Many of us have an opinion about the future of the 9th Brigade. This article is just that, my opinion. Moreover, an opinion on how the 9th Brigade may leverage its part time (PT) components to further support the Army Future Structure Implementation Plan (AFSIP). Although my opinion only, there may be parts of it you agree with, or even better, parts you do not agree with. Importantly, if this paper achieves a level of conversation and thought, then it will have achieved more than expected.
For as Winston Churchill once said, “Those who never change their minds, never change anything.” The transfer of the 9th Brigade to Forces Command (FORCOMD) and the transition of full-time (FT) units into its structure, delivering an integrated Brigade to the Army, provides both challenges and opportunities. This paper discusses some of each.
The changing 'service culture' within the Army owing to the development of the Total Workforce (TWF) model can be significantly explored through the example of 9th Brigade. 9th Brigade will change from belonging to a PT functional command to a FT functional command. It will integrate both PT and FT units and develop both a PT and FT workforce within single units. Moreover, the opportunity to retain a PT brigade commander offers Headquarters (HQ) FORCOMD a PT representative within its senior leadership team.
Although this is not the first trial of an integrated brigade, the effects of the Army's desire towards TWF provides the 9th Brigade model an opportunity to achieve significant headway in the TWS strategy. Judicious management and development will likely result in a world-leading example of capability development.
Although not the first integrated brigade in the Australian Army, the 9th Brigade model could arguably be the first attempt to achieve a sustainable TWF model. After the disbandment of 6th Brigade in 1997, 7th Brigade was reorganised to include both FT and PT units. However, it only remained an integrated brigade until 2005 with what has been described by some as “the expulsion of the PT members”. It would however be unfair to judge the integration of 7th Brigade in 2005 as a failure of the TWF now because the concept of TWF was not a strategic direction 20 years ago.
Rather, the integration of 7th Brigade was viewed at least at the functional HQ as a means of reaching a sustainable FT workforce by 2005 only. The most unfortunate aspect of the 7th Brigade integration in 2005 is that because it was not viewed as a case study for future Army structure development, there is a scarcity of available performance information available now which could support new structure planning. However, the recent reintroduction of PT members back into 7th Brigade could provide a strong argument that the sole FT workforce in 7th Brigade was not sustainable to meet Army’s ever-growing requirements. Nevertheless, with a focus on achieving a successful and sustainable TWF model, 9th Brigade offers the Army real opportunity at a successful integration test case.
Retaining a PT brigade commander in 9th Brigade may offer FORCOMD significant advantage as it progresses under AFSIP. Deployments, fixed term contracts, and various other opportunities for FT service have influenced the development of the operational nature of the PT service over the last 20 years. The result is that many senior PT officers have been afforded a level of FT experience and therefore a working knowledge of FT service. Moreover, combined with their PT service, they have a very good understanding of the challenges posed by both FT and PT service and thus become very suitable leaders for integrated service.
With the previously mentioned challenges of integration and the requirements for significant insight into the nuances of PT service, retaining a PT commander at 9th Brigade may better support integration within FORCOMD. This PT commander provides a highly qualified advocate and mentor for PT service challenges in an almost entirely FT functional HQ. As such, it could be argued that a PT commander supported by an adequate staff of both FT and PT personnel would be distinctly suited to commanding and managing an integrated brigade. With the removal of PT members from the Command and Reserve Branch within HQ FORCOMD, Commander FORCOMD may benefit from having PT representation within the senior leaders providing a PT point of view. Unlike the 7th Brigade example, a PT commander within the 9th Brigade could offer Army a significant advantage in development and retention within an integrated brigade.
The integration of units within 9th Brigade may offer a significant advantage; examining the possible models available could offer insight into 9th Brigade's future. For example, 1st Armoured Regiment (1 Armd Regt), a FT armoured unit, will seek to utilize 3rd/9th South Australian Mounted Rifles (3/9 SAMR), a PT armoured sub-unit. Likewise, 9 Combat Service Support Battalion (9 CSSB), a PT unit, will include a FT sub-unit – 1st Combat Service Support Team (1 CSST). The integration of both a FT and PT unit/subunit provides several opportunities to examine integration via two different avenues, namely: the PT and FT unit models.
The blending of 1 Armd Regt offers significant challenges, particularly when the FT unit is relatively new to 9th Brigade. 1 Armd Regt is a tank regiment that is 72 years of age; it served in the Vietnam War, has three battle honours, and relocated to South Australia (SA) in 2017. Components of 3/9 SAMR have served in three wars, including both world wars; it has 15 battle honours and has represented the SA community for 167 years. So careful consideration should be made to achieve an integrated unit that considers training, command and control, workforce management, and – importantly – 'service culture'.
