

Command and Control 3rd Brigade (Reinforced)(ANZUS) and Exercise Talisman Sabre 2017

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) conflates ‘command and control’ into one abbreviated concept: C2. This conflation loses fidelity and clarity in applying command and control as one of the ADF’s six warfighting functions.¹ This paper separates command from control, encouraging both ideas to exist and interact in varied states of cooperation, collaboration and support as well as states of tension, disagreement and, at times, conflict.

This paper is based on a reinforced combat brigade’s command and control experience before and during Exercise Talisman Sabre 2017. The Australian Army designates its three reinforced combat brigades as the Army’s ‘units-of-action’.² These ‘units-of-action’ are habitually commanded by the 1st Australian Division and Deployable Joint Force Headquarters.³

In June and July 2017, 3rd Brigade, participated in the Australian, New Zealand and United States joint and combined Exercise Talisman Sabre at Shoalwater Bay Training Area, in Central Queensland. As an augmented force, 3rd Brigade (Reinforced)(ANZUS) served as the Land Component Command, expanding from its doctrinal eight units and approximately 4,000 people to a formation of 11 battle groups / unit headquarters of approximately 6,300 people.⁴

Exercise Talisman Sabre challenged 3rd Brigade. As an Australian, New Zealand and United States joint and combined force, 3rd Brigade operated against an independent, adaptive and thinking ‘enemy’ based on Australia’s 1st Brigade from Darwin and Adelaide. This ‘enemy’ enabled 3rd Brigade, within Exercise Talisman Sabre, to test its ability command and control force elements in a competitive peer-adversary warfighting environment.

During Exercise Talisman Sabre, and in prior training events, Headquarters 3rd Brigade’s key responsibilities were commanding and controlling ‘where people meet’, or where two or more subordinate units interact, in the battlespace. Constant command and staff diligence is required to support subordinate units in their actions in a complex, lethal and often cluttered battlespace. If a headquarters does not, or cannot, control ‘where people meet’ then their value as a headquarters is questionable.

A combat brigade headquarters, honed through a half-millennium of warfighting, is at its heart a simple organisation.⁵ The headquarters contains a commander and staff. The interactions between these two entities set the tone for brigade leadership, goodwill, capabilities and fighting power.⁶ Both entities have responsibilities. Key among these: *the commander ‘commands’ and the staff ‘control’*.

This paper explores command and control from observing interactions, responsibilities and accountabilities between commanders and staff. Based on 3rd Brigade’s Exercise Talisman Sabre 2017 experience, these observations include:

The commander:

- ~ commands
- ~ provides preliminary guidance

- ~ collaborates
- ~ resets
- ~ processes information

The staff:

- ~ control
- ~ coordinate battle procedure
- ~ manage information priorities
- ~ maintain teams

This paper is designed to inform military professionals as we continue to learn and evolve our understanding and application of command and control.

Command and Control

The commander commands

A commander ‘commands where people meet’, through clear and timely guidance articulating fulsome intent for organisational missions, tasks and purpose. The commander designs succinct orders applying pragmatic combined-arms groupings of, often, high demand-low availability capabilities.

Commanders rehearse their delivery of orders. Commanders deliver orders assuming, due to the chaos, chance, friction and uncertainty of war, they may lose direct contact with subordinate commanders. Therefore, clear commander’s intent, articulated in orders, is vital.

For example, to ensure that subordinate commanders are adequately ‘task-organised and resourced, commanders consider the terrain and its occupation two command levels down and assign tasks one level down’.⁷ This consideration and assignment is articulated when commanders brief using terrain models. Here a commander builds a shared understanding of their intent through describing for the audience decisive terrain, key terrain and relevant control measures.⁸

Commanders carefully and deliberately plan their presence in the battlespace. To ensure clarity and unity of effort, commanders ‘overcommunicate’ their logic and intent, through frequently and deliberately repeating their key themes and requirements to subordinate commanders and staff.

Commanders distinguish between dilemmas and problems, where a dilemma is a difficult choice involving unattractive alternatives and a problem is a situation that must be somehow resolved.⁹ In doing so, commanders enable permissions and allocate resources to support their subordinate commanders achieve tasks that, ultimately, solve both dilemmas and problems.

Commanders lead and enable operational art, which is

... creative thinking used to design campaigns and major operations,
and to organise and employ military force.

