN compliant
f.   Is offering unrestrictive service
g.   Will occupy an authorised position at the higher rank.

CONCLUSION

14.   The Australian soldier of today finds himself in a world which is more complex and lethal than ever. Soldiers are required to undertake an extremely wide range of tasks within the same geographical area, at short notice and in complex terrain. To conduct Joint Operations in this environment, soldiers must be able to operate in versatile and agile teams, and be able to orchestrate actions in a precise and discriminating fashion. This places increasing demands upon soldiers to conduct close combat, peace enforcement and humanitarian operations simultaneously. Future soldiers and especially leaders will need to be even more versatile and adaptable than ever.

RECOMMENDATIONS

15.   To achieve standardisation of the ATiR PTE (P) – CPL/BDR within Army it is recommended that:

a.   CM-A conducts a review of all ECN's within Army in order to identify those Career Managers that have not yet implemented the ECM model within their respective corps.

b.   CM-A introduces a more definitive timeline for the implementation of the ECM model across Army.

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STANDARDISATION OF TRAINING

"We *must try, by correctly foreseeing what is coming, to anticipate developments, and thereby gain an advantage which our opponents can not overcome on the field of battle. That is what the*

future expects us to do". General Friedrich von Bernhardi, quoted in Hermann Foertsch, *The Art of Modern Warfare,* 1940

INTRODUCTION

1.   Training is crucial for any large organisation. It commences at the beginning of our careers and continues daily throughout our working life. With training comes development, and the development of our people is paramount to the success of the organisation in attaining its goals. In order to succeed, training must be relevant and it must adapt along with the changing landscape of the employer.

2.   Effective training and development benefits the organisation by:

a.   increasing productivity

b.   minimising supervision within the workplace[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Training_and_development - cite_note-:0-1#cite_note-:0-1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Training_and_development)

c.   increasing job satisfaction

d.   aiding retention

f.   skills development

g.   reducing injury.

AIM

3.   This paper aims to highlight standardisation shortfalls that exist within training establishments. All training must be standardised; however standardisation can be difficult when organisations are involved with large numbers of Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs) and Module Learning Outcomes (MLOs). These challenges can be further compounded by training establishments working in isolation of each other due to geographical separation.

"Since the beginning of strategic warfare, a special group of individuals has been tasked with training warriors to survive in combat. This profession is over ten thousand years old and has influenced the rise and fall of nations throughout history. It is the only recognised profession that trains students to protect lives by taking another life at the same time". Bruce K Sidle, *Sharpening the Warriors Edge,*1995

STANDARDISATION

4.   The Army has seen many changes since 1999 that have directly or indirectly necessitated adaptation within the workplace. At times this change can be slow and deliberate at other times rapid and disjointed. This was demonstrated with the introduction to service of the M777A2 Lightweight Howitzer and the saga of the towing and power attachments which saw a regiment of M777A2s without the means to move nor power the gun.

5.   Developing the tools and resources from with which we facilitate our training should be integral to the organisation and this should also encompass standardisation. As technology advances and ideas develop so should the tools and resources adapt in order to meet current

workplace practices, these changes need to occur as soon as changes are made to doctrine, workplace practice and/or to references.

6.   Training establishments have at times been slow to ensure that the changes within the organisation translate to changes within the Learning Support Material (LSM) as was demonstrated when the Land Warfare Procedures-General (LWP-G) 7-4-12 5.56 mm Austeyr Family of Weapons, 2014 superseded LWP-G 7-4-12, 5.56 mm F88 Austeyr Family of Weapons, 2010.

ONE STOP SHOP

7.   The introduction to the LWP-G-7-4-12 meant wholesale changes were required with the Teaching Objectives (TOs) for both the formative and summative assessments on the Subject One Corporal Army. In many Training Establishments (TEs) instructors are constantly up-dating references and scenarios. Instructors should complete this as a matter of course to ensure the lesson meets the TOs but there should be no reason for instructors to be making wholesale changes to the lesson. The Training Authority should be the 'One Stop Shop' for all new information; this will ensure standardisation with all learning materials across all TEs as well as providing all the updated assessment material.

COMMON LEARNING EXPERIENCE

8.   Standardisation will allow all trainees a common learning experience, if Trainee 49 at WONCO-A, NT is being delivered 5.1.2.5 Explain the stages of a drill lesson then Trainee 17 at WONCO-A, SA should be receiving the same lesson with the same learning and assessment materials and where practical and appropriate the same scenario.

9.   Trainees will gather and compare experiences and thoughts from their particular session very much like current practice. Writing from experience I have always been frustrated to discover when my peers who have conducted the same training and gained the same proficiency received a better experience.

RELEVANCE

10.   Ensuring standardisation and the ability to quickly capture new doctrine and technology will also give the TEs relevance within the organisation. Trainees will arrive with the knowledge that their learning experience will set them up for success on return to their respective units. Again the higher headquarters must take the lead to ensure that all training is relevant to latest workplace practices.

11.   Standardisation is impeded by geographical separation and this physical separation is compounded by a lack of communication between all stakeholders. Often changes would be made within the modules but is not being transmitted to those who are tasked with the delivery.

CONCLUSION

12.   In conclusion standardisation is an important aspect to any training. Standardisation should form the basis for all training within TEs regardless of separation or change. For TEs to remain relevant they must promote a stimulating and engaging learning culture for trainees.

13.   Trainees will always be motivated to attend future courses if they are confident what they are receiving is the most relevant and up to information in accordance with current workplace

practices. By having motivated trainees who want to attend our courses the organisation is further strengthened by the retention of its people.

14.   Standardisation promotes relevance by swiftly capturing developing doctrine and aligning all training with workplace requirements. Standardisation provides all trainees with a common learning experience.

RECOMMENDATIONS

15.   To support standardisation within TE and derive the best benefit from standardisation the following actions are recommended:

a.   establish a lesson review team to update all learning support materials

b.   review and adjust learning materials as changes occur

c.   review and adjust assessment tools as changes occur

d.   liaise with all stakeholders with regards to changes.

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RECONSIDERATION OF WOMEN'S INCLUSION IN INFANTRY

INTRODUCTION

1.   In 2011 Julia Gillard ordered the removal of bans that had prevented women applying for the most dangerous and demanding military roles within the Australian Defence Force, including infantry. It coincided with the reviews and inquires into the treatment of women in the Defence Force, largely lead by the Skype sex scandal. It also came after polls had showed Julia

Gillard's popularity among women was problematic[161]. The timing of the announcement meant that many saw this as a political agenda rather than a well-researched and fairly implemented decision to enhance Australian Defence Force capability.

2.   This decision was not about women in combat zones or combat roles. It has been established from past, as well as current, operations that women already operate in these roles effectively. This is because the modern battlespace and future operating environment, unlike the traditional battlefield, has no defined 'frontline' or 'combat zone'; rather, we quite often find militaries involved in the 'three block war'[162].

3.   **Purpose.** The purpose of this paper is to improve operational capability of infantry in the Australian Army.

4.   **Scope.** This paper will argue that employing women in infantry roles, both as an officer and an enlisted soldier, will affect the operational capability of the Australian Army. Current policy and the considerations and constraints in employing women in this role will be discussed with a focus on the physical attributes, unit cohesion and discrimination as key factors.

AIM

5.   This paper proposes that in order to ensure the Australian Army's fighting capability is at its optimal, the policy for the inclusion of women serving in infantry must be reconsidered.

PHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES

6.   **Body mass.** The body mass of females does not support the highly physically and demanding role of infantry. It is a well-known fact, that on average, men are physically stronger than women, this can be attributed to the difference in body mass. A study in the journal of applied physiology found that men have an average of 12 kilograms more skeletal muscle mass than women. Women exhibit around 40 percent less upper-body strength and 33 per cent less lower-body strength then men. The researchers found that weight and height differences between men and women could only account for half the difference in strength[163]. With such differences in the composition of the female and male body it seems illogical to include women in such a physically strenuous job role and no doubt this will inevitably have an effect on the females overall durability thus women in infantry will ultimately have a shorter career.

7.   **Durability.** The durability of a female's body has a direct effect on their ability to serve for a long period in an infantry role. The British Army, in its own research, showed that women were twice as likely as men to suffer muscle-skeletal injuries during basic military training[164]. In comparison a female's body lacks the body mass of a male's body, so when placed in a highly demanding physical role such as infantry is more susceptible to damage. There is no doubt, that due to body mass, the longevity of a woman's body in infantry roles is a major concern. There are such a large number of injuries in basic training alone, a significant increase in injuries in a higher physically demanding function is to be expected. A militaries' greatest asset is its personnel; compare this to an equipment selection: why would a military consider a weapon that is on the outset the same as the other except - one would last eight years and another one just five years. Hence employing women in infantry would only allow a short window of service; therefore, their body and military career should not be placed in jeopardy by being employed in this role.

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[161] Sheridan, G (2011)
[162] LWP – G 7-7-1 (Chap one para 1.8)
[163] Ghose, T (2015)
[164] Col Kemp, R (2016)

UNIT COHESION

8.　　**Attraction.** First and foremost attraction between soldiers in an infantry section will have a direct effect on unit cohesion and for this reason women should not serve in these unique teams. Employing women into infantry sections introduces another element changing the dynamics of a team. With such a close bond, that a section environment presents, the increased chance of an attraction forming is very realistic. An infantry section operates for long periods of time, in isolation, in demanding roles not comparable to other Army positions. If that relationship causes a strain on the group's cohesion we find ourselves with a section not at its mental peak to be combat effective. Thus attraction between section members must be limited and to achieve this infantry must remain a male only domain.

9.　　**Preparedness.** An infantry section needs to be at peak preparedness to combat any likely enemy threat or deploy to any theatre of operation. If unit cohesion is affected in anyway this is jeopardised. By restricting women from serving as infantry we allow sections to be at their peak preparedness. In today's conflicts most of our enemy are not bound by international law or Geneva conventions: therefore, we must ensure we give ourselves the greatest advantages of success. For the Australian Army this means ensuring our greatest mobile fighting asset, the infantry section, is the strongest, most powerful, best trained and most physically and mentally prepared to win. When a policy can negate a potential shortfall in capability, by eliminating a potential risk to an important factor, of unit cohesion and physical attributes then policy should remain to protect it. Thus for the infantry section to maintain its unit cohesion and operational preparedness it should not include women.

DISCRIMINATION

10.　　**Defence Force recruiting discrimination policy.** Discrimination based on sex should continue to exclude women from serving in infantry.   The Defence Force has the ability to discriminate on numerous attributes such as intellect, physical capability and mental health. There are numerous reasons based on health that exclude people from enlisting including bipartite patella syndrome. Although research suggests that only 2% of people with this condition will show symptoms[165], it excludes a person from joining based on the reasoning that they are more likely to have a knee injury during their career. This example highlights, that although there may be exceptions of women that have the required physical attributes, it does not mean policy should change based on a few exceptions. Consequently discrimination based on sex due to general suitability must eliminate women from serving in an infantry role.

CONCLUSION

11.　　It has been highlighted why women should not serve in infantry based on constraints that employing a female in these roles would pose. The difference in the body mass of males and females will have a direct effect on the durability of a female's body thus a female will ultimately have a shorter career. Due to the unique close knit environment of an infantry section the Australian Army can not risk impacting unit cohesion due to attraction between section members and therefore effecting overall preparedness for operational capability. The Army should always use its best assets available, and this should not be limited to equipment, to ensure that the infantry is an effective and efficient organisation.

Recommendations

12.　　It is recommended that the decision to remove gender restrictions on all roles in the Australian Army, namely infantry, needs to be reconsidered.

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EXERCISE KOKODA – WE CAN DO BETTER

INTRODUCTION

24.   The purpose of this paper is to highlight the missed potential training opportunities associated with Exercise KOKODA (Ex KOKODA) as part of the Subject One Corporal Army Course (S1CA)

25.   This course is based on the All Corps Soldier Training Continuum (ACSTC), focusing on Leadership, Training and Operations modules. It has been a continuing trend that soldiers attending the S1CA have on average three to five years service in the Australian Regular Army (ARA) and as such, many lack the necessary prerequisite skills and knowledge prior to attending this course.

26.   **Scope.** This paper seeks to address the standard of individual soldier skills and knowledge upon trainees march in to the S1CA and also to ensure that they have a good understanding of the broad range of skills required of a Junior Non Commissioned Officer upon successfully completing this course.

AIM

27.   The aim of this paper is to provide each trainee an equal opportunity to excel in each of the three modules of the S1CA Course regardless of age, gender or corps.

