The seeds of disaster: the development of French Army doctrine, 1919-1939

A significant work on the development of doctrine within peace time, Doughty’s The Seeds of Disaster explores the French army’s development of doctrine in the interwar period. In a thorough and balanced analysis, Doughty argues that the interwar French Army was neither hollowed-out by underinvestment nor did it attempt to re-fight Germany in 1939-40 in the same manner it had in 1918. The French Army undertook serious experimentation with combined arms warfare, had opportunities to gain battle experience in colonial battles, and developed a military doctrine that was logical. Instead, Doughty argues that the primary cause for French military failure in 1940 was overcentralisation in the command and control system and rigidity in tactical doctrine. The Seeds of Disaster provides a continuing reminder of the dangers of institutional over-bureaucratization, hyper-centralized command and control systems, and group-think.