Recent high-intensity conflict in Ukraine and the Red Sea is proof positive that navies face a growing asymmetric threat from militarised small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS). The barrier to entry for naval combat has been reduced through sUAS to the point that motivated individuals and groups can effectively engage technologically and militarily superior surface forces. I will examine how the RAN could appropriate land-based counter-sUAS technology and doctrine for employment in the maritime domain.

The RAN has spent decades optimising its traditional kill chain, with a natural focus on hostile aircraft and anti-ship missiles; however, the development of the militarised sUAS is pushing naval combat operations into unforeseen territory. The US Department of Defence (2021) acknowledged this:

The emergence of sUAS as both hazard and threat has complicated an already complex and challenging security environment. While fundamentally aircraft, sUAS exist in the gap between air defense [sic], force protection, and airspace control across the operating environment continuum.

Combat in Ukraine has seen wide use of weaponised First Person View (FPV) sUAS in the land domain. These systems utilise a camera feed and headset to allow the operator to ‘see’ the drone’s perspective, enabling intricate manoeuvres such as flying into open windows or armoured vehicle hatches before detonating (Milasauskas & Jaškūnas 2024). Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have been forced to innovate and repurpose technology to bridge the force protection capability gap, such as counter-sUAS jammers and ‘cope cages’ for armoured vehicles (Newdick 2024, Payne 2023).

The Red Sea provides a similar example of sUAS in naval combat. Aircraft from the US Navy’s Carrier Air Wing 3 – on their recent deployment to the Red Sea aboard USS Dwight D. Eisenhower – engaged multiple missiles and drones aimed at the task group and commercial shipping. Captain Marvin Scott, the Wing’s CO, described the threat from Houthi “one-way munitions” as “constant” (USNI 2024). This combat, however, represents an almost ideal counter-sUAS environment. The Eisenhower task group had the advantage of range, giving crews valuable time to identify and prosecute potential threats.

Let’s examine a less favourable hypothetical, similar to the land warfare scenarios in the current Ukraine conflict. One of our Anzac-class frigates is entering a foreign port as part of a routine deployment. There is an assessed force protection risk, so several armed sailors are posted on the upper decks. Unknown to the crew, a motivated group has acquired dozens of small commercial sUAS and outfitted them with explosives. The drones are launched from the port precinct, roughly 500 metres from the frigate as she comes alongside.

A commercial off-the-shelf FPV sUAS system offered by DJI can achieve speeds of 140 km/h. Even assuming that this speed is somewhat reduced by adding an explosive payload – for this example let’s say that the sUAS can reach 100 km/h – a tiny target at highway speeds would still be almost impossible to engage with small arms fire. A handful sUAS are shot down by the sailors’ accurate marksmanship.

The swarm of sUAS covers the distance to the frigate in 18 seconds. The primary weapons on the frigate cannot engage the small targets at close range and low altitude. The sUAS impact, detonating around the bridge and radar array. This realistic scenario has the potential to cause significant harm to ADF members as well as untold damage to a multimillion-dollar warship, all for the cost of a few sUAS and explosives.

The question then becomes what can we do to adapt to this changing threat environment?

I see the beginnings of a solution in the US military’s approach. Recent years have seen the US Marine Corps making significant investments in counter-sUAS doctrine and technology. The Light Marine Air Defence Integrated System (L-MADIS) is specifically designed to counter the sUAS threat. L-MADIS is distributed across two light tactical vehicles, with “one acting as the brain and the other as the brawn” (Cortez 2023). The ‘brains’ consist of an electro-optical system, radar, and drone detection system, and the ‘brawn’ consists of a dismountable electronic warfare system (Seck 2024). The two halves, when combined, allow L-MADIS to identify and eliminate sUAS threats, using its electronic warfare suite to ‘soft-kill’ the targets.

L-MADIS has proven itself effective in the land domain; however, it also found an unusual use within the maritime domain. Several years ago, the USS Kearsarge transited the Suez Canal with L-MADIS literally strapped to its deck. Rogoway (2019) underlines the odd nature of this tactic.