COURSE PREREQUISITES - RESPONSIBILITIES

28.   **Parent unit.** Most major units have implemented very effective pre course training programs for their members and this is evident by the vast differences in standards upon trainees marching into the course. This however, this is not always the case as some trainees are unable to attend pre course training which can be attributed to a variety of factors including operational/training tempo, unit requirements and undisclosed or unforeseen individual personal issues.

SHORTFALLS

29.   **Weapon handling.** Several basic proficiency shortfalls have been identified including several trainees experiencing difficulties with the conduct of the F89 Minimi handling drills. Whilst most arms corps members displayed a very good level of competency on this weapon system, most of the non arms corps members are not regularly exposed to the F89 LSW and this is reflected in the standard of these particular members during the conduct of weapons lessons.

30.   In some cases, trainees have not received training or have failed to retain the proficiency on the new enhanced F88 Austeyr handling drills and therefore experienced some difficulty during the conduct of the weapons lessons.

31.   **Navigation.** The course deploys to the field on Exercise ANZAC during which the assessments are focused on operations and basic fieldcraft. Trainees are required to plan and conduct a section patrol during which they must navigate and lead their sections to several check points in order to meet the commander's intent for example, clear a suspected enemy observation post or cache at a particular creek junction. It is during this phase that it becomes evident that most trainees who are regularly exposed to navigational requirements displayed sound navigational skills. This standard however is not reflected across the board and some trainees display difficulty with even the basic navigational requirements such as using a protractor, plotting grid references, calculating bearings and using a Silva compass.

32.   **Use of IT applications and functions.** Trainees display varying levels of experience with MS PowerPoint during the Deliver Army Training (DAT) Conduct a Theory Lesson module. This results in a large proportion of their lesson preparation time being consumed by learning basic PowerPoint operations and functions which in turn may impact on the quality of their presentation and assessment result.

EX KOKODA – ALL CORPS INTERGRATION

33.   **All corps integration.** Ex KOKODA presents an effective medium for the integration of trainees from all corps into a section. The end result being an integral variety of skills, knowledge and experience that each section member can draw upon throughout the course. Ex KOKODA enables each trainee to display their individual knowledge and skills as well as their ability to command, lead and motivate their section through a protracted period whilst conducting a variety of activities.

34.   **Activities.** Current activities for Ex KOKODA are drawn from the handbook and the opportunity is there for staff to include additional activities as required. The activities conducted on each Ex KOKODA are adapted to suit the climatic conditions and geographical location of

each course. These activities conducted are classified as high, medium or low level activities IAW the Heat Management Work/Rest tables.

BARRIER TESTING FOR INCLUSION, NOT EXCLUSION

35.   **What to include.** A standard barrier test conducted prior to the commencement of each course would highlight any deficiencies with the course prerequisites and enable   NQ-Wing WONCO-A staff to focus on these shortfalls when planning the activities for   Ex KOKODA. Alternatively, a list of shortfalls may also be provided by the member's unit directly to WONCO-A. These activities would be broken up into stands where a soldier's five on each activity is to be delivered by the allocated section commander. This would then be followed by a practice session. Once the topic has been covered and practiced, the section will then practice each new skill as they continue to move between stands (ie: major or minor obstacle crossing) and then developed further into section Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Exercise ANZAC (Ex ANZAC). Some suggested topics to be covered include the RV and Marry Up procedures, staking of guns, conduct of clearing patrols and RATEL procedure which also incorporates Reports and Returns.

CONCLUSION

36.   The S1CA course is the first and most important and daunting step on the promotion ladder that a soldier will undertake. It is therefore imperative that each soldier is provided equal opportunity to excel in each of the three areas of assessment on the course regardless of age, gender or corps. By incorporating a barrier test at the commencement of each course identifying each prerequisite deficiency and incorporating these topics into Ex KOKODA, each soldier will be provided with this opportunity. This also provides each section the opportunity to use these lessons to develop their SOPs for Ex ANZAC.

Recommendations

37.   Due to several shortfalls of training proficiencies and prerequisites identified with weapons, navigation and basic soldier skills, it is recommended that:

a.   A barrier test be conducted at the commencement of each course IOT ascertain deficiencies in course prerequisites. This test is to be conducted by NQ-Wing WONCO-A staff on day zero of the course.

b.   The activities for Ex KOKODA to be amended to include the list of activities detailed in annex A.

c.   The activities on Ex KOKODA are all corps skills and assumed prior learning; therefore all activities are to be conducted by the allocated trainee section commander.

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eLEARNING: MEDIUM FOR CHANGE

INTRODUCTION

1.   eLearning is becoming more and more an accepted method of promoting professional development within organisations worldwide including the military. Its basis of using electronic mediums and the world-wide-web for facilitation of learning has seen the industry boom with on-line collaboration driving successful outcomes and change. Army is embarking on a pathway to develop eLearning as a viable medium for education and professional development. eLearning is considered to be an effective strategy for Adult Learning, how we introduce it and how we employ it will be the challenge.

2.   **Scope.** This paper will introduce eLearning within the adult learning environment. It will explore a potential change to professional development course structure and will address issues relating to the misconceptions and opportunities associated with eLearning.

AIM

3.   This paper aims to highlight the benefits and challenges of using eLearning for educational purposes in Army.

eLEARNING

4.   **Adult eLearning.** Andragogy (Adult Learning) is a theory that holds a set of assumptions about how adults learn. It uses approaches to learning that are problem-based and

collaborative rather than didactic. Malcolm Knowles an acknowledged authority on Adult Learning proposes that our traditional education system is progressively regressive. He states that the forces at work on learners from around the second grade upwards have little to do with learning and more to do with achieving – passing tests, scoring high on SATs or qualifying for a job (Knowles, M. 1984). Parallels to this proposition could be made with the professional development of our soldiers and officers, where attendance on a promotion course is more about getting a tick in the box than applying newly attained skills.

5.   The schema of military training and education is influenced by military protocols and customs. Traditional face to face and tell and test teaching philosophy is the norm where the teacher is a custodian of knowledge not a facilitator of learning. This behaviourist approach, does not allow for the trainee to employ the principles of constructivist learning which is commonly associated with adult and eLearning. eLearning if used effectively provides the trainee with the opportunity to take responsibility for their learning and allows them to pursue new and innovative thought within a collaborative environment. Creating collaborative learning environments embraces the concept of active learning (a key concept of adult learning) where – students actively construct their knowledge with peers and teachers, creating an arena where different discourses and learning styles could comfortably co-exist (Roschelle et al. 2001).

6.   **Structure change.** The challenge therefore is to build on the new found skills that the trainee acquires. The current format of professional development courses sees a limited, and often not mandatory pre-course component. The fundamental change required is that the bulk of assimilation of knowledge should be achieved during the pre-course. It is here where the trainee should do the reading-in on topics, familiarise themselves with doctrine and policy and conduct the majority of written type activities and assessments. Currently much time is spent on the residential phase regurgitating content that is in fact already covered in the pre-course. This is not smart business. Applying a blended eLearning framework to pre-course, trainees will be able to participate in online activities (e.g. computer conferencing discussions, collaborative group projects/presentations, access course notes) and replace part(s) of the face-to-face content. This simple change will have an immediate cost benefit by reducing the required time needed on residential courses.

7.   **Misconceptions and opportunities.** eLearning is an approach to teaching and learning, conducted via electronic media, typically on the internet (Oxford Dictionary, 2016). Most Army personnel are familiar with eLearning having completed online CAMPUS courses. The CAMPUS course design is a click and go slide based activity that contains simple navigation buttons, incorporating quizzes and limited interaction. This is eLearning at its basics. eLearning can be either an asynchronous or synchronous activity. CAMPUS courses can be categorized as asynchronous as there is no predetermined time for the learning to take place. Trainees work at their own pace, and take the time to learn what they need to know. The development of more synchronous activities through web conferencing and chat options will significantly change the dynamic incorporating the key adult learning concept of collaboration. Further as eLearning develops and designers and educators become more familiar with Learning Management Systems a combination of both is possible.

8.   eLearning in Army has the potential to be used over multiple devices (laptops, tablets, mobiles). This literally allows eLearning to be in the hands of our people at any time. There are obvious security questions that can be raised here however this is a challenge which will be addressed in due time. This should not roadblock eLearning as a viable means of education but should instead have Decision Makers consider how we work around it. If it is good enough for institutions such as Harvard and Oxford Universities to use, surely we can build in our own

encryption, or purchase off the shelf Learning Management Systems that have encryption in place to protect intellectual property.

9.   As Army and the world become more connected our personnel will have consistent access to the internet through smartphones, tablets and other technological devices. This factor alone should drive investment into eLearning. There will be initial resistance however a robust campaign to educate personnel on the benefits of eLearning will go a long way. The training and education of our personnel will become autonomous with endless information and resources at their fingertips.

CONCLUSION

10.   The value of eLearning is that it can save time and money. The ability to reduce the time trainees spend away from their home unit will have a profound impact on personnel productivity and will greatly reduce the financial burden associated with professional development. A simple rethink on how we structure and conduct our training will see this easily achieved.

RECOMMENDATIONS

11.   If eLearning is to be a viable medium for education within Army, the following recommendations are made:

a.   Pre-course is mandatory for professional development courses.

b.   A needs analysis be conducted to determine what content of professional development courses could be conducted as eLearning modules.

c.   A robust campaign is undertaken to educate all ranks on eLearning.

d.   Purchase off the shelf Learning Management Systems for trial and evaluation outside of the DRN.

e.   Professional eLearning design agencies are consulted for the development of a Defence Learning Management System.

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INCREASING THE PROFILE OF THE WARRANT OFFICER AND NON COMMISSIONED OFFICER ACADEMY WITHIN ARMY

INTRODUCTION

1.   The current perception across soldiers of all ranks within the Australian Army is that the Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Academy (WONCO-A) exists to individually train soldiers, on the all corps soldier training continuum, enabling them to advance through the ranks as non-commissioned officers (NCO). If the unit is to truly fill the role of an academy we should strive to be the centre of excellence within the all corps space and a go-to point for all ranks, including officers, to seek guidance on all corps skills and knowledge applicable to unit and individual training.

AIM

2.   This paper identifies options that could be utilised to raise the Academy's profile within Army.

OPPORTUNITIES TO INCREASE THE WONCO-A PROFILE

3.   With advances in technology and the prevalent use of social media by all ranks within the Australian Army, there is an abundance of opportunities that can be taken to create a more visible and enhanced profile for WONCO-A. Currently the Academy has taken up such social media opportunities with the use of an Academy Twitter and Facebook account enabling the Academy to present information to its followers.

4.   With the transition of the DRN to SharePoint, there is an opportunity for the academy to create a portal that could become a very useful tool for NCO's of all ranks to use on a daily basis. Currently, the WONCO-A SharePoint page, on top of being challenging to find, provides nothing more than pre course information such as joining instructions. The WONCO-A SharePoint page could be developed as a portal for all personnel who have completed a subject one course to find information relating to content they covered on the course. A portal could provide direct links to the latest versions of doctrine used throughout the courses, links to the latest versions of the Discipline Law Manuals, orders templates and any other relevant all corps

information. On top of having these useful links for the NCOs, it could also be used to advertise anything relating to the Academy, including the social media platforms currently in use.

5.   In addition to providing links to the latest versions of doctrine, it could also include templates for unit, company and platoon level all corps training, these could be in the format of suggested lesson plans, ideas for content to be included within unit training in order to allow NCO's to maintain skills taught during their subject one courses and could also include a forum where ideas or training that has worked well within different units could be shared.

6.   The creation of a portal with all the relevant information used throughout the courses would also have the potential to become a tool for use during the courses. By including the links to all references used during the courses the site would become a single point for students to go to find any information they require during the course. On top of this, syndicate discussions could be used throughout the courses for training ideas and content to be included within the portal. By allowing these syndicate discussions, it would create a sense of ownership by all students conducting training within the Academy and enable the portal to remain current and relevant to what NCOs want and need on a day to day basis.

7.   In addition to the increased use of technology there are other opportunities that should be considered such as continuation training, in the form of short online and face to face 'workshops' to support NCOs from local brigade units. Such continuation training could be voluntary or unit directed and aimed at refreshing and refining all corps skills taught on subject one courses. Bearing in mind that some ECNs within Army will not put skills taught on the subject one continuum into use until such time as they are attending the next subject one course, soldiers would have an opportunity to decrease their skill fade. This would also allow an opportunity for the units to identify those self motivated soldiers who seek to develop their own knowledge. The academy could provide recommendations for tentative identification of soldiers to be considered for talent management.

