The best Australian military history book that was never published: A review of Albert Palazzo’s The Australian Army and the War in Iraq, 2002-2010

As its title states, the book reviewed in this article examines the Australian Army’s involvement in the Iraq War from 2002 to 2010. It also examines preparations for the war and the roles of the Navy and Air Force, albeit focusing on these Services to a lesser extent than the Army.

The book is a compelling read and – importantly – the concluding chapter offers an assessment of Australia’s participation in the Iraq War through the lens of the Australia/US alliance; examining Australia’s roles and objectives within that alliance and how its participation in the Iraq War helped to achieve them. This assessment remains highly relevant today in light of the Defence Strategic Review’s assertion that in Australia’s current strategic environment the US alliance is of increasing importance.[1]

One of the most interesting things about this book is that it was never actually published. Completed in 2011 and originally intended for publication in the Australian Army’s ‘Campaign Series’,[2] The Australian Army and the War in Iraq, 2002-2010 was instead classified SECRET AUSTEO due to the strategic nature of its content. A partly redacted version was subsequently released in 2017 following a Freedom of Information Act request made by Fairfax Media.

This version of the book was posted online to accompany a related Sydney Morning Herald story that appeared on the newspaper’s front page on 25 February 2017.[3] The redacted version of the book can still be accessed via that newspaper’s website.[4] This remains the only publicly available version of the book, and it is therefore the version that is reviewed in this article.

Fortunately, the redactions do not make the book’s narrative hard to follow. Most of what is redacted seems to be place names, as well as several illustrations that, according to accompanying text that was not redacted, probably contain maps showing force locations. Details of special operations forces activities in western Iraq in 2003 have also been redacted, as have areas where the book addressees Cabinet discussions about Australia’s participation in the war. To reiterate, these redactions are insufficient to lessen the accessibility or value of the book as a historical analysis.

Structurally, the book contains 11 chapters, plus a preface by the author, an introduction, and a conclusion. The preface is worth re-reading after completion of the book as it gives context to the circumstances of the book’s writing and the decision regarding its classification. The book’s 11 chapters present a candid account of the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF’s) performance in the Iraq War, that of the Army in particular. It does not refrain from being critical when Palazzo considers that criticism is justified, and this makes it a valuable leaning aid for Australian Army personnel interested in drawing historical lessons. In particular, this reviewer noticed five major themes within the book that are worth contemplation.

• Clear and consistent strategic objectives. The Australian Government set clear strategic objectives at the outset of Australia’s participation in the Iraq War, and consistently sought to achieve them as the conflict progressed. The main strategic objective was to enhance the Australia/US alliance, with a primary supporting objective being the maintenance of positive Australian domestic perceptions of the ADF, the Government, and ADF operations in Iraq. Other stated objectives included contributing to the removal of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and the provision of support to the rebuilding of post-Saddam Iraq; however, in practice these were a distant secondary concern.

  Although the ADF contributed to achieving these secondary objectives, it did so by coincidence rather than as a result of deliberate prioritisation. Ultimately, Palazzo concludes that by setting, maintaining, and thereby achieving its main strategic objective, the Australian Government did something very rare in Australian military history: it achieved an Australian victory as defined within its own limited terms, and it did so at a relatively low cost in blood and treasure. He notes, though, that this was partly due to US willingness to accept Australia’s limited contribution to the Iraq War as sufficient in light of its own strategic circumstances, considerations, and objectives.

• Absence of operational and tactical objectives. The Australian strategic objectives discussed above translated into the need for a prominent tactical presence in Iraq – but that was all. As Palazzo shows time and again, tactical level force elements performed their tasks well, but at the operational level these tasks were not defined or assigned well, and operational level objectives were not set. As a result, several commanders of Army force elements such as the Security Detachment in Baghdad and the Al Muthanna Task Group in the south of Iraq set their own objectives for their rotations.[5] Although these tactical level force elements performed their tasks well and achieved their self-assigned objectives, they had also largely determined the associated measures by which their successes were judged.

