Introduction

Throughout the long and proud history of the Royal Regiment of Australian Artillery, and indeed our forefathers in the Royal Artillery, advancements in capability have been formed through experience, good and bad. In the excitement of the future involving technological advancements and platform acquisitions, it is essential that we take lessons from our history, born through the blood of Australians past, to produce a prepared force to support the nation’s interests.

As discussed by Chief of Army, LTGEN Burr, substantial change is occurring across the world and this change requires an agile response from us all. ‘Army in Motion’[1] describes this change and discusses how we are postured to respond to today’s operations (Ready Now) as well as prepare for the challenges ahead (Future Ready). In becoming Future Ready, we as an organisation need to comprehend conflict and understand how we will design to win against a conventional adversary.

The Australian Defence Force’s experience over a generation has centred largely within the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO) where we have seen the hunger for precision strike continue to grow in the attempt to maintain legitimacy within a protracted counterinsurgency operation. In other theatres of conflict, we have observed a belligerent state utilise vast amounts of artillery to great effect; destroying key nodes, overwhelming a military force, and allowing for the annexation of Crimea. Whilst there was no utilisation of our forces, it has provided a precious glimpse into a scenario that may be faced in a peer/near peer conventional conflict.

Whilst capabilities and technologies have progressed, the themes faced by our forebears are similar- just on a different scale. It is through these examples that our current and future force can understand how these problems were solved in practice, without relying purely on theorems.

The historical problem faced is perfectly shown through WW1, namely the Western Front. The popular image of this scene is of a great stalemate where defensive firepower stymied manoeuvre. This stalemate continued until the invention of combined arms warfare and other innovative processes to enable this. Arguably, one of the most critical advancements in this period was the establishment of the Counter Battery Staff Office (CBSO), which in effect became the first intelligence-fires fusion cell[2].

The Birth of the CBSO

Up to the commencement of WW1, advancements in weaponry and munitions allowed commanders of such capabilities to create effective killing zones. This advancement in firepower had not been countered by technologies with which this could be defeated, less the reliance on a mysterious moral power from ever willing,eager, and arguably misinformed constituents. Unfortunately, strength of will by itself will fail to stop hot lead. This defensive strength on both sides led to stagnation and the focus at a tactical level therefore turned to enabling manoeuvre, so that attacking forces could close-force decisive engagement or withdrawal[3]. In attempting to solve this, active measures on the battlefield such as the introduction of tanks, aerial observation, and the extensive use of gas were utilised[4].

Whilst these measures enabled success, it is argued that a passive measure; a rethinking of how artillery was employed by establishment of the CSBO, wielded the greatest results. At its simplest, the CBSO was the establishment of a sensor-shooter-commander link at the corps level. The CBSO coordinated (but did not command) efforts from sound ranging and flash spotting from the Royal Engineers, air observation posts from the Royal Flying Corps, Forward Observer reports, interrogation reports and intercepted wireless traffic, to build accurate depictions of the enemy picture[5]. This allowed for the allies to successfully neutralise or destroy Hostile Batteries (HB) to enable friendly manoeuvre, which are exemplified in the victories at Arras, Vimy, Amiens, Messines and Cambrai.

Its task could be distilled to two essential functions. Firstly, the compilation of information from its sensors and then the subsequent analysis to produce intelligence assessments on the position of HBs within its AO. This intelligence was utilised in the generation of a counter battery fire plan in support of missions for the day, or in the maintenance of artillery superiority within the AO. The advent of what we may think is a rather simple process, proved hugely successful in the latter parts of the war, and largely took Durchbruchmüller’s[6] effectiveness away at pivotal moments for the allies.

The CBSO was a small headquarters by modern standards (10-15 people), typically led by a LTCOL ,with a couple artillery and intelligence officers with orderly soldiers in support to the large staff work required in plotting and disseminating HBs[7]. For its lack of ‘staff power’, it made up with positive lessons learned as the conflict continued. Ever popular harassing fire made way for precision indirect fires to achieve neutralisation at the critical period, with weaponeering utilised to provide the right effect for each target. A measure of effectiveness was utilised through battle damage assessments and interrogation reports in its attempt to further improve results, instilling a generative fighting culture within the CBSOs across the allied forces.

Contemporary Application

As our defence force has become increasingly specialised, it is unreasonable to expect our intelligence function to provide specific answers to discrete capabilities. It is absolutely critical that the RAA provides commanders with the RAA assessment of enemy artillery actions. To contract this problem to the intelligence community is to receive an assessment that may be lacking for our needs.

The story of the CBSO is a success story for information analysis and incorporation of this intelligence into planning. The LWP-CA (RISTA) 2-3-2 of yesteryear discussed the importance and application of the counter battery fight, and whilst it is not contained at the same level of detail[8] within the updated version, its principles in deriving Artillery Intelligence is of extreme importance. Our officers need not only understand the LWP-CA (STA), but also the LWP-CA (OS) and (AMD) series should they become effective within a conventional fighting headquarters.

The military of today is not on the Western Front, but it faces a similar problem in restoring manoeuvre in support of attacking forces achieving organisational outcomes. Technological advances have seen the balance between offence and defence start to grow, with defenders able to inflict significant damage to an offensive force prior to a decisive engagement taking place. Sensors have progressed to enable acquisition in a multi-domain environment, and the proliferation of long-range precision fires have turned a Hindenburg sized problem into an intercontinental one. This will require flexibility and innovation from all levels to produce effective and lethal coordination in the face of a peer conflict.

Conclusion

Whilst CBSO is not designed to combat a problem such as above, the tenants of fusing intelligence and fires resonates within the modern headquarters. It is this innovation in light of chaos and destruction that should present a path forward for all those that have to contemplate this past problem in a contemporary context.