8.   Talent Management is mentioned in the 'Grounded Curiosity' article by MAJ Scott Holmes, 'Junior Leadership in the Australian Army'. This area is one within which the Academy could seriously consider being directly involved. With close liaison to both DSCM-A and the local brigades, talent management could be used to significantly enhance Army's capability adding to the credibility and influence that WONCO-A could gain. This would have to be carefully managed with something similar to a BOS process to ensure the right personnel are being identified otherwise the reputation of the Academy could tarnished. If the WONCO-A is manned with the appropriate personnel, this shouldn't be too challenging.

9.   With close liaison to local brigades, the Academy, time permitting, could also look to offer independent arbitration/umpiring/assessment for brigade competitions, such as military skills competitions, drill competitions etc. This would see the staff of the academy being seen within the brigades on a more regular basis and with the expected academy standards being on display more regularly to the units, show the academy as a "centre of excellence" to the units.

CONCLUSION

10.   Broadly, when doing a basic Google search for 'marketing strategies' and 'how to raise a business profile', the underlying theme is 'communication and transparency'. All of the ideas mentioned within this paper also revolve around these same themes. With the use of technology, the academy could increase the transparency of what it offers army whilst at the same time enabling increased communication, thus allowing NCOs to offer up ideas to the academy. Army

has a lot of very talented personnel who at times come up with exceptional ways to improve how we do business, though at times it can be difficult for them to have their voice heard.

11.   By giving our junior leaders a voice, showing our presence outside of the Academy and displaying our high standards amongst the brigades, we can take advantage of Army's talent and strive to continually offer an exceptional level of all corps training. This would allow our junior leaders to have some ownership of their training and make WONCO-A an organisation that personnel aspire to be posted to.

Recommendations

12.   To enable WONCO-A to increase its profile within Army and become known as a centre of excellence, it is recommended the following be considered:

a.   Creation of an Academy portal on SharePoint providing links to all the latest all corps doctrine used on a daily basis and throughout the subject one courses.

b.   Creation of a forum within the portal allowing NCOs to post topics, discussion points and suggestions for all corps training.

c.   Closer liaison with local brigades to provide continuation training in the form of workshops preventing skill degradation.

d.   Inclusion of syndicate discussions within the subject one continuum for feedback and ideas on the portal to enhance NCOs ownership and maintain relevance.

e.   Offering independent arbitration to brigade competitions and getting the faces of the academy staff out amongst the brigades.

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OVER EMPHASIS ON CIVILIAN ACCREDITATION

INTRODUCTION

1.   In July 1993, the Australian Army initially registered as a Nationally Registered Training Organisation (RTO). This RTO status enabled the Army to offer potential soldiers and officers civilian recognition of skills acquired over their training or career in accordance with the National Regulatory Framework. In meeting this status Army implemented the Certificate IV in Workplace Training and Assessment, now Certificate IV in Training and Assessment (TAE10).

2.   Throughout a soldier's career and progression through the ranks they will be panelled and complete the SUBJ 1 All Corps Soldier Training suite of courses for the ranks of Corporal, Sergeant and Warrant Officer respectively. These courses train on the requirements to instruct and assess lessons of a military content such as Drill, Weapons, or Theory adopting the different methods of instruction, as well as conducting individual work based training and planning training programs. To meet objectives, in conjunction with the unit's operational tempo within the Force Generation (FORGEN) cycle.

3.   These skills, knowledge and attributes are dictated within the Manual of Army Employment that defines the training requirements for the respective rank of Corporal, Sergeant or Warrant Officer.

4.   **Scope.** This paper defines what the SUBJ 1 All Corps Soldier Training courses train and assesses soldier's capabilities to deem competence within the command, leadership, management, operations and training environment. It will outline that the Non-Commissioned Officer operates as a confluent of soldier and instructor throughout their career. Furthermore, this paper will define the proficiencies and skills gained from these promotion courses and question the requirement to requalify regularly on Certificate IV Training and Assessment each time there is industry change, or whether personnel retain competence as they are constantly developing and maintaining these skills within their career management structure.

AIM

5.   The aim of this paper is to determine the requirement for Army personnel to be granted TAE10 qualifications, to instruct and assess in the modernised military, and to look at a sustainable contemporary combat soldier model.

MEETING INDUSTRY REQUIREMENTS

6.   **Qualified Instructor.** The Subject One Corporal course trains and tests the potential Corporal to make several presentations to be delivered and to meet the evidence requirements to

be deemed, 'achieved' in the TAE10 Qualified Instructor module of the Certificate IV Training and Assessment. Once promoted, these skills are relied upon regularly in the workplace, training subordinates and conducting revision lessons and individual and work based training, to soldiers that have experienced gaps with training or the implementation of new equipment into the work force.

7.   **Qualified Assessor.** Similarly, the Subject One Sergeant course trains and tests potential Sergeants on developing training and the critique process to enable the Sergeant to assess the standard of delivery of lesson provided by their subordinates, Corporals and trained soldiers as well as providing feedback and self development guidance to their superiors. The critique process and the ability to produce a platoon training plan is part of their sine qua non mentoring, within the workplace.

8.   **Further training.** These courses are also offered individually by the Regional Education Detachments, training private soldiers through to officers, either in the new skills or re-qualifying as there is a perception that these skills are not maintained in the workplace.

PROFICIENCIES COMPARED TO CAPABILITY

9.   *We have work to do to ensure that essential military requirements define our training and that civilian competencies do not.* Major General PW Gilmore, AO, DSC

10.   **Incorporating a relevant and progressive skill development model.** The current climate of up skilling our soldiers on TAE10 requirements is costly and weighs heavily on Defence resources and time, meeting the needs and having civilian accreditation dictating these skill sets. When delivering training within the military this civilian accreditation is not required.

11.   For modernisation and strategic planning this proficiency or civilian accreditation is not required, however our soldiers training with these skill sets and attributes is essential on the modern day battlefield.

12.   **Progressive and developmental.** When posted to Training Establishments the individual is required to complete an Instructor, Assessor and Staff Development Program. This program revises the skill sets required to provide instruction and assessment for the applicable establishment that they are posted to. For example, being posted to 1st Recruit Training Battalion, the individual is panelled on the Recruit Instructor Course.

13.   **Proficiency beyond qualification.** Current training allows for these skills to be aligned with the civilian accreditation. Providing evidence in way of a completed Record of Attainment for these Subject One courses would allow those within the transition phase from the Army, the ability to transfer these competencies and be granted the civilian qualification TAE10 equivalent.

14.   **Synchronisation of training opportunities.** Likewise, the Subject One Warrant Officer course should include the Training Supervisor component of the Certificate IV Training and Assessment. This would then align with the whole competency to be granted on transition from the Army if this qualification was required for the individual's civilian career progression.

CONCLUSION

15.   Inherently the soldier is a confluence of a warrior and instructor, constantly providing instruction, guidance and mentoring of subordinates and superiors alike.

16.   Over emphasis on the requirement of the current TAE10 or Certificate IV in Training and Assessment which recants proficiencies. Requiring individuals to constantly ameliorate these

proficiencies and skill sets. When as a Corporal, Sergeant or Warrant Officer in the workplace these skills are employed constantly whilst training subordinates, superiors and preparing strategic planning for the modernised battlefield within the comprehensive capabilities of the FORGEN cycle.

Recommendation

17.   That on transition to the civilian workplace these skills be aligned to the civilian qualification if the soldier is pursuing a civilian career in the training industry and require these proficiencies recognised. This would reduce the exorbitant remunerative burden and associated resources, but still assist with the retention of benefits offered to soldiers on enlistment, when transiting from the Army.

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SUBJECT 1 FOR SERGEANT (RECRUIT INSTRUCTOR) COURSE

INCENTIVE OR DISTRACTION

INTRODUCTION

1.   For many years the 1st Recruit Training Battalion (1 RTB) has been responsible for conducting ab initio training for Army's soldiers. The initial training of Army recruits at   1 RTB provides the foundation skills, knowledge and attitudes required to undertake Initial Employment Training (IET) and reinforce Army. As such it is essential that those entrusted to lead, train and mentor these mostly young men and women, not only want to do the job but possess the appropriate competence, experience and attitude to do so.

2.   A number of incentives designed to attract the right type of people to 1 RTB over the years have been implemented, including instructors being guaranteed attendance on a   Subject 1 for Sergeant Course (SUBJ 1 SGT) tailored specifically for them.

3.   **Scope.** The scope of this paper is to articulate how this concept came into being. It will also detail how the various courses have been conducted and argue that there is a case for discontinuing this methodology.

AIM

4.   The aim of this paper is to question the merits of conducting the SUBJ 1 SGT Course at 1 RTB as a stand alone career course specifically designed to cater for Recruit Instructors (RIs).

THE EVOLUTION OF A COURSE

5.   **History.** The concept of promotion courses specifically designed for RIs goes back to the 1980s. Initially it was recognised that by virtue of their employment, RIs undertook a number of elements (competencies) of the SUBJ 1 SGT Course that could see them exempt from having to undertake a residential course. A number of On the Job Training (OJT) requirements coupled with a formal module was undertaken when the pilot course was first stood up in 1987. Over the years, a SUBJ 1 SGT course has been conducted at 1 RTB in one form or another as an incentive to encourage Junior NCOs to look at a posting to Kapooka. This concept more recently has fallen under the Recruit Instructor Incentive Support Program (RIISP). In recent times the Army Recruit Training Centre (ARTC) has put forward proposals to undertake courses primarily at Kapooka under this program.[166]

6.   **Current day.** There is currently discussion between 1 RTB and WONCO-A regarding the reintroduction of the course and how it would be structured. The latest proposal moves away from an incentive based approach and more towards reducing Army's Non Platform Support (NPS) liability in support of 1 RTB.[167] It has been argued that by having RIs undertake the majority of the course at Kapooka, the wider Army would benefit by not having to backfill RI positions over longer periods of time. 1 RTB envisage that the course may take the trainee anything from eight to 18 months to complete.

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[166] Hudson KG, WO1, Brief for COMDT ARTC. Aug 13
[167] Clayton M, WO1, mark.clayton1@defence.gov.au. Correspondence pertaining to SUBJ 1 SGT (RI). 06 Apr 16.

COURSE STRUCTURE

7.   **Methodologies.** Initially RIs undertook OJT and assessment and were required to attend a short formal module. This module consisted of those topics that could not be undertaken and assessed as OJT, such as Military Law, Service Writing and Operations. The first iteration of the course was entirely conducted at Kapooka. A number of different methodologies have been implemented since.

8.   **Recent courses.** More recently the course has been conducted both at 1 RTB and Canungra. This involved Training Support Coy, 1 RTB managing the non-residential component of the course through work books with WONCO-A providing a Mobile Training Team (MTT). The training and assessment conducted by the MTT primarily consisted of Communication for Leaders (C4L) and some elements of the Deliver Army Training (DAT) module. For trainees to successfully complete the course they were required to attend the Operations Module at Canungra as a residential requirement, being given five different modules throughout the year to choose from. These modules were the relevant Operations modules contained within scheduled WONCO-A courses.

WHY DISCONTINUE?

9.   **Current proposals.** A proposal in 2014 [168] was put forward as a way of reducing the time that RIs spend away from family and thus improving the work life balance of instructors. This along with other reasons such as incentives and reducing NPS liabilities show that   1 RTB has attempted to justify the conduct of these courses for varying reasons over the years. Although there may be some merit in the concept of conducting a stand-alone course specifically for RIs, the truth of that matter is that 1 RTB is no different to any other organisation in Army when it comes to retention, managing work life balance and managing short term vacancies within their organisation.

10.   **What trainees think.** A Training Review Report (TRR) for a course that was conducted in 2007 [169] put a number of questions to trainees. This course was made up of both a non-residential phase at Kapooka and a residential phase at Canungra. When asked for general comments, a majority of those trainees who completed the TRR tool stated that the course should be conducted entirely at a WONCO-A wing. This would remove them from feeling that they had a moral obligation to support their platoons whilst undertaking the non-residential requirements. They also stated that it would reduce the time required to complete the competency requirements of the course substantially.

11.   **Previous recommendations.** The conclusion made in the 2007 TRR was that the course was not coordinated in an effective or efficient manner with a recommendation that it not be continued and that trainees from 1 RTB should attend a scheduled course at a WONCO-A wing.

CONCLUSION

12.   Issues such as providing incentives, retention, reducing NPS liabilities and providing an appropriate work life balance are no doubt important; however, standing up an all corps promotion course specifically to cater for one unit within Army is not an efficient or effective use of resources. WONCO-A as a Training Centre of Excellence for the All Corps Soldier Training Continuum (ACSTC), can provide the appropriate training and assessment that is moderated, standardised and aligned through a rigorous Instructor and Assessor Development Program. 1 RTB should manage their short term vacancies in the same manner as all Army units.

