Introduction: An Argument Whose Time Has Come

Few debates in the information environment generate stronger views than the relationship between Military Public Affairs (MPA) and Information Operations (IO). For decades, practitioners across Western militaries have argued over whether MPA should remain separate from influence activities to preserve credibility or become more deeply integrated with IO to maximise operational effectiveness. Today that debate is becoming increasingly disconnected from operational reality.

The information environment (IE) has evolved beyond the organisational constructs inherited from the post-Cold War era. Strategic competition now occurs continuously across all layers of the IE (physical, virtual, and cognitive)[1], and is captured in traditional media, social media, and our very psyche. Adversaries no longer distinguish between information disciplines, or peacetime and wartime narratives. They employ integrated campaigns designed to influence perceptions, decision-making, and behaviour at tactical, operational, and strategic levels simultaneously.

Against this backdrop, the argument that MPA should remain organisationally or culturally isolated from IO has become increasingly difficult to sustain. Indeed, the more important question is no longer whether MPA belongs within IO, but whether Western militaries can afford for it not to.

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) already provides the answer. ADF doctrine recognises MPA as an information capability that informs, educates, and persuades target audiences in support of strategic objectives, and directs that MPA be synchronised with other information-related capabilities across all levels of operations[2]. The issue is therefore not doctrinal legitimacy, but organisational implementation.

If Australia seeks to achieve information advantage against sophisticated competitors, MPA must be recognised for what it has become: a central operational capability in the contest for narrative superiority.

The Information Environment Has Changed. Many of Our Assumptions Have Not

The traditional separation between MPA and IO emerged from legitimate concerns over credibility. A capability traditionally filled by journalists, MPA was associated with truth, transparency, and accountability. IO, particularly through historical associations with military deception and psychological operations, was often viewed as a separate influence enterprise. The resulting organisational "firewall" sought to protect MPA from perceptions that it was involved in manipulation or deception.

However, scholars and practitioners have challenged this binary distinction for decades.

As early as 1996, Robin K. Crumm argued that global media systems were blurring the lines between MPA and psychological operations (PSYOPS). The report observed that communications directed towards domestic audiences increasingly influenced foreign audiences and vice versa, making traditional segmentation increasingly unrealistic[3].

More recently, RAND researchers argued that the distinction between "informing" and "influencing" is largely artificial because all information has influence effects. By the very nature of informing someone, you are influencing their understanding. The report concluded that excessive separation between MPA and PSYOPS[4] increases the risk of contradictory messaging, information fratricide, and missed opportunities for coordination.[5]

The same argument appears in contemporary professional literature. Major Brian Kerg and Major Kenneth Kunze note that Public Affairs Officers already make choices about which stories are told, how they are framed, and which themes are emphasised. They are therefore inherently engaged in narrative competition even while remaining committed to truthful communication.[6]

This creates an unavoidable reality that MPA informs, influences, and shapes perceptions. So, the question is not whether influence occurs, it’s whether that influence is deliberate, aligned with operational objectives, and coordinated with other information effects to maximise impact.

The ADF Already Recognises Military Public Affairs as an Influence Capability

Ironically, much of the debate occurring within the defence community has already been settled in doctrine. ADF-A-3 Military Public Affairs defines MPA as an "inform and educate" capability with the ability to influence. It states that MPA supports national strategic communication objectives and is synchronised with other information-related capabilities.

Significantly, the doctrine explicitly identifies target audiences and acknowledges that MPA seeks to inform, educate, and persuade those audiences. Perhaps more importantly, the doctrine directs MPA activities to be fully integrated into joint force planning and synchronised with other information-related capabilities during operations.

The doctrine's Combined Team-Uruzgan case study illustrates exactly what integrated IO looks like in practice. MPA, PSYOPS, Civil-Military Interaction & Cooperation (CIMIC) achieved a unity of effort through synchronising their activities across media engagement, social media, the establishment of a radio station, traditional media (such as billboards), and key leader engagement. These efforts helped amplify International Security Assistance Force messages and strengthened their reception through concise, clear, and repeated talking points, and shows integration is not a recent innovation, it is established ADF doctrine.

Narrative Superiority is Now an Operational Objective

Military professionals often discuss air superiority, maritime superiority, and decision superiority. Increasingly, modern conflict requires narrative superiority: the side that most effectively shapes perceptions frequently gains advantages that cannot be achieved through kinetic means alone.

