This review applies Lawrence Freedman’s Command:The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine to, as articulated in the Australian Army Contribution to the National Defence Strategy, 2024, the Australian Army’s three responsibilities as: a national institution, a profession, and a fighting force.[1]

In connecting Freedman’s work and the Australian Army’s three responsibilities, several themes emerge where the Australian Army can simultaneously learn from history, enhance current practice, and prepare for the future. These themes, as considerations against the Australian Army’s three responsibilities, include:

• National institution: between leaders, confidence, main effort, balance of risk, weakness, and decision-making.
• Profession: knowledge, training, ambiguity, structure, relationships, communication, and preparation.
• Fighting force: guidance, empathy, cooperation, understanding, combined arms, coordination, and coalition.

Freedman explains that the word ‘command’ comes from the Latin mandare, meaning to commit or entrust, from which we also derive ‘mandate.’[2] The Australian Defence Force (ADF) defines command as ‘the authority which a commander in the military lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment… [and command] includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.’[3]

Freedman notes that ‘at all levels of the chain of command, individuals have only temporary authority, but it is [ideally] still sufficient to exercise command.’[4] He also acknowledges that, through differing missions, situations and forces available, there is ‘no simple pattern’ or ‘neat organisational diagram’ for commanders to follow.[5] Freedman explains that commanders frequently face ‘awkward choices’, generating battlefield tensions and disagreements, caused by ‘limits faced by commanders, whether the result of politically determined boundaries or… scarcity of resources’, or ‘synchronising many disparate activities’, or enemy actions.[6]

Freedman emphasises that, through ‘personal responsibility and accountability, ' the ‘qualities that contribute to effective command are often those that would be admirable in almost any setting: professional knowledge, efficient use of resources, communication skills, the ability to work with others, a moral purpose, a sense of responsibility, and care for other people.

Similarly, unsuccessful command often includes ‘forms of inflexibility that lead to failure: excessive caution; fixation with certain tactics; insisting that all is going to plan when the results are evidently poor; and underestimating the enemy.’[7] Freedman argues, and this review demonstrates, that ‘very few command arrangements at times of war are friction-free. Those giving orders do not always succeed in communicating them effectively or getting them to be followed as required.’[8]

The Australian Army Contribution to the National Defence Strategy 2024, recognises that the National Defence Strategy, 2024 articulates necessary requirements, focus and guidance for the Australian Army to maintain expertise in land combat. In optimising the Army for land combat, specifically through littoral manoeuvre and long-range land and maritime strike capability, the transformation of the Australian Army, among other capabilities, includes mastering command as a ‘system of a sophistication unlike anything in our [Army’s] history.’[9]

This review, through emphasising the three responsibilities for the Australian Army, acknowledges Freedman’s examination of the ‘diversity of contemporary conflict.’[10] The three responsibilities for Army, as a national institution, a profession, and a fighting force, combined with command as a ‘system’, are ever present and ever challenging for military exponents and leaders to know, apply, learn, and adapt in peace and war.

Three responsibilities: Australian Army as a national institution, a profession, and a fighting force

As earlier stated, the Australian Army Contribution to the National Defence Strategy, 2024, defines the Australian Army’s three responsibilities as a national institution, a profession, and a fighting force. The Army ‘fulfils these three responsibilities at the same time’, and the three responsibilities are complementary, interdependent, and mutually reinforcing.[11]

Importantly, the three responsibilities support the transformation of the Australian Army, among other capabilities, through command as a ‘system’ by simultaneously – and somewhat paradoxically – balancing both the broadening possibilities and converging options to lead and unify the Army of today and set the foundations for the Army of the future.

The Australian Army is one of Australia’s most enduring institutions. The Army is its people, their families, and the communities in which they live. In biasing Army’s habits to the three responsibilities, the Army remains part of Australia’s national story. Ultimately, the Army values, with humility, its enduring connection to land, to community, and to our nation.[12]

Three responsibilities:

1. A national institution: the Australian Army is a national institution built on a foundation of ‘service’. The Army acts only at the direction of the Australian Government. The bond between the Army and the nation is a source of strength, and a vital element of national security. Those that serve or have served in the Army – be they full-time or part time – develop skills as Australian citizens that help to deepen Australia’s national resilience.[13]
2. A profession: trust is the foundation of a soldier’s profession. As a profession, soldiering demands high physical, intellectual and moral standards. The Army trains and prepares to meet these standards every day. Every Australian soldier accepts the ‘unlimited liability contract’. This contract has two parts. First, soldiers accept that they may have to give their lives in defence of the nation. Second, they know their duty may require the ethical application of lethal force.[14]
3. A fighting force: The Australian Army exists to fight those who would do harm to Australia and its interests. Technology is constantly changing the character of war, but the enduring human nature of war is brutal, violent, and without compromise. The Australian Army’s most powerful weapon is the tactical initiative, quiet determination, compassion, and pragmatic leadership of the Australian soldier. This is as powerful as any missile or mortar in building asymmetry against larger adversaries.[15]