  Palazzo is particularly scathing in his criticism of Headquarters Joint Operations Command and its predecessor, Headquarters Australian Theatre, for this situation, but much blame is also directed towards General Sir Peter Cosgrove, who was Chief of Defence Force at the outset of the war. This is because Cosgrove made the decision in early 2003 to exclude Commander Australian Theatre from the chain of command. Instead, the in-theatre commander in Iraq reported directly to Cosgrove. As a result, the ‘tactical general’ and the ‘6,000-mile screwdriver’ effects are evident on numerous occasions throughout the book.[6]

  This command arrangement arguably degraded the ADF’s operational level management of the war from its outset. Risk aversion was another key issue that Palazzo determined was a consequence of this command arrangement. A ‘no mission is worth dying for’ attitude at the strategic level meant that the ADF was not really involved in fighting the insurgency in Iraq in the way that the US and UK armed forces were.[7]

• Significant logistical issues. Due to decades of Defence budget cuts in the late 20th century, the ADF was not prepared for war in the early 2000s. As a result, several force options that were proposed as possible Australian contributions to the invasion stage of the Iraq War were not fit for purpose. Army’s contribution of a special operations task force during the 2003 invasion happened largely because it was the only viable option. Army’s other force elements were almost all assessed as not being suitable for deployment to the war, even against the degraded and demoralised force that was the Iraqi Army at that time.

  Throughout both the invasion and occupation stages of the deployment there was a repeated need to make short notice purchases under a Rapid Acquisition Program, to ensure that ADF force elements could be deployed with the right equipment. On several occasions this equipment was not available for use during force preparation, and deployed force elements were only able to access it after their arrival in theatre. This situation was the result of the earlier implementation of a ‘just in time’ logistics system within the Australian national support base, which is civilian industry best practice. It is not, as Palazzo points out, suitable for the unique circumstances that militaries face in war.[8]

  The result of the just in time logistics system was that several of the cost savings made in peacetime were more than cancelled out by the last-minute expenses incurred to urgently rectify shortfalls in vital equipment needed for the war. For that matter, Palazzo highlights that the ADF logistics organisation was poor in general throughout the deployment to Iraq. Multiple lines of logistics support back to Australia led to overlapping roles and responsibilities that were never properly deconflicted, especially jointly and at the theatre level. This led to duplication of effort and inefficiencies.

• Lack of jointness. Jointness did not really happen during the ADF’s contribution to the Iraq War. Instead, different ADF force elements tended to work directly with their equivalent Services within the militaries of Australia’s coalition partners. The structure of the ADF’s commitment to Iraq was therefore more reminiscent of the structure of its commitment to the Vietnam War than it was adherent to its own joint doctrine of the period. The establishment of a Joint Task Force Headquarters in June 2003 did not alleviate this situation, because this headquarters only had command of a few of the force elements in theatre. Others were under the operational control of their coalition (specifically US) equivalents. This means that ADF operations in Iraq were much less joint than has generally been assumed.
• The contribution made by embedded personnel. Throughout the book, Palazzo makes it clear that the ADF was very good at achieving international influence by embedding personnel in coalition – particularly US – headquarters. These embedded personnel contributed to the planning and execution of coalition operations and were a key means by which the ADF directly influenced the setting and obtaining of coalition campaign and operational objectives. For example, the most prominent embedded officer whose influence Palazzo refers to is Major General Jim Molan, who was the Chief of Operations for coalition forces in Iraq in 2004-05, and in this role had oversight of up to 300,000 coalition troops.[9] What Palazzo unfortunately does not comment on is the combined impact of these embedded personnel over time. Despite this, it can be inferred from the number and prominence of his references to individual embedded personnel that this impact must have been substantial.

Palazzo’s book The Australian Army in the Iraq War, 2002-2010 is highly recommended as it contains several pertinent lessons for today’s ADF, in addition to constituting a valuable historical account. As Palazzo himself observes in the book’s conclusion, ‘Iraq is at risk of becoming a forgotten conflict’ in Australia, as ‘the conflict in Afghanistan is the war that dominates the attention of political leaders and military commanders, as well as the headlines of the media’.[10] Arguably, the unusual circumstances of this book’s release have put it in the same position as the conflict it chronicles. In the case of the book at least, its potential obscurity can be easily overcome. Interested personnel can download the book at this link free of charge. It is worth the read.

End Notes