Emerging literature increasingly recognises the central importance of information effects within modern warfare. Major Joseph D. Levin argues that modern conflicts demonstrate the growing importance of ‘cognitive warfare’ and public-facing information operations in determining strategic outcomes. His article highlights how information environment dominance can influence domestic support, international legitimacy, and coalition cohesion.[7]

One of the strongest contemporary examples of this is Ukraine. Ukrainian strategic communications, combined with consistent public affairs activity, PSYOPS, and leadership messaging, have successfully generated international support, sanctions against Russia, and sustained political will across multiple countries. The use of coordinated information effects, in tandem with kinetic strike, has created a holistic advantage over Russia (such as during Op Spiderweb where unprecedented visibility into battlefield operations via the media and social media gave Ukraine narrative superiority ahead of the first round of peace talks with Moscow[8]). The result of Ukraine’s coordinated focus on the information environment has been not merely informational success but tangible military advantage.[9]

Conversely, conflicts in Gaza have demonstrated how even significant military success can be undermined when adversaries successfully shape international narratives. As several recent studies highlight, actors such as Hamas have deliberately used information activities to create strategic pressure despite tactical disadvantages.[10]

So, while narratives do not replace military power, they can determine how military power is interpreted, with MPA being best positioned to shape that interpretation to wider audiences.

Competitors Have Already Integrated Information Capabilities

Perhaps the most compelling argument for integration is the behaviour of our adversaries.

China's “Three Warfares” concept demonstrates a long-standing commitment to the integration of psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare. Recent Chinese military writings further elevate "cognitive domain operations" as a central component of future warfare, highlighting their dedicated effort to, and acknowledgment of, the role of the information environment[11].

Russia has also adopted an equally sophisticated approach. According to researchers at the Institute for the Study of War, Russia is deliberately developing global networks of journalists, media personalities, and AI-enabled content creators to sustain long-term influence operations[12]. The Institute’s report characterises these activities as integral components of Russian ‘cognitive warfare’, components regularly uncovered in malign information websites connected to these Russian media efforts[13].

In their article, Scilla Alecci further demonstrates how state-linked actors are exploiting journalism ecosystems, impersonating media organisations, targeting reporters, and conducting intelligence collection through ostensibly journalistic channels.[14]

Meanwhile, Iran continues to demonstrate sophisticated understanding of IO, with the Lego videos being a prime example of how understanding your target audience and the platforms they use, can influence global perceptions and support[15]. More recently, Iranian efforts focused on targeting US military morale, families, and public perceptions through coordinated disinformation media campaigns aimed at undermining confidence in US military operations.[16]

These states do not separate media engagement, communications, influence activities, and information assessment into isolated organisational silos. They consistently pursue coordinated effects, even when the West often does not, and that asymmetry matters.

Public Affairs Needs Information Environment Assessment

One of the strongest practical arguments for integration concerns situational awareness.

Public Affairs professionals should be among the most informed personnel within the information environment enterprise. Yet in many organisations they are often excluded from key information assessment processes, and/or simply do not have the time or resources to keep up with the flow of incoming information.

An integrated IO workforce provides Military Public Affairs Officers access to timely:

• Information environment assessments.
• Narrative analysis.
• Sentiment monitoring.
• Disinformation identification.
• Audience analysis.
• Behavioural insights.
• Strategic communication planning.
• Adversary information activity assessment.

This produces immediate operational benefits.

If malign narratives emerge targeting ADF activities, MPA integrated within an IO team (inclusive of information environment analysis) can rapidly identify, assess, and respond. If adversaries seek to exploit misinformation within media ecosystems, integrated IO teams can provide commanders with early warning and coordinated response options, including coordinated campaigns that achieve narrative superiority before adversaries can even speak. Without this integration, MPA very often becomes reactive and unable to meaningfully contribute to achieving an information advantage.

Military Public Affairs, PSYOPS and CIMIC Are Complementary, Not Competitive

Some continue to perceive MPA, PSYOPS, and CIMIC as competing information disciplines. Operational history suggests the opposite.

The Al Muthanna Task Group provides an excellent Australian example. In his case study, Major Michael Harris details how MPA worked alongside CIMIC to shape local perceptions, communicate reconstruction efforts, and maintain domestic support. MPA was integrated into targeting, planning, daily briefings, and commander decision-making processes. The Task Group commander later described the capability as mission-critical.[17]

Likewise, contemporary research at the Naval Postgraduate School concludes that the side most effectively coordinating MPA and PSYOPS efforts often gains significant advantage in the information war. After examining conflicts including Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Gaza, the authors concluded that coordinated MPA-PSYOPS efforts produced stronger outcomes than isolated ones.[18]

The issue then is not convergence of authorities, it is integration of effort.