... [this thinking] allows commanders and their staffs to better understand the challenges facing them, while visualising and conceptualising approaches to achieving their strategic objectives.¹⁰

Through operational art, commanders link ends, ways, means and risk to achieve a desired objective or outcome. These links require commanders to answer the following questions:

- ~ Ends - What is the military end state that must be achieved, how is it related to the strategic or policy end state, and what objectives must be achieved to enable that end state?
- ~ Ways - What sequence of actions, branches and sequels are most likely to achieve those objectives and the end state?
- ~ Means - What resources are required to accomplish the sequence of actions? What are the culminating points for key resources such as communications, kinetic and non-kinetic fires, logistics and medical support?
- ~ Risk - What is the chance of success, failure or unacceptable consequences in performing the proposed sequence of actions?¹¹

The commander provides preliminary guidance

The commander writes and provides preliminary guidance to staff and subordinate commanders for the execution of operations based on: enemy actions and intent; direction from higher headquarters; their personal understanding of the mission; the battlespace environment; and their professional knowledge and experience.

Preliminary guidance is influenced through a commander's design discourse with their subordinate commanders and planners.¹² Preliminary guidance becomes an extension of the commander's thinking. This is where the commander states their personal commitment to the plan.

An example of a commander's preliminary guidance may include:

- ~ Defining the problem. What is the problem that needs solving? And the corollary, how can your friendly forces create a problem the enemy cannot solve?
- ~ Assumptions – What are anticipated enemy and friendly actions? What resources, freedoms or constraints are evident?
- ~ Conditions – What conditions are necessary before an operation commences? What are the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR)? What must be understood about the enemy locations, friendly force dispositions, terrain and lines of communication? When are critical capabilities, such as communications, fires, logistics and medical assets, ready and/or culminated?
- ~ Unifying ideas – Explain ideas and doctrinal definitions that guide, unite and harmonise the force. Explain the urgency, or not, of the mission. Explain how the mission nests with campaign, strategic or policy objectives. Explain the intended method of operating against the enemy.
- ~ Mission – Write a draft mission for the staff and subordinate commanders to examine and, if necessary, amend.

- ~ Intent – Write a draft intent paragraph, including:
 - ~ Purpose – connects the commander’s intent to the campaign plan
 - ~ Method
 - ~ Defines and assesses the enemy’s centre of gravity. A centre of gravity is the primary capability, or strength, of the enemy (or a friendly force).
 - ~ Articulates the defeat mechanism to weaken, undermine and dismantle the enemy’s centre of gravity.
 - ~ Designs a plan mindful of the enemy’s response to the plan. Deceives the enemy of the main effort so they believe friendly force actions are not what they seem. Ensure timings, intent, force structure, signals emissions, headquarter nodes and friendly critical vulnerabilities are opaque or unknown to the enemy.
 - ~ Defines the enemy targeted by the deception plan which is usually a person or people.¹³ Also defines:
 - ~ methods of deception and how to protect the friendly force centre of gravity.
 - ~ motivations for the deception target(s) to act, confirming their bias in thinking and their preconceived beliefs.
 - ~ methods confusing the deception target(s)’ decisions and obscuring friendly force intentions.
 - ~ tactical tasks for deception actions such as: contain; delay; disrupt; feint; demonstrate; fix; isolate; and, neutralise.¹⁴
 - ~ Includes an operational framework based on lines of operation and initially conceived decisive events.¹⁵
 - ~ End State – postures the force for the next objective, phase, branch or sequel.
- ~ Courses of Action / Schemes of Manoeuvre – Describes options and ideas on how the operation may occur. Courses of action guidance includes, for example:
 - ~ the **main effort** (always bolded)
 - ~ supporting efforts (in priority)
 - ~ key tasks
 - ~ command relationships
 - ~ groupings
 - ~ resources assigned or allocated, including logistics which ‘do not determine the course of action [but] do set the stage for action and its limits, and often will indicate a preferred course of action’.¹⁶
 - ~ the combined-arms reserve
 - ~ preliminary moves and actions
 - ~ priorities
 - ~ phases including measures of performance for phase transitions, branches and sequels
 - ~ requirements for liaison
- ~ Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) – are information requirements identified by the commander as essential in facilitating timely decision making. CCIR doctrinally contain two components: ‘priority intelligence requirements (PIR), which are enemy and environment focussed; and friendly force information requirements (FFIR), which are friendly force and supporting capabilities focussed’.¹⁷
- ~ Estimated Culminating Points – guide the staff to measure and assess key capabilities for duration, conditions, protection and risk. For example, staff

assessments on the maximum distance from the Brigade Support Group to the forward line of own troops before the Torch Battle Management System becomes strained. Staff then design solutions to overcome any capability limitations.