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[168] S1SA-RI Working Group Msn Analysis. 2014
[169] WONCO-A TRR 2005/1006426. Oct 07

There will be a requirement for trainees undertaking this type of course to attend at least a few weeks of residential training regardless, ensuring that 1 RTB will still require to manage their short term vacancies. If the focus once again moves towards providing incentives with the guarantee of attendance on a SUBJ 1 SGT course, then positions could be quarantined on WONCO-A courses to achieve this.

Recommendations

13.   The following recommendations are made:

a.   A stand-alone SUBJ 1 SGT course for RIs no longer be considered with positions on WONCO-A courses being quarantined as an incentive for Junior NCOs looking at   1 RTB as a posting option.

b.   Applications for recognition based specifically on the work RIs undertake be considered to assist in reducing the amount of time they spend undertaking an external residential course.

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THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY – INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

'Every soldier committed to continuous learning and self-development.'

– I'm an Australian Soldier (2006)

INTRODUCTION

1. The first tier of the Army Training Continuum (ATC) is individual training. This tier is designed to develop personnel through the provision of initial corps education and training, in order to prepare them to carry out their role within Army. However, units often fail to realize that individual training is an ongoing cycle, which must be continued throughout the professional careers of our personnel.

2. **Scope.** This paper will explore the training continuum, from point of entry training through to professional development of personnel throughout their Army career.

AIM

3. This paper proposes ways to improve individual training conducted across Army, in order to provide Army personnel with the skills, knowledge and attitudes they require in order to ensure Army 'remains capable of successfully and effectively conducting operations across the spectrum of conflict' (Australian Army 2014).

POINT OF ENTRY AND INITIAL TRAINING

4. **Competency based training.** Competency based training is defined as 'training and assessment, which requires the attainment and demonstration of specified skills, knowledge and attitudes (SKAs) to meet Army's capability requirements' (Australian Army 2015). During the early stages of training, personnel are provided with the foundational training they require to enter the workplace. However, at this level, they are not yet vocationally competent or able to operate independently.

5. **Further training.** The output that should be expected from point of entry and initial training is a 'qualified' individual, who possesses the required skills, knowledge and attributes at a foundational level. Further training is required to assist the individual to develop 'proficiency' within the particular skill. For personnel to achieve proficiency, the unit must provide further opportunities for guided practice, together with professional mentoring.

UNIT TRAINING

6. **Ongoing training.** As the battlespace evolves, so must our training. In order to meet evolving requirements, courses are lengthened to include new knowledge and skills. Once the course is finished, however, personnel are provided with limited opportunities to practice or consolidate these skillsets. Within units, continuation training should be conducted to ensure that the knowledge and skills covered during courses are not degraded. In order to ensure that training is successful, it must be graduated and focus on the exit standard of the particular course and progress.

7. **Targeted training.** It is important that training provided by units is targeted and appropriate. The benchmark for unit training should be the exit standards of entry and initial soldier and officer training. Conducting assessment in this manner will provide unit commanders with a 'snapshot' of personnel's skillsets and capabilities, enabling commanders to target training to the requirements of the cohort.

8.   **Mentoring.** Mentoring the individual to 'develop the potential of your subordinates' is an important part of successful professional development (Australian Army 2013). The benefits of mentoring are manyfold. Mentors benefit from the mentoring process through the opportunity to develop their leadership skills. The mentee benefits from the opportunity to gain guidance from experienced senior personnel. Finally, the unit benefits by ensuring the effective and successful trade of knowledge from senior personnel to the next generation of leaders (Department of Defence n.d.).

PROMOTION COURSES

9.   **Pre-course training.** Most, if not all, courses contain a requirement to complete reading or training prior to attending a course. Whilst overall the responsibility rests with the individual to complete these requirements, supervisors must be prepared to provide assistance and guidance. The increasing use of eLearning platforms to deliver training, however, reduces the role of supervisors in pre-course training. This is problematic, as individuals can access all of this information, it does not mean that they understand what they are reading or watching. The information technology aspect must also be combined with the experience and knowledge being passed down by all ranks, soldier to soldier.

10.   **Post-course training.** Upon exit, individuals will possess the skills, knowledge and attitudes required for promotion. However, it is critical to success that training for promotion does not stop on the completion of the course. Post-course training must occur in order to assist the individual to retain and enhance the knowledge, skills and attitudes they acquired on course. This recognises that courses provide only a component of the holistic training required for individuals to succeed within complex and shifting modern workplaces and operating environments. Opportunities to develop leadership must also be provided. The workspace provides individuals with opportunities to develop effective leadership skills and styles.

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

11.   **All corps and corps specific.** Preparing and moulding of our future leaders through professional development is critical to Army's ability to achieve its mission. Professional development should be focused to allow individuals the opportunity to be developed at both all-corps (core military skills) and corps specific level. Professional development should also encompass opportunities to engage in joint training between corps and trades.

12.   **The next rank.** A critical component of professional development is preparing the individual to perform the functions of the next rank. Individual units play a key role in the preparation of personnel to develop the skills, knowledge and attitudes they require to achieve promotion. A valuable resource within the unit is found in personnel who have completed promotion courses and have achieved promotion. This approach to training will serve as a means to develop all involved, through the sharing of experience and knowledge. This approach also provides superiors with the confidence in the ability of those under their command.

CONCLUSION

13.   Individual training in all-corps, trade and corps skills forms the foundation of Army capability. As the first step in developing collective capabilities, individual training needs to be targeted and effective. The often significant time lapse between entry and promotion courses represents a valuable opportunity to consolidate training outcomes. Similarly, the gap between promotion courses and achieving promotion offers a valuable opportunity to develop leadership skills. Currently, these training opportunities are not successfully exploited. By examining how this time can be better employed, we can develop effective training to close the shortfall, further enhancing the capability of our land force.

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STEPS TOWARDS MAKING GOOD BETTER

Develop yourself before developing others

Wayne Bennett

INTRODUCTION

1.   The Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Academy (WONCO-A) has the opportunity to enhance its instructional techniques and develop psychological skills in trainees. Guidance from Forces Command[170] [171]and tactical command of the WONCO-A has directed[172] the need for development of heuristic training across the All Corps Soldier Training Continuum (ACSTC).

2.   The implementation of a refined teaching methodology has great potential to enhance the learning experience of the soldiers being influenced and hones the techniques of experienced instructors.

3.   **Scope**. This paper will briefly outline the science of how students of the profession of arms learn and teaching methods that will lead to a stronger level of retained knowledge and mental development post the WONCO-A experience.

4.   **Aim.** The aim of this paper is to identify the benefits of enhancing instructional techniques in order to develop soldiers and achieve WONCO-A lines of operation[173].

THE SCIENCE OF LEARNING

5.   The science of learning involves how the brain learns, how to teach and is enhanced by developed psychological skills. These are foundations for soldier development.

6.   **Learn how to learn.** The brain learns by a process of absorbing information from stimulus and storing it in short-term memory. This information is then filtered and either discarded or committed to long-term memory[174]. Committing information or new skills to long-term memory is essential for soldier development; however, the brain only processes so much information while still maintaining situational awareness to deal with potential threats. The retention of long-term memory is also influenced by the emotional or instructional experience[175]. WONCO-A's current methods of instruction can be optimised to stimulate greater retention of information to long-term memory.

7.   **Learn how to teach.** Current instructor development programs have insufficient focus on adult learning or andragogy[176] styles and techniques to enhance training delivery. Understanding how the brain learns, how adults learn and, therefore, how an individual instructor learns, leads to greater development for instructors. Developing their own unique learning styles will support instructors developing more potent teaching methods.

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[170] MAJGEN Gilmore, P 2016, *Commander Forces Command Guidance 2016,* Department of Defence.

[171] BRIG Ryan, M 2016 *The Ryan Review: A study of Army's Education, Training and Doctrine needs for the Future*, Department of Defence.

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8.   **Developing psychological skills.** Surprisingly, 90% of successful performance is attributed to psychological skills compared to physical abilities or intelligence.[177] Army allots time for psychological training in areas such as PTSD, but not in understanding the psychological impact on performance. A student or instructor with developed psychological skill will be able to learn or motivate themselves more effectively. Instructional techniques and training at the WONCO-A miss opportunities to develop these psychological skills.

9.   Understanding the science behind learning allows the foundations of soldier development to be built upon and, therefore, instructors to improve their instructional methods.

DIFFERENT INSTRUCTIONAL METHODS

10.   Modernising instruction by utilising techniques such as primary-recency effect, purposeful practice, reality based training scenarios and reflective debriefing, fosters the development of the soldier and instructor.

11.   **Primacy-recency effect.** The sequence of learning affects long-term memory retention. Primacy–recency effect is the observation that information at the beginning (primacy) and end (recency) of a learning episode is retained better than information presented in the middle[178]. By commencing lessons with revision, references and historical quotes, the key components of the lesson are delivered when trainees are close to or already at the least effective time to retain information. At the end of the lesson information generally tapers off or instructors conduct an unfocused test of objectives. To maximise retention and implement principles of andragogy important information should be covered in the first 15-20 minutes, trainees then get up to move or stretch, and then less essential information or the "reason for learning" is reviewed in the middle. Important content should be reviewed in the last ten minutes to take advantage of the recency effect.

12.   **Purposeful practice.** Purposeful practice is rehearsing with well-defined, specific goals, is focused and involves feedback[179]. Importantly it involves embracing feedback to create positive emotions connected to effective rehearsals. Rehearsal by doing something repeatedly without purpose foregoes opportunity to transfer information to long-term memory and can leave trainees in a negative psychological mindset. A common example across the WONCO-A is when a trainee rehearses a drill lesson focussed only on repetition. Teaching trainees elements of purposeful practice can improve the acquisition of skills and increase their positive association with achieving summative assessments. As an example, the trainee breaks down the rehearsal into stages and sets goals. They then allocate peers specific areas to focus on and give feedback. This focuses the critique and identifies areas to be enhanced to achieve the set goals. As practice continues with purpose and goals are achieved a positive mindset develops.

13.   **Reality based training or testing.** The competency-based system is used for most summative assessments. Trainees commonly do what they need to do to pass rather than develop the knowledge or skill to enable them physically or psychologically. All training and summative assessment should include emotional, psychological and physical dimensions[180]. Connecting all of these dimensions with reality based training scenarios, such as Day in the Life of a Warrant Officer, can trigger greater memory connections that improve performance and resilience. Therefore a reality based system has greater potential to develop soldiers.

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14.   **Debriefing.** Reflective debriefing can be utilised to allow a trainee opportunities to transfer information to long-term memory and enhance their psychological skills through self-analysis. Debriefing with non-reflective questioning techniques such as 'how did you go with that assessment?' does not stimulate in-depth analysis. Reflective questions like 'What was most challenging for you to overcome during preparation for this assessment?' or 'how much practice or time would it take you to master this subject?' followed by 'When will you commit to that practice?' forces the mind to reflect back through the entire process and potentially set future development goals.

15.   Modernising current instructional methods as outlined, will further enhance memory retention and soldier development.

CONCLUSION

16.   The WONCO-A has areas to improve within a broader Army strategy[181]. Maturing the foundations of soldier development through the knowledge of learning, instructional techniques and psychological skills will enhance the all corps soldier continuum. Put simply these are steps towards 'making good better'.

Recommendations

17.   In support of enhancing instructional techniques and soldier development within the WONCO-A recommendations are:

a.   Utilise external trainer support to develop alternative instructional methods and psychological skills development in the training continuum.

b.   Implement reality based training scenarios for summative assessments across the whole ACSTC, similar in design as Day in the Life of a Warrant Officer.

c.   Design pre-course packages that develop learning and psychological skills.

d.   Implement a WONCO-A reading list of reference materials that include different teaching methods and psychological development.

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[181] Ryan 2016

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APATHY - THE NEW BLACK

Apathy is merely a learned behaviour, a habit that can be changed.

– Susanna Barbee

INTRODUCTION

1.   The standards and values of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) are central to our identity. Every policy document is based on the requirement to uphold and maintain our values, whilst every piece of doctrine is crafted to attain or maintain the standards we require of our

personnel. However, the values and standards of the ADF are at risk of erosion from complacency and indifference.

2.   **Scope.** It is important to recognise that the maintenance of our standards and values requires constant reinforcement. It requires consistent effort and focus from Australian Army command, beginning with our training establishments.

AIM

3.   The aim of this paper is to identify the measures and behaviours that Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Academy (WONCO-A) staff can incorporate into their daily routines to best support and uphold our values and standards.

CHANGE IS INEVITABLE

4.   **Evolution.** The culture of the ADF reflects the values and standards of Australian society. As our society evolves, so too do our standards and values. Although this change is continual we must remember that the ADF values and standards are derived from our proud history and culture, we must shape this evolution to continue to lead us forward.