An integrated IO team is no different to a corporate ad agency, or how big businesses run their communication teams. When it comes to information in the private sector, elements contributing to a business’ narrative aren’t siloed, they are one unit, and it’s clear to see how each information discipline in the ADF contributes similarly:

• MPA contributes credibility, media engagement, and strategic communication (the ‘PR’ wing of the corporate world).
• PSYOPS contributes behavioural understanding and influence expertise (the advertising and marketing wing).
• CIMIC contributes local population understanding and trusted engagement (the community engagement wing).
• Information environment analysts provide situational awareness (the marketing data gurus).

When implemented together they create a more complete information capability than any discipline can provide alone.

The Credibility Argument Deserves Respect, But Not Veto Power

Concerns regarding credibility should not be dismissed. Credibility remains the foundation of effective public affairs. However, credibility is not protected by isolation. Credibility is protected by truthfulness, transparency, and professional standards.

The assumption that coordination with IO automatically damages credibility is increasingly unsupported by operational experience. As RAND observed, much contemporary PSYOPS activity already relies upon truthful information. The distinction frequently lies not in the content but in audience, attribution, and delivery mechanisms.[19]

Moreover, contemporary behavioural research suggests trust is increasingly mediated through social networks, communities, and identity groups rather than institutional distinctions between information disciplines. In this environment, separation for its own sake does not provide much protection, while strong professional governance does.

Integrated workforces may actually be better positioned to preserve ethical standards because they provide shared situational awareness and clearer understanding of organisational boundaries. Their joint authorities may also contribute to delivering more timely information, on the right channels, which builds credibility and trust with audiences.

Beyond White, Grey, and Black

The historical framework of white, grey, and black information activities has shaped much of the cultural resistance to MPA-IO integration. Yet strategic competition increasingly renders these distinctions less useful as organising principles.

The modern challenge is not whether information belongs to a particular category, it is whether information activities contribute to strategic objectives while remaining lawful, ethical, and credible. Arguably, all operations the ADF undertakes fall under these caveats. If delayed attribution (previously thought of as ‘grey’) supports a commander to safely manoeuvre forces to meet government direction, and does so lawfully, then the argument that it is less ethical or credible is void.

The key distinction should no longer be between MPA and IO, white or black. The ADF does not need separate tribes competing for relevance within the information environment. We need integrated professionals operating under clear authority, robust oversight, and common strategic purpose to deliver effective information activities for commanders.

Conclusion: Military Public Affairs is a Warfighting Capability

The information environment is now a contested domain of strategic competition.

Narratives influence behaviour.

Media ecosystems affect military outcomes.

Information advantage shapes strategic success.

In such an environment, MPA cannot remain a peripheral support function.

ADF doctrine already recognises its influence role. Operational experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere demonstrates its value. Allied thinking increasingly emphasises information advantage, narrative superiority, and integrated information workforces, while competitors are investing heavily in media ecosystems, cognitive warfare, and information campaigns.

The evidence points consistently in one direction: Military Public Affairs is not separate from Information Operations, it is one of Information Operations' most important capabilities.

The future challenge is therefore not convincing Public Affairs Officers that they contribute to information effects. The future challenge is organising the workforce in a way that allows them to achieve those effects more effectively than our adversaries.

Because in an era of strategic competition, credibility itself may be one of the most powerful influence capabilities available to the Australian Defence Force.

End Notes

[1] As described in Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (AJP-10.1)

[2] ADF-A-3 Military Public Affairs

[3] Crumm, RK 1996, Chapter 2: Defining Information Warfare and Identifying the Public Affairs Link, JSTOR

[4] Now returned to ‘PSYOPS’ in U.S. terminology, at the time of the report ‘PSYOPS’ was called ‘MISO’.

[5] CHAPTER SIX Overlaps Between Public Affairs and Military Information Support Operations

[6] Tell Me a Story: Operationalizing the Narrative in the Information Environment

[7] Lessons on Public-Facing Information Operations in Current Conflicts

[8] Translating Ukraine Lessons for the Pacific Theatre | Australian Army Research Centre (AARC)

[9] Lessons on Public-Facing Information Operations in Current Conflicts

[10] Lessons on Public-Facing Information Operations in Current Conflicts, The Roles of PA and MISO in Modern Warfare, Militants, Media, and the Gaza Information War

[11] Total War on Taipei: China Explores Elevating Cognitive Effects into Its Vision of Warfare

[12] The Kremlin is Cultivating an AI-Trained Global Media Cadre for Lasting Influence

[13] Real news site or Russian propaganda? 

[14] Phony whistleblowers fake journalists and cyber spies-ICIJ network targeted after China Targets probe

[15] Pamphlets, radio, and now Iran’s AI-generated Lego videos: the new frontier of information warfare

[16] Tehran's War on American Morale

[17] Military Public Affairs in Complex Environments

[18] The Roles of PA and MISO in Modern Warfare

[19] CHAPTER SIX Overlaps Between Public Affairs and Military Information Support Operations