- ~ Assessment – guide the staff, when examining courses of action / schemes of manoeuvre, to methods of assessing options as *FASSD*: feasible, acceptable, suitable, sustainable and distinguishable. *FASSD* guides both enemy and friendly actions and may include considerations for a phase of war (advance, attack, defend or withdraw), mission essential tasks, time constraints and/or resource limitations.
- ~ Wargame guidance – may include selected decisive events,¹⁸ priority intelligence requirements and tactical considerations for tasks assigned. Tasks assigned may include: cover; screen; guard; attack; advance; pursuit; defend; delay; and withdrawal.¹⁹ Finally, commanders guide employment of the three wargaming options: avenue-in-depth; belt; and box.

The commander collaborates

Commanders establish resilient command environments through enabling mission command. This requires commanders to build mutual trust, establish shared understanding, agree prudent risk and encourage disciplined initiative through collaboratively interacting, planning and executing missions with their subordinate commanders and staff.

The 1/3 – 2/3 rule of planning states that commanders may employ one-third of available time until a deadline to make a plan, and then provide their subordinates with the remaining two-thirds of time to develop their own preparations, plans and rehearsals. It is a simple rule of thumb preventing senior commanders from monopolising all time available and pushing their teams into a crisis mode.²⁰ The corollary to the 1/3 – 2/3 rule is the ‘1/3 – 2/3 accelerator’:

If subordinate commanders, or staff, are involved in planning early, either through warning orders, commander-to-commander interaction, or involvement in the actual military appreciation process, then the 1/3 – 2/3 rule exists concurrently and planning concomitantly accelerates. That is, the subordinate’s two-thirds of time commences when engaged early in the planning process by their commander and/or higher headquarters.²¹

Collaboration requires commanders consistently nurturing relationships and conversing purposefully and regularly with other commanders and key staff. This occurs through face to face meetings, by voice, in writing or, less preferably, through a trusted third party. Key commander-to-commander collaborative interactions include:

- ~ Confirmation briefs: occurring immediately after an orders group, acknowledging to the commander a mission, tasks and questions of fact.
- ~ Back briefs: occurring prior to a rehearsal of concept detailing to the commander a mission, task execution and critical information requirements.

Importantly, for collaboration, as noted by the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Angus Campbell, commanders as highly inclusive leaders ‘have an open mindset, a desire to understand how others view and experience the world, and a tolerance for ambiguity’. Noting his approach, General Campbell states:

I try to listen. And I try to understand why someone’s opinion is different from mine. And I think in those two efforts . . . you are both recognising the individual and respecting them, and you’re giving pause to analyse, compare, complement, and question your own beliefs. In trying to understand the difference of opinion, you are giving the project or the initiative you are dealing with space to become better.²²

The commander resets

To maintain their energy, balance, focus and composure, commanders ‘reset’ themselves each day. This ‘reset’ includes maintaining daily discipline of, for example, the 15:7:2 routine. That is balancing work (approximately 15 hours), rest (approximately seven hours), physical training (if possible) and thinking (approximately two hours).

During their thinking time, commanders can ‘reset’ and reorganise their thoughts. They may employ a notebook, computer log or trusted third party to reset, review and prepare guidance, plan interactions with colleagues and their boss, rehearse (and keep rehearsing), and clear their thinking to support and enable the next efforts of staff and subordinate commanders.

The commander processes information

Usually, of course, new information and re-evaluation are not enough to make us give up our intentions: they only call them into question. We now know more, but this makes us more, not less uncertain.²³

Carl von Clausewitz,
On War

Positive, neutral or negative information reflect changing situations confronting the commander and the people they command. A commander’s interaction with information can create inflections, turning points, or decisions causing significant change in operational activities and design. Whether at the time they believe it, or not, commanders need all available information, in whatever form it arrives. Once information is received, the commander chooses how to respond.

Responses to information received by commanders are usefully summarised by Epictetus who stated: ‘it’s not what happens to you, but how you react to it that matters’.²⁴ A commander’s response to information, positive, neutral or negative, sets the tone for staff efforts.

