“Moving the nation to a war footing simply took time. Recruiting and training large armed forces and creating an extensive munitions and aircraft industry could not be done instantly.”

Dr Peter Layton, National Mobilisation During War: Past Insights, Future Possibilities 2020 

There is war in the Indo-Pacific. In a surprise attack, US forces in the region are bombed, and this is rapidly followed up with attacks on other allied countries. Land and naval forces from the hostile nation have advanced south, capturing strategically important bases including Guam, the Philippines, and Singapore. Most US Air Force assets in the region have been destroyed on the ground. An Australian Army division – forward deployed into the Indo-Pacific with the task to secure key locations in Malaya, Singapore, New Guinea, and Timor Leste – has been destroyed and most of its soldiers made prisoners of war.

The year is 1942, and despite the enormous human tragedy of these setbacks and the existential risk of the strategic circumstances, the situation is far from catastrophic for Australia. The Army had nine divisions available for the defence of Australia or deployment into the Indo-Pacific[1]. Factories across Australia were already producing munitions and war materiel in quantities that would prove decisive. Food and medical supply industries were likewise producing in sufficient scale to supply both Australian and US troops.

This paper will describe why, at the strategic level, Australia was relatively well prepared to weather the storm of 1942. I will argue that Australia was fortunate and benefitted immensely from the conflict in Europe, which propelled our nation to prepare for sustained combat operations several years prior to the appearance of an existential threat from Imperial Japan. Mobilising a nation for war requires both time and social licence.

Firstly, I will define mobilisation and provide a brief history of the key actions taken during the relevant years immediately prior to and during the Second World War. I will then provide two examples: the development of industry and raising of land forces to demonstrate what was achieved between 1939-1942 and how key actions cannot be compressed in time. Finally, I will outline what the effects were of these actions and how they were essential to Australia’s survival. This paper will deliberately focus on the generation and sustainment of military capabilities; it will not address military strategy or how these forces were employed between competing theatres.

Mobilisation in Defence is the act of moving from the prepared state for a range of contingencies to being ready to execute a specific operation. It involves generating Defence capabilities and capacities outside the scope and capacity of existing preparedness guidance and budgetary allocations. In certain circumstances, mobilisation may necessitate the marshalling of national resources to defend the nation and its interests[2]. Marshalling of national resources is a decision taken by government and involves activities that require the civil community, including all levels of government and industry, to work in cooperation with or as part of the armed forces[3]. Many of these activities take time and – regardless of the resources allocated in a crisis – that time cannot be compressed. Marshalling national resources also involves making decisions around public spending and control of the economy. To do this in a democratic country, the government requires social licence, the ongoing acceptance and approval of the community over the period of mobilisation[4].

The work to mobilise the Australian nation towards war began in 1937, two years before Germany invaded Poland. There were already signs of competition spilling over into crisis and conflict on the European continent and the UK convened an Imperial Conference. One of the significant outcomes for Australia from this conference was that the UK rearmament program was struggling to supply their own needs and Australia could not depend on the supply of defence equipment from Britain. In response, Australia began establishing our own modest defence industry[5]. The Australian Government also created a ‘War Book’, which described what every government department was required to do in the event of war[6].

On the 3 September 1939, two days after Germany invaded Poland, Australia formally declared war. This had several immediate effects. It allowed the government to use legislation that it could only enact in wartime, and it created the social licence to begin mobilisation actions in earnest. Spending on defence increased significantly, which resulted in a corresponding expansion in industrial capability and capacity[7]. The Second Australian Imperial Force (2nd AIF) was raised specifically for overseas service. For home defence, the government reintroduced conscription. This required all unmarried men to complete training with the militia[8].

The opportunity gained during this period was that national mobilisation could be gradually escalated so at no stage did the nation need to go from a standing start to full mobilisation. The increase in industrial output was not achieved instantly, rather there was a steady increase in capability and capacity as machinery and tools were manufactured, organisations established, and workers trained. Problems and issues were fixed as they were encountered, and lessons were learned that would be vital in the years ahead. Economist and historian Sydney Butlin referred to the achievements of this period as a “major factor in Australian survival under the Japanese threat.[9]” Layton expanded on this point stating, “The most useful achievement, however, was less industrial output than establishing the organisations that, with their skilled staff and management teams, were to make practical the further expansion necessary to meet the threat of Japanese invasion in 1942. By the end of 1941, the nation’s munitions organisation had been set up, considerable factory construction undertaken, initial difficulties overcome, false starts corrected and mistaken appointments adjusted.[10]”

Between December 1941 and February 1942, Imperial Japan expanded across the Indo-Pacific. On 18 February 1942, Prime Minster Curtin publicly declared ‘total mobilisation’[11]. This escalated the mobilisation measures already in place and “Government now assumed an unprecedented – and never again equalled – degree of control over Australian society and the economy[12]”. The next day, Darwin was attacked by Japanese air raids. With a direct threat to mainland Australia, the social licence for further mobilisation was present. Rather than resist the degree of government control and expenditure being enacted, the Australian population was “clamouring to be told what to do and what to sacrifice[13]”. Even with this government direction of ‘total mobilisation’, many of the tasks required to defend Australia would not have been possible without the work already started.