One model to achieve integration could be to task 3/9 SAMR as an independent sub-unit within 9th Brigade but tie its training to 1 Armd Regt. Training, particularly weekend and exercise period, could be the responsibility of 1 Armd Regt planning, allowing the integration of training of both as part of a single armoured cavalry regiment. Maintaining service culture and identity would remain a responsibility for the leaders of both 1 Armd Regt and 3/9 SAMR separately. The advantage is that 3/9 SAMR retains its identity and connection to the community whilst still providing personnel support for 1 Armd Regt training and force generation requirements.
The independent model may be disadvantaged by not attaining a high level of integration compared to the design ambitions of a developed TWF model. As such, this model provides the ability of each unit to retain an individual identity; however, its inability to adapt, appreciate and best embrace the TWF opportunities may result in partial success.
The TWF is designed to provide a mechanism of fluid adaption where the abilities and availability of each individual are maximised to achieve an amplified integrated capability outcome. As such, to achieve the full benefit of the TWF model, a different approach of integrating 1 ARMD REGT and 3/9 SAMR may be required. Consequently, to achieve an amplified integrated capability outcome, it could be argued that coordination of each individual's needs as well as the needs of the whole would require a central command structure. Considering 3/9 SAMR becoming a sub-unit under the command of 1 Armd Regt may be the only logical option which resulted in its direction.
As such, retention of the identity of 3/9 SAMR would require careful consideration, particularly during the ceremonial aspects of regimental life. The need to provide for PT service requirements such as allowances, pay, and career management would require significant support at both the sub-unit and regiment level. However, provided these are achieved, this model could provide a more adaptable TWF model.
The integration of 9 CSSB and 1 CSST reverses FT sub-unit integration into a PT unit requiring adaption, but for significant advantage. This model could provide an easier avenue for integration. Importantly, many of the unit’s supporting staff are FT members and are suitably trained to manage the integrated pay requirements for a FT sub-unit. The command and leadership of the FT sub-unit will benefit from the experience of working within a PT unit structure, gaining valuable insight into PT service as a part of career development.
Moreover, the PT unit achieves greater capability and sense of achievement by including the FT team within the battalion. Subsequently, a greater level of involvement with the brigade's FT units is achieved due to the provision of CSST for their activities. Moreover, PT personnel are available to support the CSST support requirements. Overall, there are significant advantages of including a FT sub-unit into a PT unit.
Since late 2020, the SA army environment has been conducive to the successful integration of PT and FT based units. Due to both the 2019/20 bush fires and the COVID-19 response requirements, the FT and PT units have been involved in providing a domestic response in SA. Moreover, the SA based FT and PT units have had significant opportunity to work together while providing the response even though they belonged to two separate brigades.
Furthermore, the requirements of these domestic operations have allowed 1 Armd Regt to build a positive and growing presence in the region. PT and FT units are required to deliver an integrated response to these domestic needs. Therefore, the provision of these responses has meant that the PT and FT units have built collaborative relationships supporting a sustainable TWF structure in SA that will now transition under a single brigade.
Although integration of the SA units under a single brigade has been enhanced by their collective efforts within domestic operations, 9th Brigade’s transition to HQ FORCOMD is likely to cause some domestic coordination challenges. HQ 2nd Division has been tasked with domestic operations as its raison dˈȇtre; however, 9th Brigade’s transition to FORCOMD now sees the majority of PT personnel in SA not primarily tasked with domestic operations. The reason for tasking 2nd Division with domestic operations was that it could provide a national response. With the transition of 9th Brigade out of the 2nd Division, that is no longer the case.
Importantly, provision of domestic operations in SA will now require the coordination of units within HQ FORCOMD as well as those remaining in 2nd Division. This outcome provides a complication to the provision of domestic operations that may not have been fully appreciated when the AFSIP was being drafted. Overall, the consideration for delivering domestic operations in SA requires significant planning and exercising between the functional HQs, as will the continued monitoring of this brigade’s design.
The proposed AFSIP and Army Objective Force forward basing design, though challenging for units with armoured vehicles located away from their home units, does provide a significant opportunity for PT units. Forward basing equipment near training areas provides PT units with a readily accessible training pool. Moreover, PT unit training programs often occur outside FT unit training programs due to weekend and summer holiday PT concentration periods. Forward basing could remove a significant governance burden for units meeting the growing expectation within Army of having access to equipment without the need to own and store it. The forward basing design certainly meets the needs for access to PT personnel's equipment and a likely reduction in governance.