A commander’s measured, balanced, clear-thinking and articulate response to information received elicits the same from staff. A commander’s emotional, unhinged

and muddled response to information received is also reflected in the staff's work to follow. Emphasising this point, Professor Sandra Harding, Vice Chancellor, James Cook University stated that, as a leader, 'you are the best-behaved person in your organisation' and through that behaviour 'you are the difference in your organisation'.²⁵

One key enabler of information for a commander is a named area of interest (NAI) which is a 'point or area along a particular avenue of approach through which enemy activity is expected to occur ... activity or lack of activity within an NAI helps to confirm or deny a particular enemy course of action.'²⁶ When examining NAIs commanders should question the following:

- ~ Are enemy actions in the NAI known or assessed? What is the enemy's disposition and orientation?
- ~ How was the enemy identified? What asset was employed to make the observation? Is the asset persistently identifying the enemy?
- ~ When was the last enemy observation?
- ~ What was the duration of the observation?
- ~ How was the observation reported?
- ~ How do we employ our NAIs to gain and maintain contact with the enemy?

Priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), as one component of CCIRs, are needed by commanders and staff to understand the enemy or the operational environment. PIRs are also associated with 'decisions that critically affect the overall success of the command's mission.'²⁷ Similarly to an NAI, when assessing PIRs the commander requires:

- ~ Conditions affecting the target
- ~ Target characteristics and behaviours
- ~ Effects required
- ~ Systems employed to identify the target
- ~ Status of identifying the target

Finally, in providing staff clarity on information requirements and maximising staff efficiencies and opportunities to rest, commanders agree wake-up criteria, or thresholds of knowledge, with their staff. Depending on the phase of war or operational tempo, wake-up criteria for a commander may include:

- ~ Commander to commander discussions
- ~ A commander's decision point based on the force's changing measures of effectiveness and performance in the battlespace
- ~ Employment of the commander's reserve
- ~ Civil population requirements
- ~ A specified level of personnel or equipment casualties
- ~ High value target opportunities or threats

Command and Control

The staff control

Complementing a commander, the staff ‘control where people meet’ communicating, synchronising and sequencing orders, actions, timings, support and resources to enable the commander’s intent. Battlespace coordination includes defining: areas of operation; deception plans; axis of advance; report lines; objectives; coordination points (including security, timings to open and close the coordination point); boundaries (including operations boxes, restricted fire areas and temporary boundary changes); limits of exploitation; routes; retransmission sites for communications systems, and subordinate unit locations.

Staff control and assess battlespace facts, including: enemy capabilities; timings; meteorological and environmental occurrences; distance; days of supply; people’s readiness and fatigue levels; equipment availability; air hours and rate of effort; weapon ranges; relief in place coordination; passage of lines coordination; and, culmination points.

Staff develop plans, propose changes, allocate staff effort and monitor the plan’s progress. Staff ‘respect the detail’ and ‘respect the difficulties’ of planning.²⁸ Staff cannot rest until they know that subordinate commanders have received necessary guidance and instructions.

Staff represent the commander at subordinate commanders’ orders groups to ensure nesting of ideas between the originating headquarters and the wider organisation. Ultimately, well planned and harmonised orders represent the minutes of a meeting articulating an agreement of people’s ideas.

Enabling ‘where people meet’ requires staff’s early planning and then active fighting for communications. This includes the operations-led *PACE Plan*, articulating Primary, Alternate, Contingency and Emergency methods of communication. Care in staff information collection, fusing, distribution, management and receipt accelerates a shared understanding between commanders at all levels.

A framework for communications, the *PACE Plan*, is a timely and complete method of delivering guidance and instructions to empower subordinate commanders to act within the commander’s intent. In explaining the potential power of well executed *PACE Plans*, Colonel Nick Foxall, Colonel Effects, Headquarters 1st Division and Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, notes that:

... future skills required of our leaders and soldiers are to fight to enable power to our weapons and communications systems.²⁹

For example, enabling an integrated *PACE Plan*, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) is a useful complementary system to Army’s Torch Battle Management System. Through employing both Torch and AFATDS, in support of the *PACE Plan*, a headquarter’s battlespace coordination measures, and other key information, are disseminated with speed and enhanced understanding.

