“Gotcha”, The Sun, 4 May 1982

The complexities of operating in an adverse air situation, where air superiority was hardly ever achieved, and where the enemy had a considerable amount of freedom to operate, were quickly learnt but at considerable cost to the Task Force during the Falklands War.

In the last article, Air Defence in the Falklands War – Part 1, the paper explored the prelude to operations, the air defence design, and the lodgement and ground clearance of the Falklands. Victory was not certain for the United Kingdom (UK), and it was hard fought and learnt through mistakes made prior to embarkation, during the transit south, and through intense fighting on Falkland Islands. In this follow up article, the paper will critically analyse the air defence design and its employment during the Falklands War and identify lessons applicable to the Australian Army that can be applied to contemporary operations.

Lesson One – Staff Tables and Load Lists

There is a general requirement across all levels of defence to have standardised staff tables and load lists to cater for different missions and transport requirements. From operating with absolute minimum scales to operating with full scales, identifying the equipment requirements and logistic burden is essential. This is particularly important for the Australian Army, as all likely deployments would require our capability to force project over vast distances.

In the Falklands context, there were problems prior to leaving the UK in determining what equipment and vehicles should be taken, and conversely, what should be left behind. The condensed timeframe for departure, the uncertainty of deck space and shipping, and the lack of a tactical loading sequence all resulted in mission-essential equipment not been taken or incorrectly loaded onto vessels. This resulted in partial mission failure of air defence on the first day of the amphibious landings into San Carlos. Furthermore, it severely limited the employment of Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD) capabilities such as the Rapier, due to not being able to manoeuvre throughout the battlespace as a result of limited vehicles.

Lesson Two – Passive Air Defence Measures

Rarely does a battlespace have ideal conditions for defensive operations with good cover, concealment, and fields of fire. However, this does not negate the need to conduct passive air defence measures to reduce the visual signature of a defensive position. Passive air defence provides greater redundancy to the commander, as they gain greater layering of defence. This is important in the employment of GBAD as the systems are finite and are not easily recoverable.

Therefore, any measures taken to increase survivability are necessary. The Falklands campaign highlighted that even though enemy aircraft could approach the island from any direction, and the terrain offered little scope for concealment from aircraft attack, passive air defence measures reduced detection. The use of air sentries, dispersion, camouflage nets, and fighting pits assisted in concealing the air defence positions during the amphibious lodgement at San Carlos.

Lesson Three – All Arms Air Defence

The use of All Arms Air Defence (AAAD) might seem insignificant to modern strike aircraft; however, it is still relevant as it forces aircraft to fly higher, lower, or in different directions. This shaping combat function makes aircraft more vulnerable to missile attack or unable to deliver their weapon loads at the desired target. Even though AAAD is an all-corps skill, many units either do not practice this skill or are unaware of it.

Practicing this skill is important to all Australian Army units as it provides basic defence against airborne threats, particularly to units that do have organic air defence systems. In the Falkland context, AAAD had to be taught or re-taught during the voyage south, causing minor control issues during the initial stages of the amphibious lodgement.[1] However, AAAD forced the FAA strike aircraft to alter their flight paths, reducing the effectiveness of weapon systems. Furthermore, the soldiers who manned the guns were seen to be fighting back, and this raised the morale of all those under attack. This effect on morale must not be underestimated.

Lesson Four – Early Warning

The performance of air defence is critically dependent on the earliest possible identification of threats. To ensure any air engagements are prosecuted effectively, the ability to detect, identify, track, and engage air units is essential. To ensure this occurs, timely dissemination of warning states needs to occur between the layers of defence. This is important to the Australian Army as the passage of information needs to reach the fire unit with sufficient time to process, react, and engage.

The faster the transmission of warning status, the higher the probability of engagement and success rate for GBAD systems. In the Falklands context, there was no airborne early warning assets, and the ability to detect, identify, and track air units was via organic systems.[2] This severely reduced the coverage and warning times available to the air defence design.

The reliance on organic systems did not initially work. The outer defensive belt had problems in locating aircraft with sufficient speed to timely disseminate warning information to the middle and inner tier fire units. To augment the slow warning status, GBAD fire units employed air sentries, reinforcing the requirement for passive defence measures to provide redundancy to the commander.

Lesson Five – Employment

Regardless of the task undertaken or the type of weapons utilised, the employment of air defence must remain flexible and adaptable to achieve the mission intent. Flexibility in planning and mission command will ensure that the effects of terrain and other detrimental factors to the defence are minimised, and the defence is planned and implemented effectively and efficiently.

Flexibility in employment is important to the Australian Army as it enables mission command. It gives commanders the ability to react to changes within the battle and to enable transition between methods of employment. Furthermore, it enables commanders the freedom of action to achieve their mission; for example, defensive tasks may still be achieved through aggressive employment such as through air ambushes.

In the Falklands context, GBAD systems were not employed in ideal terrain to ensure weapon engagement occurred before the line of weapon release from FAA strike aircraft. This was evident during the amphibious lodgement at San Carlos. FAA strike aircraft could approach the lodgement area from all avenues of approach, and the GBAD fire units had to continually adapt to the changing situation to ensure the right effect was achieved at the right time, accurately.

Lesson Six – Liaison

Air defence planning and implementation is conducted at a formation level and higher. This ensures that the strategic intent is met and achieved. However, without liaison and integration with the ground manoeuvre element, friction may arise due to a lack of information and understanding intent. The friction usually arises through the use of terrain, the requirement for life support, and force protection measures.

Furthermore, friction may also arise in the air defence coverage. This is important as GBAD units and manoeuvre elements may occupy the same operating area; however, the manoeuvre element may not be the priority for air defence coverage. In the Falklands context, when GBAD fire units were deployed it was often with little prior knowledge of the ground force scheme of manoeuvre. This led to confusion as to what neighbouring units were doing as well as friction over site selection and use of terrain and the limited flexibility afforded to commanders.

Lesson Seven – Training with supported Arms

To achieve high reliability in air defence employment, there needs to be significant investment into providing training that is robust and realistic. This not only develops our personnel from being qualified to being competent, but also trains our personnel in the psychological factors of warfare such as stress and task fixation. The training should include detection, tracking, application of weapon control orders, and engagement skills.

Also – similarly to liaison with the manoeuvre element – combined training is essential. This enables all units within the area of operation an appropriate depth of knowledge on employment, as well as limitations in capabilities. In the Falklands context, friction arose between GBAD units and manoeuvre elements as they did not account for the time and effort in which systems had to be manoeuvred around the battle space. It came as a surprise to manoeuvre elements that GBAD systems were heavy, cumbersome, and difficult to carry on several occasions.

Furthermore, unrealistic orders were given to GBAD fire units to engage any aircraft seen, even if the engagement of targets was outside of weapon capability. This reduced capability and wasted limited missile magazine depth.[3]

Conclusion

The Falklands War is a contemporary example of multi-domain operations and A2/AD warfare. The campaign was fought 40 years ago; however, the lessons learnt are still relevant to the Australian Army. The Falklands War highlighted the complexities in force projecting capability over vast distances, lodgement, and sustainment of operations all whilst terrain and airspace are contested.

It is through critically examining past air defence conflicts, such as the Falklands War, that we can attempt to avoid historical problems and incorporate solutions to our current training and employment of air defence systems. Whether in periods of competition or conflict, the Australian Defence Force’s broader air defence capability must be enhanced among existing and future platforms so that all platforms can effectively contribute to the total air defence system through defence-in-depth.