The Polish State of Affairs

Situated between Germany and the Baltic States, Poland holds a rich history and strategic significance as a vital link between East and West Europe. Shaped by its resilience during World War II and the Cold War, Poland has evolved into a key player in European affairs, particularly in regards for galvanising support against current Russian aggression. With a vibrant cultural heritage, a dynamic economy, and active engagement in the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Poland is expanding its influence beyond its borders.

Having enjoyed over thirty years of relative stability post communism, Poland has seen remarkable economic growth, even defying the detrimental impacts of the Global Financial Crisis. This prosperity stands in contrast to that experienced by the UK, Germany, and France in recent years. Seeking to ensure the continuation of this success, primarily driven by its robust economic performance, Poland has proactively strengthened its strategic posture both politically and militarily – and with good reason. This article will contextualise this change in posture and offer ways that Australia and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) could enhance collaboration.

The Spirit of the White Eagle

Poland's geopolitical decisions to join the EU and NATO reflects a collective memory deeply etched with the consequences of a vanquished nation. The Polish psyche has been shaped by traumatic events, epitomised by poignant references to Auschwitz, Katyn, Mokotow, and the Warsaw Uprising. Consequently, Vladimir Putin’s subversion of Crimea in 2014 acted as a catalyst, accelerating Polish military aspirations. This led to a comprehensive restructure of the Polish Armed Forces (PAF), accompanied by an ambitious capability modernisation program. 

Since then, Poland has emerged as an ardent advocate for NATO's assistance to Ukraine, influencing the positions of other members, and even altering the long-standing reluctance of countries like Germany. Enjoying widespread domestic support, Poland has consistently increased its defence budget, now well exceeding NATO’s mandated two percent of GDP, and aims to nearly double its military personnel strength within the coming decade.

Aspiring to become the EU’s largest military force (with support from the USA), Poland is strategically positioning itself as a leading nation within both the EU and NATO. This military expansion involves substantial acquisitions of hardware and technology transfers from South Korea, complemented by the integration of smaller quantities of premium US military equipment, including Abrams tanks and F-35 fighter aircraft, alongside indigenous systems such as the Borsuk IFV. 

While actively hosting and supporting NATO forces, Poland is conscientiously ensuring the attainment of sufficient sovereign military strength to effectively counter acts of aggression. This proactive approach is specifically aimed at pre-empting any potential threat before a comprehensive NATO response can be initiated. The focus is on addressing its limited strategic depth and various geographical vulnerabilities inherent to the region.

The Suwalki Gap, long acknowledged as key terrain, constitutes a relatively narrow stretch of land in northeast Poland situated between Belarus and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. This region presents potential vulnerabilities in military defence; a historical reality evidenced by various military campaigns spanning from before the Napoleonic Wars to World War II. 

Despite that, the Kaliningrad garrison may have been substantially diminished to supplement Putin’s 'special military operation' and Lukashenko’s regime’s main focus is internal security in Belarus; the deployment of tactical nuclear warheads, the proximity of battle-hardened Wagner combatants, and the exploitation of refugees on the Belarussian border serve as persistent reminders to Poland of the existential threat from the northeast. 

To counter the historical consequences of its geographically permeable environment, Poland has long desired an ‘Intermarium’. Initially envisioned as an alliance encompassing Central and Eastern European nations situated between the Baltic and Black Seas, it sought to counterbalance threats from the west (Prussia/Germany) and the east (Russia/USSR). The concept has evolved into the ‘Three Seas Initiative’, and underscores Poland's commitment in fostering near regional collaboration. Comprising of twelve EU member states, the initiative aims to strengthen political, economic, and potentially military cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe. This bloc within the EU holds a unique conceptual understanding of geopolitics compared to their Western European counterparts. 

As Poland enthusiastically pursues a regional leadership role, it faces several dilemmas. Ukraine currently serves as a natural bulwark for Poland from the most likely threat vector. However, a Russian victory would drastically compromise Poland’s strategic depth and its ability to respond effectively along a more exposed eastern flank. 

Therefore, this necessitates an ongoing financial burden in estimating the minimum strength required for an effective military deterrent. Fortunately – for now – the conflict to the east has propelled NATO into action, resulting in the establishment of eight eclectic multinational battle groups adjacent to the Ukrainian border. 

Additionally, the seaborne threat in the Baltic Sea has lessened with Finland’s – and soon Sweden’s – admission into the alliance. Nevertheless, NATO’s inherent bureaucratic nature and complex decision-making processes complicate Poland’s strategic plans, raising issues of the alliance’s reliability, timeliness, commitment, and compatibility. 

Furthermore, Poland’s stance on nuclear weapons fuels an ongoing domestic debate. While the nation has ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it hasn’t endorsed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, advocating for the retention and potential use of NATO’s nuclear arsenal on its behalf. Putin’s high-risk endeavours, coupled with miscalculations in Ukraine and his threats of ‘nuclear first-use’ have reaffirmed the central role nuclear deterrence plays in Poland’s national security strategy. Poland remains vigilant against any indication of a shift from the current US/UK-backed commitment, finding reassurance in the ongoing presence of those nations’ troops in the country.

The Legacy of Shared Valour

The shared military experiences of Australians and Poles were primarily forged during World War II’s North Africa Campaign. Australians, defending the highly strategic coastal port of Tobruk for five months, defiantly embraced the title “Rats of Tobruk.” Polish soldiers from the Carpathian Brigade played a pivotal role in lifting the siege. In recognition, the Australian 9th Division conferred the same esteemed title upon the Poles. These enduring friendships impacted Australia’s post-war migration, with our veterans sponsoring the migration of 1,500 Polish soldiers between 1947-48 in response to the challenges posed by Soviet occupation of the Polish homeland. 