The staff coordinate battle procedure

Based on the commander's preliminary guidance, staff coordinate battle procedure as a well-practiced drill requiring:

- ~ Step 1. Receive the mission and commander's preliminary guidance
- ~ Step 2. Issue a warning order, including specifying when subordinate commanders and/or staffs are required for planning, orders or rehearsals
- ~ Step 3.
 - a. Make a tentative plan, sequence the plan via a synchronisation matrix, identify branches, sequels and phases, assess battlefield geometry, conduct rehearsals, revise drills, and anticipate tasks at all levels including understanding combined arms, coalition, joint and whole of government groupings and capabilities.³⁰
 - b. Revise battle drills including running contingency check lists or 'play-books' to save time. Drills and checklists free commander's and staff's minds for innovation, especially when in contact with the enemy.³¹
 - c. Consider issuing a second warning order.
- ~ Step 4. Start necessary movement, execute concurrent activity.
- ~ Step 5. Support the Commander's reconnaissance.
- ~ Step 6. Complete the plan and dry synchronise the plan's sequence. Record newly identified branches, sequels and phases for subsequent development.
- ~ Step 7. Issue the complete order and conduct a rehearsal of concept. Complete the synchronisation matrix.
- ~ Step 8. Supervise and refine.³²

Reviewing doctrine, lessons from previous operations and historical case studies are important elements of battle procedure. Reviewing doctrine includes our warfighting fundamentals, such as principles of war or operational considerations. As noted by Major General Krause, reviewing the principles of war is important because:

... as humans, our natural instincts are usually the opposite of the ideas espoused in these principles ... therefore, when thinking about planning, we should turn the truism, or principle, upside down to ensure planning completeness and to expose any biases we may hold.³³

Emphasising Major General Krause's point, below are an expansion of the ADF's principles of war. Each principle articulates a perfection which is rarely possible in the chaos, chance, friction and uncertainty of war. Based on lessons from history, the principles of war are reminders for commanders and staff of our aspirations in war. The principles are not slavish boundaries. Nor are they an excuse for rigid thinking. The principle of war are guides to ensure plans are on track based on emergent circumstances.

- ~ Selection and maintenance of the aim – requires a simple, direct, unambiguous and achievable plan. All efforts must continually be directed towards attaining the aim.
- ~ Concentration of force – applies decisive military force at the right place, at the right time and in such a way as to achieve a decisive result.

- ~ Cooperation – sets aside self-interest to collaborate with others and is fundamental to combined arms teams.
- ~ Economy of effort – prudently allocates and applies resources to achieve the desired results. Needs to be balanced with the other principles of war, notably security and sustainment.
- ~ Security – operating effectively with minimal interference from the enemy.
- ~ Offensive action – gaining and retaining the initiative ... action must be swift, decisive and directed toward the achievement of the end state.
- ~ Surprise – Robert Leonhard states that the ‘principle of surprise subsists through the concept that military forces are perpetually unready’ ... [with, for example, military units] ‘moving, resting, planning, resupplying, or conducting combinations of these functions, each of which precludes combat readiness’.³⁴
- ~ Flexibility – adapting plans, countering unforeseen circumstances and ensuring success against friction, unexpected resistance and setbacks, or capitalising on unforeseen opportunities.
- ~ Sustainment – anticipating, planning and command support of logistics requirements.
- ~ Maintenance of morale – realising, as noted by General James Mattis, that military service includes ‘some of the best days of our lives and some of the worst days of our lives. However, service means we are living. It means we’re not sitting on the sidelines... saying, ‘Well, I should have done something with my life.’³⁵

The staff manage information priorities

Daily commander’s update briefs (CUB) are event driven, based on staff analysis and assessment, and not historic narratives of past events. When briefing the CUB, staff articulate what they know, what they don’t know, and what they assess may occur. For completeness, staff commentary during a CUB categorises information as:

- ~ If known – confirm the source
- ~ If reported – confirm source & reliability
- ~ If assessed – by whom?

Staff report accurately. Guessing information when briefing a commander is a gamble, not a risk. Risk is usually articulated as risk to mission, force and/or force reputation. In contrast, a gamble is altogether distinguishable from risk, as noted by General Erwin Rommel:

A bold operation [with risk] is one in which success is not a certainty but which in case of failure leaves one with sufficient forces in hand to cope with whatever situation may arise. A gamble, on the other hand, is an operation which can lead either to victory or to the complete destruction of one's force.³⁶

Prudent questioning of staff during CUBs by commanders enables their distinguishing between risks and gambles. This questioning includes commanders understanding and articulating risk appetite, thresholds, controls, tolerance, treatment, transfer, equities, opportunity cost and information requirements.³⁷

At the conclusion of each CUB a commander sets, agrees or reaffirms priorities with the staff. These priorities are apportioned to current, future and plans staffs and may include:

- ~ Current operations staff: controlling the current phase of operations, through warning orders and fragmentary orders, perhaps to 96 hours in line with the next air tasking order cycle.
- ~ Future operations staff: defining and measuring the force's effectiveness and performance in the current phase. Measures of effectiveness assess *why* decisions are required. Measures of performance assess *what* metrics are needed to ensure correct decisions. The future operations staff produce warning orders and fragmentary orders supporting commander's decision points (such as deployment of the formation reserve), initiating branch, sequel and phase changes or assigning new tasks.

