Background

The Australian Army’s proud history of operating in littoral environments is etched into its collective consciousness – the images of young men clad in slouch hats clambering up the barren hills around Anzac Cove and supply tents stretching across the beachfront are seared into our institutional memory.

But despite this, Australia – unlike our counterparts in the United Kingdom and the United States – has never maintained a separate ‘Marine’ force. Our small number, and our great coastline, made this a practical impossibility. But in times where mobilisation of nations states took months, the rapid penetration and counter-penetration capability that marine forces offer was of far less importance than the heavier capability that more traditional land-based units can provide. But the littoral zone – that pesky part of the Earth where the land meets the sea, and the sea meets the land – now demands the attention of all regional players in the Indo-Pacific.

Global population trends all point towards an explosion of population in the coastal areas of the Indo-Pacific. In fact, despite already being incredibly densely populated, its population is expected to double in size within the next 20 years.[2] As cities which may already be suffering from infrastructure deficiencies spill over into instability, navigating the intersection between littoral, urban, jungle, and human terrain represents a challenge that traditional warfighting units may be unable to expeditiously and efficiently navigate.

This demographic change, coupled with advancement in technology which has significantly reduced the time on target for military assets into combat zones, has drawn into sharp focus the need for a rapid response capability for regional players. In this respect, traditional, heavier land forces are ill equipped to meet the complex and multifaceted terrain requirements of the Indo-Pacific’s littoral zones and deploy rapidly to meet the demands of fast paced warfare.

A Way Forward?

So, what’s the solution? If “traditional force” concepts are, as asserted, largely inert in respect of littoral combat, then an alternative solution needs to be proposed.

That solution looks like an increased focus on Australia’s light infantry capability. Light infantry, as the name suggests, lacks the shock and awe capable of being generated by mechanised force, but with its absence of vehicle-based firepower and manoeuvre comes an increased ability to operate in unfavourable and hostile terrain. But more relevantly in the context of a littoral conflict (where naval supported supply lines are the primary method of supply and sustainment), they are capable of largely operating with impunity where naval supremacy has not yet been achieved. Vehicle enabled forces, with their reliance upon fuel and access to rear echelon logistics assets, must naturally be supported with a surer supply line.

Previous conflicts illustrate this point. Charney, renowned military historian of conflicts in Asia, points out that compared to Europe, the Pacific theatre saw very little use of armour until the Allied invasion of Burma in late 1944.[3] In no small part, this was referrable to the lengthy supply lines necessary to prosecute a war in the region. Thus, until access to the more stable, land-based supply that Burma and India offered, the full weight of armoured assets were not able to be brought to bear against Japanese forces.

That claim is backed up by sources more temporally proximate to that conflict as well. United States Marine Corps Colonel Robert Williams wrote:

In most of the operations in which the Marine Corps participated in the Pacific in World War II there was little use for armour.[4]

In fairness to Colonel Williams, he argued that the Marine Corps needed to experiment with utilising armoured assets to assist in the breakthrough of more firmly entrenched positions.[5] He goes onto make a critical point about the use of mechanised assets in littoral operations – commanders are often forced into a decision point: to make pre H-Hour preparations of the battlespace, thereby compromising the element of surprise for the assaulting force in order to gain more preferable conditions for mechanised operations; or to tolerate the significant risk to assets that comes with mechanised forces attempting to make a beachhead through minefields and anti-armour traps.

His commentary should give guidance to modern commanders in the context of the 21^st century Indo-Pacific:

In the latter part of the war [pre-H preparation] was easy. [The Japanese] could not reinforce the garrisons on their island strongholds because of our overwhelming air and sea power. Suprise could be subordinated in favour of the application of a great concentration of force and loss of surprise could have little effect on the odds.[6]

Thus, even towards the end of the war when there was a noticeable uptick in the use of armour in the Pacific, arguably that approach was supported by the unmatched naval and air superiority of the Allies.

In a 21^st century conflict no such guarantee of supremacy can be made. That fact alone significantly hinders the deployability and sustainment of mechanised forces in the region. There is little doubt that mechanised forces are effective in land focussed campaigns in Europe, but transplanting those concepts into an Indo-Pacific conflict should be approached with significant caution. Our colleagues in the United States are beginning to confront the challenge posed by the unique requirements of the Pacific – including reconsidering their approach to armour towards a lighter concept which caters to the logistical and terrain difficulties of the Indo-Pacific.[7]

This article should not be taken as suggesting that Army’s units all abandon their mechanised platforms in favour of small boats and jungle kit. But a force which seeks to exert influence into the Indo-Pacific must put its ability to prosecute a war in the littoral first – and the concept which has proven itself most effective in comparative conflicts has been dismounted infantry. The demands of such a conflict puts a disproportionately high value on light infantry’s adaptability to terrain and its flexibility to overcome significant threats to supply, and – consequently – should be the primary focus for Australia.

The foregoing has focused on the role of littoral forces in a kinetic conflict. But the capability which they offer extends into peacetime and across the spectrum of conflict. The ability to rapidly deploy and negotiate terrain devastated by natural disaster for example, and provide aid to our regional neighbours represents an important aspect of maintaining good relations and countering rival influence in our region. Light infantry, enabled by logistical elements, is best suited for this role.

Conclusion

All infanteers would have no doubt been counselled by their instructors at Singleton that “there are no obstacles to dismounted manoeuvre”. Naturally it seems such comments are made to strengthen the collective resolve in anticipation of broaching otherwise treacherous terrain, but both in doctrine and in practice: it is correct.

The mobility granted by the absence of vehicles and the veritable baggage train which accompanies them allows for the wide freedom of action required to operate in littoral environments. Even setting aside for a moment the immense logistic feat required to insert the assets, the requirement for the infantry to protect its rear elements (and where separated, the vehicles themselves), acts as an insurmountable roadblock to fully employing an infantry force.

Demographic change and the ever-increasing strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific means that for Australia to effectively project force within its region it must have a force capable of responding to its unique demands. This article has elucidated the reasons why light infantry is the premier force for littoral combat, citing historical precedent and the uniqueness of today’s geopolitical demands, and argued that consequently, Australia’s focus should be towards generating effectiveness in the littoral through light infantry forces.

End Notes