Q&A
Leadership
Instructor tips
Army in motion
Post Activity Reports
Night without batteries

Serving our Nation
Foreword

Army Lessons conducted a *Smart Soldier* survey earlier this year. 533 Army members responded and provided invaluable guidance as to the strengths and weaknesses of this publication, as well as preferred themes, distribution considerations and feedback on Quick Decision Exercises (QDEs). The 533 respondents were distributed across all ranks with mostly Diggers responding, and all corps being represented.

Overall, 94% of soldiers were aware of Smart Soldier, with 76% reading all or a part of it and a further 38% used the QDEs.

When asked what types of articles soldiers would like to read, the following feedback was offered:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Historic lessons</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New capabilities</td>
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Army Lessons will be using as many of the suggestions from this survey as possible, such as the idea of a Q&A with soldiers. For a summary of the survey results send an email to army.lessons@defence.gov.au.

**RFI:** We have been asked to produce a ‘101 uses of the toggle rope’ article. We have collected about 40 ideas so far.

Please share any ideas you have with army.lessons@defence.gov.au. The best legitimate submission will get a military history book.
Many historical experiences highlight the advantages that a force can gain at night and recent operational experiences validate this claim. Night vision goggles (NVG) are an aid that have greatly assisted our ability to 'own the night'. However, this advantage has been significantly eroded in recent years with near peer and asymmetric adversaries increasing their NFE capability with military and commercial off the shelf (COTS) systems. We must therefore master training, techniques and procedures of the night, including our ability to do so without night aids. This article has sourced a number of training notes and lessons from World War I and World War II. They are provided as considerations for a back-up option and do not replace the gains from having NVGs.

**Vision in night combat**

Soldiers who can use their eyes in the dark have an immense advantage over an enemy that is not so well-trained. Once we are accustomed to working in the dark, it is surprising how much we can see even on the darkest night. It requires practise and some knowledge of how the eyes work in the dark. Without knowledge or practice of advanced night viewing techniques, we instinctively continue to adopt normal night viewing practices.

**Night observation theory**

From a purely physical point of view, seeing by day and seeing by night are as different as seeing and hearing. Inside our eyes are two completely different sets of nerve endings, both sensitive to light and the means by which we see. One set are called 'cones', which we use by day, and the other are called 'rods', which we use only at night. Rods are activated about an hour and a half after sunset (or at half-moonlight); when it is brighter than this the rods are dazzled and cannot see, and the cones do the work. Owls and cats have rods only; hens have only cones; human beings have both, but living largely by day and using artificial light by night we tend only to be expert in using the cones. Rods behave differently and require different treatment.

"Nearly everything we did was at night, so it was no surprise that we got very good at nocturnal operations, with the technological advantage of the NVGs. All the same, they required a lot of training to work with."

CPL Mark Donaldson, VC from his book The Crossroad.
**Dark adaptation**

Our day eyes, on moving from sunlight to subdued lighting indoors, require only a few seconds to adapt themselves to less light. But the change-over from light to darkness is far more drastic; our night eyes take over and only become fully accustomed to the dark after half an hour or more. At first, we can see nothing at all, and then our eyesight gradually improves. Even after three quarters of an hour there may be progressive improvements, but most of the gain is achieved within that first half-hour. At dark this process keeps pace with the failing light and no special precautions are needed. But when we move from a light area to dark area, it will take approximately 20 to 30 minutes before we can see as effectively as a soldier who has been in the dark the whole time. Once adapted our eyes are extraordinarily sensitive, for example, to see a match struck some distance away.

Images

**Top:** Shell fire and flares towards Pozieres. The pinpoints are bursts of shrapnel. The curved lines show the effect on the negative of Verey lights sent up by the Germans from front line trenches to illuminate an area where a raid is expected.

**Middle:** An armed soldier guarding supplies intended for transport to Australian units overseas.

**Right:** An infantry attack with fixed bayonets during night manoeuvres at a training camp.

Full dark adaptation is easily destroyed by any light we see; a flash from a torch or headlamp, reading a map by torch light, flares and gun flash, interior or instrument lighting in a vehicle. Many soldiers never give their dark adaptation a chance to become complete and so never realise how sensitive the eye can become in the dark.

Remember these rules:

- Once it is night, allow yourself, or your soldiers, sufficient time for dark adaptation to be applied before going out on a night patrol, driving without lights, training at night and so on.

- Reduce illuminated areas and only briefly look at them if you have to. For example, let your torch shine through a chink in your fingers.
• Preserve dark adaptation by avoiding to look at lights unnecessarily, and try not to see them accidentally. For example in the diagram above, shielding your eyes from lights will allow you to see beyond the lights more easily.

• If you have to look at a lit area, protect the dark adaptation of one eye by keeping it shut. (This was the old sea-captain’s trick when he moved from his bridge to the charthouse). For example, read a map with one eye, and learn to keep one eye shut instinctively whenever a bright light goes by.

Each side would send out patrols at night. I had to go out every alternate night on patrol. The Germans would go past us so close we could have killed them as we crawled on our stomachs on patrol. And in the fog which rolled in from the sea it was easy to mistake a person. But it was no use our shooting them, because it was the patrol’s job to go out further to stir them up, and learn where their positions were. We’d give a couple of blasts and watch the Germans fire back. That way you’d know at night where the enemy would be.

PTE Querruell, 2/32 Battalion

Method of looking
During the day our eyes see best by looking directly at an object and can search for targets rapidly. At night, our eyes notice the presence of objects better by looking a little to one side of them. This is because the cones are crowded in the centre of the eye and the rods which we use at night are crowded out of the centre and form a ring round it. The most sensitive part of the eye at night is a few degrees off the direct line of sight, and there is a blind spot in the centre. We should therefore, ‘aim off’ by about 150 mils, or a fist’s width at arm’s length. Find which direction suits you best, to one side, or below. If you look directly at what you wish to see you may never see it. Confidence and practice is required to resist the temptation to look directly at an object “to make sure it is there”.

The rods also tire rapidly, meaning if you stare in the same direction for a period of time, objects which were at first visible begin to fade after about ten seconds and may disappear completely. Shift your eyes and they reappear. When rods in one part of the eye grow tired; shifting your gaze calls others into action. Our ability to see at night seems to wax and
wane, since the sensitivity of the eye varies from moment to moment. An object may be clear one moment and then begin to fade the next. Time must be taken to make sure if it is really there.

During the night our eyes take time to soak up what little light there is, so it is no use scanning quickly. By day you can cover an area in a series of close, fairly rapid sweeps, examining each little detail systematically. At night move your eyes to a series of more widely spaced positions and look for a few seconds in each direction, paying attention to areas which you are not looking at directly. If you think you see something, do not look straight at it, but look a little to one side, giving it a few seconds to appear.

Remember these rules:

- Do not look directly at the object but aim off with your eyes.
- Do not stare fixedly.
- When observing, take time.
- Rest your eyes for ten seconds every two minutes.

Experienced troops in a small group stand a good chance of going to ground in the one to two seconds it takes for the first flare to rise before it bursts and, if caught standing or crouching, will freeze. Before the eyes become accustomed to the light, the enemy can only pick up movement. Therefore, if none is detected, either no more flares will be fired or there may be a few seconds before another is sent up. If movement is seen flares will be kept in the air continuously and one is really in trouble.

Images on left

Top: Night brings no respite to the artillery in the desert battle. Throughout the hours of darkness, 25-pounder guns blaze away at the enemy.

Middle: Tobruk, Libya. The sky as it appeared at night when exploding shells, bullets and tracers created these effects.

Bottom: Engineers filling in a shell crater made in the roadway during a mock night attack.