Importantly for the future operations staff, the reserve is the means by which the commander can decisively influence the battle, flexibly react to unforeseen developments, reinforce success and seize opportunities. The more obscure a situation the bigger and stronger the reserve. The reserve must be a combined-arms force capable of performing the widest range of battlefield functions. The reserve should be prepared to engage in the current action but its most important task is preparing for the next action. Once the reserve is committed, a new reserve is immediately designated.³⁸

- ~ Plans staff: designing and planning the next phase. This includes agreeing a plan-to-plan with the commander, thereby ensuring the commander's intimate leadership of the military appreciation planning process. Following and supporting the military appreciation planning process are the new operational order, dry synchronisation, orders group, and rehearsal of concept. A key output from the plans staff are relevant warning orders ensuring a shared understanding between the headquarters and subordinate commanders and their staffs.

The staff maintain teams

A small headquarters, supported by a commander's intent and operational vision, enables staff *coup d'oeil* that is described by Clausewitz as an 'inner light, which lead to the truth', and translating as 'glance' in French. *Coup d'oeil* is recognised as 'intuition which comes from real knowledge and experience, brought together in a flash of insight to suit the situation'.³⁹ In achieving staff *coup d'oeil*, a small headquarters aligns quickly and engenders cooperation.

In small headquarters, people cannot stand idle while others are busy. Depending on staff efforts required, this means that normally specialist staff will multiskill to perform generalised staff functions to assist their colleagues. In a small headquarters, staff feel a sense of responsibility to help because, due to *coup d'oeil*, they gain a shared understanding of operational needs. In small headquarters, staff see and sense key issues fused in the one place - usually a single room or tent.

Friction can and does occur between staff on a small headquarters but, by necessity, tends to dissipate or resolve itself more quickly than a larger complex headquarters. In a small headquarters, if people cannot work together staff fractures rapidly occur. These fractures must be resolved equally rapidly, otherwise a small headquarters ceases to function.

Complementing their commander, a small headquarters must maintain their energy, balance, focus and composure. Like a commander, staff should seek a daily discipline of, for example, the 15:7:2 routine.

Conclusion

Leading the Australian Army's 'unit-of-action', the reinforced combat brigade headquarters contains a commander and staff. The interactions between these two entities set the tone for brigade leadership, goodwill, capabilities and fighting power. Both have responsibilities. Key among these: *the commander 'commands' and the staff 'control'*.

Based on Headquarters 3rd Brigade's command and control experience before and during Exercise Talisman Sabre 2017, this paper informs our professional understanding of command and control.

Key themes identified in this paper include the commander: commanding; providing preliminary guidance; collaborating; resetting; and processing information. In support of the commander, the staff: control the formation; coordinate battle procedure; manage information priorities; and maintain teams.

By separating command from control, this paper examines the roles of a commander and staff in executing a brigade headquarter's key responsibility of commanding and controlling 'where people meet', or where two or more subordinate units interact in the battlespace. Ultimately, constant command and staff diligence is required in supporting subordinate units perform effectively in a complex, lethal and often cluttered battlespace.

Chris Field serves in the Australian Army. He has commanded at each level from platoon, company, battalion, brigade to joint task force. His combat deployments include East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, he deployed twice on Australian disaster relief operations, and on peacekeeping operations to the Middle East and Solomon Islands. His interests include leadership, strategy and innovation.

Endnotes:

¹ Six Warfighting functions are: Intelligence (or *Know* in Australian doctrine); Command and Control (or *Adapt* in Australian doctrine and Mission Command in US Army doctrine); Movement and Manoeuvre (or *Strike* in Australian doctrine); Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires (or *Shape* in Australian doctrine); Logistics (or *Sustain* in Australian doctrine); and, Force Protection (or *Shield* in Australian doctrine).