5.   **Continuity and change.** Whatever the case, both continuity and change are critical to our success. The ADF constantly strives to evolve to remain at the forefront of training and technology, whilst every endeavour has its cornerstone set firmly within the parameters of our values and standards. The risk however, is that we compromise our paradigm, as opposed to evolving with the societal changes. Just because it may be socially acceptable to saunter with hands in pockets whilst holding a phone to your ear, it does not make it soldierly nor does it make it acceptable within the ADF.

6.   **The clown on the unicycle.** Within the academy we, as commanders, managers and supervisors, have the task of balancing precariously upon our slowly evolving doctrine to deliver the standard required. Concurrently, we are obligated to actively engage a much more diverse and educated (and opinionated) trainee base which have a firm understanding of technology, societal advances and social norms.

THE BYSTANDER

7.   **The blind eye.** As we go about our core business, we constantly see actions, attitudes and behaviours that are not in keeping with the values and standards of the ADF. Some will take action, but others will carry on the course of their duties unless the infraction is quite severe. Simple actions such as realigning deficiencies in dress and bearing help all involved understanding that the basics are what we build on, we must do them well. The ADF cannot tolerate indifference. An apathetic approach breeds an environment within which further apathy thrives.

8.   **Reinforce and educate.** As the trainers and mentors within the ADF, we are obligated to inculcate a sense of pride and professionalism within everything we do and to everyone we engage. This is not to imply that it is the sole responsibility of the academy to uphold the values and standards of the ADF, however, we are obligated to do our job. We must see ourselves and all Academy staff as exemplars within the ADF and strive to be professional in everything we do.

9.   **Dominoes.** Each and every time values and standards are reinforced; there is a knock on effect. Imposed discipline encourages self discipline; thereafter self discipline imbues collective discipline. All too often however, a diluted standard or a questionable value is allowed to

continue unchecked, because we see it as another unit's responsibility to rectify, or as a generationally accepted standard.

COURAGE

10.   **Stories and wine.** Anecdotes and jokes are part of our valued larrikin culture. However, the language and subject is often outdated, off colour or inappropriate. We have a responsibility to check our own delivery, and admonish others if we believe they have crossed a line.

11.   **It's not personal.** To point out a breach of standards or a poor value judgement to a peer or superior can be exceedingly challenging. It takes a level of courage for difficult conversations to be broached. It is essential to respect that courage and acknowledge that it is done to improve us professionally, not denigrate us personally. This should be explained to those we counsel as peers and superiors, and those subordinates we discipline.

12.   **Mountains and molehills.** Many reportable incidents of inappropriate behaviour originate from minor errors in judgement, or poor value decisions allowed to go unchecked. As this behaviour is not countered, or in fact encouraged, it is perceived as acceptable. As unchecked individuals progress up the ranks, they become more at risk of causing or being involved in a reportable incident due to their skewed perception of our values and standards. We are doing our future leaders, as well as the reputation of the ADF, a disservice if we perpetuate this behaviour.

CONCLUSION

13.   It behoves us all to uphold the standards and values which form the foundations of a professional, effective and inclusive Army. It is difficult to change inculcated opinions, personalities and mannerisms. However, it is essential that recognise that it is our responsibility to reflect on, and adapt, our values in order to maintain our integrity as an organisation.

Recommendations

14.   The Academy staff, as members of the preeminent training establishment for leaders within the ADF, are encouraged to:

a.   take any and every opportunity to modify the behaviours and attitudes of all soldiers within their sphere of influence, to align them with the values and standards of the ADF,

b.   hold ourselves and others to account for our actions and inactions to ensure our values and standards are reinforced, remembering that it's not personal, it's professional, and

c.   take ownership of the expectations within the Academy to be the exemplars by maintaining and imposing a professional standard - always.

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REINTRODUCTION OF BARRIER ASSESSMENT FOR SUBJECT 1 CORPORAL ARMY COURSE.

INTRODUCTION

1.   In August 2006, COMD LWC released a directive (Comd's Directive 17/06)[182] for the trail on the removal of the barrier assessment for the Subject 1 Corporal (ARA) Course, now known as Subject 1 Corporal Army Course. This trial was to assess the effects and impact on the conduct of the course to meet the requirements stipulated in the Chief of Army's directive 14/05 in relation to the Hardened Network Army.

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[182]   Commander Directive 17/06 – Implementation of Trial on the Removal of Barrier Assessment for the Subject 1 Corporal (ARA) Course.

2.   At the time of the directive, it was identified that the current corporal asset was approximately 1200 below authorised establishment, while the private asset was approximately 2000 above the authorised establishment.

3.   The trial was conducted over the directed period of September to December 2006, and based on the results at the time, it was decided that the barrier assessment would no longer be a requirement for trainees to complete prior to attending the course. The Subject 1 Corporal (ARA) Course (promotion course) was renamed the Junior Leaders Course (development course) in 2007.

4.   **Scope**. This paper will identify current issues in regards to the pre-requisite and entry standards, and recommendations to incorporate barrier assessments prior to commencing the Subject 1 Corporal Army Course.

AIM

5.   The aim of this paper is to identify issues in the current entry standard on Subject 1 Corporal Army Courses and proposes strategies to assist in enabling WONCO-A to consider re-implementation of the barrier assessment package prior to trainees attending a Subject 1 Corporal Army Course to ensure they have the required skill sets and set them up for success.

PREREQUISITE STANDARDS

6.   The current prerequisite entry standard for trainees to attend Subject 1 Corporal Army Course is Private Proficient (PTE P)[183] the prerequisite entry standard, however, are varied from trainee to trainee due to training opportunities, experience, and Corps. Current FORCOMD directed tasks and unit priorities also have a significant influence on trainee's exposure and use of the required basic skills for the course. The main priorities by most units are on the directed tasking from FORCOMD and their ongoing compliance and governance issues which impacts on units allocating adequate time to enhance and develop basic soldier skills such as F88 and F89 weapon handling, drill, navigation, radio telephone procedure, first aid, general military knowledge and dress and bearing. The lack of experience in basic soldier skills has become a significant issue across the wider Army.

7.   Currently during the Deliver Army Training (DAT) phase of the Subject 1 Corporal Army Course on an average there are approximately 17 trainees that fail their formative assessments in regards to drill, and approximately 7-10 trainees who fail their formative assessments for weapons due to lack of experience and preparedness prior to attendance on the course.

DIRECTED TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

8.   It appears that Regional Panelling Authorities (RPA) are directed by a higher authority to ensure that the Directed Training Requirements (DTR) [184] for each scheduled course are to be filled. To ensure this, RPA's contact units directly to ensure that units provide the allocated

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[183]   202960 – Subject 1 Corporal Army Course Joining Instruction, dated 4 Mar 16

[3.]   Current and former RSMs back briefs to SI SQ Wing, WONCO-A have indicated the pressure from RTA's to ensure the DTR's are met regardless of suitability. This has been addressed locally, however, remains a future issue.

numbers to the DTR. To meet the unit allocation to the DTR, some trainees are made to attend at short notice, which can result in trainees being panelled despite their suitability or preparedness. This issue has been raised in discussions by former and current RSM's with the SI SQ Wing, WONCO-A and has been addressed locally to some degree, however, remains an issue for the future.

BARRIER ASSESSMENT

9.   The re-introduction of the barrier assessment would provide the instructional staff a snapshot of the standard of the trainees prior to the commencement of the course and identify any training shortfalls. The barrier assessment would also provide an opportunity to observe potential trainees under assessment conditions prior to the course to identify any strengths and weaknesses to assist in the allocation of sections.

10.   With the re-implementation of the barrier assessment, trainees can be assessed to ensure they meet the prerequisite standard in weapon handling for the F88 and F89, drill, navigation, ratel procedure, first aid, general military knowledge and dress and bearing.

11.   The conduct of the barrier assessments can be conducted by the Brigade Training Teams (BTT) as they were prior to 2006. Close liaison can be conducted by WONCO-A staff and BTT staff to ensure that assessments are conducted in accordance with the current doctrine and assessment criteria.

12.   With the reimplementation of the barrier assessment and feedback back to units via the chain of command (FORCOMD) on the trainee suitability/ not suitability to attend the course, units would more than likely be more pro-active and actively involved in preparing their soldiers prior to commencing the course.

CONCLUSION

13.   Only through the appropriate development and experience (both time in service and rank), a soldier gains the required skill sets to become an effective leader. The re-introduction of the barrier assessment would ensure that selected trainees have the required skill sets and only suitable trainees are identified for advancement and promotion opportunities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

14.   To improve the current standard of trainees attending the Subject 1 Corporal Army Course the following recommendations should be considered:

a.   A review to Comd's Directive 17/06 – Implementation of Trial on Removal of Barrier Assessment for Subject 1 Corporal (ARA) Cse, be conducted to ensure that it is still valid in regards to authorised establishment figures.

b.   Re-introduce barrier assessments for the Subject 1 Corporal Army Course. Barrier Assessments should be focused on the basic soldier skills such as weapon handling for the F88 and F89, drill, navigation, radio telephone procedure, first aid, general military knowledge and dress and bearing.

c.   Barrier Assessments should be conducted by regional Brigade Training Teams in conjunction with the regional panelling authorities with close liaison and support provided by HQ WONCO-A.

d.   A barrier assessment completion certificate be introduced for trainees that remains valid for a period of six months, so that trainees have the ability to attend a Subject 1 Corporal Army Course where appropriate during the certificate time period.

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RECOGNISING AND COMBATING WORKPLACE APATHY

INTRODUCTION

1.   Do the people in your unit really care, or are they just going through the motions? Every officer, warrant officer, and non-commissioned officer must to know the answer, as it makes a huge impact to the performance of any unit. Engaged soldiers are not just happier than apathetic ones, they're inclined to do their best─far more than the required minimum─for their commander. That extra effort can make the difference between successful activities and 'also-rans'. Apathy and engagement, like other aspects of workplace culture and attitudes, depend on factors that are not easily measured or controlled and are not just about success. Individual personalities can affect the group dynamics within a unit as no two people react the same when given a particular task. Therefore keeping soldiers interested is key to maintaining a high performing unit.

AIM

2.   The aim of this paper is to inform commanders at all levels about workplace apathy and how to combat apathy to prevent poor performance.

3.   **Scope.** This paper discusses how to recognise apathy in your unit personnel. Supervisor and individual responsibilities are discussed, and methods to overcome apathy are recommended.

APATHY

4.   **Recognising apathy.** Apathy is not difficult to detect. It's simple; people who don't care look like they don't care. Apathy can show up in various types of behaviour depending on the emotional makeup of the soldier. Apathetic people can be detached and unfocused, without much of an attention span. Their energy can also be low. They may be easily angered, argumentative or defensive. Apathy can be reflected in a lack of optimism, a lack of energy in an organisation and a culture of clock-watching. People either switch off or become over-concerned with dismissal time and holidays.

5.   Just as apathy manifests itself in many ways, depending on the individual, there's no one magic bullet for solving the problem. However all solutions start in the same way; with listening. When commanders see signs of apathy in a soldier, the first thing to do is to find out what's on the soldier's mind. You shouldn't ask them a question that threatens their job security; otherwise they'll become defensive and dismissive. We should ask them something like, 'How are you going today?' or, 'Is there anything interesting going on for you?' Just the act of showing interest in a soldier can be helpful as it breaks the negative thought process and the idea that no one's noticing. One cause of apathy and one barrier of engagement, in my experience, is the belief among soldiers that they're virtually invisible, that no one notices them or cares what they think. For that reason, a commander's 'I hear you' is an antidote to the soldier's 'I don't care.'

6.   **The soldier's responsibility.** What commanders find out in such conversations could cover a whole range of reasons, from simple boredom with the job, a unit newcomer's social isolation, or issues off the job that affect the soldier's mood and performance at work. Whatever the cause, a superior typically cannot solve the problem by themselves. The soldier has to take responsibility for their attitude and future. Commanders need to offer soldiers opportunities to learn new skills that can prepare them for more advanced jobs, but it's up to the soldiers themselves to take advantage of every training opportunity available.

SOLUTIONS

7.   **Building engagement.** The best solution to rid apathy from the workplace is to keep it from growing. Create a culture of engagement. All levels of management have a role in doing this, from commanding officers, to the officers and non-commissioned officers engaged with team building and soldier performance, in barracks or in the field. Commanders who deal most directly with the soldiers may have more control over job assignments or duties, and, if so, they might be able to rotate work more if the jobs are repetitive and lack room for creativity. These supervisors play a central role in creating a positive workplace culture and making sure that all soldiers are recognised for their efforts. Activities designed to build engagement can be formal programs, such as contests and monthly soldier recognition, or informal actions such as one-on-one chats, open-door policies or impromptu acts of soldier recognition. All these initiatives can be used to build a culture of appreciation. The keynote in such a unit is that soldier contributions are recognised publicly, both by commanders and fellow soldiers. Commanders can also build engagement in the way they talk with soldiers about a subject they know well, their own jobs. Commanders should ask soldiers, 'What can I do to make the job more interesting or more efficient for you?' If the soldier does have some ideas and then sees them acted on, a double message of empowerment is delivered: The soldier has been listened to with respect, and the soldier has actually had an impact.