Alterations to Australian Defence Force exercise activity dates is often a contributing factor to limiting the maximum participation of PT personnel. Moreover, PT personnel in some instances require prior notice of up to 12 months to organise leave with their civilian employers. However, during the Armoured Cavalry Regiment (ACR) integration trials, the author experienced changes to exercise dates that reduced planned PT involvement. The lesson is that stricter adherence to exercise dates would assist PT participation. Additionally, with the proposed use of forward basing, FT units will need to adhere to dates for equipment availability, further supporting greater PT involvement. Overall, defined and steadfast unit training programs will better support TWF outcomes.
Beyond the reintroduction of integrated brigades, attention should be drawn to not replicating PT units that mirror the FT unit design structure, due to the varying natures of their respective tasks. Predominantly, PT units prepare personnel to fill a manning document for tasks like Defence Force Aid to Civil Authority (DFACA), which is not a single unit responsibility. In contrast, FT units are generally structured to provide a unit response to a capability requirement. Consequently, designing PT units the same as FT units may not be the most appropriate response. Furthermore, PT units are impacted by funding personnel per their requirement, so can be configured around a salary cap.
Additionally, FT units with an everyday workforce need to be structured to fall within a manning cap. Consequently, a PT unit workforce structured to meet salary cap provisions may achieve a more flexible TWF model.
The 9th Brigade will provide Army with a means of developing and maturing the TWF beyond its current guise. The contemporary nature of the brigade can offer a dynamic platform of innovation to Army. Options such as providing corps-, rank-, and trade-agnostic positions to units – particularly PT units – may provide greater personnel capability. Agnostic positions could allow greater flexibility by allowing out-of-rank and/or trade personnel to be posted to an available position. The use of agnostic positions would be particularly relevant in regional depots, where corps and trade options are limited. Though centralised around RAAF Edinburgh, the opportunity to invest in regional depots by providing agnostic flexibility may provide further enhancements to the trial. Options providing workplace flexibility and accepting an individual’s circumstances can only benefit the workforce, AFSIP, and the TWF.
The new structure of 9th Brigade provides a number of opportunities for PT personnel. Forward basing will likely provide PT sub-units with a ready pool of equipment to utilise during weekend training. Provided the cultural identity of long time SA sub-units can be retained, the additional personnel to support units such as 1 Armd Regt provide significant opportunity and an enhanced capability. Moreover, retaining a PT commander of the 9th Brigade may provide Commander FORCOMD with a senior PT advisor to support FORCOMD decision making on PT service issues. A significant amount of opportunity exists for commanders at the tactical level to effectively leverage off the opportunities the AFSIP, TWF, Unit Affiliation Trial (UAT), and Flexible Establishment Trial (FET) seek to provide.
The integration of 9th Brigade does provide an excellent case study to measure the effectiveness and opportunities provided by an integrated brigade within AFSIP. With a focus on developing an integrated formation that supports the development and enhancement of a TWF model, Army could be able to take significant advantage from the lessons that are likely to be learnt as 9th Brigade develops its capability. Like any test or case study, significant measurement and parameters will need to be in place to ensure a fair and measured understanding of the outcomes is achieved. Unlike the 7th Brigade integration in 2005, the 9th Brigade integration offers the opportunity for documented outcomes to support future Army structure planning and workforce management.
The balance between meeting domestic and conventional tasks from two separate functional HQs is challenged further with the transition of 9th Brigade to FORCOMD. Certainly, the transition offers significant opportunity for both FT and PT personnel within SA, but it also provides significant coordination implications for a domestic response in SA. Though HQ 2nd Division should be responsible for planning and coordinating a domestic response in SA, it is likely that it will only be able to achieve this by use of a workforce from FORCOMD. Unlike the other states, not owning a suitably sized workforce in SA does pose some challenges and strategic balance within the state.
As outlined at the beginning, the changes to 9th Brigade offer both challenges and opportunities. It allows Army to test and evaluate components of the TWF that may not be possible or as effective otherwise. Moreover, with suitable parameters and measures in place to support decision making, an evolution towards a stronger and fitter component of Army may be possible. 9th Brigade provides Army with a great opportunity to build its knowledge of this structure’s benefit, as well as its disadvantages. Both will need to be fully understood to enable a stronger future Army. Ultimately, by its very existence, 9th Brigade demonstrates that Army is willing to take risks and seek new opportunities to support our nation. It certainly demonstrates an Army In Motion.
As a member of 3FD SQN, we are a small sub unit that brings a lot of capability, hindered by the fact that Ares sub units, don't always have the funding or material capability, to train as a Full time soldier could.
I, personally, look forward to this integration and the opportunity it could provide for those Ares soldiers, willing and able to put the time and effort in, to advance their skills, mindset; and overall, ensure that we have the best possible workforce available, for whatever task is laid upon us.