At night time, sniping and machine gun fire on fixed lines occurred spasmodically, making the track back to battalion over the escarpment hazardous. One night on the return trip, carrying food and a large billy of tea, one of the numerous tracer bullets flying about, rose from the ground in the distance, climbed to its maximum height and descended. In the half second it took to rise, the bullet moved neither left nor right and I knew it was headed directly for me. With the familiar sharp crack of the supersonic bullet it passed within inches of me at waist height.

SSGT Perversi, 2/32 Battalion

More examples and tips are provided on the appearance of objects. Send an email to army.lessons@defence.gov.au to request copies of these.
Night tactics in World War I

Delville Wood had been taken and retaken 3 times when we reached there and as no dead had been buried the sight was most gruesome. It was worst at night time when a man was on SOS guard duty. One seemed to be all alone with the dead and in the half light or dark they appeared to move if one kept his eyes fixed on one spot for any length of time. Anything will appear to move at night time and I remember firing my rifle into a stump at night. I could have sworn it was a hun bending over our telephone line.

GNR W Duffell, 1st Australian Field Artillery Brigade

During WW1 the conditions of modern warfare indicated the training of a soldier to work efficiently under cover of darkness was a matter of ever-growing importance. This was particularly the case due to the improved accuracy of observation from aircraft and the increased danger of surprise effects obtained by machine guns and automatic rifles firing from positions prepared in anticipation.

A force not thoroughly well-trained in night work will suffer three times the number of casualties suffered by a force of corresponding size, in which training in work by night has been systematic and thorough.¹

Training of vision
Two or three soldiers, under an instructor, would be taken out to familiar ground in the night. The instructor would then direct them to notice the different appearance which objects present at night and expose them to a range of visibility, such as:

- viewing objects at different degrees of light and shade
- comparing the visibility of men under different conditions of dress
- viewing objects against different backgrounds
- viewing the ease with which bright objects are seen, especially if in movement.

If there was rising ground in the vicinity, the difference in the visibility of men standing on the skyline or on the sides of the slope would be noted. Experiments about visibility in the distance would also be made. For example, in the distance, strike a match in the open. Blank cartridges would be fired, and recruits taught to judge the direction in which the rifle was pointing and its approximate distance from them.

Training of hearing
To train their powers of hearing, soldiers, placed a few yards apart, would be made to guess what caused a noise and the approximate position of it. The rattle of a mess tin, the working of the bolt of a rifle, the movement of a patrol, the throwing down of accoutrements, low talking, or any noise likely to be heard on outposts were utilised. Special pains were taken to impress upon the soldiers the penetrating power of the human voice. The distance at which soldiers talking, even in a low voice, could be heard on a still night was astonishing, and as it is a sound which cannot be mistaken for anything else, and which disturbs birds and animals more than any other, it was most important that the recruit would be shown the absolute necessity of keeping perfect silence.

At this stage, it was good practice to post the soldiers in pairs at intervals along an alignment which the instructors endeavoured to cross unnoticed. The instructors would cross from both sides, so as to compel the recruits to watch in every direction.

¹ Training pamphlet, PR85/293 MAJ Cole
Finding bearings
When the recruit was accustomed to the dark, and entirely overcome their nervousness, they would be taught to find their bearings by the Southern Cross. The recruit would check the direction of their advance by means of stars, landmarks, and even the wind, and conversely, by the same means, find their way back to the point from which they started.

To test a soldier’s ability to keep a given direction when moving at night, the following plan was useful. Having chosen a spot from which no prominent landmarks are visible, the instructor, accompanied by the recruit, would advance towards it from a distance of not less than 200 paces. While advancing, the recruit took his bearings. On arriving at the spot chosen the instructor would turn the recruit rapidly round two or three times, and then order the recruit to continue to advance on the same line as before.

Observing the moon phases and constellations
An elementary knowledge of the names and positions of the principal constellations and stars was very useful in night work. Without such knowledge, there would often be difficulty in pointing out the particular star chosen for the column to march on, and any mistake may have serious consequences. The Manual of Map Reading and Field Sketching 1912 states that the lateral movement of a star will not exceed 90 mils (5°) in 20 minutes and that it is safe to march for about a quarter of an hour on the same star.²

A rough knowledge of the moon phases enables soldiers to estimate approximately the duration of moonlight. When the new moon is first seen, it rises in the morning and sets about sunset. But its hours of rising and setting become later each day, and by the time it reaches its first quarter, the moonlight lasts from about sunset to midnight. At full moon, the moonlight lasts all night. When the moon begins to wane, and its hour of rising becomes later than the hour of sunset, there is a daily increasing period of darkness between sunset and moonrise. Consequently, when the moon is growing, moonlight may be expected in the early hours of the night, but after the last quarter not till after midnight.

² A World War II pamphlet said that a star with a bearing about two degrees less than the compass course should be selected, and it will serve as a guide for half an hour.
Night tactics in World War II

While building up your dark adaptation, grudge every bit of light you have to see, and once you have it, preserve it jealously from light.

‘How to use your eyes in the dark’
Medical Research Council Laboratory

Japanese tips
Camouflage was used at night to prevent reflections of moonlight and to disguise the silhouette of the figure to make identification more difficult.

In scanning for enemy soldiers, it was advisable to look upward from a lower position in order to silhouette them against the sky. Soldiers on patrol would occasionally lie down on the ground and scan all directions for suspicious objects.

The visibility range at night, when the moon was not covered by cloud, differs greatly according to whether the observer faces the moon or has the moon behind, and the surface of the surrounds. For example, the following results of experiments conducted on the visibility range by well-trained soldiers at the Japanese Infantry School are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground and background</th>
<th>Starlit night</th>
<th>12th day from the full moon (crescent)</th>
<th>15th Day of the moon (full)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single soldier</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level, grassy ground</td>
<td>25m</td>
<td>30m</td>
<td>75m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level, bare ground</td>
<td>30m</td>
<td>30m</td>
<td>50m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dark background</td>
<td>10m</td>
<td>10m</td>
<td>15m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silhouetted against the sky</td>
<td>35m</td>
<td>130m</td>
<td>180m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further, the Japanese used ‘noise’ as an effective weapon. Sounds like weapons firing could be heard at times some miles within the Australian lines. HQ and troops in the vicinity immediately assumed the enemy had infiltrated to their locality and threatened them.

Reconnaissance and preparation
It is ideal for the plan to be made well ahead, and for the attack to be rehearsed both by day and by night, but time will seldom be available, and many night attacks will have to be quickly staged.

Aim at giving all commanders down to platoon level an opportunity to observe the ground by both by day and night, but recce after an unsuccessful or incomplete action will be extremely difficult. Make full use of maps and air photos to supplement an incomplete recce.

Patrols must be active before an attack to ascertain enemy dispositions and dominate the ground. Enemy may have changed from day to night dispositions. Forming up positions must be covered by sentries or by patrols.

Surprise is essential to success, therefore ensure secrecy. Take care nothing puts the enemy on the alert.

Tired troops will rarely succeed in a night attack.

Noisy attack
An orchestrated Fire Plan arranged on a timed programme may include concentration on various locations on line of attack as well as others off the flanks and beyond the objective.

It must be clearly laid down how long fire is to last, and whether concentrations can be repeated, and if so, on what signal and for how long.
It may sometimes be advantageous to do the first part of the advance in silence, bringing down support fire at a later stage on a timed programme.

Whatever form of attack is adopted, there should be no shooting or shouting by assaulting infantry. Bayonets should be fixed and blackened or dulled by mud.

One can see sufficiently to move slowly and carefully, counting footsteps and noting changes of direction, even on dark nights, but to detect other people moving before they detect you it is essential to stop frequently, lie on the ground and identify any other objects by sky-lining them. It is also essential to be silent. Strangely enough, some German patrols had been ambushed through being heard chatting!