8.   **Steps to overcoming apathy within yourself and your team.** There are a number of ways to overcome apathy. Firstly, leadership starts with you. Observe your own behaviour and when you begin to notice careless efforts and unfocussed attention do something about it. You also need to be aware. Where are you seeing the effects of your apathy on your team? At meetings with your peers? On a Task? In the field? When you do see it, dig deeper, slow down, ask questions of yourself, and take the time to understand.

9.   Where appropriate, have a conversation to talk about what you are observing with apathetic individuals and the negative impact it might be having on them. Show you care and build their awareness around the consequences of such behaviour. Avoid hubris as you will loose credibility and soldiers will not talk to you. You should coach or mentor the individual to determine a solution to empower and engage them. Focus on what you can control and the benefits of such a solution, and then you should follow up and review progress, and if possible recognise success.

10.   When you do notice anyone projecting a negative perspective in your unit, make an effort to find solutions. If you can't overcome the negativity on your own, think about discussing it with other members in the chain of command to help you work through the problem before it impacts your team or your subordinates.

CONCLUSION

11.   Having discussed how to recognise apathy, how to engage with soldiers that show it, and how to fix the problem at hand, the answers are simple. If you engage with your soldiers and show empathy towards how they're feeling, it will stop apathy from starting in the first place. The way you act, as a commander, has a direct reflection in your subordinate's attitudes and behaviours. If you follow the steps to overcoming apathy provided you will see an immediate improvement in your unit's efforts, behaviours and attitudes, therefore leading to overall pride in that accomplishment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

12.   I recommend that commanders at all levels create a culture of engagement. Talk to your soldiers informally and get to know them, and what makes them tick. Find out what their issues are, and if possible fix the problem before it lowers morale.

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THE SUBJECT ONE CORPORAL–ARMY LEARNING MANAGEMENT PACKAGE AND DAILY TRAINING PROGRAM AND THE EFFECTS OF CHANGE

INTRODUCTION

1.   In recent years, the Subject One Corporal – Army (SUBJ 1 CPL–ARMY) course has seen some important changes to the way training has been delivered. Some of the more significant changes have included the insertion of a 48–96 hour resilience activity (Exercise Kokoda), a move back to 40 minute drill formatives, the removal of explosive hazards awareness and protection (EHAP) training and the addition of a military ethics package.

2.   The Learning Management Package (LMP) has seen a number of revisions ranging from administrative name changes to the insertion/deletion of entire module learning outcomes (MLO). As a result of these changes, the daily training program (DTP) has become a rather fluid document that has required some intensive management by Course Sergeant Majors (CSM), requiring input from Directing Staff (DS) and cell subject matter experts (SME).

3.   **Scope.** This paper will look at the current change/amendment process that is detailed in Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Academy (WONCO-A) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and how these changes affect the DTP. Recommendations will be made based on the analysis contained within.

AIM

4.   This paper will highlight some of the recent changes that have occurred within the LMP and DTP and look at any improvements that can be made to further enhance and streamline this process.

LMP/LSM AMENDMENTS

5.   The need for an LMP or LSM amendment is usually identified at the sub-unit level by DS during the preparation or delivery of lessons. These are then recorded in objective using the relevant LMP/LSM observation report to be attached as an annex within the post activity report (PAR) for the course session. Once the PAR leaves the sub-unit there is very little feedback coming back down the chain in terms of proposed changes and amendment requests.

6.   Minor changes can be approved by the Senior Instructor (SI), however, these are generally only of a grammatical, administrative or formatting nature. Any major changes that involve a change to the sequence of learning or the DTP must have Commanding Officer/Chief Instructor (CO/CI) approval and are generally discussed during the Post Course Review Board (PCRB).

7.   This is the stage where the process should be driven by Training Support and Development (TS&D) to ensure a collaborative approach that is driven from the top down, rather than from the bottom up. WONCO-A SOP 2.6 details the process that must be followed but it doesn't state ownership of the process and it lacks detail with some of requirements with the roles and responsibilities. A more detailed flow chart would be beneficial in providing a visual representation that follows a number of pathways depending on the change required.

DAILY TRAINING PROGRAM

8.   The DTP has been through a number of changes due to recent updates of the LMP. Some of these changes have been extremely beneficial such as the individual military appreciation process (IMAP) being replaced with the combat military appreciation process (CMAP), however, some of these changes have been very reactive and haven't had the research and analysis put into it that is required. An example of this is the direction to include more personal administration time for trainees throughout the course program.

9.   Every time there is a significant change it degrades the learning sequence due to limitations placed on CSM. Some limitations include 40 minute lesson periods, local mess timings, climatic conditions in tropical locations and course content. An example of a recent change that had such an effect was drill formatives going from 20 minutes to 40 minutes. Due to the extra time required to conduct 40 minute formatives there was a requirement to move other lessons around, in turn creating other scheduling dramas, and in some instances resulting in having to deliver lessons out of sequence.

10.   A more detailed analysis of the master DTP at the TS&D level would be beneficial, but it is imperative that sub-unit DS have input in the process. This is another initiative that would benefit from a collaborative top to bottom approach.

CONCLUSION

11.   The need for continuous improvement should be on an as-required basis. Whilst there will always be circumstances where change is needed, sometimes too much change can be detrimental also. The current approach for updating the LMP, LSM and the DTP will remain

highly workable providing there is always a collaborative approach, but it must be driven by the most relevant entity/group within the Unit.

RECOMMENDATIONS

12.   In support of existing processes, it is recommended that:

a.   a review of SOP 2.6 be conducted. This should include a more detailed flow-chart detailing ownership of each process and expand on the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders from the DS all the way up to the CO/CI

b.   a more collaborative approach that is driven from top to bottom or bottom up depending on the change needed. Greater analysis of sub-unit PARs will assist TS&D to identify any action items and allow a TASKORD to be released with groups/tasks

c.   greater analysis be done by all stakeholders once changes are instigated. This should include reporting of trends and any outcomes from the training review report.

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ENHANCING LITERACY WITHIN THE ACSTC:
CLOSING THE GAP

"Literacy is a bridge from misery to hope. It is a tool for daily life in modern society. It is a bulwark against poverty, and a building block of development, an essential complement to investments in roads, dams, clinics and factories. Literacy is a platform for democratization, and a vehicle for the promotion of cultural and national identity. Especially for girls and women, it is an agent of family health and nutrition. For everyone, everywhere, literacy is, along with education in general, a basic human right.... Literacy is, finally, the road to human progress and the means through which every man, woman and child can realize his or her full potential."

— Kofi Annan

INTRODUCTION

1.   The Army has identified that the level of literacy standards, in particular of the junior non commissioned officer and the senior non commissioned officer, has deteriorated.

2.   In 2006, the Army withdrew the suite of subject three courses and amalgamated these courses into the all corps soldier training continuum (ACSTC) subject one courses. As a result of this, the literacy standard has slowly degraded across Army, and therefore has placed the burden upon the staff officer to rectify these shortfalls.

3.   **Scope.** This paper will discuss the benefits of reintroducing the stand alone education course continuum that will develop and enhance all ranks involved in the ACSTC from junior non commissioned officer through to warrant officer. This will raise the standard of the literacy and communication IAW the National Reporting System (NRS)[185] and place Army in good stead for the future.

AIM

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[185] The National Reporting System (NRS) provides a uniform, national framework for reporting on the language, literacy and numeracy outcomes of students.

4.   The aim of this paper is to propose the introduction of an effective system of educating soldiers to the literacy levels needed by today's modern Army.

LITERACY

5.   Literacy can be defined as the ability to read and use written information in a range of contexts. Literacy also involves the integration of speaking, listening and critical thinking with reading and writing. The reintroduction of a separate stand alone literacy course will improve soldier's literacy levels. By standardising the ACSTC to a higher literacy level, regardless of prior enlistment education levels will better prepare soldiers for tertiary education.

6.   **Literacy allocation.** The current ACSTC provides minimum time to focus on literacy within the subject one suite of courses. These current courses allocate on average five periods of formal instruction[186]. This instruction, due to the restricted time frame, tends to become brushed over and difficult for trainees to absorb the extensive amount of information. Dedicating a course, with the sole focus on literacy, will allow for the standardisation of literacy levels and have the ability for trainees to absorb the required information with minimal distractions from other course subjects.

7.   **Education standards.** The minimum education standard for all soldiers entering the Army is currently at year ten standard[187]. For most roles within the Army, this standard is acceptable for a soldier to perform basic written communication. However, once a soldier has been identified as displaying potential for promotion, the literacy standards that are required will also change. The ACSTC subject one courses requires junior leaders to display more complex literacy skills. It is expected that soldiers above the rank of corporal can write official letters and express their thoughts in the format of essays. Therefore, in order to increase the literacy levels a dedicated literacy program needs to be developed.

8.   **Future development.** Although the Army initial standard of literacy levels is reasonably low, it is assumed that most soldiers will wish to professional develop themselves throughout their careers. With this in mind, the Army needs to have the ability to allow soldiers to develop through external tertiary education. Soldiers professionally developing themselves may lend for progression to the ACOTC through RMC or ADFA. It will also enhance the chances of success for the ASWOC scheme. Raising the literacy levels within the ACSTC will bridge the gap for junior commanders through to warrant officer to participate in self directed professional development.

9.   **Computer literacy.** Over the past 20 years, the Army has digitally evolved from the utilisation of notebooks for written communication. Army now relies upon digital technology through email correspondence and expressing formal instruction in the format of PowerPoint. There has also been an increasing need for soldiers to be conversant in the detailed functions contained within standard computer applications. An example of this would be the use of formulas within excel spreadsheets. Currently, the ACSTC provides no means of formal instruction for the development of computer literacy. As a result, Army needs to formalise this training within a stand alone course continuum prior to advancement to the ACSTC promotion courses.

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[186] 202960-SUBJ 1 CPL ARMY, 202876 –SUBJ 1 SGT ARMY, and 202881 SUBJ 1 WO ARMY Training Management Package

[187] Employment Specifications, All Corps Soldier - Amendment 7

10.   With the inclusion of a stand alone literacy course, the Army will see a rise in its soldier's literacy levels. This will place Army's future senior soldiers in good stead for future educational development. Furthermore, by introducing a stand alone course this will reduce the current burden on the resourcing requirements.

RESOURCING

11.   When examining the current Army ACSTC resourcing liabilities for literacy, it can be difficult to asses the full cost. This is a result of literacy education being spread throughout all subject one courses. Integrating a dedicated literacy course continuum will standardise all MLOs contained within the current subject one LMPs. With this integration a change in the course authority will be necessary to allow for standardisation and moderation. This will also reduce the current WONCO-A instructor liability that is being utilised within the subject one courses for the literacy lessons and instruction. Reintroducing a stand alone literacy course will also allow a means of conducting pre-course diagnostic testing.

12.   **Course authority**. Current literacy instruction contained within the ACSTC belongs to the subject one courses, with the authority being RMC-A. Changing the authority will reduce any ambiguity within the three separate courses that are conducted in five different locations. The inclusion of a dedicated SME organisation will provide an increase in standardisation, moderation and modernisation. Currently, the continuum does not provide a means of pre-course diagnostic assessment for recognition of prior learning, in literacy levels. The reintroduction of this type of pre-course assessment will reduce the through-put of trainees requiring formal instruction. Instructors will be able to focus on trainee's that requires closer attention.

13.   Through LMP standardisation and the introduction of a dedicated authority for literacy instruction the modernisation within Army will result in a reduction of resourcing for the current training establishments.

CONCLUSION

14.   Literacy within Army is an essential component of communication. Army requires an effective system to educate soldiers in literacy, therefore aligning standards to modern society. Allocating sufficient time with the appropriately qualified personnel will develop soldiers to their full potential. By redirecting authority for the literacy instruction, standardising LMPs and providing a means of diagnostic assessment the Army's literacy resourcing capability will improve. If Army is to be on the forefront of modernisation, why not start at basic literacy.

Recommendations

15.   To increase the current Army soldier literacy levels, it is recommended that:

a.   The re-introduction of a dedicated stand alone course to be attended prior to the ACSTC subject one course continuum with authority transferring to the Royal Australian Army Educational Corps.

b.   Provide a means of pre-course diagnostic assessment to gauge prior literacy levels.

c.   Introduce computer literacy and Defence applications training.