Next, this review applies Freedman’s work on command and ‘the interplay between political and operational considerations’, alongside the ‘quirks of character, small hesitations, or rushing hubris’ of leaders, to the ambition of the Australian Army’s three responsibilities.[16]

Command – The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine and the Australian Army’s three responsibilities: a national institution, a profession, and a fighting force

We now examine the application of Lawrence Freedman’s Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine to the Australian Army’s three responsibilities:

1. A national institution – the Australian Army is a national institution built on a foundation of ‘service’. Applying considerations for a national institution may include:
   • Between leaders: a political leader, President Truman, and a military leader, General MacArthur, 15 October 1950: ‘Listen, you know I’m President, and you’re the general, you’re working for me…You don’t make any political decisions; I make the political decisions. You don’t make any kind of a decision at all. Otherwise, I’m going to call you back, and get you out of there.’[17]
   • Confidence: ‘what really counted [in April 1951] was that MacArthur had lost confidence in himself and was beginning to lose the confidence of his field officers and troops.’[18]
   • Main effort: ‘Dien Bien Phu was indispensable yet not made the top priority. Once the [French] commitment had been made, it needed to be backed up with the full resources of the [French] army.’[19]
   • Balance of risk:
     • during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy ‘wanted to stay on top of the chain of command to ensure, not that the missiles would be launched should it prove necessary, but that they were not launched when they should not be’.[20]
     • ‘senior military figures may have found [during the Cuban Missile Crisis] the constant attention from civilians, and in particular Robert McNamara, irritating, but no attempt was made to circumvent the established chain of command and the US Navy’s operational proposals were largely approved.’[21]
   • Weakness: describing Joseph Kabila, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2001-2019, ‘in countries with weak state institutions and legal systems, individuals create bespoke power structures around themselves to legitimise and secure their rule. The armed forces provide symbols of power and vital sources of protection, but when much depends on loyalty and trust, competence and integrity come to be valued less than close family or tribal ties.’[22]
   • Decision making: Tony Blair, British Prime Minister, 1997-2007, ‘attempted to influence American decision making [in the Iraq War, 2003-2007], but he could not do as much once the war had begun as he had done in pre-war diplomacy. [Blair] set ambitious objectives for an ‘exemplary’ occupation of southern Iraq, but it was never backed up with sufficient resources and personnel, and eventually, the United Kingdom found itself left alone with its area of responsibility and increasingly unable to cope…[S]trategy was left to develop out of an uneasy conversation between [British] field commanders and their superiors in London. The politicians ended up following the military lead.’[23]
2. A profession – as a profession, soldiering demands high physical, intellectual, and moral standards. Applying considerations for a profession may include:
   • Knowledge: neither President Nixon nor National Security Advisor Dr Kissinger, ‘had a feel for the inherent chaos of combat, often seeing as excuses the many factors [in Vietnam] that could frustrate the best planned operations, including bad weather. Both [Nixon & Kissinger] regularly complained about the [US] military’s ineptitude and lack of imagination.’ [24]
   • Training: The Indian Army’s advance into East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in December 1971, ‘at least one large river would have to be crossed, followed by a dash to the capital (Dacca), which would be challenging for an army that tended to be methodical and disinclined to improvise, relying as it did on infantry divisions with few mechanised units.’[25]
   • Ambiguity: Ariel Sharon’s view of Moshe Dayan, in 1973, Dayan conveyed ‘his intentions in an ambiguous way, leaving plenty of room for initiative and interpretation…if the result was success, fine. But if it was failure, well then, the responsibly was not [Dayan’s] but yours.’[26]
   • Structure: Admiral Sandy Woodward in the Falkland Campaign, 1982, ‘command centres become like islands occupied by close associates. Within each such centre, the combination of isolation, intensity of work, abundant adrenalin and stress, and the comradeship such pressure can generate, may create insular states of corporate mind.’[27]
   • Relationships: in response to an order to send North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) troops to Pristina airport to pre-empt an unexpected July 1999 Russian advance, Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson, British Army, Commander NATO Land Forces, Kosovo said to General Wesley Clark, US Army, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, ‘Sir, I’m not starting World War III for you…’ Following the Kosovo Campaign, both [General] Clark and [Lieutenant General] Jackson acknowledged that fatigue, frustration, and stress meant that their conversation was more bad-tempered and emotional than it need have been.’ [28]
   • Communication: General James Mattis, ‘when you’re the senior commander in a deployed force, time spent sharing your appreciation of the situation on the ground with your seniors is like time spent on reconnaissance: it’s seldom wasted.’[29]
   • Preparation: ‘commanders…spend much of their time preparing for wars that never come, training their units, keeping their equipment up to date, refining their doctrines, and planning for possible campaigns.’[30]
3. A fighting force – the Australian Army exists to fight those who would do harm to Australia and its interests. Applying considerations for a fighting force may include:
   • Guidance: ‘a fundamental skill in the art of leading – especially at the generalship level – is the ability to issue a clear and precise order that is incapable of being misunderstood, does not meander, is not overly poetic or semantically ambiguous, and is independent of the spirit of the commander (or the spirit of the order) as a factor that completes it. Every commander – not to mention a general officer – should remember that a subordinate does not always see eye to eye with them.’[31]
   • Empathy: of French forces at Dien Bien Phu, May 1954, ‘after the immediate paralysis [in the face of Viet Minh assaults], the [French] garrison commanders pulled themselves together. Some of their tactical decisions can be criticised, but they fought back with conviction and determination. If [these actions] had been better appreciated in Hanoi and Saigon, reinforcements might have been found with more urgency.’[32]
   • Cooperation: in October 1973, ‘Israeli command structures were inadequate to cope with complex operations that required close cooperation. Between General Headquarters and Southern Command…there was ‘no common language, and the situation was even worse between South Command and the divisions in the field.’[33]
   • Understanding: Saddam Hussein, in the Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991, ‘did not appreciate the difference American airpower would make. He dismissed warnings as exaggerations,’ including from United States’ F117 Nighthawk, Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles, and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters.[34]
   • Combined arms: led by General Grachev, Russian forces attacked Grozny, 31 December 1994, which ‘required the coordination of troops from different units, services and ministries. They came from tank and motor rifle regiments, airborne and naval infantry units, as well as Internal Troops, whose training was largely for riot control. [These disparate forces] had no experience of operating together and arrived with varying levels of combat readiness and equipment… [and ultimately] each organisation directed its own forces in ignorance of the actions of others.’[35]
   • Coordination: ‘hybrid warfare [does not] describe a clever innovation, something never tried before. Most wars are hybrid, in that belligerents engage in a variety of activities to hurt and disorient their adversaries. Often these activities follow their own paths and so they may not be well coordinated. The talk of hybrid war [for example in Russian operations in Ukraine 2014 to present through bringing together regular and irregular forces; overt and covert activities; combining established forms of military action with cyber-attacks and information warfare] suggested that apparently disparate activities were properly integrated to achieve a degree of synergy… but [for Russia] the disparate actions were rarely synchronised to maximise their strategic effect.’[36]
   • Coalition: US Army’s ‘three intellectual/martial traditions’: (1) ’heroes…champions of display, of skill-at-arms, of bold speech but, above all, of exemplary risk-taking.’[37]; (2) ‘guardians…preoccupied with defending the homeland; and, (3) ‘managers…mobilising all resources for a titanic struggle.’[38]