SSGT Perversi, 2/32 Battalion

Shooting by sense of direction
Under conditions where the pistol is likely to be of value, you should use ‘smash and grab tactics’. Frequently, during night combat, you will not have a clear target – you may see a formless bulk close to you in a dim light, a sudden noise in your vicinity, or a fleeting glimpse of the enemy. Steady, deliberate aiming for service shooting may be out of the question because you may not get that type of target during night attacks. Many things are happening simultaneously and in bad light conditions (for example, in the dark, in smoke or in fog). Often, it is a case of ‘point and squeeze’. That is all you have time for, and if you have practised sufficiently you will be pointing in the correct direction and squeezing at the same time.

SSGT Perversi, 2/32 Battalion

World War II Lessons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essentials for success</th>
<th>Tips from experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simple plan</td>
<td>Silence gives surprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best possible reconnaissance</td>
<td>Silence is the result of patience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thorough preparation</td>
<td>Noise invites destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detailed orders</td>
<td>Grenades and knives are weapons of the night</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolute leadership</td>
<td>Sounds from the enemy can be intended to break your silence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

It was very easy to get lost under desert conditions, to walk in a circle instead of straight ahead. To overcome this problem one chose a suitable star and walked towards it. Most movement within the area was done at night as the enemy monitored all our movements in daylight.

PTE Hurst, 2/7 Battalion

Conclusion

Something that has not changed over the years is the purpose of movements in darkness or in obscurity to conceal preparations and thereby achieve maximum surprise and effect. Another important consideration is that night combat can help to reduce the casualty rate. This article provided historical lessons from World War I and World War II that can provide useful tips for today’s soldier.

Want to read more?
Many training programs were found in the historical publications. For copies of these or a list of the publications sourced to write this article send an email to: army.lessons@defence.gov.au.

For contemporary doctrine on night operations and navigation, go to Doctrine Online: http://drnet/Army/Doctrine-Online/Pages/Home.aspx
Use of Training Aids
During the delivery of a formal lesson, be it a drill lesson on a parade ground or a theory lesson in the classroom, the use of training aids can increase the standard of a lesson exponentially. The most common fault with the use of training aids, is that the RI does not understand how to employ them or use them to their full potential.

For example – if when delivering a theory lesson in a classroom, the RI is not using a cordless ‘clicker’ or laser pointer and has to return to or stand at the lectern to use the mouse for a 40 minute PowerPoint lesson, this will hinder the instructor’s ability to engage with the class through being able freely move around the classroom.

In a field lesson, the RI may have a large picture of a set of binoculars but not fully understand the use of the graticules within the left monocular to judge distances. During the lesson, they may get asked questions with regards to the picture and will not be able to explain it properly.

Likewise, if the RI is using training aids during a lesson and does have a reasonable understanding of the item being used (ie, how to employ it) but lacks an in-depth working knowledge on the item then they will be unable to answer all questions. Again, this does not achieve the level of competence that we ideally want instructors to have.

For example – if when delivering a weapon lesson, the RI has a sectionalised LSW to enhance the content of the lesson and gets asked a question about how certain parts of the weapon work, the RI may understand the lesson and weapon in basic form in order to deliver the lesson but not enough information on the training aid to enhance the lesson further.
The Field Training Cell would be the first point of contact in regard to loaning out or making up platoon field lesson stores, including ‘slap ups’.

STP will provide guidance to RTC staff on lesson delivery, the use of training aids and what may or may not add to/detract from their lesson. Open lines of communication between RTC and STP staff has greatly assisted with this.

Knowledge of Lesson Content

Having knowledge of a particular lesson subject (ie, a section attack), and knowing the teaching points and the content of the lesson itself (ie, stages of the attack) can be two very different things. STP has observed numerous times during lesson assessments that RIs will know the EF88 or LSW from their job trades and various experiences, but they will have a limited deeper understanding of the weapon system.

Tip 1: Training aids are used to put complex things into perspective. Understand the training aid being used and employ it to its best ability in order to enhance the lesson.

Tip 2: Training aids, when used in the right context and when the instructor has a good understanding, will not only enhance the lesson but will also take off some of the teaching pressure of the lesson and enable a better result for the learners.

Tip 3: When utilising training aids, such as a display board, the RI needs to ensure that there is a clear view for the recruits to see what is been taught. In regards to the size of these boards and so on, these items are pre-positioned within the training areas and are regularly maintained by the Field Training Cell.

Tip 4: When delivering a field lesson and using a whiteboard or similar item, the RI will deliver the lesson using ‘slap ups’, magnetic or adhesive strips detailing the heading of the teaching point and then expand on that topic. The RI should only have the relevant teaching point topics up on the board in order to teach it. Good practice would be not to have more than five ‘slap ups’ up on the board, as more than this becomes too distracting to the learners. When moving on to a new teaching point, remove all previous ‘slap ups’ and close off that teaching point.
Tip 5: RIs need to continually read the relevant publications/doctrine in regard to the lesson content, understand the LMP and the required Subject Learning Outcome for that lesson. RIs need to continually learn their instructional trade while posted to 1 RTB and seek professional development. This will aid them in the delivery of their lesson and enhance their own skill and knowledge. Instructors are also encouraged to sit in on other lessons given by either the Pl SGT or another member of their platoon or company. Even RI never stop learning.

1 RTB is a posting in which you will continually need to learn and improve on your ability to instruct, mentor and lead.

Command and Control (C2)

It has been observed that when new RIs are confronted with a section of up to 15 recruits for their first formal lesson (normally a drill lesson), it can be overwhelming to the point where staff can lose C2. This can also happen within the barracks or out in the field environment. Normally this will occur during the RTC staff’s first platoon within the ‘raise period’ (first two weeks). As time goes on, the RI gains more experience and time in front of the recruits, which in turn greatly assists with their confidence. C2 does not only apply to the Sect Comd level, but for Pl SGTs and Pl Comds that may have very limited command experience and may find it overwhelming at first.

Tip 6: Exposure to recruits and recruit training will not only build a leader’s confidence to command, but also their ability to instruct at a higher standard. The more exposure to recruit training, by ‘driving’ (marching) a platoon around the area and taking command in barracks, the better it will be for the newer RIs. It will allow them to grow their confidence by knowing their job, seeking assistance from their peers, superiors and Training Support Company, and maintaining their physical fitness.

Time Management

Time management during lessons is a big factor in the delivery of a lesson. Each teaching point or stage needs to have appropriate time allocated in order to allow enough time for the recruit to absorb the information as best they can. This also applies to allowing time for confirmatory and practice stages. This then leads into the Test of Objective phase and closing off the lesson in the allocated time.

While conducting assessment, STP has seen very good and very poor time management (where a lesson will go well over the allocated time frame). On average, a lesson will go over time by approximately 15 to 45 minutes due to poor time management. This will have an impact on the daily training program follow on lessons.

Tip 7: Rehearsals are the key to good time management. During a weapons or field lesson, it is easy for RIs to have a quick glance at their watch, it’s not so easy to do so while on a parade ground giving a drill lessons. Understanding the lesson content and the blueprint of the lesson will aid in growing confidence for instructing. Knowing the lesson and not giving long-winded explanations or trying to add extra content (their own life experiences/deployments) should assist in keeping within the allocated time frame.

Tip 8: While an RI is delivering a lesson, regardless of the discipline, time management should always be on their mind. In saying this, if for whatever reason, a recruit is struggling to grasp the lesson content being taught or is at a poor standard, then the lesson is to carry on and the recruit(s) who were identified at struggling in the lesson continue on as best as they can. There are periods in the Daily Training Program that cover administration and revision, this allows the RTC staff to revise lessons from that day or catch up recruits who may have missed parts of a lesson.
The question was raised ‘Do RIs still wear watches or do they rely on smart technology?’. When STP has conducted assessments, the majority of the RTC staff will wear some form of a watch. From time to time, STP will see an RI use their mobile phone as a timer and store it in their pocket, one of two things normally come of this:

- the RI doesn’t feel it vibrate and their timings are shot, or
- the RI is distracted by the timer going off and this will detract from their lesson.