United States Marine Corps, Marine Air Ground Force Staff Training Program (MSTP), Pamphlet 5-0.4, *The MAGTF Officer's Guide*, Quantico, Virginia, March 2010, p. 22

<<https://cdet.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/pid-1223794-dt-content-rid->

[190316_1/orgs/CSCDEP_Content_Library_AY14/AY%2017%20CourseMaterials/Full%20Publication_s/MSTP%20Pamphlet%205-0.4%20MAGTF%20Officer%27s%20Guide%20%282010%29.pdf](https://www.army.gov.au/sites/g/files/net1846/f/lwd_3-0-3_formation_tactics_interim.pdf)> [accessed 18 August 2017]

Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Army), Land Warfare Doctrine, LWD 3-0-3, *Formation Tactics*, 2016, p. 10 <https://www.army.gov.au/sites/g/files/net1846/f/lwd_3-0-3_formation_tactics_interim.pdf> [accessed 18 August 2017]

Headquarters United States Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0 - Mission Command*, Washington, DC, 28 March 2014, p. 1-4

<http://www.apd.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/adrp6_0.pdf> [accessed 18 August 2017]

² Department of Defence, Australian Army, *Plan Beersheba - Under Plan Beersheba our Army continues to modernise in order to remain equipped and prepared for new and emerging threats*, 15 June 2017 <<https://www.army.gov.au/our-future/modernisation-projects/plan-beersheba/plan-beersheba>> [accessed 06 September 2017]

³ Department of Defence, Australian Army, *1st Division*, 13 December 2016

<<https://www.army.gov.au/our-people/units/1st-division>> [accessed 06 September 2017]

⁴ 3rd Brigade's 11 Battle Group / Unit Headquarters included: Battle Group Eagle; Battle Group Coral; Battle Group Samichon; Battle Group Cannan; Task Group Black (NZ); Battle Group Gimlet (US Army); Battle Group Pegasus; 4th Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery; 3rd Combat Engineer Regiment; 3rd Combat Signals Regiment; 3rd Combat Service Support Battalion leading the Brigade Support Group.

⁵ Brigade (n.) "subdivision of an army," 1630s, from French brigade "body of soldiers" (14c.), from Italian brigata "troop, crowd, gang," from brigade "brawl, fight," from briga "strife, quarrel," perhaps of Celtic (compare Gaelic brigh, Welsh bri "power"), from PIE root *gwere- (2) "heavy." Or perhaps from Germanic. *Online Etymology Dictionary*, <<http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=brigade>> [accessed 18 August 2017]

⁶ Martin van Creveld, *Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945*, Praeger; Reprint edition, 2007, pp. 3 & 170. Martin Van Creveld asserts that 'within the limits set by its size, an army's worth as a military instrument equals the quality and quantity of its equipment multiplied by its Fighting Power'. He defines Fighting Power as: ...*resting on mental, intellectual, and organisational foundations... manifesting, in one combination or another, as discipline and cohesion, morale and initiative, courage and toughness, the willingness to fight and the readiness, if necessary, to die ... Fighting Power, in brief, is defined as the sum total of mental qualities that make armies fight.*

⁷ LWD 3-0-3, *Formation Tactics*, *Op Cit.*, p. 108

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 108. Use of terrain. When formulating the plan, the commander must evaluate, in relation to the mission, all of the key terrain in the assigned area of operations; some of this key terrain is designated as decisive terrain. It is only by assessing the relative importance of areas of key terrain first, and then eliminating the less important, that a commander can make a sound judgment about the decisive terrain. Decisive terrain and key terrain are relative to the level of command. What is decisive terrain to a forward battle group commander may only be key terrain to the formation commander. Therefore, it is important that the higher tactical commander clearly states which ground is considered to be the decisive terrain and key terrain. To ensure that immediate subordinates are adequately task-organised and resourced, commanders should consider the terrain and its occupation two command levels down and assign tasks one level down.

⁹ The Mayfield Handbook of Technical and Scientific Writing, *Dilemma/Problem* <http://www.mit.edu/course/21/21_guide/dilemma.htm> [accessed 18 August 2017]

¹⁰ United States Department of Defense, *Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning*, Washington, D.C., 2011, p. I-5

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. III-1 – III-2

¹² MSTP, Pamphlet 5-0.4, *The MAGTF Officer's Guide*, *Op Cit.*, p. 28

¹³ LWD 3-0-3, *Formation Tactics*, *Op Cit.*, p. 168. Deception - Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to their interests.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 23 – 29, p. 168 Delay: A form of retrograde in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without becoming decisively engaged. Disrupt: cause the enemy to break up their formation and tempo. Feint: An offensive tactical technique involving contact with the adversary conducted for the purpose of deceiving the adversary about the location and/or time of the actual main offensive action. The feint is an offensive technique involving actual contact with enemy. It is this contact that distinguishes a feint from a demonstration. Demonstration: an attack or show of force, without contacting the enemy,

and usually forms a part of an overall deception plan. **Fix:** A tactical task in which a commander prevents the enemy from moving any part of their force from a specific location for a specific period. The fixing force must prevent the enemy from moving in any direction.

