Introduction

Many would have seen footage from explosive First Person View (eFPV) drones in Ukraine. Generally in high definition, a video will show the final moments of a soldier as they are caught in an open field or targeted through open vehicle hatches. After token efforts to hide or escape, their final expressions of horror are captured before the screen goes blank. Often, these videos are accompanied by another viewpoint showing the impact, leaving no doubt on the fate of the soldier in the video.

The Ukraine War has accelerated the use of technology in warfare, with eFPV drones changing the character of war. This article will first discuss this change before outlining how the Australian Army would need to adapt if it were to introduce this capability.

eFPV drones in Ukraine

Since the 2022 Russian invasion, drones have been a feature of the Russo-Ukraine War. Initially TB2 drones helped blunt the Russian advance on the narrow roads of Ukraine.[i] As the war settled into prolonged periods of static warfare, commercial quadcopters became critical for reconnaissance and eventually dropping grenades on Russian positions.[ii] The most significant evolution was combining explosive charges with FPV drones.[iii] A capability that is affordable, lethal, simple and is personal in its targeting. It is these characteristics of eFPV drones which are changing the character of war.

eFPV drones are highly affordable, with their small size and basis in civilian manufacturing leading to Ukraine planning on producing a million drones per year.[iv] This is done at a far lower cost than anti-tank missiles or purpose-built loitering munitions. eFPV drones provide a significant asymmetric advantage to the Ukrainians when used against armoured vehicles valued at millions of dollars.

eFPV drones have proved highly lethal in Ukraine. Due to their manoeuvrability, eFPV drones can target fast moving vehicles and can re-attack if they miss. Significantly, the ability to target the vulnerabilities of vehicles such as open hatches or thin armour, magnifies the effect of their explosive charges. When targeting individual soldiers, eFPV drones are reversing a trend of survivability in warfare.

Since helmets re-emerged during the First World War, individual soldier protection has reduced casualties. Helmets, body armour, and other protective measures have also been complemented by medical innovations such as combat tourniquets. The combination of individual protective equipment and improved combat medicine dramatically increases the chance of surviving direct and in-direct fire – except when a soldier is unlucky enough to receive a direct hit. The manoeuvrability of eFPV drones increases the likelihood of achieving direct hits, making warfare more lethal.

eFPV drones are relatively simple to operate. During the Chief of Army Symposium, Dr Jack Watling explained that a drone operator could be trained in three weeks to utilise eFPV drones to greater effect and at greater range than a military sniper.[v] While this was caveated by the existence of some countermeasures against eFPV drones – and the possibility of more emerging – this reflects the current situation. Conversely, the application of machine learning and image recognition may make eFPV drones even simpler to operate, potentially overcoming emerging countermeasures.

Dr Watling also explained how eFPV drones are responsible for the ‘personalisation of the battlefield’ due to their precise nature.[vi] Although individual targeting has occurred with drones since the first CIA Central Intelligence Agency MQ-1 Predator drones in the early 2000s, targeting of this nature has been deliberate and the effects of a hellfire missile observed from afar.[vii]

eFPV drones are being used against targets of opportunity, with the operator seeing the final expression on their target’s face. This has ‘shortened the distance’ of combat, reversing a centuries old trend of warfare where ranged weapons, firearms, and eventually aircraft and missiles have dehumanised targets.[viii] While operators of eFPV drones aren’t necessarily exposed to risk, they are arguably as close to some aspects of combat as hand-to-hand fighting, increasing their risk of psychological harm.

How the Australian Army should adapt

The effectiveness and asymmetric advantage provided by eFPV drones in Ukraine suggests this capability will be adopted by other militaries, including Australia. In response to eFPV drones changing the character of war, the Australian Army needs to consider how to protect itself from this threat and prepare to operate them. As others have already written on the need to protect against drones,[ix] and the establishment of a training cell to develop this capability,[x] this paper will instead focus on the capability, psychological, legal, and ethical adaptions required before introducing an Australian Army eFPV drone capability.