Like the old saying goes: Practice makes perfect.

Instructor Skill Set

The instructor skill set ranges from dress, bearing, and demeanour during lessons, to the use of words of command and the overall day-to-day conduct of recruit training.

The individual’s instructor skill set is a personal thing, which will either see the RI strive and do very well in delivery of training, or they will find teaching lessons hard and not get the full benefit from their posting to 1 RTB and from the experience.

Regardless of what Corps the RI comes from, if they have had bad habits or incorrect drills when teaching lessons, these habits will transfer to their instructor skill set and teaching style at 1 RTB.

For example – RIs may teach a weapons lesson in a way they operate back in their units, when the relevant publications/doctrine state something different to what they are teaching.

Tip 9: A good RI regardless of rank of experience, will be one that is looked up to by both other staff and recruits. They will need to take on the role as a Sect Comd, PI SGT or PI Comd. Recruits will see through a poor RI and that member will lose control and respect very quickly. RTC staff need to maintain their professional standard and strive to develop themselves through numerous professional military education that are continuously conduct by Training Support Company staff.

Everybody remembers that bad instructor that they had during their training for various reasons, this poor RI performance can be traced back to a poor instructor skill set.

Are there other tips that can improve or maintain an RI’s professional standard? In short, yes! But it’s not as easy as reading an article or a book, it comes down to the individual preparing themselves before attending the RIC, by actually completing the supplied pre-course booklet, and by understanding how to research doctrine for a lesson subject.

When attending the RIC, be prepared to put in the extra hours to practice lessons, prepare equipment and listen to feedback and advice. The RIC will prepare members who have been selected for a posting to 1 RTB.

Closing

STP is there to help assist with the development of RTC staff into the best instructor they can be if they take on feedback, learn from their mistakes and continually learn the most current doctrine. Most new members posting into 1 RTB will find that it will take at least one platoon for them to hit their straps as a RI and fall into a rhythm of teaching, mentoring and leadership. But once they do, they will find being a RI to be one of the most rewarding jobs they will ever have and will see how much influence they can have on the newest members of the Australian Army.

Anyone seeking further advice about a posting to Kapooka should find someone who has had this experience and ‘pick their brains’. If not, find the ARTC and 1 RTB SharePoint websites and see if this provides the information you are after.
They say their oath or affirmation, subscribe their signature and commence their journey. However, at no point, during this personally momentous occasion, is an individual candidly explained the gravity of the unlimited liability contract they have just signed with Australia and Her Majesty the Queen. Therefore, how many young Australians truly understand this limitless bestowal of dedication to their nation? How many truly understand the nature of war and its inherent military risk?

Does the Army understand unlimited liability?

“No young man truly believes he will ever die.”

The Spirit of Age, William Hazlitt (1825)

The unlimited liability contract is a concept that is not readily shared amongst members of the Australian Army. Whether it be due to a lack of comfort with the notion, or that it is deemed of less significance than other aspects of military service, a certain level of professional discourse is missing.

This article will draw on considerations for why this has occurred in Army. It is argued that the understanding of the unlimited liability is foreign to a vast majority of the Officers and Soldiers of the Australian Army in 2019. In this article, no criticism nor blame will be derived from the origin of this, simply outlining the reasons as to why the Australian Army may be evolving to a point where it has potentially lost sight of the hard realities of what the nation requires of it.

What is the unlimited liability contract?

The unlimited liability contract was first socialised by Australian born British Officer General Sir John Hackett in 1962 and published in his work The Profession of Arms in 1963. He states that it is not a legal contract; it is merely a moral framework relevant to military personnel encompassing their service to their nation.

When committing to service within the Australian Army, individuals will experience personal sacrifice at all levels. They will be exposed to additional laws, surrender basic human rights and freedom and, at times, assume dangerous or deadly roles. They must be willing to apply lethal force against the enemy and be prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice of their own life.

Army’s baseline understanding of the unlimited liability contract

The Centre for Australian Army Leadership (CAAL) conducted a leadership baselining activity with wider Army during the first half of 2019. The leadership baselining activity consisted of a series of leadership working groups with the...
The intent was to generate thought and discussion from the audience on the concept of the unlimited liability contract. Those present demonstrated eagerness and willingness to be a part of the process and openly discussed Army leadership in general. When posed with the question, however, ‘What does unlimited liability mean to you?’ the results were very different. There was a common trend of hesitance and inability to articulate what the unlimited liability contract meant across Army or to an individual. The audience often required shaping and prompting to draw out a response. Officers and soldiers were clear in describing their role and their requirement to obey orders, remain apolitical and serve the nations interests. They were not as forthcoming in their responses on the possibility of applying lethal force against the enemy nor sacrificing their own life.

Why is the possibility of making the greatest personal sacrifice not at the forefront of our minds?

Military doctrine and training

Doctrine is the highest order of intellectual insights for a military. It drives training and capability effectiveness. It is responsible for transforming a civilian into a combatant and shapes the way we train for and fight at war.

“The danger associated with violence engenders fear in combatants and dramatically degrades the efficiency and effectiveness of soldiers and units. Realistic training and strong leadership reduce the negative effects of fear by generating high morale, confidence and resilience.”


Despite the consequence of unlimited liability and the grounding reality it should provoke with every soldier, the concept is not currently published in any Army or Defence doctrine. If the theory of ‘service and team before self’ is of the utmost importance to a commander, it will be developed and fostered. The trends, however, clearly suggests unlimited liability is not being continually reinforced throughout an officer or soldier’s career, and it is likely that leadership, doctrine and training may be a reason for this. Therefore, the intent is for the Australian Army Leadership Programme (AALP) to incorporate unlimited liability into Land Warfare Doctrine 0-0 Leadership and systematically embed its theory and understanding into the All Corps Officer and Soldier Training Continuums (ACOSTC).

Careerist approach – self over organisation

Further feedback from the leadership baselining activity indicated that there was potentially a perception that some Army leaders were adopting a careerist approach. Audiences commented that they had observed some leaders who were concerned more with advancing their own careers above that of service requirements and the needs of the team. The common observation was that these leaders did not allow subordinate commanders freedom of action and that they focused on preventing failure and avoided anything that may have proven a poor reflection on their leadership.
qualifications and potential are what leads to the next rank, then the desire to achieve well in this regard encourages an individual to place self-needs first. Moreover, the prevalence of the careerist approach will degrade the notion and importance of unlimited liability. This is where Army has an opportunity to revise its individual reporting procedures with the intent to focus more on rewarding leaders who are team-focused.

In recent times, many soldiers and officers have lived experiences in the application of unlimited liability, during campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. They may argue that unlimited liability is not a foreign concept to them. They have seen comrades make the ultimate sacrifice and lived experiences where the application of lethal force was required. The argument is real and undeniable. It is questionable however, that ‘service before self’ remains a key motivator in all aspects of military service, particularly outside of combat roles and engagement in war-like operations.

Conclusion

This article describes the unlimited liability contract and its relevance to the Australian Army. An officer or soldier may at any time be called upon to apply lethal force against the enemy or sacrifice their life in the name of service to the nation. Leadership baselining demonstrated that some members of the Australian Army feel that unlimited liability does not apply to them. Further, current leadership doctrine does not support Army through training the unique nature of soldiering. It does not emphasise that unlimited liability is a fundamental belief underlying the profession of arms. For this to evolve, the concept of unlimited liability will be examined in leadership doctrine and included in the ACOSTC advanced leadership packages. The intent of this training implementation will ensure that the unlimited liability contract is understood in such a way that it is being practised and reinforced at all levels of command. In an ideal world, ‘service before self’ will no longer be a concept, but common practice.