Isolate: seal off. Both physically and psychologically, and enemy from their sources of support, deny them freedom of movement and present them having contact with other enemy forces. **Neutralise:** tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable of interfering with a particular operation.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 168. **Decisive Event:** major events or effects that are a precondition to the successful disruption or negation of an enemy's centre of gravity.

¹⁶ Huston, James A., *The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775–1953*, Center of Military History, U.S. Army, Washington, DC, 1966, p. 424

¹⁷ United States Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7, *Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper*, Suffolk, Virginia, 3rd Edition, July 2013, p. 1 <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/fp/fp_ccirs.pdf> [accessed 18 August 2017]

¹⁸ LWD 3-0-3, *Formation Tactics, Op Cit.*, p. 168. **Decisive Event:** major events or effects that are a precondition to the successful disruption or negation of an enemy's centre of gravity.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 16-18

²⁰ Velaction Continuous Improvement, 2009-2016 <<http://www.velaction.com/one-third-two-thirds-planning-rule/>> [accessed 18 August 2017]

²¹ Major General Michael Krause to author during Exercise Talisman Sabre, Shoalwater Bay Training Area, July 2017

²² Juliet Bourke & Bernadette Dillon, *The six signature traits of inclusive leadership - Thriving in a diverse new world*, Deloitte University Press, 14 April 2016 <<https://dupress.deloitte.com/dup-us-en/topics/talent/six-signature-traits-of-inclusive-leadership.html>> [accessed 18 August 2017]

²³ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 1976, p. 102

²⁴ Epictetus, Translated by P.E. Matheson. Illustrated by Hans Erni, *The Discourses of Epictetus*, Berne, The Limited Editions Club, 1966.

<<https://www.davidbrassrarebooks.com/pages/books/03676/epictetus-limited-editions-club-hans-erni-illustrator-p-e-matheson/discourses-of-epictetus-the>> [accessed 18 August 2017]

²⁵ Professor Sandra Harding, Vice Chancellor, James Cook University, *Summary of Proceedings North Queensland Women's Leadership Forum*, Townsville, Australia, 08 Aug 17

²⁶ Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*, Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C., 2010, Glossary p. 6 <<https://www.mca-marines.org/files/MCWP%205-1%20MCP.pdf>> [accessed 18 August 2017]

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Glossary p. 7

²⁸ Major General Fergus McLachlan, Commander Forces Command, to author during Exercise Talisman Sabre, Shoalwater Bay Training Area, July 2017

²⁹ Colonel Nick Foxall to author during Exercise Talisman Sabre, Shoalwater Bay Training Area, July 2017

³⁰ US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, US Joint Publication 1-02. **Synchronisation** –The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.

LWD 3-0-3, *Formation Tactics, Op Cit.*, p. 169. **Synchronisation** - The arrangement of related and mutually supporting actions in time, space and purpose to maximise their combined intended effects.

³¹ Major General Michael Krause to author during Exercise Talisman Sabre, Shoalwater Bay Training Area, July 2017

³² Army Study Guide, *Army Board Study Guide - Troop Leading Procedures*, 1999 - 2017 QuinStreet, Inc. <http://www.armystudyguide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/survival/troop-leading-procedures-3.shtml> [accessed 18 August 2017]

³³ Major General Michael Krause to author during Exercise Talisman Sabre, Shoalwater Bay Training Area, July 2017

³⁴ Robert R. Leonhard, *Fighting by Minutes: Time and the art of war*, Praeger; First Edition, 1994, p. 136

³⁵ LWD 3-0-3, *Formation Tactics, Op Cit.*, pp. 21-23

³⁶ C. Peter Chen, *World War II Data Base, General Erwin Rommel*, Lava Development, 2004-2017 <http://ww2db.com/person_bio.php?person_id=4> [accessed 18 August 2017]

³⁷ Based on the author's notes from the Defence Senior Executive Service / Star Rank Professional Development Program, Enterprise Risk Management, Canberra, 29 August 2017

³⁸ LWD 3-0-3, *Formation Tactics, Op Cit.*, p. 35

³⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *Op Cit.*, p. 102