Capability Adaption

If the Australian Army decides to develop an eFPV drones capability, a different approach will be required. In line with how eFPV drones are utilised in the Russo-Ukraine War, they must be treated as a weapon rather than an aircraft. Capability Programs must cater for keeping stock at a required level, rather than simply buying a finite number. The capability program for eFPV must be agile, able to adapt to countermeasures as they emerge. Finally, eFPV will need bespoke training facilities. If eFPV drones are to reach their full potential, suitable targetry that simulate fast moving and precise targets will be required. Where possible, simulation and training will need to expose operators to the realities of utilising eFPV drones against enemy combatants.

Psychological Adaption

In his seminal work On Combat, Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman outlined how humans are largely not pre-disposed to killing, with distance reducing the psychological impact on soldiers when they use lethal force.[xi] While the first point has been disputed by academics such as Dr Rob Engen, the second point is uncontested.[xii] Operators of eFPV drones are physically distant; however, the immersive nature of controlling the drone brings the operator psychologically closer to the combat experience. If the Australian Army is to adopt eFPV drones, it must be prepared for the psychological impact on the operators. As suggested by Grossman for combat writ large, reality-based training will increase the ability of the operators to carry out their duties; [xiii] however, this will still pale in comparison to when eFPV drones are used in anger. It will be critical that eFPV operators work in a team, a proven method of support in combat,[xiv] as well as having immediate access to psychological support.

Legal Adaptions

For centuries, once the decision is made to engage with lethal force, nothing can be done to reverse that decision. The bullet is fired, and it can’t come back. eFPV drones change this paradigm as the operator has a choice whether to engage until the last moment. The other fundamental difference is that the target will generally be aware that they are being targeted by an eFPV drone. Legal issues will arise if the target attempts to surrender to the drone, or simply throws down their weapon. It will be unclear if these are legitimate acts of surrender or are they simply buying time until the eFPV drone runs out of battery.

In Ukraine, procedures have been developed to allow surrender to drones to occur, using specific instructions to guide prisoners to ground units to be taken into custody. [xv] If instructions aren’t complied with, they potentially remain a target and can be legally engaged as a combatant. The legal issues surrounding eFPV drones are without precedent and far removed from the combat envisioned by those who wrote the various treaties which govern conduct in war. The Australian Army will need to develop unambiguous legal guidance if it is to operate eFPV drones.

Ethical Adaptions

Engagements with eFPV drones in the Russo-Ukraine War often appear one sided. The target is often helpless to prevent their demise, with some even throwing their helmets at the drone in a vain attempt to knock it out of the sky.[xvi] Employing lethal force against someone who is effectively defenceless, but still a combatant and legal target, has a high potential for an ethical dilemma and moral injury. Military necessity and whether this aligns with the Army’s values will need to be considered, particularly when eFPV drones are used against individual soldiers.

There is no easy solution to the ethical, legal and psychological aspects of using eFPV drones; however, many of these issues can be mitigated by targeting enemy vehicles or equipment rather than individuals. Not only are these likely more high value targets, but they will be a clearer target from an ethical and legal sense, with less risk of moral injury for the eFPV operator. This self-imposed limitation, however, may reduce the psychological impact that the presence of eFPV drones on the battlefield has on the enemy, reducing their effectiveness.

Conclusion

The Russo-Ukraine War has accelerated the use of technology in warfare, with eFPV drones being the most prominent and impactful example. The characteristics of eFPV drones—affordable, lethal, simple, and personal—have changed the character of war. If the Australian Army is to develop an eFPV capability, it must make capability, psychological, legal, and ethical adaptations. Acquiring and training with eFPV drones will be the easier part of the equation;, addressing the psychological, legal, and ethical challenges they present will be the true test of the Australian Army's readiness for this new era of warfare.

End Notes