The Current Climate

The ADF’s recent experiences through ‘The Global War on Terror’ resulted in an immature approach to theatre sustainment. Whilst fit for purpose, our method of sustainment in the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO) was bespoke and did not build sufficient resilience into our National Support Base (NSB), nor did it develop our ability to sustain changing operating environments; specifically, within our region.

The release of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) shined the light on significant lapses in the way we have approached sustainment and the lack of resilience built into a Whole-of-Nation (WoN) approach to logistics. Whilst the DSR addresses a broad scope of logistical shortfalls, this article will consider our approach to strategic fuel, and will argue that prioritising an optimised workforce capable of expeditionary operations is crucial.

The DSR recommends a WoN approach to fuel sustainment with specific attention applied to our ability to distribute fuel to the north and northwest of Australia; while there needs to be a common understanding to the collective fuel requirements led by an integrated fuel council, enabling National Defence. Figure 1 illustrates the vulnerability of Australia’s energy security, as geopolitical tensions and supply chain disruptions continue to strain our system. There is a heavy reliance on imported fuel, with up to 90% imported from various countries within the strategic ‘land bridge’ to our northwest, demonstrating a strong need to defend key Lines of Communication (LoC) throughout our region and to source alternative methods for supply.

Figure 1: Australia’s Energy Security (Data Source. https://www.iea.org/)

To mitigate the risks associated with this high degree of dependence, Australia maintains a strategic fuel reserve, managed by the Australian Institute of Petroleum (AIP). This consists of both crude oil and refined petroleum products held in a combination of onshore and offshore storage facilities, inclusive of inbound ships.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates Australia’s holdings to be 61 days, which falls significantly short of the obligated 90-day minimum. With our figure representing the lowest holding of any member state, when coupled with a refinery network without capacity to deal with the holdings, the concerns raised within the DSR become further evident.

The concept of National Defence incorporates strategic depth and resilience, an integrated approach, and a common understanding of each stakeholder’s critical requirements – encompassing supply, distribution, and storage. Disrupting supply of refined petroleum products such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel would critically undermine our ability to practice National Defence, particularly when Defence assets increase their draw on an under-established northern distribution and storage network, notwithstanding an increased US presence.

While this establishes the inadequacy in our WoN approach to the current strategic environment, there is scope for the ADF to influence a ‘joint, expeditionary theatre logistics system with strategic depth and mobility’ which supports resolution at the tactical and operational level.

The ADF possesses a significant military workforce that is highly trained and capable of operating in an expeditionary role, enabling the integrated force – the Army’s Petroleum Operators (Pet Op) have never been more relevant.

The Solution to Expeditionary Fuel

The role of the Pet Op within the 17th Sustainment Brigade (17 Sust Bde) is to facilitate the Deployable Bulk Fuel Distribution System (DBFDS). In practice, they are the uniformed workforce that receive bulk fuel from the NSB and distribute it into theatre.

Whilst other force elements play critical roles at defined junctures, they are not as broadly employable as an integrated force – particularly when considering their fundamental make up. An example being Ground Crew Air Support (GCAS), who are equally trained in handling aviation fuel; however, operate primarily from vehicles within fixed infrastructure and have a dual-hatted specialisation in munitions.

Pet Ops on the other hand, are fundamentally an expeditionary force employable within amphibious and airmobile operations facilitating refuelling to both ground and air. Their ‘expeditionary’ or deployable capabilities, compromised fuel testing and ability to embed into Host Nation (HN) infrastructure will be critical to operational success within the littoral environment to the north.

The Exemplar

The Tactical Supply Wing (TSW) of the Royal Air Force (RAF) demonstrates the potential for what the ADF can achieve with Pet Ops. The TSW provide logistics support to deployed forces and was established in 1993 following the First Gulf War as a more flexible, responsive option to support forces within remote and austere locations.

Given our geographic disposition, a similar approach would allow a Refuel Point Aviation (RPA) to be ‘pushed’ forward to strategic points in the north, northwest, and offshore – supporting sustained operations, increasing redundancy, and enabling our ability to hold an adversary at risk.

To achieve this, due attention should be considered for investment toward the interoperability of our fuel capabilities with US Forces. The US will play a strategic role in our National Defence, and interoperability with the US will be critical due to its significant workforce, fuel storage, and distribution capability. There is greater opportunity for success through increasing fuel-specific International Engagement (IE) and training serials.

Pet Ops: Current State

The Pet Ops do not come without significant issues; this specialised workforce has been ‘sitting on the bench’ for too long. In the MEAO, fuel was heavily contracted and – while perfectly suitable at the time – led to a disgruntled and underutilised workforce that now experiences increased hollowness, exacerbated by the current retention and recruitment issues. Not since the ADF’s commitment to East Timor and Solomon Islands have our Pet Ops truly been tested and – while this was a significant time ago – proved their viability.