Since Poland regained full independence in 1989, Polish and Australian military contingents have periodically been co-located, mainly due to demonstrating loyalty to the US alliance in campaigns such as Afghanistan and Iraq. The PAF, ranking as the fourth largest military contributor to the 2003 Iraq Campaign, commanded various coalition troops within the Multinational Division Central–South (MND-CS). Demonstrating their expertise, the Poles secured the Umm Qasr port and the adjacent oil platforms, subsequently also undertaking special operations as part of JSOTF.[i] Additionally, both nations have participated in various UN operations. 

The recent emphasis on bolstering NATO cohesiveness has further strengthened the bilateral relationship between Poland (a member nation) and Australia (an Enhanced Opportunities Partner). This provides additional avenues for collaboration between the geographically distant countries with similar strategic intent and political considerations. Furthermore, the two nations enjoy an unhindered cultural connection through the substantial diaspora and the Australian population with Polish heritage.[ii]

There has been a gradual rise in defence military and industry interactions in recent years. Notable events included Poland expressing interest in acquiring the former HMAS Newcastle and HMAS Melbourne. Poland’s shortlisting of the Hawkei, coupled with close observations of the battle proficiency of Australian hardware gifted to Ukraine such as the Bushmaster and the Corvo Unmanned Aerial System is also presenting collaboration opportunities. 

Poland’s recently procured K9 self-propelled howitzers will be similar to Australia’s AS9 Huntsman variants, contributing to the similar (predominately American) hardware that both militaries will have in the near future. The relationship hit a highwater mark in 2018 with the Polish President and Defence Minister visiting Australia with the intent to ‘explore a MOU regarding defence cooperation’.[iii] However, these announcements are yet to be publicly realised. 

Crafting a Path

Australia and Poland’s military outlooks would appear disparate at first glance. Australia, a maritime nation with no land borders, contrasts with Poland – a continental power with limited sea access. One is adjacent to a military conflict to its east, while the other contends with the insecurity of its trade routes and northern approaches in a region dominated by littoral influence. 

Despite these facts, both are regional middle powers with strong links to the USA, exhibiting geo-political influence beyond their global standings. Emulating the defiance of the ‘Rats of Tobruk’, both nations have rejected revanchism and economic coercion from larger regimes. Equally, both nations have achieved counter-intelligence successes, but continue to face existential threats from state actors who seek to conduct espionage or usurp our respective domestic democratic processes. 

With Poland’s increasing influence in NATO and the EU, coupled with its potential leadership role in the ‘Three Seas Initiative’, there is a compelling argument for further enhancing our overall defence interactions. Shared military history, alignment with the American alliance, use of similar military hardware, linked heritage, and the current subtle military interactions form a solid foundation for exploring various lines of efforts: 

• Pursuing the Defence-related MOU: This initiative aims to facilitate increased exchanges on shared security concerns and specialised capabilities like cyber operations, artificial intelligence; and enhances the feasibility of pursuing other lines of collaboration.
• Establishing a greater ADF diplomatic presence in Warsaw: A permanent in-country representation would specifically oversee the military-to-military relationship, transforming existing subtle linkages into a more sustained and enduring military connection, facilitating increased exchanges and cooperation.
• Professional Military Education initiatives: To further the military relationship, the Australian Defence College could establish a greater connection with its Polish counterparts. This would include guest lecturer presentations and transitioning into various exchanges, emulating the previous acceptance of a Ukrainian member. Reciprocally, an ADF member could be seconded to the War Studies University to provide a sustained Australian perspective and subject matter expertise on the Indo-Pacific area of operations.
• Increased Defence Industry collaboration: Poland, as host or the third-largest military trade exposition in Europe and serving as the major conduit for military aid to Ukraine, offers opportunities for partnerships. Greater exposure and engagement with major players within the Polish defence industry can further expand collaboration in areas like cybersecurity, space technology, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and other disruptive technologies. This collaboration would also assist shaping capability requirements and improving Australian military procurements due to Poland’s intimate knowledge of the Ukrainian conflict.

Conclusion

Recent narratives, including our Defence Strategic Review, express concerns about the increased possibility of military conflict in the near future – a reality currently faced by Poland. Strengthening the military relationship would facilitate more in-depth collaboration on security preparedness. This approach also offers valuable insights into Poland’s posture as a front-line NATO state against existential threats. 

Poland's role in hosting and conducting larger, more complex exercises, influenced by lessons learnt from the Ukrainian conflict, provides a unique perspective on deterrence strategies, grey zone tactics, and even the PAF’s success in recruitment and retention. Commensurately, the PAF would welcome insight of the ADF’s experience in the Indo-Pacific, fostering an exchange of knowledge and expertise that enhances the overall strategic preparedness of both nations. Undeniably, a closer defence relationship also serves as another direct link into NATO and the EU. 

Australia has already demonstrated through tangible efforts that it ‘Stands with Ukraine’. An enhanced military relationship would extend that solidarity to Poland. The recommendations in this paper provide several initial pathways for Australia and the ADF to pursue such an outcome. Inspired by the tenacity and determination of our military forebearers, the ADF and the PAF can forge a stronger partnership that honours their legacy, paving the way for shared resilience and success in the face of current and future challenges.

This article was derived from the author's recent visit to Poland as part of a JSDF College delegation.

End Notes