Future Operating Environment

Australian Land Force's Vulnerability to Drone Warfare

By James Harvey March 4, 2021


Australia’s land force has a capability gap in its capacity to respond to the emerging, low cost drone threat demonstrated by Turkey and Azerbaijan. This doesn’t appear to be a result of a lack of planning on our behalf, but rather an unanticipated, emerging capability which is proving to be cheap and effective. We must adapt quickly, to ensure our capacity to credibly deter and respond to threats in our region is developed and maintained.

Case Study 1 - Operation Spring Shield

In northern Syria between 27 Feb - 03 Mar 2020, Turkey launched a major offensive against the Syrian forces, called Operation Spring Shield (OSS). The Turkish forces utilised both artillery and massed drone attacks to cause staggering casualties amongst the Syrian forces. On 02 Mar 2020, Turkey claimed to have destroyed two jets, two drones, eight helicopters, 135 tanks, five air-defence systems and hundreds of other vehicles of the Syrian regime. [1] In reply, Syria claimed to have shot down six Turkish drones. [2] Surprise was certainly a factor in the contrasting casualties of the two belligerents; however, the brief conflict clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of conventional land power to the emerging capability of concentrated drone attacks.

Case Study 2 - Azerbaijan vs Armenia 2020

In September and October of 2020 Azerbaijan and Armenia engaged in a substantial conventional conflict over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. An effective peace deal was agreed in early November 2020, enforced by Russian peacekeepers in the region. Prior to this, the Azerbaijanis had notable success with drones, using both Turkish and Israeli models. Armenia’s army is a numerically superior, well equipped, legacy soviet, mechanised force, incorporating tanks, SP artillery, IFVs etc, in a mode of warfare that would be familiar to any western military planner trained in recent decades. Unsophisticated, but substantial. In the first week of fighting, Azerbaijan claimed to have destroyed 250 armoured vehicles, 250 artillery pieces, another 130 military vehicles and over 30 air-defence systems. Armenia claimed to have downed around 100 Azerbaijani drones in the same period. The contrast in this case is not as staggering as in OSS; however, the difference is still substantial. Armenia’s significant territorial losses in the conflict speaks to the lack of response a conventional land force has to an effective, drone augmented force.

The Drones

Turkey fielded two types of drones in OSS, the TAI Anka, which is broadly analogous to the US Reaper, though probably less sophisticated and capable, and the Bayraktar TB2, a small, slow, low flying drone analogous in scale to the Shadow, fielded by Australian forces. On the face of it the TB2 is not very threatening; however, it is small, cheap and effective enough. It appears its armament is capable of achieving K-Kills up to MBT, exploiting that AFV weakness of (lack of) top armour.

Azerbaijan also fielded two types of drones, the TB2 and the Israeli Harop, an even smaller drone that is launched out of a vehicle mounted tube, similar in function and appearance to the familiar MLRS. The Harop is again, effective enough. It carries a small HE payload, similar in scale to a medium artillery round and the operator simply crashes the drone into the target. Again, the attributes of small, cheap and 'effective enough' are observed.

The Drone Niche

These drones and the means of employing them have found a niche in the contemporary battle space. They have two key characteristics; first they are effective; and second they escape engagement by sophisticated GBAD systems. Their efficacy has been discussed, but their apparent indifference to GBAD is not immediately obvious. It is fair to say that most GBAD systems and their concept of employment are predicated on the fact that military aircraft are highly capable, highly valued, very expensive to build, and require significant pilot training.

All of that means that; first, surface to air missiles (SAMs) can be justifiably very sophisticated and expensive, while still maintaining a substantial cost benefit ratio per downed plane. Second, their very presence in the battle space imposes significant dilemma on the adversary commander, regarding the risk of lost aircraft versus the opportunity presented by its use. However if sufficient combat effect of the aircraft can be replicated at little cost, in large numbers and with no risk to the ‘pilot’ per sortie, all of a sudden both the cost of the SAM and their disruptive effect on the battle space are substantially, if not entirely, undermined.

