We are on a pathway to becoming a littoral fighting force that matches the threats of the future, and is designed to fight and to win in our unique geography. We are experts in land combat and each of us has a role to play. 

– Chief of Army

It is an old design principle that the development of military capabilities needs to trade-off between three characteristics: protection, fire-power, and mobility. Each characteristic comes with benefits and trade-offs that must be in balance. To get the balance as right as possible requires the best guess for what the next war will demand. The recent release of the National Defence Strategy (NDS) has made a stark assessment of how Army is weighted: heavy, lacking fire-power and unable to move. 

The strategic picture described in the NDS is demanding a focussed and integrated force. Army was designed for decades to be able to respond to the widest range of operations and contingencies. The direction and the capability plan articulated in the Integrated Investment Program (IIP) is clear: Army will develop a littoral capability in order to get forward into the region and have the capacity to control key strategic points necessary for the defence of Australia.

Coupled with investments in long-range fires, the combined arms fighting system, and guided weapons and explosive ordnance, the complexion of the Army is shifting in a profound way and the direction of travel is set. To meet the challenges head on, Army will need to make one crucial adaptation: the development of a new warfighting philosophy focussed on operations across all domains. This requires a clear understanding of the critical role for land power in the integrated force.

Army is well-practiced projecting land power from the sea. Littoral operations are different though. It demands that Army exerts control and influence of the maritime and air domains from the land. This is a fundamental paradigm shift for the Australian Army and an expression of what it means to be an integrated force capable of operating across domains.

It is useful to look towards allies and partners for what the littoral environment means. The USMC offer the following definition of the littoral: ‘two segments: the seaward portion is that area from the open ocean to the shore that must be controlled to support operations ashore. The landward portion is the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea.’ This definition is useful because it emphasises the way the maritime, air and land domains interact during military operations. This is an important insight for Army to recognise as it orientates to fight in the littoral. 

Peter Dean (an author of the Defence Strategic Review) and Troy Lee Brown offer that the littoral is significant for Australia, ‘being surrounded by a complex web of interlocking littorals to the north and north-east: the archipelagic states of Indonesia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.’ In the Australian context, littoral operations present the opportunity to control key sea-lanes and sea lines of communication that are vital to Australia’s security.

The right perspective on Army’s direction is important. This is an old problem in a new context. Rather than view the DSR and NDS as a challenge to land power, it is important to look to Army’s history and experiences as a littoral force. The exemplar are the operations in the south west Pacific during the Second World War. Land operations allowed the allied forces to advance a string of airbases, which could then interdict Japanese maritime forces. In these operations, control of the land allowed the joint force to project air power to deny sea lines of communications to the enemy. The land component was a critical feature of the allies overall operational approach in the South-West Pacific area of operations. 

So, while this maritime focus for Army is not entirely new in its history, it does demand a shift in warfighting philosophy. Rather than land power using the maritime domain as a means to get to the fight on land, Army must transform to generate effects in the maritime and air domains from the land. This insight is necessary for Army to orientate workforce planning, capability acquisition and delivery, concepts and doctrine and readiness requirements toward the suite of new craft that will be Army owned and operated. 

The capability investments outlined in the IIP reinforce this logic, emphasising the need for Army to project forward, lodge at strategic points and employ long-range land-based maritime strike to deny key approaches to any adversary. Whereas Army in the South-West Pacific in the Second World War projected from the sea, so that air forces could interdict and strike enemy maritime capabilities, the future force requires Army to project, secure, and strike across all domains.

The littoral environment is one where Army’s inherent characteristics enhance the overall effectiveness of the integrated force. It may be trite to observe that land is where people live, where aircraft must land, and where ships must return. However, this is important as it means it will be fought over, requiring the employment of land power to win. Jack Watling, an analyst from RUSI, describes land power’s utility in terms of persistence, asymmetry and presence. 

When compared to air, maritime, space, or cyber capabilities, land forces have the ability to occupy, hold, and defend strategic points. Land power requires a significant investment of combat power to defeat. Littoral operations are not a supporting operation in the context of larger maritime and air campaign, but rather a critical contribution to the integrated force’s ability to persist and sustain operations, impose cost, and hold adversaries at range. This mission, and the value of land forces in the littoral, must drive the intellectual and cultural foundations for Army to be a successful component of the integrated force. 

Army must think about what this means for its warfighting philosophy into the future, and in turn, what it will mean for doctrine, procedures, warfighting functions, and likely operational tasks. General Charles Flynn, Commander US Army Pacific (USAPAC), describes a design for his forces based on persistence, positional advantage and staying power that can challenge adversary command and control, satellites, missiles and ships. While United States forces operate at a scale and in a context different to the Australian Army, there is synergy between the requirements outlined in the NDS and USAPAC’s approach: the potential for land power to alter an adversary’s risk calculation through effects from land into the maritime, air and other warfighting domains. This idea needs to be the nucleus for a new warfighting philosophy for Army.

Chief of Army has been clear on what the NDS and the IIP mean for Army: ‘[t]he most impactful changes remain ahead of us – including the introduction of new capabilities that will fundamentally change how we operate as a fighting force (emphasis added).’ While force design can dictate capability purchases and organisational structures, the critical adaptation that must occur is in the minds of the soldiers and officers who will realise this shift in warfighting focus.

It is necessary for a new warfighting philosophy that addresses Army’s ability to conduct operations across domains. This demands a deep understanding of the littoral environment and the risks and opportunities it presents. Army’s people require a historical perspective of Army’s littoral operations to understand effects from land into the maritime and air domains. Last, each soldier and officer must possess a firm belief and confidence that land power is essential for the integrated force to generate effects across all domains. General James Mattis has observed that ‘the most important six inches on the battlefield is between your ears.’ For the Australian Army, what happens in those six inches will be the most important thing that will need to adapt for the challenges ahead.