The Need for Awareness
A tragic paradox of our time is that we live in an age where social media claims to have made us more connected. Yet the conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, and the persistent spectre of global terrorism, remind us of humanity’s enduring divisions. Undoubtedly social networking platforms offer many positives, like the democratisation of news and as a means through which otherwise isolated individuals can connect with others. However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that social media has also added a new threat dimension to the already fraught landscape of modern warfare.
The increased use of social media in conflicts is especially evident in open source intelligence (OSINT) gathering. OSINT, as the intelligence discipline drawing from publicly available information, has seen rapid growth in recent years. Consequently, warfighters require a strong awareness and appreciation of the military applications of this new medium of information exchange and the threat it poses in contemporary warfare.
Social Media & OSINT
Despite originating during the Cold War, the term OSINT did not see regular use until the 1990s following the exponential increase in open source information available online (Perez 2024, 53). However, even the massive amount of data made publicly available by the early internet now pales in comparison to the deluge of real-time information that social networking platforms provide. Indeed, social media is unique among open source information mediums, in that its users are both its consumers and creators (Luțai 2020, 98). Furthermore, with 54% of the world’s population now owning a smartphone, social media has never been more accessible (GSMA 2023).
Perhaps most interesting though is that even despite a general awareness of the highly intrusive nature of some social media apps, like the Chinese-owned TikTok, users continue to enthusiastically consume and create data on these platforms (Ryan and Kang 2024). This curious tendency towards excessive digital candour, when coupled with the accessibility of social media makes it a powerful tool for intelligence gathering (Oakley and Rogg 2024, 539). Military users of these platforms, as prominent targets for intelligence agencies, must therefore assume that their activities are constantly being monitored online (Nicholas 2023).
Violent Non-State Actors
Among the largest adopters of OSINT are Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs). VNSAs are groups that while not state entities, are nonetheless armed belligerents in a conflict (Flamer 2023, 1171). Many VNSAs rely almost exclusively on OSINT because the data that underpins it can be easily collected and the resulting intelligence product freely disseminated (Luțai 2020, 99). As such, OSINT is an appealing choice for these groups which are the inherently weaker side in asymmetric warfare against a state (Flamer 2023, 1171).
Perhaps the most notorious use of social media by a VNSA to date was seen in the atrocities committed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). ISIS used the details that people published about themselves online to profile individuals en masse (Ungureanu 2021, 180). The powerful impact that such information can have was then seen in how ISIS used it to identify and radicalise vulnerable persons (Steinbach 2016). Accordingly, social media and the intelligence it provides have added to global instability by enabling terrorists to recruit, finance, and publicise violent acts in a manner and on a scale never before possible.
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: ‘A TikTok War’
VNSAs are far from alone in utilising social media in warfare. Even with their superior resources, states are now turning increasingly to social media for intelligence gathering. Since the outbreak of large-scale combat operations between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022, social media has played a pivotal role in this conflict. The tactical utility of this real-time information has meant that both sides have used it to equip them with an enhanced situational awareness of the battlespace. Indeed, the use of social networking platforms is so prevalent that it has even been dubbed the World’s First TikTok War (Oakley and Rogg 2024, 539).
The name ‘TikTok War’ was earned in the early stages of the invasion due to accounts of Ukrainians taking to the internet to alert authorities to the location of approaching Russian convoys. Ukraine’s military then used this information to help target these elements through kinetic effects. Other times, it was Russian soldiers themselves who betrayed their positions by posting images and status updates on social media after crossing the border. In this way, social media-sourced intelligence can offer combatants valuable insights into enemy movements, force composition, and logistics (Oakley and Rogg 2024, 546).
Social media though does not necessarily make war any more transparent, and both Russia and Ukraine have also used it as a means of spreading propaganda. In the months before the invasion, the Russian government used anti-Ukraine posts online in an attempt to create a façade of casus belli. This was done to shape their citizenry towards a favourable view of the impending conflict and to justify a full-scale war (Nicholas 2023). Conversely, Ukraine sought to galvanise a public rejection of the Russian assault by using these same sites to mythologise early tales of exaggerated or even false national bravery and resistance. This was seen in the over-inflated reporting of the last stand of the Snake Island garrison and the celebrated exploits of the non-existent ‘Ghost of Kyiv’ (Oakley and Rogg 2024, 541-2).