Australia’s GBAD Concept of Employment

Australia’s own emerging GBAD concept of employment is broadly convergent with the generic example provided above. While this will represent a major step forward for our GBAD capability and the deterrent effect that is provided by its mere existence, it still leaves our force open to the niche mass drone attack described above. Our land force is made up of a small number of highly capable, highly valuable elements, that when combined, behave as force multipliers for each other and in the best case achieve a capability which is significantly greater than the sum of the parts. This is exemplified in our combat brigade model; however, our highly capable combat brigades have neglected integration of GBAD as an organic capability.

This leaves a staggering vulnerability for which the common answer is something along the lines of “Div/US will deal with that”. This is a perfectly acceptable answer in a scenario where only one brigade faces a problem at a time; however, given the numerical superiority of any credible regional threats, we can be assured to be outnumbered and that ‘acceptable scenario’ becomes at best, unlikely. This is true even for the battlefield of yesteryear where our primary concern from above was a highly valued attack helicopter.

To understand Army’s responsibility to fight the complete land battle, it must be accepted that the land domain is in fact three dimensional; however, our land force is designed to fight across the battle field as if it is a chess board. It has a distinctly two dimensional construct. There is a risk of conflating the third dimension of the land domain with the air domain. We have done, and continue to accept this conflation at our peril. The enemy of the 21st century would be foolish not to attack this seam in our Defence architecture.

Nexus of the Emerging Threat and Australia’s Vulnerability

In the battlefield of 2021, the emerging threat hovers over our otherwise exemplary force, waiting to the fill the niche and take advantage of the opportunity we readily present to them. Our situation perfectly fits those described above, that the drone capability will readily take advantage of. We have a highly capable, two dimensional land force, with procurement plans to enhance that capability with self propelled artillery and IFVs, amongst others. These new procurements will be the match or master of any adversary in the two dimensions in which they excel. However, in the third dimension, when looked at from above, what difference is there between a BTR-80 and a Lynx? Between a 2S23 and K-9 Thunder? Nothing worth talking about when looking at the drone pilot’s kill board.

It might be suggested that our planned GBAD procurement is more than a match for this kind of drone threat, and in terms of capability, they certainly would be. Except that the drones leverage the fact pointed out by the famous Frenchman, 'quantity has a quality all its own'. How many AMRAM missiles will Australia field? Azerbaijan, a nation of about half Australia’s population, fielded a force of around 100 TB2s. It’s reasonable to assume our capacity to engage could be quickly exceeded, leaving our adversaries to enjoy an uncontested battle space.

But the niche they could fill goes deeper still. On a GBAD targeter's matrix of high pay off target lists, attack guidance matrices and target selection standards, where will the slow, low flying drone, which costs about the same as a single AMRAM missile, and only carrying a few small munitions sit? Probably below the fixed wing, fast air threatening the battle space; probably below the fixed wing surveillance or EW assets in the adversary ORBAT; and probably below the armoured attack helicopters, buzzing around without concern of anything smaller than a .50 cal round. In short, they probably won’t be engaged by our planned GBAD capability of the next decades in any case.

A Proposal

So what is the way forward? It is not easy to discern a comprehensive answer at this stage. The manoeuvrist desire is to find an elegant answer that can undermine the capability before it even knows it’s in a fight. The sophisticated answer is no doubt coming, and with time and investment will appear in our future ORBATs. It will probably include a sensor array that identifies the threat and slews the associated delivery system and either engages automatically or alerts a watchkeeper to decide. I don’t propose such an answer; however, I propose an answer for the combat brigade, which is a fighting answer, for today.

The drones’ niche hinges on the fact that our GBAD is sophisticated, expensive and few. It hinges on the fact that by only being 'effective enough' the drone can be cheap and numerous. But it has vulnerabilities of its own. It is slow, it is low flying, it is burdened to its limit with sensors and munitions and thus carries no countermeasures. In short: it is weak. There is just no one around who can pick a fight with it.

I propose that a workable answer to this emerging threat is an uninventive analogy of our current anti-armour philosophy. That is to say every vehicle (or as many as is practical) has a cheap, easy to use, shoulder launched anti-air weapon stowed somewhere. This comes across as decidedly inelegant, but it is importantly uninventive. It is important because it is a timeless truth of warfare that you must be able to strike your foe.