How can you help?

In order to consolidate the unlimited liability contract in leadership doctrine, we must first gather your thoughts and opinions. Below are some targeted questions for you to consider:

1. In what ways can the careerist approach be minimised amongst leaders within Army?

2. Has modern warfare and technology altered the identity of our unlimited liability contract?

3. In what ways does society affect our contribution to the nation and ability to place service before self?

All responses are welcome and can be sent to the CAAL group email: leadership.nexus@defence.gov.au

The best submissions selected by SO1 Army Leadership will each win a military history book.
Mission Command: Does the Australian Army effectively utilise Mission Command?

Now? Yes. I believe it has improved considerably over the years from what I have seen. Now this is not speaking for all areas of the Army, only for the level of my exposure. The reason I believe it was not greatly used previously was because it appeared that Mission Command was just about the overview of the mission [whatever the task was] and the commander’s intent, which were then funnelled and syphoned down to the section level; thus giving the responsibility of complete mission command to the subordinate (usually a section commander). Now, in this case this is not inherently wrong; however, when there has not been clear cut or detailed guidance from the source, the end product is at risk of being watered down, or skewed if you will. 

Recently, or as recently as I have noticed, it appears guidance is a lot more forthcoming in not just the mission itself and the intent of the commander (‘the what’); but also ‘the how’ they perceive it to be carried out/accomplished; ‘the when’ they need it; and (what I believe is the most important especially when you need people ‘on board’) ‘the why’.

Role Clarity: Is it effectively developed and promoted within the workplace?

From my experience, yes. Other than the initial meetings between an individual and their new CoC upon posting into a new unit (for example), there is not much more promotion for Role Clarity outside of the given expectations from aforementioned CoC and the individual’s duty statement. The MAE is still a foundational document to refer to should someone not fully understand their role, or they need a refresher on what exactly they are to provide at their rank and/or job level.

As for the development of Role Clarity, the PARs/PFADSs assist in acting as that indicator of whether someone is or is not performing within their role; the picture developed will be made from that individual’s capacity for the work they do and their character. The former can be heavily affected by the individual’s understanding of their role, if they are underperforming, this could be an indicator they do not completely understand what is expected of them in their job. Through feedback, as per what the PARs/PFADSs provide, this can lead to further development of Role Clarity for an individual.

As part of Smart Soldier edition 56, the Centre for Australian Army Leadership (CAAL) ran a leadership competition where it asked wider Army to provide submissions on some key leadership focal areas. The intent of this competition is to continue the professional discussion on leadership, and importantly, continue to aid the development of the Australian Army Leadership Programme (AALP). The AALP will be introduced over the next two years and it is intended to be an incremental and systematic approach towards developing leadership within the Australian Army. CPL Green’s submission was selected as the best from a wide range of submissions across Army.

CPL Green’s frank and honest responses to the questions, coupled with real-time examples from his experience, resonated strongly with the CAAL team, and also Commandant RMC-A. In particular, his observation that good leaders require a combination of good character, leadership, and competence was spot on, along with his detailed observations on contributory dissent and the trap that Army has made for itself.

Developing Army leadership into the future

Written by CPL Green, 1 RTB
Character: Does having good character make you a good leader? Why?

It depends on what being of ‘good character’ encompasses. If it is simply being a friendly individual who is easily liked by the majority, then the answer is ‘No’. If it is being friendly while also possessing the ability to be firm but fair with an intact moral and ethical compass, then the answer is ‘partially’.

Why partially? I believe in order to be a good leader you need to possess at a minimum two attributes: Good character (the latter mentioned example, not the first example) and Competence. I have been very lucky in my career to have served under or alongside some fine soldiers who possessed the above attributes. On the odd occasion though I have had the displeasure of being ‘led’ by individuals who possessed only one of these attributes, or neither.

Simply put, you cannot be a good leader (someone who is looked up to by both their peers and subordinates; someone who others model themselves on and strive to be just like or even better than) if you are a disliked individual due to not being of good character and/or you cannot do, or do not know your job well, yet expect it of others. Personnel, particularly JNCOs and below, are enamoured and put their trust in those that hold themselves with high integrity, who treat them with respect and can carry out their duties to the full (or even more) requirements.

Contributory Dissent: Is it effectively engendered, managed and practised?

No. That is not to say it is not at all being utilised; however, as a whole I do not believe it is widespread. This is mainly due to the fine line between speaking openly and honestly with someone, in particular superior ranks, and being accused of insubordination. This is one of the factors I believe where it is not effectively used or encouraged. The other factor is fear, fear of shortened career prospects.

Time and time again I have seen the ‘yes men’ – I have even been one myself. Agreeing to a statement, task, opinion piece, just to appease the person of superior rank who has said it or given it only to realise that there is insufficient time for a task to be completed, or poor mission planning to name a couple of examples. These people, a lot of the time, carry weight over what goes in your PAR, which in turn reflects what type of person you are purported to be and when you will progress in your career. For many, I believe, speaking openly and honestly in situations, where it looks like logic will be an afterthought, is daunting. Purely because they feel they will be disciplined or will be worse off for it. We have done it to ourselves, with years of instilling discipline and the black/white following of orders at initial training, yet telling our soldiers to be innovators and think for themselves – it creates a confusing atmosphere. One which sees most soldiers just simply say: ‘Yes’.

I have seen it with my own recruits. About three quarters of the way through my last platoon the whole platoon gave a resounding ‘Yes CPL’ when I asked them if two minutes and thirty seconds was enough time for them to be changed out of DPCU and back in the hallway in PT attire in preparation for a lesson. They were too indoctrinated into simply wanting to please their superior by telling me something they thought I wanted to hear or they told me the answer they thought would make me leave them alone. I questioned whether they actually thought such minimal time was enough, only about one quarter of the platoon then remained ‘Yes Men’. The rest, remained quiet, contemplating. One spoke up and said it was not enough time to complete the task to which I then asked them how much time as a minimum they thought they needed; the response was three minutes thirty. They requested one extra minute, which they received.

To make this a useful tool, Contributory Dissent relies on the people both using it and receiving it. They will need to understand the line between being insubordinate and being honest and open about concerns or areas that need to be addressed. It will also need to be championed by those willing to be on the receiving end (ie, CPLs and above), so they can make it known to their subordinates they are interested in feedback, ideas or ways they can do things better. Open up the floor, do not be the only one standing on it.
Authentic Leadership:
Does the Australian Army have authentic leaders? Do we apply authentic leadership well as an organisation?

In the Senior Leadership Group, I believe so. Only from what I see, not from having personally met any. It is challenging to give a hard and fast answer to the first question due to it being a result borne from individuals coming together to form the collective. We can only say ‘yes we have authentic leaders’ if the vast majority of our leaders are indeed authentic; however, we first need them all to possess the correct characteristics as a baseline to even be considered so. We enlist personnel based on their aptitude, their ability to potentially do a job, not necessarily based on their character (the closest we come to that is a police/psychological background check); from there, most people are given the green light to undertake the training necessary to mould potential leaders.

In order to be an authentic leader you must possess (to a degree) the natural characteristics of integrity, compassion, good listening skills and consistency, to name a few. These can be developed most certainly; however, expecting the majority to be able to achieve them and employ them naturally is unrealistic and we will simply end up with individuals who will ‘fake it ‘til they make it’. Upon developing potential leaders initially (ie, through RMC, Subject courses etc.), we will then need to nurture those leaders by providing continual support and guidance along the way. This will ensure their leadership qualities are developed further rather than a one-stop shop on what military leaders SHOULD be like and then entrusting them to do it.