Yes, it’s somewhat bewildering to think that a vessel like Kearsarge, which has four layers of air defence all by itself… needs a little buggy chained to its deck to detect, classify, and fend-off weaponized drones that can be bought at retail electronics shops. But this is the nature and pace of the threat and there are few places where a large capital ship is as vulnerable to attack than in the tight confines of the Suez Canal, which sits alongside a known hotbed for militant activities.

This isn’t to suggest that all RAN vessels should have tactical vehicles parked on the flight deck; however, it is critical that the Navy acquires mature equipment which can effectively respond to sUAS attacks. The drone threat in Ukraine and the Red Sea demonstrates that the implementation of jammers and other sUAS-specific countermeasures on our ships is key to protecting Australian troops, especially in littoral environments such as what the Kearsarge and our hypothetical Anzac-class frigate faced. 

This technology, however, is only half of the equation for combatting the threat. The other half is training. With a small Defence Force, a joint – rather than maritime domain-specific – training effort makes sense. As a model, Fort Sill in Oklahoma hosts the US Army’s Joint Counter-sUAS University (JCU), which trains members from all six branches to effectively employ radar, electronic warfare, and smart shooting systems to defeat the drone threat (Epstein 2024). Australia is uniquely situated by the AUKUS treaty to engage with our US allies so that the ADF can take away lessons for implementing similar, organic training. If Australia were to set up a counter-sUAS school, instructors could be trained at JCU. Australia’s new school should respond to the requirements of all three services and aim to simulate the threat from swarms of coordinated sUAS. Combining this training with the acquisition of mature counter-sUAS technology will be vital for force protection in any future conflict.

In conclusion, sUAS represent a clear and present danger for Navy operations. Their speed and cost effectiveness make them desirable for potential opponents in asymmetric conflict and make them nearly impossible to counter using current methodology and technology. To fight this threat, the RAN must look outwards and learn lessons from our partners in the US military, most especially their land domain forces.

References

1. Cortez, C 2022, Drone Destroyer: 2nd LAAD tests LMADIS, United States Marine Corps Flagship, viewed 19 July 2024, https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/3225868/drone-destroyer-2nd-laad-tests-lmadis/.
2. Epstein, J 2024, The US military isn’t ready for the coming drone war, Business Insider, viewed 19 July 2024, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-military-isnt-ready-drones-potential-biggest-threat-next-battlefield-2024-5?op=1.
3. Flynn, K 2023, Make Every Marine a Drone Killer, U.S. Naval Institute, viewed 18 July 2024, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/november/make-every-marine-drone-killer.
4. Milasauskas, T & Jaškūnas, L 2024, FPV drones in Ukraine are changing modern warfare, Atlantic Council, viewed 19 July 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/fpv-drones-in-ukraine-are-changing-modern-warfare/.
5. Newdick, T 2024, Ukraine Situation Report: Russian Anti-Drone Electronic Warfare Tank Captured, The War Zone, viewed 19 July 2024, https://www.twz.com/news-features/ukraine-situation-report-russian-anti-drone-electronic-warfare-tank-captured.
6. Parsons, D 2024, Carrier Air Wing 3 Returns Back Home After High-Tempo Middle East Deployment, USNI News, viewed 18 July 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/07/12/carrier-air-wing-3-returns-back-home-after-high-tempo-middle-east-deployment.
7. Payne, S 2023, Russian Tank With ‘Cope Cage’ Covered In Explosive Reactive Armor Emerges, The War Zone, viewed 19 July 2024, https://www.twz.com/russian-tank-debuts-cope-cage-covered-in-explosive-reactive-armor.
8. Rogoway, T 2019, USS Kearsarge Transits The Suez Canal With Anti-Drone Buggies Keeping Watch On Deck, The War Zone, viewed 19 July 2024, https://www.twz.com/26067/uss-kearsarge-transits-the-suez-canal-with-anti-drone-buggies-keeping-watch-on-deck.
9. Seck, HH 2024, Every Marine A Drone Defender Under Three Part Counter-UAS Plan, The War Zone, viewed 18 July 2024, https://www.twz.com/news-features/every-marine-a-drone-defender-under-three-part-counter-uas-plan.
10. US Department of Defense 2021, Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Strategy, 27 January, viewed 19 July 2024, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/07/2002561080/-1/-1/0/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-COUNTER-SMALL-UNMANNED-AIRCRAFT-SYSTEMS-STRATEGY.pdf.