As the conflict has progressed, Ukraine knowing that Russia would look to social media for its intelligence-gathering has also used these platforms for misdirection. Such deception was demonstrated in Ukraine’s signalling that their successful counteroffensive in the autumn of 2022 would be centred around Kherson. When the counteroffensive came, it was instead focused on the Kharkiv region and so caught the Russians off guard (Oakley and Rogg 2024, 545-6). As such, in the world’s first large-scale war covered by social media, belligerents are using this new information medium to not only provide increased situational awareness but also in intelligence dominance and influence campaigns.
Social Media & the Individual
Crucially it is not only VNSAs and states for whom social media plays a pivotal role in modern warfare. For most of its history, OSINT has been sourced predominantly from institutionalised mediums like print media, television, or radio. However, social media means that much of the world’s open source information is now literally in the hands of individuals.
This democratisation of information exchange can equip those caught up in conflicts with increased situational awareness. Moreover, the proliferation of camera phones and social networking platforms amongst civilians imposes an additional layer of accountability upon warfighters. Although it is well established that combatants must obey the Laws of Armed Conflict, the instantaneous nature of social media publication reinforces this through the potential for real-time public scrutiny of military operations.
However, this unregulated dissemination of data also presents an additional danger for combatants and the groups to which they belong. Examples of this have been seen in the inadvertent leaks of classified information on the forums of popular online games (Allison 2021). Accordingly, military users of social media must remain mindful of what they publish online. This is because any injudicious publication may accidentally provide the enemy with essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) that should otherwise be protected.
Social Engineering
As well as exposing EEFIs, social media also allows intelligence practitioners to build OSINT products from the information that users post about themselves online. Like with ISIS, this information can help intelligence agents connect with individuals and cultivate a relationship that may be exploited for tactical and strategic gain. This is because the human element is often the most vulnerable point within the security of any system (Nobili 2023, 1).
Previously, the exploitation of this vulnerability fell under human intelligence (HUMINT) and usually required the covert in-person gathering of information. However, the vast increase in publicly available and freely volunteered data online has largely replaced the need for such high-risk operations. Further, the remote contact facilitated by social networking platforms has created a new avenue for hybrid HUMINT/OSINT-based influence campaigns.
An interesting example of these new hybrid intelligence operations was seen in the reports of Ukrainian women using dating apps with fake profiles to ‘match’ with Russian soldiers. After connecting with the Russian invaders, these Ukrainian operatives used the apps’ messaging features to extract valuable information on enemy troop movements, equipment, and morale (Ankel 2023). Consequently, the prevalence of social networking platforms has created a new low-risk avenue for the creation of OSINT products. In turn, these products can then be used as a launchpad for further HUMINT operations.
Conclusion
The rise of social media means that never before has so much decentralised information been so openly available. This has brought a new threat to the battlespace that commanders and soldiers alike must work to counter. The sheer volume of new data created daily by users on social networking sites has made validating this information more difficult and deception far easier. Additionally, the largely unregulated nature of social media has increased the likelihood of security breaches and means that VNSAs can now wage asymmetric warfare with greater ease. Consequently, warfighters must understand and appreciate the military applications of social media, as well as the potential threat it poses and how to mitigate this.
It effectively explores how social media platforms have become both a resource and a risk in conflicts, aiding everything from intelligence gathering to influence campaigns.
The inclusion of examples like Ukraine’s strategic deception during its counteroffensive and the use of dating apps for intelligence adds depth and practical relevance. However, additional emphasis on solutions, such as training programs for soldiers or technological countermeasures, could have strengthen the essay’s conclusion.
Overall, really good work.
Keep it up.
Thanks and congratulations on a thought-provoking and topical article helping give a lead to Defence on what we need to be attentive to re intel-gathering and misdirection of "Tik Tok wars".
Certa Cito!