My sergeant and I took a moment to look at each other and then back to the stricken Bushmaster in front of us. What had looked like solid ground to the crew when they parked up had proven treacherous. The rain-soaked ground had collapsed and now the vehicle was nose-down on an embankment, the hull bottomed out and its rear hatch pointed up at an angle. 

My sergeant commented that it could have been a lot worse, and I agreed. No one had been hurt, the vehicle hadn’t rolled over and we extracted it without further incident. We had learned not to trust ground from visual inspection alone, but it also stuck with me that for all its utility, the Bushmaster is a bulky and heavy vehicle, superb at a variety of tasks but not optimised for operations where the ground under its wheels is not firm or flat enough.

The requirement to optimise the Army for littoral combat necessitates an urgent revision of the current concept for motorised infantry, particularly its current emphasis on Protected Mobility Vehicles (PMVs). Although the Bushmaster PMV has rendered excellent service over the past two decades, it has a number of limitations on employment in littoral combat. 

These limitations mainly stem from the weight and size of the vehicle itself, which will make it unsuitable for operations in the kind of terrain it may be expected to encounter in the littoral environment. PMVs will also take up a great deal of space on any landing craft, the primary means of getting it to the operating environment. The solution, therefore, may be a combined fleet of lightweight off-road or all-terrain vehicles which offer a high level of mobility, without the size and weight.

As a commander of a motorised infantry platoon in 2021, the Bushmasters were an excellent asset to possess. Having four of the vehicles at my disposal meant I was able to rapidly move my platoon from one side of the training area to the other, provided there was a secure and reasonably accessible track available. It could even, to a limited extent, go offroad or cross country. 

If my Officer Commanding needed me to re-posture from an anti-armoured ambush to preparation for an urban clearance, I simply needed to stomp my platoon a few kilometres back to a rendezvous (RV), link up with my Bushmasters and move straight to the next RV. On the way, my diggers could resupply ammunition, food and water, and even rest until the time came to dismount, whilst I could write my orders for the next task. Organically lifting my whole platoon without being dependent on outside assets was a privilege I never took for granted.

Maintaining that level of mobility capability in the littoral environment will be another challenge altogether. The PMV is, unfortunately, a heavy vehicle, coming in at just over ten tons. As has been highlighted by senior leaders within Army, fighting in the littoral environment for the ADF means fighting in the tropics. It means fighting under dense canopy and dealing with heavy rainfall. It means fighting on islands with little to no infrastructure, with roads and bridges that may be unable to support the weight of our current fleets of vehicles. 

This raises concerns about the viability of the PMV, even the PMV-Light, in such an environment. As anyone who has ever tried to take a Bushmaster off road will tell you, it bogs all too easily. Even in Townsville Field Training Area (TFTA) or Shoalwater Bay, where the environment is relatively benign, my often-ill-advised attempts to move my platoon’s vehicles cross-country or over difficult creek crossings would frequently result in extended self-recovery. Attempting to employ PMVs in an even harsher tropical environment would emphasise these weaknesses and negate their advantages.

This is compounded by the difficulty of moving vehicles into and within the littoral environment to begin with. With the laundry list of vital stores needed to support a littoral campaign, and a limited number of landing craft to carry them, PMVs to grant mobility to the infantry would soon take a back seat to long range fires platforms, supply trucks, fuel, and the bulk stores needed to sustain combat operations. The infantry, then, would rapidly lose their organic mobility and be compelled to act exclusively as light infantry, depending on other elements for transport and sustainment.

Organic mobility platforms for the infantry provide a key advantage in the littoral environment and will require a change in mindset away from the dependence on protected mobility vehicles. Keeping the infantry mobile but minimising the footprint of mobility platforms for transport into the Area of Operation (AO) and for use in areas without feasible infrastructure, means downsizing to vehicles that can go anywhere, fit anywhere and thrive anywhere. In short, it means getting everyone on a motorbike course.

Glibness aside, motorbikes, quad bikes, and lightweight four-wheel drive vehicles are the surest way to guarantee mobility for infantry in an environment hostile to our current fleet of heavy conventional vehicles. What the exact model might look like is debateable and would likely come down to a combination of vehicles, informed by experimentation with various platforms.

Professional discussions among colleagues regarding the challenges of littoral combat produced ideas such as maximising our use of Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) as direct fire platforms or organic CSS assets, while others suggested simply mounting every soldier on a motorbike. While the idea of mounting a whole Combat Team on motorcycles might sound far-fetched, it’s been done before. Not just in World War II, but for a good portion of the Cold War the Soviets maintained whole battalions of motorcycle infantry, primarily for scouting purposes. 

Anecdotally, these troops complained when their bikes were phased out in favour of the BTR-60, saying it was too loud for reconnaissance and too heavy for their purposes. Furthermore, where before they had enjoyed freedom of movement in difficult terrain, they were now greatly restricted in their avenues of approach.

The Australian Army are certainly no strangers to fast, light-skinned but well-armed patrol vehicles. In infantry battalions it is also quite common for sniper teams to be mounted on all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), or for ATVs to be utilised by Company Sergeant Majors (CSMs) to conduct resupply of platoons in the field. But keeping a whole combat team mobile would require pushing larger numbers of these vehicles down to the section level.

This is not to say that mounting a whole infantry section on trail bikes is the solution. The practicalities of trying to ride around on a motorbike with a light support weapon or 84mm strapped to the back aside, there is still a need for firepower and comms. This would be best provided by a light off-road vehicle, like the Ultra-Light Tactical Vehicle (ULTV) – based on the MRZR Alpha made by Polaris moving into service with the US Marine Corps (USMC). 

Coming in two- or four-seat variants, the ULTV has a reputation for effective off-road manoeuvrability and can be fitted for a variety of different missions from casualty evacuation to direct fire support. This option provides a lower training liability when compared to putting every soldier on a motorbike. Two-to-three such ULTVs could lift a whole section and allow them to carry food, water, and ammunition for extended operations. With the appropriate modules, a platoon could remain independent of external resupply far longer than seventy-two hours.

Budget constraints may, however, limit the ability of the Army to invest in a new fleet of vehicles, even a fleet as versatile as the ULTV. The USMC divested its tanks and a number of other heavy assets, and so had the budget to afford this new fleet and a whole range of new and experimental equipment. Even so, this does not make the idea unfeasible. The goal is to get vehicles to the infantry that can move fast over rough and muddy terrain, and, of equal consideration, be easily transported and offloaded by landing craft.

In short, anything and everything is on the table. Similar to how the obsolete M113AS4 platform has been kept in service to train battalions on mechanised warfare, so too should the Army seek to acquire a variety of light vehicles to test and adjust the way it will utilise motorised infantry in littoral operations. It may be that eight riflemen mounted on Kawasaki KLR650s would be optimal. Or an ATV towing a trailer with a mounted M2 Browning. The only concrete requirement is that the platforms chosen are capable of effective mobility in the tropical environment and be small and light enough for ease of strategic transportation.

In conclusion, littoral operations in our near region will significantly lessen the ability of PMVs to achieve their full potential, whilst taking up much needed space on limited strategic lift. On the other hand, a fleet of light, mobile, low-cost vehicles able to function in any terrain and taking up a minimum of space on available sea and air assets, will keep infantry fast and mobile in any island-hopping campaign.