We are taking steps in the right direction with leadership seminars and the like; however, these are not widespread and generally only attract those who either are developing or already possess the characteristics to make them an authentic leader. To be candid, we promote people into leadership roles (especially from the enlisted pool) who fundamentally are not ready. It is great they have scored well on their PAR when it comes to job competence, and they have ticked the biggest item of all (the attendance on their Subject courses), which they asked for themselves rather than be nominated based on merit. However, these do not capture the person’s ability to actually be an authentic leader, if a leader at all. A box on the PAR form for commenting on Leadership is not enough, particularly when the words included are generally just ‘belt-fed’ copy and paste repetitions. If we want an organisation of authentic leaders, we need to identify them as an individual and nurture them. A plant cared for properly will not just blossom once.

Overall, we are taking the right steps. Are we there yet? No, not yet.

CPL Green has been sent a military history book as recognition for sharing his thoughts on leadership. More importantly, his observations will go towards aiding the further development and implementation of the AALP.
Chief of Army, LTGEN Rick Burr, released two statements in mid-2018 that outlined the key ideas driving his leadership of the Australian Army. His Commander’s Statement was delivered in July last year and titled Australia’s Army: An Army in Motion. His Futures Statement, named Accelerated Warfare, was released in August.

The two statements are closely linked and work together to describe the key ideas for Army, including:

- how the Army can be competitive and gain the edge, both tactically and strategically

  • what Army’s current operating environment looks like

  • how this environment is likely to evolve

  • what all of this means for Army now and tomorrow.

- This article is designed to investigate these concepts and what they mean for all of us.

**Accelerated Warfare**

So, what is Accelerated Warfare and what does it mean for Army? And what does the Chief of Army mean when he talks about Army in Motion?

Accelerated Warfare describes our operating environment – a world rapidly changing and developing around us all the time. Often what springs to mind when talking about rapid change is technology and equipment, and there are incredible leaps being made in technology every day that affect how we handle conflict. But Accelerated Warfare is more than just the newest and latest high-tech equipment.

Accelerated Warfare looks at how global politics, changing contemporary threats, the increasing role of space and cyber in operations and technology all interact in a dynamic operating environment.

It’s about how the speed of these changes provides challenges and opportunities—some of which we’re already aware, others which are only just beginning to emerge.

So what? Well, our operating environment is changing, and fast; it is changing faster than what our Army was designed for. This has important implications for every Australian soldier, regardless of rank, service category, or corps.

**Army in Motion**

If in Accelerated Warfare we’re always in competition in a system that is changing faster than ever before, we must be an Army in Motion. Being an Army in Motion is about being agile enough to handle the changes happening around us.

This happens through the Chief of Army’s five key themes: Preparedness, People, Partnerships, Profession, and Potential.
Preparedness. We have to be ready now for the challenges of our current environment and also work to make sure we’re future ready for the challenges to come. This means always thinking about how we can evolve our thinking, training, organisation and equipment to prepare for the future. This includes all Army personnel – your thoughts about how to improve our operations are valuable and can help ensure Army is both ready now and future ready.

People. Our people are our strength. It is the Army’s people that help Army be more adaptive and provide experience and capabilities we might not otherwise have. At every level, we must invest in maintaining and developing skills, and growing our expertise. This means taking advantage of offered courses and identifying opportunities to learn and develop that your chain of command might not yet know about. An example of investing in our people is the creation of the Small Team Laboratory between Army Headquarters, Diggerworks and the Contemporary Operating Environment Force (COEFOR) at the Combat Training Centre. This laboratory will further explore the opportunities that technology provides for dismounted combatants and experiment with tactics, techniques and procedures.

Partnerships. We exist in a highly connected world; Australia’s geographic position within the Indo-Pacific region, coupled with our trade, human and information connections, is an important aspect of Army’s purpose both locally and globally. We help our friends and neighbours because it’s the right thing to do, and in doing so, we build strong regional partnerships. Investing in our region is also a vital part of staying ahead of the competition. International engagement events allow all ranks the chance to display our professionalism, our respect for other cultures and our interest in working closely with regional partners; these are the traits that make us a desired regional partner.

Profession. Doing the right thing and holding ourselves to high standards upholds the trust that society places in us as a professional fighting force. Daily interactions and environments give us the chance to practise being honest, ethical and self-disciplined: this is as small as completing the given number of reps in PT, and as big as being honest about making mistakes so that we can all learn from them and get better.

Potential. The diversity, dedication, and countless hidden talents among our Army must be unlocked to maximise Army’s potential. If you have innovative ideas about how to incorporate technology into your workplace or how to take a new approach to a tactical problem, these are valuable to Army and Army wants to know about them. This doesn’t mean we’ll always be right! Failures provide incredibly powerful learning opportunities—having an open mind and trying new ways to make Army better is how we stay ahead of our competition.

What is my role in Army in Motion? Australian Army soldiers at all ranks are vital in achieving Army in Motion to cope with an environment of Accelerated Warfare. These concepts are high-level strategy—how Army designs for the future and interacts with other services—but they’re also about individual and small team changes and growth. Accelerated Warfare and Army in Motion are about you and your work, and you have the capacity to develop Army’s capability and agility in a number of ways. These include:

1. Developing resilience to change. Change can be incredibly frustrating, especially when we’re trying to plan our lives and things are turned on their head at a moment’s notice. Everyone, at all levels, understands how annoying and challenging change can be, but it also provides us the chance to put into practise what we preach: the ability to adapt to the evolving threat and to do so quickly enough to gain the advantage. We must become resilient when faced with change and grow better at accepting it as a normal part of our operating environment.

If the enemy changes faster than us and stays one step ahead, we’ve already been beaten.
2. Learning how to build strong teams quickly.
We also need to re-think what we know about teams and team building. Historically we’ve focused on forming teams at the section and platoon level through close in-barracks environments where we can build strong relationships over time.

But the rapidly changing operating environment may mean that this is not always possible. Instead, we are going to find ourselves in situations where we need to team and re-team quickly with new (possibly unfamiliar) teammates of differing corps and specialist skills to meet task demands. This is part of the Chief of Army’s Good Soldiering: how we as an organisation and as individuals demonstrate good character through our adherence to the four Army values of courage, initiative, respect and teamwork.

3. Participating in the ‘contest of ideas’.
‘Contest of ideas’ is a term that refers to the Chief of Army’s enthusiasm for harnessing the thoughts and innovation of all members of the Australian Army to keep moving forward. The contest of ideas encourages everyone to think about how to solve Army’s issues. This is because your individual point of view may provide a way of thinking about the problem that no one else has come up with. We’re searching for new options, divergent opinions and varied ways of imagining how we can address challenges.

There are many forums for this conversation: it can happen in your workplace or amongst friends. But there are also countless PME platforms (including Smart Soldier, The Cove, Grounded Curiosity and the Land Power Forum) where you can submit your ideas. Your respectful, thoughtful and thought-provoking contest of ideas helps Army think more broadly about the solutions to problems to create a stronger, more resilient and more agile fighting force.

4. Helping to simplify the Army.
Simplicity is key for our Army to adapt quickly and achieve the edge over adversaries. We have many processes and procedures that are overly complex and long-winded making us slower and less responsive and requiring significant human time and energy. There are places within Army where we can use or improve human-machine teaming to reduce man-hours required for tasks, such as CMA’s use of a bot, ‘Donna’, to perform data entry with less errors. Innovations like this leave a crucial asset, our people, more available for important, human-centric tasks. Another example is using barcodes in armoury checks to streamline the process and free up valuable personnel for other tasks.

Conclusion
Our operating reality is complex and rapidly evolving, and it has been for some time. While the concept of Accelerate Warfare might sound new, it is a term that simply provides an easy way to acknowledge these complexities and prompt us to think about the operating environment in which we must fight. Army in Motion makes sense as a way to stay competitive in this challenging environment, and it provides a range of ways in which all Army personnel can contribute to ensuring we’re ready now and future ready – making Army faster, more agile and more resilient to handle the challenges we must face.

