The Defence Strategic Review and National Defence Strategy: implications and outcomes for the Australian Army

Crafting a National Defence Strategy is an immensely challenging task. At its core, it requires a theory of victory – or a theory of success – so that practitioners can deliver it[1]. Within military education institutions and elsewhere, the development of strategy is often reduced to a formula that allocates available resources against efforts. This is wrong-headed thinking – as Jeffrey Meiser points out, doing so amounts to a applying a formula of ‘end+ways+means=(bad)strategy’ that leave assumptions fuzzy and underpinning logic unclear[2]. Developing strategy is a much more significant and iterative undertaking that goes far beyond simply assigning resources to methods of employment to deliver upon some end-state. Moreover, strategy-making must evaluate rival strategies rather than just some means-based planning. Fortunately, recently released Australian strategic policy documents promise to provide a theory of success that spells out the underpinning logic to strategic direction, clarifies assumptions, and has the capacity to adjust iteratively in response to shifting strategic circumstances.

National Defence Strategy

On their release, the National Defence Strategy (NDS) and Integrated Investment Program (IIP) were introduced by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles as “a fundamentally new approach” and a “framework to guide the significant and urgent changes required to address Australia’s challenging strategic circumstances”[3]. Those circumstances, recognised in the Defence Strategic Review (DSR), described Australia’s closest international partner, the United States of America, as no longer being the leader of a unipolar world. The DSR also acknowledged that actors such as China are threatening the global-rules based order[4]. The NDS goes further to explicitly call out Russia, North Korea and Iran as destabilising and “examples of how revisionist states can undermine peace and security”[5]. This view parallels NATO leadership who have shone a light on Russia and its immoral, illegal invasion of Ukraine, and have also criticised the economic and military support provided to it from China, North Korea and Iran[6]. Australia’s NDS was written as a response to these circumstances to address Australia’s strategic interests.

Helpfully, the NDS points out that Australia is not alone, but shares strategic interests with like-minded partners and allies. They include: “the US, … New Zealand, Japan, our partners in Southeast Asia and the Pacific family, the Republic of Korea, India as well as the UK and other European nations”[7]. To best understand Australia’s strategic interests, they can be visualised as concentric circles[8],[9]. At the centre, Australia requires the means to halt adversaries from attacking over the air-sea gap onto Australian territory. To prevent such an attack, Australia requires capabilities to deny enemy basing in our immediate region. Beyond Australia’s immediate region, the archipelago of Indonesia and the Philippines can be both a conduit and barrier to the rest of the world. In the Indo-Pacific region, Australia’s interests are concerned with the balance of power within the Indo-Pacific because unchecked growth may develop into an irrepressible force. This assessment also holds true at a global level when considering maintenance of the global rules based order.

Given these strategic circumstances and interests, the NDS spells out Australia’s security strategy as one of denial. Simply put, this entails “altering any potential adversary’s belief that it could achieve its ambitions with military force at an acceptable cost”, delivered through the familiar strategic objectives of ‘shape’, ‘deter’ and ‘respond’. The NDS also introduces strategic tasks listed as: defend Australia and our immediate region; deter through denial any potential adversary’s attempt to project power against Australia through our northern approaches; protect Australia’s economic connection to our region and the world; contribute with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific; and contribute with our partners to the maintenance of the global rules-based order[10]. This strategic guidance quite clearly and concisely provides a landmark objective for the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and pathway by outlining six capability effects to be achieved. They are: project force, hold a potential adversary’s forces at risk, protect ADF forces and supporting critical infrastructure in Australia, sustain protracted combat operations, maintain persistent situational awareness in our primary area of military interest, and achieve decision advantage[11].

The Australian Army’s place in National Defence Strategy

While providing overarching guidance for the ADF, the NDS goes further to define the Australian Government’s requirements for the Australian Army. It calls for “An Army optimised for littoral manoeuvre with a long-range land and maritime strike capability.”[12] Over the coming decade, the NDS also calls for even longer range land based weapons as well as an amphibious combined arms land forces, enabled by the other services, which can control strategic land positions[13]. This direction requires far more than merely ‘bayoneting the shipwrecked’ after naval and air forces have successfully prosecuted their targets in the air-sea gap, or even just deploying continentally for Defence of Australia tasks[14].

Earlier this year, Professor Ian Langford talked to the Cove about the DSR and what it holds for the Australian Army[15]. He maintained that the character of future war is likely to be underpinned by a mix of technologically advanced capabilities and older warfighting concepts. Acknowledging regional geography, this could look similar to the US Marine Corps doctrine concept of stand-in-forces[16] and expeditionary advanced base operations[17]. These concepts call for an integrated joint force to contest and deny in all domains areas of strategic significance. In that discussion, Professor Langford noted that 2nd (Australian) Division is a key provider of forces in the Australian Army.

Whilst the strategy is clear (as are strategic interests, objectives and tasks), the bridge between the strategic and tactical levels is yet being realised. This deficit raises a key question concerning the implications of the NDS for the Australian Army. Drawing these strands together for greater understanding is an essential function of military leaders[18]. As practitioners in the profession of arms, we must engage with these topics to better understand and succeed in our assigned missions[19].

In a talk hosted by 2(AS) Division and streamed by The Cove on Tuesday 27 August, Professor Peter Dean will discuss implications for the Australian Army from the DSR, NDS and IIP. In doing so this discussion will support our understanding of Army’s role in defence of the nation, a role with significant importance for 2 (AS) Division, the Army and the ADF and a whole.

Details

• When: 16.30-17.30 [AEST] Tuesday 27 August
• Where: Randwick Barracks Officer’s Mess (all ranks welcome)
• Livestream: cove.army.gov.au (best accessed outside the DPN)
• Livestream: cove.army.gov.au (best accessed outside the DPN)

About the Speaker 

Professor Peter J. Dean, PhD, SFHEA, is the Director, Foreign Policy and Defence at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. Professor Dean has an extensive background in military and defence studies. An international award-winning author he has authored numerous books, policy papers and articles on the US-Australian alliance, Australian defence policy, military operations and regional security. Previously Professor Dean was the University of Western Australia’s (UWA) first Chair of Defence Studies and the inaugural director of the UWA Defence and Security Institute. Most recently Professor Dean was Co-Lead of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) Secretariat where he served as senior advisor and principal author for the Independent Leads, His Excellency Professor the Hon. Stephen Smith and Air Chief Marshal Sir Angus Houston AK AC AFC (Retd).

Footnotes