Conclusion

This review applies Lawrence Freedman’s Command: The Politics of Miliary Operations from Korea to Ukraine to, as articulated in the Australian Army Contribution to the National Defence Strategy, 2024, the Australian Army’s three responsibilities as a national institution, a profession, and a fighting force.

In connecting Freedman’s work and the Australian Army’s three responsibilities, several themes emerge. These themes, as considerations against the Australian Army’s three responsibilities, include:

• National institution: between leaders; confidence; main effort; balance of risk; weakness; and decision making.
• Profession: knowledge; training; ambiguity; structure; relationships; communication; and preparation.
• Fighting force: guidance; empathy; cooperation; understanding; combined arms; coordination; and coalition.

Freedman’s detailed examination of command complements the ADF’s definition of command as a commander’s lawful exercise of authority over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Freedman notes that all levels of the chain of command, individuals have only temporary authority.

The Australian Army Contribution to the National Defence Strategy, 2024, recognises that the National Defence Strategy 2024 articulates necessary requirements, focus, and guidance for the Australian Army to maintain expertise in land combat and to transform the Australian Army, including through command as a ‘system of a sophistication unlike anything in our history.’

Finally, this review acknowledges Freedman’s examination of the ‘diversity of contemporary conflict,’ through emphasising that the three responsibilities for the Australian Army – as a national institution, a profession, and a fighting force – are ever present and ever challenging for military exponents and leaders to know, apply, learn, and adapt in peace and war.