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THE REQUIREMENTS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THE BMS WITHIN THE COMBAT BRIGADES

INTRODUCTION

1.   The intent of this paper is to delineate requirements and impediments to the introduction of Battle Management Systems (BMS) within the Combat brigade (CB). This discussion will examine the necessity for a BMS which is the preeminent Command and Control (C2) capability within the world today. The capability provided by these C2 systems means that any military force without a BMS system will be at a distinct disadvantage in the battle space if facing an adversary that does. This paper will also discuss the reluctance to change to the BMS by personnel within the CB's. The adoption of the BMS faces several key obstacles, one of the most significant is the human factor of reluctance to change learned behaviours, traditional TTP's and SOP's. The final focus of the paper will examine the exposure and training of BMS faced by the wider Army and the CB's. Conflict throughout history has demonstrated countless examples of poor C2 leading to catastrophic outcomes, one of the most disturbing incidents to soldiers and commanders occur when a blue on blue event takes place.

THE REQUIREMENT FOR BMS

2.   In the early stages of the first Gulf War on 17 Feb 1991 at 0100 a fratricide incident took place approximately five kilometres north of the Saudi Iraq border.[188] The event occurred when an Apache attack helicopter engaged a US Bradley Fighting Vehicle and an M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier with two Hellfire missiles. The result of the friendly fire saw the death of two with six severely injured US soldiers. A subsequent investigation of the incident concluded that human error to be the primary catalyst for the event. Could a BMS have prevented this incident from occurring? The capability within the current Torch BMS suggests that it is entirely possible. An incident such as this demonstrates the requirement for a BMS.

3.   The Australian BMS system possesses the potential for our Army to conduct C2 like never before. The ability to disseminate and receive real time information has previously been unheard of. Additionally, the Torch Battle Management System will seek to lift the "Fog of War" and provide all commanders at the Brigade, Battle Group and Combat team level with a situational awareness not seen before within the Australian Defence Force.

4.   BMS *technology provides commanders with a quantum leap in situational awareness, wide access to navigational information and significantly enhanced digitally encrypted radio*

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[188] Operation Desert Storm – Apache Helicopter Fratricide Incident: June 1993

coverage. There can be little argument against employing the BMS, when utilised properly the advantages and effectiveness of this C2 tool is unparalleled. Despite this, there exists a critical hurdle in its implementation into the CB's. Individual and collective reluctance to change sees the cultural shift to BMS a difficult one.

RELUCTANCE TO CHANGE

5.   Reluctance to change is defined as the act of opposing or struggling with modifications or transformations that alter the status quo in the workplace. Change can be a time of opportunity for some and a time of loss.[189] Experience has shown us that one the greatest hurdles facing the Australian Army in the development and maturity of the BMS is an inherent reluctance to cultural change to a digitised mindset. This is where the CB's fully integrate, understand and utilise the capability and not just use it because it has been mandated.

6.   In the mid and late nineties the 1st Armoured Regiment introduced two major equipment acquisitions, those being Digital encryption for VHF radio communications and Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation hand held receivers. The introduction of these two capabilities was set to revolutionise manoeuvre warfare not just within the Royal Australian Armoured Corps but across the wider Army.

7.   The employment and use of the GPS was to significantly alter the way that vehicle commanders would operate tactically. Employment of GPS units meant that individual crew commanders could navigate from point to point with far more accuracy and at greater speed. Regimental and Squadron Commanders were able to conduct complex manoeuvres with stunning precision utilising GPSs. This was something that that had not been seen before.

8.   It soon became apparent that individual crew commanders who did not possess a GPS unit or have the knowledge to competently use one would quickly become disorientated, lost and would be unable to keep pace with the now much faster moving CT's and BG's. Despite this 'navigation revolution' that was occurring within the Corps, a small portion of RAAC commanders refused to consider that the use of the GPS was a positive step forward. Individuals, who in their conviction, steadfastly believed that the use of a map and relying on 'dead reckoning' was still the most effective way of navigating.

9.   The introduction of digital encryption for VHF radios also came with some getting use to. There was little argument against using secure voice communications, however, the practical application proved challenging. In the first several years of its existence, there was the preference to referring to plain text whenever conducting more challenging activities such as a LFMX. Using secure voice was considered too hazardous due to the complexities and as a result these kinds of activities were undertaken almost exclusively in plain voice text. To put it simply, it was considerably easier to not use secure means. Today, only under exceptional circumstances would a call sign ever deploy operationally without full digital encryption.

10.   The employment of secure communications took several years to be fully embraced, ultimately it was human resistance and a reluctance to change the way we had done business for years. If the acquisition of digital secure communications and the use of GPS has taught us anything it is that people ultimately do not like change. We get comfortable with our procedures, techniques and above all else we often hold onto our traditional ways of thinking. Regardless of how good or promising the new is the old ways are habitually believed to be better. In short, the challenge facing the Combat Brigade is a cultural one. Adapting to a new way of thinking and

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[189] Queensland Government - Change Management Best Practices Guide

conducting business will not come easy or without its many detractors. A potential solution of addressing this change is to commence the training and exposure of BMS to soldiers and officers is by introducing the system as early as possible in their training and careers.

EXPOSURE AND TRAINING OF BMS

11.   The ADF follows a systematic approach to training that focuses on developing military capabilities that align with Government direction and strategic guidance.[190] A potential solution to tackling the resistance to the BMS is to expose soldiers and officers to the system as early as possible within their careers. This would mean that soldiers commence training on BMS during their IETs or at 1RTB and officers during their FAC at RMC-D. The earlier an individual is exposed to a system, concept of piece of equipment the better chance and greater likelihood of assimilating the technology exists.

12.   Consideration must be given to the introduction of BMS training upon all Corps promotion courses. The greater frequency and exposure to BMS will inculcate and normalise any potential trepidation faced when using the system. The reduction via exposure will greatly reduce the apprehension faced prior to using BMS on exercise or operations. With the introduction of BMS *DSTO has suggested the Army adopt a Crawl, Walk, Run approach.*[191]

13.   During the 'crawl' phase, the emphasis is on learning the individual components of the skill or task. During the 'walk' phase, the components are integrated, at a slower than normal pace. Finally, during the 'run' phase, the skill or task is performed at normal speed, with conditions similar to actual combat conditions.

14.   Up until late 2015 and early 2016 the Combat Brigades are clearly still in the crawl phase where by the focus is on personnel gaining individual qualifications and skills necessary to employ the Battle Management System. By early to mid 2016 the 1st Brigade will begin transitioning to the Walk phase. Finally by the time the 1st Brigade moves to the ready phase of the Force Generation Cycle in 2016 the Brigade needs to be at the Run phase. The Army must ensure that the CB's become fully conversant with BMS as soon as possible. This will ensure that it maintains a technology edge and C2 superiority over potential adversaries.

CONCLUSION

15.   BMS provides the means to deliver state of the art C2 and situational awareness to our Army; this system will keep us at the forefront of technology and provides a significant tactical advantage against potential adversaries. It is essential that the Army invests significant time and effort in this system in order to be fully conversant and competent with the equipment. The impediments to the introduction of BMS will remain an ongoing dilemma and without question reluctance to change and making the cultural shift being key issues. Exposure and training of personnel in the BMS will prove to be the most effective way of overcoming cultural change and for Army personnel to assimilate the system. The sooner we expose our personnel to BMS in their careers the less daunting and difficult it will be for them to understand the system. Torch Battle Management System is a substantial game changer within our CB's and our C2 procedures. This is an exciting and time for our Combat land manoeuvre components. We have

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[190] ADDP 7.0 Training
[191] *Recommendations for Collective Training for the Battle Management System in 2012*

only just touched the surface with this system and I foresee the Torch capability to become an every day part of our operation functioning in the long term. If we fail to become digitised or fully utilise this system then we will have missed an opportunity to exploit a tool that gives us a quantum advantage against any adversary. BMS Torch is an outstanding system and we should take every opportunity to improve ourselves in its use and functionality.

RECOMMENDATIONS

16.   In support of the introduction of BMS into the Australian Army, it is recommended that:

a.   All Officers and Soldiers are introduced to BMS as early as possible in their careers.
b.   Consideration be given to training of BMS upon All Corps promotion courses.

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THE FAILING UAS TRADE:
GROWING A SUSTAINABLE CAPABILITY

INTRODUCTION

1.   As the ADF adapts to a connected and congested battlespace, it is only too clear the future of targeting is underpinned with the use of advanced unmanned systems. At the forefront of this technology is the use of Unmanned Air Systems (UAS).

2.   Since 2006, The Australian Army has deployed the 20th Surveillance and Target Acquisition Regiment (20 STA) to provide UAS support to enhance Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability on a number of complex operations on multiple deployments. These deployment experiences are the keystone of fielding a future more resilient system for unknown deployments.

3.   With this in mind, it would be a reasonable expectation, the lessons learnt on operations and exercises would be incorporated into a robust training continuum in 20 STA.

4.   **Coalition partners.** The use of UAS by coalition partners such as the United Kingdom and the United States of America, is more advanced, and has already seen similar issues in the area of enhancing capability, to those faced currently by ADF. Army should evolve by the utilising other nation's mistakes, and so to assist in developing methods at minimal cost to the government.

5.   **Scope.** This paper will discuss the need to utilise a more efficient way of maintaining suitably qualified and experienced UAS operators within Army focusing on 20 STA. In line with the current mindset the Army is not a job for life the incentive for an operator to stay beyond Initial Period of Service is reduced. This paper will also discuss this trade does not attract a Return of Service Obligation (ROSO).[192] However other trades have an expensive or technical training burden, such as, pilots have a ROSO attached.

AIM

6.   The aim of this paper is to propose the introduction of an effective industry recognised training system, as well as incentives to improve retention of our most valuable commodity within OPUAS, the operator.

TRAINING BURDEN

7.   **Initial employment training.** The current training for ECN 250 OPUAS is 13 weeks, inclusive of a live flying component. This produces operators that cannot function without constant supervision in a flying position.

8.   **Continuity Training**. Progression through the category system is a slow process, and dependant on the capability of the individual. In most cases, the average time to develop a fully

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[192] MILPERSMAN, Part 7 4–4
   Return of Service Obligation (ROSO) *means a. preserving a minimum level of knowledge, experience and skill within the relevant Service in order to sustain the wide range of capabilities required within the relevant Service; and b. making the most efficient use of limited training resources and providing a fair return to the ADF, in the form of service rendered, from those who benefit from the expenditure of significant amounts of those resources.*

qualified bombardier is four to six years. This process further qualifies operators to the level where they can plan and conduct missions with minimal supervision; Mission Commanders (MCs).[193] This experience is improved exponentially with the environmental considerations developed on operations in different theatres. These are the fundamental learning blocks for operators; this cannot be replicated in a simulated environment.

9. **Lessons learnt**. With over 10,000 hours of flight time on operations, the cumulative experiences learnt from operations should now be embedded within a mature workforce, and capability such as the Shadow 200 UAS. This information, within Army, can be passed on during steady state training, proven from experiential learning. This environmental knowledge base is eroding quicker than it can be taught to future MCs. Although lessons learnt are reasonably well documented there is no replacement for on hand experience within the organisation. It is reasonable to think that an Army with recency utilising UAS, in multiple geographic locations, should be able to deploy to any future conflict with minimal training in line with FORGEN. UAS is expected to deploy to all possible conflict zones, to suit user requirement. All lessons learnt prior to MEAO deployments have been lost.

10. **Civil UAS**. Another point for discussion is the $46 billion business that is UAS employability, and research and development[194]. Growth within the civilian sector is advancing quickly, and the use of UAS over traditional manned aviation is taking the lead. UAS are currently utilised in the civilian agencies for checking power cables, surveying, real estate advertisements, shark watch/surf life saving, gas pipeline inspections, pest tracking, and extermination of feral animals. The most cost effective method for a civilian contractor to furnish its demand for competent and experienced operators is to recruit from trained Army OPUAS. The cost of training a civilian equivalent is expensive, this financial burden is one that a civilian contractor is keen to negate. The recruiting of trained personnel is a cost effective strategy. Licensing of UAS within the civilian sector is less stringent than previous requirement from CASA.