By mid-1943, it became apparent to government and Defence planners that they had mobilised too many troops and redirected too much of the workforce to generating military capability. The lack of workforce available to the civilian sector began to affect the ability of the nation to sustain the Australian military, support allies, and provide for civil society. Just over 12 months after Port Moresby was at serious risk of Japanese occupation, the Government started to reduce the size of both the military and defence industry workforce in order to reallocate workers to areas such as food production[14]. This demobilisation balanced the requirements of generating military power against the need to keep the nation and the economy functioning.

One of the key areas that developed over the period between Germany invading Poland and Japan’s entry into the war was the expansion of Australia’s defence industry. The war in Europe provided the government the social licence to increase defence spending. This enabled new industries to be established, building everything from tooling and component parts through to engines, explosive ordinance, aircraft, and battle tanks[15]. Factories and assembly lines take time to build or convert from civilian applications. Supply chains take time to establish. Personnel take time to train and practice at both the worker and manager level. As one example, in 1939, Australian industry could only manufacture machine tools in four locations and was almost totally reliant on importing this vital equipment from overseas. Overseas supply chains could not be relied upon after the start of the war. By the end of 1940, there were 30 firms producing machine tools in sufficient quantity to provide for the equally expanded armaments manufacturing industry[16].

Because industry had time to develop, factories were reaching full rate production by early 1942[17]. This enabled the production of high quality equipment, which had a substantial positive impact on Australian operations. In 1940, the Lithgow Small Arms Factory began to manufacture the Bren Machine Gun, a comparatively lightweight weapon well suited to jungle warfare. At the start of 1942 it was producing 300 Bren Guns per month[18] and by 1945 Australia had produced 17,249[19]. In Lysaght, near Wollongong, 45,479 Owen Guns were produced[20]. This highly popular sub-machine gun remained in service with the Australian Army until 1971. The products produced in Australia for jungle warfare also included treated clothing, drugs, and antibiotics. Australian weapons, communications equipment, and ammunition were higher quality than that used by the Japanese, which had the effect of reducing Australian battle and non-battle casualties[21]. 

Just as it took years to develop a sovereign defence industry, raising military forces cannot be achieved instantly. Recruiting, equipping, and training substantial numbers of soldiers, sailors, or airmen in both individual skills and collective drills requires time. The 6th Division was the first division raised as part of the 2nd AIF. They were formed on 28 September 1939; however, they did not go into combat until 3 January 1941. During this time soldiers underwent individual and collective training, mostly in Palestine. They were also supplied equipment such as mortars and machine guns as they became available[22]. 

The period of greatest threat to Australia was in early 1942 following the fall of Singapore and Rabaul. Even without the AIF, who had one division destroyed and three others deployed or on their way back from the Mediterranean theatre, there were a further six infantry and three mounted divisions available for defence of the Australian continent. Though standards of combat readiness of these forces would have varied, that they existed and were properly equipped was due to the government’s decision to conscript into the militia in 1939 and to mobilise industry to supply them. Due to the amount of weapons and ammunition produced by Australian factories operating at full rate production in 1942, these militia divisions were at least as well armed as most allied forces and far better armed than some[23].

By the middle of 1942, the Australian Advisory War Cabinet had concluded that an invasion of Australia was unlikely[24]. Combined with two of the AIF divisions returning from the Mediterranean theatre, this allowed resources to flow into Papua New Guinea and flow it did. Port Moresby become a metropolis of camps, airfields, dumps, and installations[25]. This produced the first land victory over the Japanese of the war when a combined militia, AIF, and RAAF force defeated a Japanese landing at Milne Bay in September 1942. This was followed by Japanese culmination on the Kokoda Track and then a successful Australian and US counterattack which first drove the Japanese back along the Kokoda track and then destroyed their beachheads[26].

The effect of the steady national mobilisation between 1939 and 1942 was that when Australia faced an existential threat from the Japanese it had a national support base that was established and ready to fight. It had taken several years for this support base to be established and involved many activities, directed by government, which could not be compressed in time. Key activities achieved during this time was developing a capable industry to produce and sustain war material at a time when supplies from Europe and America could not be assured. 

The time before an existential threat materialised was critical to our survival as a nation. The crisis in Europe and Australia’s declaration of war on Germany gave government the social licence and support of the voting population to begin mobilisation. With the resources granted by this decision, industry was able to expand and develop the required organisational structures to produce high quality munitions, materiel, and supplies in the quantities required. The military could raise, equip, and train sufficient numbers of troops. Moving the nation to a war footing took time. Australia was fortunate to have this time to prepare prior to the existential threat of Imperial Japan appearing. We may not receive this level of warning to prepare for the next major threat we face. 

End Notes