As modern conflict evolves, so too must the roles and responsibilities of the Australian Army’s formations. As outlined in 2023’s Defence Strategic Review, the 2nd (Australian) Division [2(AS)DIV] is now primarily focused on Homeland Defence during large scale combat operations. A part of the potential mission set included in this role is the protection of air bases in Australia’s north.
The capabilities developed for high-end conflict global conflict scenarios can also be used in operations below the threshold of global conflict. The structure of Security and Response Task Units (SRTUs) means they are capable of undertaking critical offshore roles, such as the protection of deployed temporary Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) facilities during peacekeeping and humanitarian operations and low intensity conflicts.
From Homeland Defence to Expeditionary Protection?
The 2 (AS) Div’s mission of defending critical domestic infrastructure during global conflict directly translates to the protection of high value assets in an expeditionary context. Deployed installations such as Air Points of Disembarkation, forward operating bases, naval logistics nodes, temporary radar installations and staging areas are vital to the success of expeditionary joint operations. These deployable facilities, established in austere or contested environments, require bespoke security arrangements. 2 (AS) Div’s protection of these nodes would allow other combat forces to focus on their core operational missions, rather than being diluted or overtasked by static security responsibilities.
Lessons from INTERFET and Emerging Gaps
This capability requirement is not hypothetical. During the 1999 INTERFET operation in East Timor, a forward airbase in Dili sustained the critical air bridge between Australia and the theatre of operations. Protection of this site was resource-intensive and fell primarily to RAAF Air Ground Security Forces (SECFOR). Since the deployment to INTERFET in 1999 there have been multiple evolutions of the RAAF SECFOR (commonly referred to as transformation 1 and 2). The scope of RAAF SECFOR responsibilities has evolved significantly and become more focused. The size of RAAF SECFOR – 2 Squadrons – is a key limitation for the provision of organic force protection at scale. Put simply, there are not enough aviators to secure the infrastructure that requires protection.
This capability gap presents an opportunity. The 2 (AS) Div, already trained in infrastructure protection, is capable of filling this role with tailored, scalable force elements. The threat environment has also evolved. Contemporary risks, including UAVs, indirect fire, and disruption to enabling infrastructure such as bridges, power, and water now demand a wider area of protection – out to 20km or more. This exceeds the traditional remit of RAAF area protection, which typically focuses on a clearly defined perimeter. Army SRTUs are better suited to projecting protection into this wider battlespace with Land Forces generally securing Ground Defence Area and beyond. The 2 (AS) Div can also reinforce RAAF capabilities through passive defence measures including engineering efforts to harden and strengthen critical infrastructure, local logistics support for the dispersal of materiel across air bases, and the conduct of camouflage, concealment, and deception operations to reduce vulnerability and enhance survivability.
Generic Airbase Ground Defence Areas (Airbase Operations – Integration Doctrine)
To mitigate external threats to the airbase operating environment, the airbase operations commander may be assigned a ground defence area. The ground defence area is defined by the geographical boundaries of the tactical area of responsibility assigned to the airbase operations commander, who has the authority to control assigned forces and coordinate operational activity. In most cases, the airbase operations commander will not be assigned an external ground defence area – outside the tactical area of responsibility – where security activities will be the responsibility of the host nation or other friendly force. A degree of coordination with adjoining formations is required where ground defence area boundaries are shared.
Why Army and Not an Expanded RAAF units?
A fair observer might ask whether an expanded RAAF force protection capability could meet the demands of modern airbase defence. However, the nature of today’s threat environment suggests otherwise. The RAAF’s organic protection model is generally limited to manoeuvre within the Close Defence Area and limited reach into the Ground Defence Area, as defined in airbase security doctrine. This model optimises static defence within a defined perimeter.
In contrast, contemporary threats – including persistent surveillance, indirect fire, and the proliferation of unmanned systems – require a more agile and layered approach. Airbases are now vulnerable well beyond their fences, and disruption to enabling infrastructure such as power, water, and logistics can render them combat-ineffective without ever targeting runways or aircraft. As static assets, airbases cannot manoeuvre to avoid threats; they must be protected through depth, dispersion, and integration with broader joint operations.
Army’s SRTUs are trained to operate in this extended battlespace. Their ability to secure terrain beyond line of sight, conduct area denial and route protection, and integrate with joint manoeuvre elements makes them uniquely suited to protecting airpower as a system, not just a site. This layered, mobile, and integrated approach is exactly what future operations require.
Building on Established Integration
This is not a novel proposal for 2 (AS) Div. SRTUs regularly train with 38X Squadrons (notably RAAF’s 381, 382, and 383 Squadrons, the RAAF deployed airbase specialist squadrons) and with RAAF Security Force Squadrons (1SECFOR SQN and 2SECFOR SQN), maintaining alignment on tactics, techniques, and procedures for airbase security. This embedded cooperation forms a strong foundation for expeditionary joint operations. This capability is already in practice, proven, and ready for deployment.
Rather than building an entirely new structure within RAAF, Defence can leverage an integrated, Army-led protection force, aligned with Air Force operating concepts. This model also provides a platform to address emerging capability gaps, particularly in countering small un-crewed aircraft systems (SUAS) and light civil aircraft. The proliferation of these threats has outpaced traditional base defence models and a layered, integrated approach is now essential.
There is a clear opportunity to develop a joint counter-UAS capability, with Army contributing manoeuvre and denial operations, and RAAF providing detection and response integration. Within 2 (AS) Div, the 9th Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery, is well positioned to assume a lead role in this space. Expanding its remit to include counter-UAS operations would not only address a critical capability gap but also enhance its relevance within 2 (AS) Div and the broader force generation model.
Scalability, Dispersal, and Organisational Agility
One of the most compelling advantages of the SRTU is its scalability and adaptability. These units deploy in flexible configurations, from platoon-sized elements to full battlegroup size SRTU, enabling Defence planners to tailor the force to mission requirements. They are particularly adept at supporting dispersed operations, operating across large areas in small, self-sufficient packets to enable agile air operations. This reflects modern realities that large, concentrated airbases are increasingly vulnerable and future operations will require distributed, resilient basing concepts. The SRTU is an ideal force to support the protection of dispersed air operations in volatile regions. SRTUs already operate in this mode through major integrated training activities and tabletop exercises. During Exercise Talisman Sabre 2025, SRTUs integrated with 38X SQN and SECFOR SQN to deliver a layered and persistent security effect.
Sustained Readiness through Structured Service Category 4
2 (AS) Div’s strength is further enhanced by the current use of Service Category 4 (SERCAT 4) personnel. Through Operational Staffing Documents, SRTUs can generate pre-identified, collectively trained force elements capable of rapid deployment both domestically and abroad. This model provides readiness and predictability while avoiding the personnel strain of tasking full-time units or relying solely on full-time force generation. By utilising part-time and specialist skillsets, the ADF maintains operational flexibility and scalability aligned with Defence’s Total Workforce System objectives.
Conclusion
The strategic rationale is clear. 2 (AS) Div, with its homeland defence roots, scalable SRTU structure, and established integration with RAAF units, is ideally suited to serve as a deployable Protection Force for RAAF facilities. This role complements its domestic mandate, relieves pressure on overstretched combat and air security elements, and enhances the ADF’s ability to operate effectively during peacekeeping and humanitarian operations up to low-intensity conflict and limited war.
By formalising and investing in this role, Defence will not only close a critical capability gap but also make smarter use of existing force structure, enabling a more agile and resilient joint force posture in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