1 Articles for Smart Soldier can be emailed to army.lessons@defence.gov.au.
This is the first of a new series of articles we are including in *Smart Soldier* to share trends from analysis to help you with your training. At *Army Knowledge Centre* (AKC), we identify trends through interviews and reviewing documents, such as post activity reports (PARs). We consider all forms of reports from exercises, operations, visits and other activities to be PARs. It is not easy to draw insights if PARs do not have useable information. So our first article is about creating valuable PARs.

All documents uploaded to the Army Capability Management System (ACMS) during the period Jan 16 – Mar 19 have been reviewed by Army Lessons, AKC, in order to extract information for analysis. The subsequent observations have been entered into the Army Learning database. This is an ongoing task. Future editions of *Smart Soldier* will include emerging, ongoing and enduring trends and/or key insights.

So what is the process for creating a PAR? Normally it starts with an after action review (AAR). An AAR is an opportunity to gain input on a broad range of experiences and opinions on a recent activity. It is recommended that an AAR be conducted after any activity, whether it is support to schools during ANZAC Day, a range shoot, a unit sporting event, humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operation or conducting a major exercise. The experiences and opinions assist Army to continually improve, as we need to do to as an Army in Motion.

If conducted properly, the AAR offers several advantages over the informal ‘hot wash’ debrief, which can vary significantly in format. By capturing experiences and opinions during an AAR, and assigning them as either sustains (things we should continue to do) or improves (things to be addressed), the team conducting the AAR can recommend follow up actions (or fixes). For example, a sustain ‘fix’ may be to recommend amendments to unit SOPs to ensure a trial TTP continues during future activities. An improve ‘fix’ may be a recommendation to amend doctrine, or training or the need to improve a capability or process. Commanders can fix things within their authority to fix, and pass other recommendations up the chain of command.

Sometimes that is where the AAR process stops. Everyone in AAR congratulates themselves on the things they did well and promises to do better in the things requiring improvement, but that does not help anyone who did not physically attend the AAR. If the results of the AAR are not captured, recorded and passed to decision makers, nothing changes and no improvement occurs. No lessons are learned! The next time a similar activity is conducted, all the same issues could arise. The following step is to capture the key outcomes of the AAR as part of the PAR.

A PAR captures key observations gathered from all aspects of the activity through AARs, interviews, and evaluations. The PAR can consider whether the objectives of the activity were achieved, as well as whether the activity was planned and conducted as well as possible. Specialists, such as logisticians or contractors, may contribute separately to the overarching unit or activity PAR. The format, content and dissemination of PAR is up for doctrine review and you can contribute your thoughts by commenting at Doctrine On-line or emailing Army Lessons.

The PAR is intended for the immediate benefit of the chain of command, especially those who directed the activity or who are responsible for the outcomes of the activity¹, but the PAR also has longer term benefits for Army. Not just for those who may have to undertake the activity next time, but also so that Army can identify trends and lessons over time from across the entire organisation. The insights identified by one unit may also be relevant to other units in different parts of the country or in different chains of command. Sometimes people think, “…we don’t have time to write a PAR” or “what is the point of a PAR, no one reads it?”. We guarantee that Army Lessons, AKC, will read your PAR, and use it for trend analysis and improvement action for Army.

Well conducted AARs and well written PARs help Army to adjust to the fast changing world we face under Accelerated Warfare, and ensure we can adapt to being an Army in Motion. By documenting and sharing what you learn in your unit or organisation, we can identify and share trends. We can also provide timely advice to help decision-makers to optimise Army capability. So help us to help you. Send your AARs and PARs to us via army.lessons@defence.gov.au and remember to include Army Lessons on the distribution list of all your AARs and PARs.

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¹ e.g. The Officer Scheduling the Activity (OSA) and Officer Conducting the Activity (OCA)
What are your top three tips for section training?

Firstly, you should always identify what your commander’s intent is so that you can mould your training to accompany that intent.

Secondly, you should have an identifiable outcome for the section members to achieve. This is so that the section is able to see for themselves the relevance of the training. Tailoring your training to encompass Corps and job functions will aid in the above.

Thirdly, focus on core fundamentals and branch forward from there. Building strong foundation knowledge will aid not only junior soldiers, but it will also aid in the prevention of skill fade within the senior soldiers too. This will lead to soldiers building their confidence to be able to accomplish tasks that are more complex.

What’s your advice to a soldier who is about to become a CPL?

Acknowledge your strengths and weaknesses. Be confident and be accessible.

By acknowledging your strengths and weaknesses, you will be able to identify shortfalls within your knowledge base. From there you can formulate a plan to counter those shortfalls. Confidence is a necessity for any NCO. If you lack confidence, start by building up your base knowledge, become proficient and work from there. Fitness is another good place to start.

As a CPL, part of your role is to mentor and guide the junior and senior soldiers in your charge. Understand that not everyone may think the same and accommodate for that.

By understanding each soldier’s strengths, weaknesses and lifestyle you will be able to plan your workspace to achieve a level of efficiency necessary to achieve whatever task that comes your way. Being accessible to your soldiers will allow you to gain the knowledge of them that you need.

From your trade perspective, what lessons and tips can you offer someone from another trade?

As an ECN 418-Technician Electrical, I can provide the operator training for small capacity generators: the 1.3 kW, 2 kW, 2.5 kVA and 16 kVA, as well as any power generation, refrigeration and automotive electrical operator training. As a member of RAEME, I can also provide the training for operator relevant tasks such as, but not limited to:

- filling out an EMEFIX
- entering operator statistics and their relevance to maintenance schedule tasks
- general equipment appreciation and operator maintenance tasks
- guidance on the technical regulatory framework.

The main tip I would give to someone from a different trade would be to look after your equipment, raise an EMEFIX the moment the equipment has been identified as having a suspected fault and give as much information regarding the fault as possible so that the tradesman can get your equipment back to you faster.

How can a soldier best prepare for a promotion course?

A soldier should seek out as much relevant information regarding the course as possible. The best way to accomplish this would be to liaise with either
their peers/seniors who have completed the course before them and, ultimately, gain an understanding of the criteria and intent of the course.

**What apps would you recommend soldiers use?**

I am not on my phone all that much; however, I have found that fitness apps such as ‘My Fitness Pal’ and Garmin’s ‘Connect’, paired with a smart watch, work well to keep fitness goals in check. I also tend to use ‘Easy Home Finance’ to keep any budgeting intact and ‘AlcoDroid’, which helps track how many drinks you’ve had, your blood alcohol content and how much you’ve spent on drinks. I believe that these apps help curve the big three – Fitness, Finance and Alcohol.

**What is the best piece of soldiering advice you have received?**

The best piece of soldiering advice I have received was from a Lance Corporal at my first posting: ‘Leave it better than how you found it’. I don’t feel it’s necessary to explain this one, although, over the years, I have adjusted it to ‘Leave it better than how you found it, but if it’s not broken then don’t fix it’. Minor adjustments are the key.

**Do you have any other tips you can offer someone on how to become a smarter soldier?**

The best tip I could give to a soldier would be to know your job; know all aspects of it from the soldiering to the trade specific. Knowledge breeds confidence, which, in turn, creates a more confident soldier. On the other side, join a club outside of the military or get a hobby to fill in your time outside of work hours as it is a good way to keep yourself from burning out.
Doctrine Online Accessibility
On average, Land Doctrine Online has 522 hits per day. In the previous quarter there have been in excess of 60,000 referrals to Land Doctrine publications from other internet sites.

The quickest way to find doctrine is via the DRNet Home page. Click ‘Army’ then the drop down for ‘Publications’ and doctrine is easy to find. Or save the link to your favourites.

http://drnet/Army/Doctrine-Online/Pages/Home.aspx

Recent Releases
The following doctrine publications have been released on Army Knowledge Online (AKO), Doctrine Online and ForceNet.