We have long known that in the two dimensional battle, every soldier must carry a rifle, not just the infantry soldier. Why is this? The reasons are numerous but a critical one is that every one of us is in the fight; the battle space is bristling with threats for the adversary, there is nowhere they can go without being threatened with destruction. The fact that most of the people carrying the rifle aren’t nearly as skilled as the infantry is no deterrence to us arming them all. Why should the same be different in this third dimension, when the threat is presenting itself in a numerous, but weak position?




James Harvey


Captain James Harvey enlisted in the Army in 2009, assigned to the Infantry Corps. He saw service with the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment until 2015. During this time he served in Afghanistan and was promoted to Lance Corporal. In 2015 he attended the Royal Military College Duntroon, graduating in 2016 to Intelligence Corps. He was assigned to the Royal Australian Artillery as his regimental posting and served at 1 Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery in command, technical and staff roles, including ADJT in 2019. He has served as the Intelligence Officer for the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment in 2020.

Prior to joining Army, he had a career in scientific instrumentation building high end research instruments for the geophysics community. His partner Sophie is also an intelligence officer, serving as the Intelligence Officer of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in 2020. They enjoy an active outdoor lifestyle outside of work. James is currently studying a Masters of Terrorism and Security Studies.


The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Australian Army, the Department of Defence or the Australian Government.


Given the current phase of assessment of IFVs, incorporating a scanning LiDAR as a part of the sensor suite, with a suitable targeting and weapons system - .30cal is probably sufficient for many of the smaller drones, may be a simple solution (relatively) if implemented before full rate acquisition.

Hi Simon, Its a great point and I agree, future sensor suites are probably going to be sufficiently capable and utilitarian to be multi-purposed and provide an efficient and sufficient tool. The trick is, what if we need something in Apr 2021? I'm confident there are brains superior to mine with the knowledge to answer the question. I just haven't heard them share it with the rest of us.

Interesting argument, I wonder if there might be a convergence between the capabilities of future anti-armour weapons (such as the Spike variants) and anti-air capability? We see already weapons such as the Hellfire missile employed successfully as an anti-air weapon on the IM-SHORAD platform. If such weapons need to be present for anti-armour weapons, particularly given many utilise optical / IR guidance methods, perhaps it could be as straight forward as a software update, to provide these weapons with at least a moderate anti-air capability, particularly given the limitations of the threat they would be addressing? Slow flying, low altitude, relatively non-maneuverable given they are carrying heavy loads of weapons, sensors and comms kit, on limited airframes?

Gday Jason, another credible point. I suspect that there is an efficiency mismatch with your concept, only because these effective Anti-armour systems' capability are probably overkill for the kind of aircraft I'm considering. But by the same token, a golf club that you can putt and chip with, when you only have chip once every 3rd or 4th hole, introduces an efficiency all it's own. A very interesting idea.

Hi James Thanks with for the well thought article. Drones do possess the ability to change the fabric of land Conflict. Other possible counter measures for consideration: - Light weight anti drone systems which are maturing fast and employ measures such as disrupting GPS signals - Portable drones that can be carried as a counter threat. - At the cost of sounding a bit ridiculous, consider bring back the hunting falcon which have been used as a drone counter measure. I agree that countering drones needs careful consideration.Use of drones in urban warfare is another interesting scenario.

Gday Jeevan, I've considered a few of those options as well. To play devils advocate, I suspect it would be fairly straight forward to overcome GPS for remote flight with a technical solution. The trick with a drone to fight a drone is the time differential between identifying the threat (seems like seconds from signature ID without electronic assistance) and being able to deploy a counter measure and vector it on. Likewise with the bird of prey. It's possibly workable with a very small drone that's persistently observing, but anything more active and you just can't deploy the counter measure in time. At least that's my suspicion.

Hi James, I really enjoyed your article. The issue of a man portable air defence systems has been suggested before by an author on the Cove. Brayden Holmes recommend three COAs: COA 1 – RBS 70 to Direct Fire Support Weapon Platoon (DFSW PL) COA 2 – Adoption of a new VSHORAD and Command and Control (C2) system COA 3 – New MANPAD System for the Combat Teams COA 3 was similar to your suggestion. While you both make strong arguments for the capability any fire and forget air defence system requires a robust combat identification system in terms of equipment and training. One of the biggest challenges for GBAD is not engaging friendly aircraft. That is why we have a specific ECN dedicated to this mission. However, I agree that we could potentially have a capability gap. One way to solve it might be to treat UAV threats like improvised explosive devices. You could equip all land platforms with a special ‘box’ that can mitigate the threat electronically. This could potentially be enhanced my using the Land 19 Phase 7B sensors to provide targeting data to the L400 platforms so that they could use their organic direct fire weapons to destroy the threat. This would enable the GBAD sensors and command and control system to conduct the target identification procedures, without having to use an expensive AMRAAM.