Internally, the Pet Ops routinely seek out challenging training through networking; however, they are commonly undermined by having basic tasks within their technical scope prioritised in support of land manoeuvre. Aviation refuelling is far more complex than a Kerbside Refuel Point (KRP) or Bulk Fuel Installation (BFI).

It is a role that only limited personnel can provide, and one that Pet Ops are best equipped for, particularly within a contested, remote context. Despite this, the latter two are prioritised. Whilst a BFI falls within the remit of the Pet Ops, there is scope for other elements to conduct smaller diesel installations, truck-to-truck transfer, or even unmanned refuel points to provide requisite support – enabling prioritisation of strategically aligned tasks.

There is immaturity in the breakdown of available Pet Op workforce, posted largely to Combat Service Support Battalions (CSSBs) rather than Force Support Battalions (FSBs). By doctrine, a CSSB provides Close and Integral support – generally providing ground fuel to land manoeuvre, and in comparatively small quantities. Whilst this is important, we have established that other elements can achieve a commensurate effect.

The FSB provides support across Mounting, General, and Close with non-transferable roles in aviation refuelling, amphibious distribution, overland pumping, and fuel quality control – all of which are capabilities of the expeditionary force that our strategic environment and National Defence demand.

This suggests that the current workforce is not optimised, though it is acknowledged that further development of the Land Force Support System may go some way towards addressing this.

Moving Forward

The required approach moving forward is linked to one general theme: workforce optimisation. It is imperative that we consider the strategic value of this workforce and test our interoperability to failure in expeditionary training serials. Where we can limit use in situations where other methods of fuel provision are legitimate, albeit not perfect, we enable capacity to trial new concepts.

Support to Joint activities, special operations, or even border security operations would provoke thought in our planners and foster development of robust refuelling concepts. This would allow us to professionalise workable solutions, discount non-workable solutions, and allocate investment into identified gaps.

Testing a viable option for the ADF’s expeditionary refuelling capability by placing them in Shoalwater Bay conducting a BFI and KRP, does not adequately meet the intent of the DSR. This is where our planning has focused the workforce and the DSR needs to act as the catalyst to change that approach.

TSW demonstrates the value in deploying a small refuelling detachment, increasing the range of both Fixed and Rotary Wing assets. Pet Ops have demonstrated capacity to achieve this but are stuck operating within the ‘norms’ of immature fuel planning. In addition to this, the US Forces will play an important role in the north and every effort should be made to increase interoperability, with combined fuel-specific training serials in a littoral environment the aiming mark.

The two platoons within the FSBs conduct a combined field phase each year, allowing them to exercise the amphibious and overland pumping capabilities. Whilst opportunistic training with the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Army Aviation (AAAvn) has occurred, there needs to be a more deliberate approach in this being a trade-wide exercise that focuses on interoperability and reduced skill fade on strategically aligned capabilities.

Incorporating distinct amphibious fuel distribution serials into the Sea Series exercise design would enable essential training with RAN, while directed AAAvn support would optimise platform currency, allowing for a more prepared force.

This signals a further IE opportunity with US fuel planners and workforce, scheduling the exercise in the north and integrating industry would enhance training exponentially, and expose any shortfalls.

There has been a long-standing requirement to professionalise our senior fuel workforce, particularly the officer cohort. The Army sponsors one officer per year to attend the UK Petroleum Course; however, there is very limited return on investment. Utilising this officer as a fuel planner within Joint Operations Command, 1st Division, Forces Command, or 17 Brigade post platoon command would lead to professionalised planning within fuel sustainment and would provide a representative to champion optimisation of the workforce.

Conclusion

The nation’s strategic fuel state is inadequate. Whilst this is recognised, the ADF cannot wait until a WoN solution presents itself. We can begin to mitigate these shortfalls by prioritising and optimising the Pet Op workforce. These highly trained and capable individuals can play a crucial role in expeditionary fuel operations to ensure operational depth, mobility, and resilience.

It is imperative to view this workforce’s strategic value and begin to test new concepts. Conducting business as usual will not enable our capabilities to develop, particularly those niche capabilities that are strategically aligned. The DSR needs to be the catalyst that causes the prioritisation of aviation refuelling and amphibious distribution and judicious allocation of workforce.

Increased attention need be applied to the interoperability with the Royal Australian Air Force, AAAvn, RAN and the US. There should be a concerted effort to test these expeditionary capabilities to failure and encourage a common operating picture. Concentrating on interoperability will tease out failure points where we can invest resources to resolve or mitigate.

The Army’s Pet Ops might just be the answer to an integrated approach in achieving an expeditionary fuel effect, but only if given the opportunity.