LWP-CA (ENGR) 2-4-1 Watermanship Amendment List Number 1. This amendment provides clarification on the skills and knowledge required of first aid providers when conducting watermanship activities.

LWP-G 7-3-5 Demolitions and Mines: Range Practices and Non-operational Tasks Amendment List Number 1. This amendment changes the rank requirements for demolitions range appointments, demolitions training certifying officers, battle noise simulation training certifying officers, target ranks in the continuum of demolitions training and qualifications, and ammunition safety officers.

LWP-CA (MTD CBT) 3-2-3 M113AS4 Gunnery. This publication covers off on all equipment of the M113AS4 vehicle turret and armaments, ammunition and the principles and drills for applying fire from the M113AS4.

LWP-CA (STA) 2-3-2 Surveillance and Target Acquisition. This publication contains information concerning the planning, preparation and execution of surveillance and target acquisition operations. It includes integration into manoeuvre, intelligence and targeting in support of a formation’s operation.

LWP-CA (MTD CBT) 3-2-0 Principles of Direct Fire Gunnery from Mounted Weapons. This publication replaces the interim publication released in December 2018.

Joint Doctrine
Don’t forget to familiarise yourself with the latest Joint Doctrine publications released.

• ADDP 00.1 Command and Control, Edition 2 AL1
• ADDP 3.2 Amphibious Operations
• ADDP 4.1 Logistic Support to Capability
You are part of the A2 Echelon of a Protected Mobility Vehicle Battalion located at GR575147 (see map on page 56). You have been tasked to establish a distribution point (DP)\(^1\) at GR675198 to provide three days of supply (DOS)\(^2\) of Class 1, Class 3 and Class 5\(^3\) in order to sustain a fully dismounted Inf Coy, Combat Team ALPHA (CT A). They are operating in an Area of Operations to the north-east of the proposed DP site. You have been tasked to plan for the movements and conduct of the DP.

The previous quick decision exercise (QDE), QDE 56, required you to plan the DP (less the convoy), which is now complete. This QDE will focus on the deployment.

References:

LWP-CSS 4-3-2 Road Transport Operations Handbook

LWP 4-0-1 Combat Service Support in the Theatre
http://siepd84wsp0016.dpe.protected.mil.au/doctrine/htmlbooks/LWP-CSS_4-0-1/LWP-CSS_4-0-1_Combat_Service_Support_in_the_Theatre_Interim_Full.pdf

Hybrid Enemy Threat (DATE - Decisive Action Training Environment)
http://collab/army/DATE/SiteCollectionImages/homepage.jpg

Concept for Employment of Army’s Combat Brigade (CONEMP)
http://drnet/Army/Doctrine-Online/Pages/CONEMP.aspx

Background – No Change

You are part of the A2 Echelon of a Protected Mobility Vehicle Battalion located at GR575147 (see map on page 56). You have been tasked to establish a distribution point (DP)\(^1\) at GR675198 to provide three days of supply (DOS)\(^2\) of Class 1, Class 3 and Class 5\(^3\) in order to sustain a fully dismounted Inf Coy, Combat Team ALPHA (CT A). They are operating in an Area of Operations to the north-east of the proposed DP site. You have been tasked to plan for the movements and conduct of the DP.

The previous quick decision exercise (QDE), QDE 56, required you to plan the DP (less the convoy), which is now complete. This QDE will focus on the deployment.

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1. A DP is a location established by the A Echelon/combat service support (CSS) organisation in a place convenient to first-line transport from which units replenish their combat supply holdings/classes of supply. DPs are open for prescribed times with allocated units given drawing times. DPs are designated by commodities which are; ammunition points, petroleum, oils and lubricants, ration point.

2. The term DOS is used to describe the rate at which supplies are consumed in one day by a known dependency. DOS is used to determine the broad stocking levels of the force. DOS will vary depending on the size of the force, type of operation, tempo and environmental conditions.

3. Class 1 is subsistence (rations); Class 3 is petrol, oils and lubricants; and Class 5 is ammunition.
Topography

Physical Terrain – No Change
You are in a mid- to high-density forested area with undulating terrain. The formed roads/tracks appear to be in good condition and are considered negotiable by Land 121 vehicles. The high density forested areas will have impact on visibility and will provide excellent cover for enemy forces or affiliates looking to disrupt the deployment.

Human Terrain – No Change
Tactical actions of the adversary Special Purpose Forces (SPF – Regular Special Forces) to date have spread panic among the civilian population. The current situation is likely to hamper the deployment of the DP. Elements of the civilian population, with assistance from SPF, are likely to attempt to disrupt the CSS element during the conduct of the deployment. Opportunistic theft from logistic supplies has occurred in the past.

Small settlements are located at GR603184, and GR664217.

Hybrid Threat – Decisive Action Training Environment - No Change
SPF are known to operate in small teams and are equipped to operate a significant distance in front of the main force and capable of conducting effective attacks against rear areas. SPF primary tasks are to disrupt the lines of communication (LoC)⁴, disruption to networks and transfer of essential supplies. Direct action tasks may involve overt, covert or clandestine attacks by armed individuals or groups to destroy high value targets through sabotage, capture, ambushes and raids in order to disrupt C2, communications and LoC.

Friendly Forces – No Change
Your dependency CT A.

Attachments & Detachments – No Change
Nil.

Mission
The A2 Echelon is to conduct a DP at GR675198 NLT D+⁷ 0300K in order to provide Class 1, Class 3 and Class 5 supplies to CT A.

Rules of Engagement – No Change
• Use nonlethal and lethal force to defend yourself, Australian forces, Australian nationals, coalition partners and mission-essential equipment.
• Use reasonable force to prevent looters.
• Can seize dangerous goods.
• Can detain personnel found in possession of dangerous goods/items.

Scenario
Plan a route for the convoy in readiness for your deployment to the DP site. Of the roads available, the following are noted as you read the intelligence summaries and view the map:
• Broken Track – extremely steep sections along the track, so that vehicles will have to drive very slowly.
• Main Road – most ambushes and other incidents have occurred on this road.
• Mountain Track – this track has been used most often as an alternate route, so that it could be perceived to be primary.

Co-ord Instructions

Timings
Time is now D Day.
Deploy to DP site NLT D+6 2000K.
Arrive DP Site NLT D+6 2130K.
Close DP NLT D+7 0300K and redeploy A2 Ech location.

Task
Select a route and provide the justification for selecting it.
Do you need an alternative route or routes and what would trigger the use of an alternate route?
What are the recognised risks and how will you mitigate against them?
Consider more than enemy contact, also include such possibilities as break down and actions on someone in the convoy becoming lost or losing communications.
What support would you like to request for this convoy?

Having planned and chosen a route you have commenced your deployment to the DP site. On the way a vehicle carrying Class 5 becomes disabled and is unable to continue on task.

With regards to the disabled vehicle, what planning considerations could be employed to ensure mission success?

What impact would it have to the CT A mission if the DP was not established?

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4 LoC are all land, water and air routes that connect an operating military force with one or more bases of operations, and along which supplies and reinforcement are moved.

5 D+7 means that the task will be conducted in seven days’ time.
It is not the intent of the QDE to provide all the specific information necessary. As such, write down any assumptions you have made and then come up with a solution. Should you think you are missing critical information, send an RFI to army.lessons@defence.gov.au.

You can either email your solution to army.lessons@defence.gov.au or go to [http://lwdc.sor.defence.gov.au/cal_forum/](http://lwdc.sor.defence.gov.au/cal_forum/) and then select ‘Quick Decision Exercises from Smart Soldier’ and then open the QDE related to this version.

If you wish to remain anonymous, there is no requirement to register to make a comment or contribute.