11. **Incentives**. There is currently no incentive for UAS operators to remain Army as they are paid the lowest paygroup, have no special recognition of trade, and gain no civil accredited qualifications. UAS operators are also able to reach the peak of their trade very early in their career. Currently there are bombardiers, MCs, who are more trade qualified than warrant officers within role. Once they qualify, there is very little technical trade advancement for them to achieve job satisfaction. The need for a more challenging career can attract a young experienced OPUAS to separate. Fig 1 depicts the career progression and decision point:

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[193] SI (20STA)OPS 28 Apr 16,
[194] Teal Group indicate a much larger growth as high as $93 billion

Fig 1. OPUAS Career profile and decision point

CONCLUSION

12.   As a progressive Army, with an avid commitment to advancing technology, it is prudent to maintain a highly trained and skilled, workforce. The FORGEN cycle is reliant on systems and manpower, to not only be fit for role but have sufficient redundancy to maintain an extended period of deployment in complex environments. The equipment is not the real concern.

13.   The main effort is retaining the human interface and its inherent needs. With the exponential growth in the civilian UAS sector, the financial incentive for qualified operators to separate, increases on a daily basis. The licensing of UAS is becoming less difficult through the Civilian Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), companies are already recruiting the expertise held by the OPUAS. This is an effective way to furnish civilian positions and negate the company's training liability.

14.   Without clear incentives, monetary gain and the recognition by Army of the specialised skill set within the UAS community, the battle to retain trained competent and current operators is exacerbated.

RECOMMENDATIONS

15.   To reduce the early separation of OPUAS experience it is recommended that:

a.   Recognition of civilian qualification is invested in within the OPUAS trade for PPL at MC qualification.

b.   Retention bonus schemes should be sought at various rank and qualification levels, in particular at bombardier rank to slow the separation rate.

c.   A ROSO be attached within the trade linked to MC qualification.

d.   Tertiary civilian aviation qualifications at MC level to become mandatory for career progression.

ME Wood
WO2
CAN Wing

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ARMING JNCO'S WITH THE WEAPONARY TO COMBAT OPERATIONAL STRESS

INTRODUCTION

1.   Conversing with your mates who have encountered similar or the same traumatic experiences, either in combat or everyday life allows for disclosure in a circle of trust uncommon to professional outsiders. The Australian Army's four core values: "*Courage, Initiative, Respect and Teamwork*" implies that "Our People are the most valuable asset within Army" and "that our success as an organisation depends upon the bonds of trust within the team environment". (CA Directive 21/13, Department of Defence 2013)

2.   Teamwork is developed at the inception of the small team environment, through group development utilising the teaming model, "*Forming, Storming, Norming, Performing and Mourning*" (Smith, M 2005). The complicating factor in this peer to peer based debriefing process is that the method of facilitating the discussion is often hindered by the education of how to encourage dialogue. The skill in extracting dialogue in the form of a debrief, at the lowest level, is a tool very few junior leaders possess, even though doctrinal framework in the ADF is current, relevant and coached through formal instruction.

3.   Operational Stress, combat stress or colloquially termed (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) PTSD, affects approximately 8.3% of ADF personnel and it is estimated that 90% of ADF members have experienced at least one potentially traumatic event at some time in their life. *ADF Mental Health Prevalence and wellbeing Study 2010* (Department of Defence, 2010).

4.   It is important to note that not every soldier that has experienced a traumatic event will develop a medical condition such as PTSD. Many soldiers will not experience negative symptoms from stress, besides the reminiscence of the event and many soldiers are able to divert their experience into positive growth.

5.   **Scope.** This paper examines the feasibility of Junior Non Commissioned Officers (JNCO) gaining the knowledge and education to facilitate post incident debriefing, so that operational stress can be minimised at the onset. This examination also includes the consideration for the JNCO to ascertain the skills needed to refer individuals to mental health professionals for guidance and treatment.

AIM

6.   This paper proposes a strategy to minimise the affect of operational stress and offers an option for the early intervention of mental illness across the junior war fighting capability.

DEBRIEFING AT THE LOWEST LEVEL

7.   In order to minimise the affect of operational stress, debriefing should happen at the lowest level. Only a soldier knows what a soldier is feeling, due to the unique environment and duties of a soldier. To explain this feeling can often become frustrating, uncomfortable and ultimately resentful, these emotions become barriers that prevent soldiers from discussion. If these barriers are broken down and soldiers are placed on a level playing field with the other soldiers of the team, dialogue is more likely to flow. This is because the team has already built a rapport with each other and are likely to have experienced the same, if not similar events. Dr Clay Lifto explains in his book *Only a Soldier Understands,* (Lifto, C 2010) that a mentor one can trust, a colleague who has been in the same place as a peer and that has experienced the same success and failures can provide comfort far greater than an outsider. To achieve this, certain

considerations such as the environment and the timing must be given, so that the divulgement of emotions and entrustment is able to materialise.

8.   It is paramount for the debriefing environment to be conducive to discussion for all participants. This means that the facilitator must select a suitable location and ensure that there is emphasis placed on enduring trust. This is achieved by prohibiting outsiders into the site selected so that the circle of trust is not broken. The environment must also be consistent in allowing all participants the opportunity to play an equal part in the conversation i.e. sitting in a group in front of a facilitator potentially restricts conversation flow, where as forming a circle may enable the participants to engage with one another and make eye contact. The consideration of the environment will foster team cohesion and build trust as each member has an individual responsibility to contribute to the group and respect the contribution of team members. The environment selection is as important and vital as selecting the optimal time to debrief.

9.   The selection of when to conduct the debrief, plays an integral role of enabling dialogue. If the time is likely to be cut short and not offer opportunity for all members to participate, then there may be benefit in delaying the conversation to a more suitable time. Likewise, if debriefing occurs too frequently this could dilute the importance of the process and infrequently could present a missed opportunity to identify an issue at its source. This is evident and detailed in the US doctrine *leader's manual for combat stress control*. It is also demonstrated that "painful memories do not have to become clinical PTSD issues, they can be accepted and diverted into positive growth" (US Department of the Army, 1994).

10.   Whenever a critical incident has occurred, debriefing should follow as soon as the environment allows; however, ideally there should be a short amount of time given for reflection. A fresh account of the incident is prevalent to avoid clouded judgment or collaboration of thoughts. As published in *LWD 7-6 Adventurous Training* (Department of Defence, 2011) "an immediate debrief will also aid in defusing the incident and will reduce the impact of encountered events". The initiative for a JNCO to facilitate a debrief for his team enables the early intervention of mental illness. With appropriate training, the facilitator of the debrief will be enabled with the skill of identifying the signs of operational stress and justify the referral of team members to trained professionals. Formal training to identify the signs of operational stress already exists in the ADF; however this training does not capture all JNCO's across Army.

NOTHING OLD NOTHING NEW

11.   A good junior leader will always ask his team how they are doing and if they are coping with the situation at hand. This approach, with the intent of compassion, can sometimes fail to identify members at risk of mental illness, as there is a lack of knowledge on how to extract underlying emotions from their team. The process of conducting a debrief after a significant incident has occurred, is not a new process. In fact the ADF has several types of post incident debriefs frequently practiced at the junior leadership level, including After Action Reviews (AAR), Post Activity Reports (PAR) and informal discussions. Unit Adventurous Training Leaders (UATL) are taught facilitation techniques with the aim of developing individual and group qualities required in battle. All of these debriefs styles require formal tuition and are competency based. Certain corps and individuals include AAR and PAR tuition in their specific soldier curriculum and place a lot of emphasis on learning from past events. This however is not an all corps function and many junior leaders are left short with the skills, knowledge and attributes to facilitate debriefs if required.

12.   AAR or PAR are an important and integral link in identifying training shortfalls and providing a nucleus for discussing the sustainability of the logistical function. The focus is predominately based on performance standards, which enables soldiers to discover for

themselves what happened, why it happened, and how to sustain strengths and improve on weaknesses. AAR, however, are not designed or focused on stresses encountered by individuals and do not aim to identify the emotions in individuals. The AT debrief model is one way of moving aside skill and performance based discussion and focusing on the emotions and thoughts of a team.

13.   The UATL is taught how to conduct debriefs after an event with the intent of minimising stress encountered during adventurous training activities. According to *LWP 7-6 Adventurous Training* (Department of Defence 2011) the aim of the UATL debrief is to "provide a structured environment for personnel to air their thoughts and feelings in relation to the incident and gain perspective". Adventurous Training debriefs provide information on likely reactions to the activity and identify personnel already experiencing or at risk of severe stress reactions. The UATL is educated and skilled in facilitating debriefings and gains a feather in his cap to not only use during AT activities but also in his greater Army career.

FACILITATING A DEBRIEF

14.   The technique and skill involved in identifying the signs and symptoms of operational stress should not be considered a difficult task for junior leaders. The skill however lies in being able to deliver the right questions in the appropriate context and being able to persuade the participants to answer a question with thought and reflection. Simply asking a question with a yes/no response such as "did you feel challenged" could be rephrased to "what was challenging". The use of adverbs such as Why, What, Where, When and How prior or after the core question creates an open ended question that encourages conversation.

15.   A good facilitator should have the skills to gauge the attitude of the debrief and approach it with the intention to moderate discussion as needed. Adler, Castro and McGurk (2009) demonstrate that it is good practice for the facilitator to arm themselves with pre-loaded questions, relevant to the incident. A facilitator must also be skilled in bringing the debrief back into context if it digresses away from the purpose of the discussion. Some examples of keeping a debrief in context are:

a.   "Let's put that subject on the shelf, we might return to it later".

b.   "That's really an important subject, but first I would like to finish this business".

c.   "Bob obviously feels this subject is important, how do others view it?"

16.   These skills are not by any means hard to ascertain and with practice and confidence the technique of facilitating a good debrief could be the environment where an underlying mental illness can first be identified and deferral to clinical professionals can occur in a timely manner.

17.   There are many different documented methods of facilitating a debrief; however, the success of the debrief relies on the facilitator's discretion as to which method best suits the demographic. The imagination required to develop new and interesting methods that engage all participants also presents a challenge to the facilitator, but will subsequently allow for freedom to extract dialogue. Themed debriefs can work in different contexts and with a diversity of participants. Some examples of themed debriefs are:

a.   **Car Parts**: Each member of the team chooses a car part relative to their contribution to the team and discusses why they chose their part. The car is a metaphorical representation of the team and without the full make up of the car it will not perform correctly or to its potential.

b. **Souvenir**: participants each choose a metaphorical souvenir from the scene of the incident. This enhances recall for the entire group as some members may have forgotten integral snippets from the scene which aids in discussion flow.

c. **Three Matchsticks**: Participants are given three matchsticks for use within the debrief, each representing a topic relating to a combat stressor. Each matchstick is struck out at the end of the participants input, thus aiding in expressing emotions.

d. **Six years from now**: Participants are proposed the hypothetical question, "If you meet up with another member of the team in six years from now what do you think you would talk about?" This method allows participants to dislocate themselves from the immediate situation and identifies what issue are significant enough for them to mentally retain.

18.   As a facilitator of a debrief, being prepared and armed with a debriefing theme, ensures that each participant is engaged in the conversation. Once a participant has made a decision based on the theme, they are committed to the group discussion and are relied upon to provide explanation.

19.   Adler et al. (2009) also found that, group debriefing may expose unique benefits that cannot be achieved through one on one debriefing with a medical practioner because "often, as a team talks, the team comforts each other". For example, one participant might be upset he didn't move quickly enough to cover a team member who had been shot. But another team member may have seen the incident and can say, "There's no way you could have made it in time," releasing some of the guilt reactions that inevitably occur.

CONCLUSION

20.   Prevalent in today's Army is the rising concern of operational stress issues relating from both combat and non-combat incidents. Mental health signs and symptoms are more likely to be identified and the associated impact of events minimised at the grass roots by junior leaders. Attempting to combat operational stress at the junior level provides an enabling effect and may allow the team to return to combat effectiveness and return to the fight sooner.

21.   Group debriefing at the lowest level provides a comfortable and conducive environment for soldiers to discuss their emotions and offers an opportunity for soldiers to confide in their peers that may not necessarily be achieved in one on one debriefing with medical professionals. By utilising current doctrine and adopting the skills of current training, facilitating a post incident debrief at the junior level creates an enabling effect throughout the organisation.

22.   The Australian Army's intelligent Junior Leader could offer a prima facie approach in referring their soldiers to medical practioners upon discovery of the signs and symptoms of operational stress. By arming JNCO's with the skills to encourage dialogue and facilitate debriefing at the lowest level the Australian Army is effectively arming its JNCO's with the weaponry to combat operational stress. The investment of skill development is ultimately, readying the organisation to overcome the after effect of the next fight, because after all "Our People are the most valuable asset within Army".

Recommendations

23.   The following measures are recommended to enable the grass root identification of operational stress and aiding in the prevention soldiers mental and emotional degradation

a.   Develop a suitable training framework to achieve the aim of identifying and minimising operational stress through the use of current doctrine.

b.   Implementing a workshop to be facilitated within the All Corps Soldier Training Continuum targeted at the rank levels of PTE to CPL.

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