Recent commentary from a range of pundits regarding the recapitalisation of Army’s land combat vehicles has been as voluminous as it has been diverse. Will Leben recently provided a pithy piece which frames both sides of the argument.

Here I am looking to highlight some aspects of that debate which in my view have been selective. I contend that capable land forces, including high-quality armoured vehicles, will remain necessary for Australia. This is because history remains the best set of guideposts, and because capable land forces are interdependent with, rather than superseded by, long range strike capabilities.

My first point relates to the oversimplified proposition that armoured vehicles can be destroyed by comparatively low-cost weapons such as anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) and therefore offer diminishing returns on capital investment. Commentators including Shoebridge, Sheridan, Davies and Williams all draw on this observation to argue against investment in land combat vehicles. However, as outlined by Brendan Gilbert, recent scrutiny drawing on experience from Ukraine is at best a partial reading of that campaign.

While it is evident that Russian tanks and armoured vehicles have been victim to Ukrainian ATGM, this is not revelatory. Ukraine has been able to conduct a largely positional defence in built up areas, operating on relatively secure supply lines (known militarily as ‘interior lines’).[1] Ukraine’s herculean efforts have also been abetted by some poor Russian tactics, which (although often paid lip-service) is an entirely relevant consideration, not merely cheap code that ‘we would do it better’.

No competent military leader would argue against having as many ATGM as possible in defensive operations. That same leader would also understand that it is very difficult to manoeuvre a human carrying a relatively heavy missile tube and sensor unit under fire. For this reason, NLAWs and Javelins are less effective in offensive operations than defensive operations. The mobility, protection, and firepower provided by armoured fighting vehicles remains essential whenever you find yourself needing to move forward into fire. This is why armour underwrites offensive land operations.

Second, the ADF cannot reasonably move away from a balanced force structure. A full accounting of the ‘balanced force’ is beyond this short piece, nonetheless it remains justified for two reasons. First, history matters. Although Australia pursues defensive strategic objectives, we have a history of achieving them by contributing to offensive military campaigns. We prefer to be expeditionary rather than waiting for a circumstance to manifest in which we would be forced to fight on our own soil. This history suggests governments have been and will continue to be unwilling to constrain the ways in which the ADF can fight to achieve these ends.

But perhaps more importantly, arguments supporting investment in long-range strike are simply not at cross purposes with the requirement for modern armoured vehicles. They are interdependent. Australia cannot reasonably expect to project standoff capabilities in the near region without protection.

A likely scenario would see the projection of ground forces to clear and hold ground in order to secure key infrastructure such as ports and airfields and set conditions for the use of standoff weapons. Ground forces are as necessary as other joint capabilities to exert control. The idea that the next war will be the first to do away with close combat is speculative at best and not supported by past experience.

Third, it is often suggested that armour – particularly heavy armour – is of limited utility in Australia’s primary operating environment (the Indo Pacific). This usually relates to Australia’s ability to project these vehicles, their employability in regional terrain, or both.

Some have criticised Army for not buying light tanks, for example. Others cite the divestment of Main Battle Tanks by the US Marine Corps as a signal that Army’s armoured recapitalisation is ill-conceived. The reality is that every Defence procurement decision is a trade-off. Light armour may be easy to deploy, but it is easy to destroy. Unlike the Australian Army, the US Marines Corps has the advantage of handing off the responsibility for projecting heavy means to the US Army.

It is accepted that force projection of heavy armour is difficult, but armoured vehicles are not responsible for gaps in Australia’s force projection. Rather, Australia’s absence of commitment to force projection is the problem with force projection. Projects including Land 8710 aim to address this capability shortfall.

The Indo Pacific’s geography is littoral, congested, and topographically complex. Armour has repeatedly proved necessary in regional conflicts. Recent lessons from counter-ISIL operations like Marawi, as well as our own previous lessons from Vietnam and the South West Pacific in the Second World War, should not be cast off as irrelevant. I might also add that jungle and urban environments also constrict the employment of many systems – like drones – which have been suggested as substitutes for the direct support that armour provides to infantry.[2] As our own recent experience has shown, an enemy can achieve asymmetry against standoff weapons by moving into complex terrain where they are more difficult to detect and target. This has and will undoubtedly continue to require combined arms teams to dislodge them in close combat.

Two of JC Wylie’s maxims are relevant in this discussion. The first is that ‘we cannot predict with certainty the pattern of the war for which we prepare ourselves’.[3] While submarines, hypersonics, and drones are important in allowing the government to generate a range of response options, they don’t obviate the need to continue to generate credible land forces. Unless the government is prepared to constrain the range of ways it can achieve Australia’s strategic objectives, the ADF must be equipped and structured to carry out a broad range of tasks.

The second and more popular idiom that soldiers on the ground, with guns, are the ultimate determinant in war holds true. This is not simply because it justifies the existence of the land force. Rather, soldiers on the ground with guns are essential for realising credible strike capabilities. These needs are not mutually exclusive.

Like every other capability in Defence’s arsenal, land combat vehicles have known vulnerabilities and rely on integration with other land and joint capabilities to provide options for government. Unless Australia is willing to hedge that missiles and drones will prove unilaterally decisive, it needs a credible Army. A credible Army needs high-quality land combat vehicles.