Small Aircraft, Sizable Threats

In the 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) and Integrated Investment Program (IIP), uncrewed or robotic and autonomous systems are mentioned a total of 57 times[1]. Clearly this is an area of significant interest and concern for the Australian Government. But why are these systems without humans useful and what need do they fill? Additionally, if our adversaries are using them, what risks do they pose, and what could the Australian Army do about them?

Uncrewed, robotic or autonomous systems have become the modern multi-tool, useful both on the battlefield (as exemplified in the Russo-Ukraine War and the current fighting between Israel, Hamas, and Hezbollah) and also in other operations where deniability is useful. Future warfare is predicted to be irregular; meaning that rather than opting for conventional or even nuclear warfare, state actors will more likely choose to act in deniable or ambiguous ways, in other words, operate in the “grey zone”[2]. Grey zone tactics include systems and capabilities that are less attributable and present ambiguous identities and intents. Arguably, Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) drones, such as those used by hobbyists, constitute such grey threats. These platforms offer low-cost opportunities both in terms of procurement and training, enabling their use by small and resource-poor actors. Ukrainian combatants have modified and deployed COTS such as the Chinese manufactured DJI and Autel to deliver lethal payloads to strike at Russian targets at a low cost of under $10,000[3]. These systems offer a value for money proposition, significantly cheaper than conventional guided munitions and the expensive aerial defence systems designed to defeat them or the fast jets that launch them[4]. With such a cost differential, the use of small drones offers a rational and economically advantageous military tactic that is growing more prevalent. Use of this technology isn’t limited to the European and Middles Eastern theatres of operations; as stated in the NDS “grey zone activities have also expanded in the Indo-Pacific”[5]. Therefore, the Australian Army must consider use and countermeasures for UAS, including measures to reduce the grey zone space within which adversaries can act.

The Australian Army’s Response to this Sizable Threat

The NDS notes that Australia’s security strategy as one of denial. Simply put, this entails “altering any potential adversary’s belief that it could achieve its ambitions with military force at an acceptable cost”[6]. This strategy has significance at the operational and tactical levels where many within Army or the wider Defence organisation are most concerned.

Countering the drone threat requires significant effort. The threat actor’s decision cycle must be interrupted through both active and passive measures. Passive measures include tried and true techniques such as camouflage, concealment, deception, and decoys, in an attempt to confuse the drone operator or its targeting system[7]. Passive measures also include target hardening such as shelters and dispersion to limit the effectiveness of drone weapons deployment. Active measures include systems that attack the drone itself, its sensors, communications and navigation or its payload. Means deployed include hacking, jamming, spoofing, ramming, shooting, directed energy weapons, nets and even using birds of prey to disable or capture drones[8].

In a recent paper published by the Australian Army Research Centre, Carl Rhodes observed that military forces unprepared for the threat of these small drones have found that themselves without options to respond, effectively leaving them vulnerable to attack at a time and place of their adversary’s choosing[9]. Whilst the need and strategic intent is clear, the implications at the tactical levels are less so. Army, in combination with the other services, must urgently consider how it counters the risks and threat posed by drones, and develop clear pathways forward in this critical area of modern warfare. As practitioners in the profession of arms, the onus is on us to direct our energy and intellect towards professional debate on this topic so as to enable success in the missions assigned to us by the government and people of Australia.

In a talk hosted by 2(AS) Division and streamed by The Cove on Tuesday 29 October, Dr Carl Rhodes will discuss implications for the Australian Army in response to the threats and opportunities inherent in the wide-spread use of small uncrewed air systems by combatants in current and recent battlefields. In doing so, this discussion will support our understanding of Army’s role in defence of the nation, a role with significant importance for 2(AS) Division, the Army and the ADF and a whole.

Details

• When: 16.30-17.30 [AEDT] Tuesday 29 October
• Where: Randwick Barracks Officer’s Mess (all ranks welcome)
• Livestream: cove.army.gov.au (best accessed outside the DPN)

About the Speaker

Dr Carl Rhodes, director and founder of Robust Policy, has over 25 years of experience delivering policy analysis and actionable recommendations for senior government and military leaders in Australia and the United States. Carl has experience as a research leader and manager of policy analysis efforts and is active across several portfolios including defence technology and acquisition and national security strategy. Carl is currently a non-resident Senior Fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and worked at RAND Corporation from 1997-2021 including as director of RAND Australia. Carl earned a Ph.D. in chemical engineering from Caltech.
 

Footnotes