Gday Mark, Thanks for the well thought out comments. While I've been accused of many things in my time, being original was never one of them, so I'm not surprised someone has already presented my idea. Or rather I've plagiarised theirs. My only defence is total, blinding ignorance. I've been presented with this argument before as well, the risk of inadvertently engaging friendly aircraft. It certainly seems possible and with the horrifyingly compressed timeframes from threat identification to engagement, there is very little room for error. What I'm not convinced by is how this is meaningfully different to the same issue of target identification and engagement on the ground. In either case its predicated by having a reasonable understanding of where your friendly forces are in the battle space, and developing suitably usable target selection standards to inform the decision to engage or not. I certainly agree with the promise shown by future sensors partnered with high velocity DF weapons.

Fantastic article, thoroughly enjoyed it. An alternative solution to issuing widespread anti-air weapons could be to raise an anti-drone eagle capability. A platoon/troop of Military Working Eagle Handlers organic to each Combat Brigade could provide coverage. The Dutch Police and French Air Force have been developing this exact capability since at least 2017, with success. Although, there would be multiple risks; how many drones can an eagle dispatch in a given period of time, issues with raise, train, and sustain of a niche capability, and the integration of eagles in a tactical environment. Lessons could be taken away from Military Working Dog supply, which relies sometimes on civilian industry and not just military breeding programs. to fill its needs.

James, A well researched and thought out article. I aim my response at the discussions above as much as your original article. I agree with your concept of a widespread, un-elegant system. Its strengths mirror that of the threat you discuss - cheap, available, and effective - which equals mass and ease of employment! The key here is that the foe you have identified is everyone’s problem, not a specialist problem. I am not paying lip service to specialists who operate in highly technical areas, such as our current GBAD specialists, but if this becomes over complicated, we will not receive a solution soon enough and it will require its own module on COAC and other career courses to employ. It will not be simple nor cheap, nor accessible to the masses, where it is needed. We already have a higher level GBAD System which has its own stream, pointed out in one response. Why do many other land forces around the world carry man portable, shoulder fired, anti-air missiles? For the same reasons we have already discussed. it’s the easy solution. Mortarmen and Artillery as a whole know better than anyone about seeking clear-air and clear-ground before firing a mission. This is a function of control. Any company 2IC or Sub unit commander could enquire about clear air through their respective chain of command to identify if there are friendly drones in the area. I won’t go on, but there could be numerous other procedural control measures and protocols which also enable timely targeting within ones AO of drones. We must strike the balance with a weapon, or system that is effective-enough. Effective-enough to be easily utilised by a gun line, cavalry or tank squadron, infantry company, battalion headquarters or brigade echelon. Again, don’t overcomplicate or over engineer – effective-enough.

Good article .There are a number of solution to deal with drone threat. As previously mentioned Avenger kind of GBAD capability could be used, however bayraktar would have range over match. The other issue with using Avenger or using anti-armour against drones is inability to find a credible target if the enemy going to use a swarm technique. As it was demonstrated during Yom Kippur war when Egyptian GBAD run out of missiles when targeted drones (they thought they were targeting planes). The same could occur now with a number of cheap commercial drones creating a swarm around strike drone. Think of drone show as well illustrated at the link below https://www.geoscan.aero/en/show-drones The most economical it seems is to use EW measures to cut the link and spoof GPS signal. https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/09/20/electronic_warfare_is_becoming_the_most_lethal_counter_drone_technology_114755.amp.html https://www.defenseworld.net/news/29409/Russia_Builds_Electronic_Warfare_Dome_to_Defeat_Drones_in_Syria#:~:text=The%20Russian%20Ministry%20of%20Defense,to%20destroy%20drones%20in%20Syria.&text=%E2%80%9CThe%20Pole%2D21%20jamming%20station,UAV%20control%20channels%2C%20are%20used. This way you could also land enemy drones and take Intel. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-16095823

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