“The sense of personal effectiveness and self-confidence created by realistic training is as much a stress reducer as when the muscles go on auto-pilot”
– LTCOL David Grossman, U.S. Army (Retd.), On Combat
A popular U.S. Army documentary about the 1st Battalion, 509th Regiment has seen a recent resurfacing. The ‘Geronimo’ Battalion, known as the most hated unit in the U.S. Army, provides a critically effective training effect for platoon to battle group sized elements – living, breathing opposition force (OPFOR) who practice D.A.T.E doctrine, with non-U.S. platforms, vehicles, and tactics. What lessons can the Australian Army take from our closest ally as training transformation and innovation continue to enhance the lethality, intelligence, and physical and mental preparedness of Australian soldiers for the realities of conflict?
Chapter 2 of LWP-G 7-7-8 Train the Battle Shot covers the psychology and physiology of combat marksmanship. Broadly addressing the topics of operant conditioning and preparation for combat stress, these critically important lessons are the first delivered to trainees in the basic and enhanced combat shooting packages. It is these lessons, alongside the Fitness Handbook, which outline how the Australian Army raises, trains, and prepares soldiers for the brutal realities of combat. But where do these lessons find their optimal application?
It’s not in the classroom and, as effective and realistic as in-service targets such as Marathon are, it cannot replace the actual human target. The current employment of Non-lethal Training Ammunition (NLTA) in opposed practices takes Australian soldiers as close as possible to engaging actual human beings with the intent to kill – but one-on-one practices in the ‘kill house’ aren’t enough. True inoculation requires a participant to sit on the edge of stress and overload – fatigue, surprise, uncertainty, and the unknown are all key, and as excellent as NLTA practices can be for combat behaviours, we more often than not end up shooting at OPFOR wearing AMCU. Not out of a lack of creativity, but a lack of bespoke OPFOR.
The enhancement to this, like many of the solutions to questions of training development, is in theory simple – establish a dedicated OPFOR sub-unit with non ADF platforms to enable units to train against a thinking enemy who plans according to doctrine different to our own. Put simply, remove the ‘out’ from Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT). But this is not necessarily feasible from either an acquisition or staffing perspective. A realistic solution had been trialled before on Exercise Talisman Sabre through the employment of a ‘Human Terrain Platoon’ who not only provided OPFOR, but also neutral parties – of which there are an abundance in the modern battlespace. So how can this be adapted to suit the annual cycle of training and not just the major showcases of capability?
The value proposition is clear, as evidenced in ADF doctrine and wider scholarly analysis of combative training. Dr. Terry Wollert and Jeff Quail’s A Scientific Approach to Reality Based Training provides a case study and model used to enhance U.S. law enforcement officer training and clearly details the tangible benefits of non-lethal munitions and live OPFOR in training. It is therefore a question of how, not whether, this should happen.
The integration of consistent and available reserve personnel into unit and brigade S7 cells would be an excellent starting point. The 1st Military Police Battalion’s employment of SERCAT 5 military police and support staff demonstrate that a well-placed section of reservists is not only able to effectively enable units and sub-units, but provide invaluable support to raising, running, and improving training.
The integration of such personnel into regular unit battle rhythms is tested and achievable. If this model is expanded to the brigade level, with a dedicated S7 platoon available for units to book as any other resource, the quality of Army training outcomes will see a marked improvement. This structure is currently in effect at the Royal Military College – Duntroon, where the Operations Support Platoon fill OPFOR billets for field training phases and reduce the necessity to juggle training support requests by other brigades and formations. With units no longer required to fill their own OPFOR billets, more soldiers can certify at Army Training Level (ATL) 1, more sections at ATL 2, platoons at ATL 3 and the Army’s combat teams and battle groups at ATL 4-6 without a substantial impost on external stakeholders.
A capability of this nature would allow the land force – and to some degree air and maritime forces – to test people, platforms, and capabilities in tailored exercise environments. Those environments can be characterised by uncertainty and austerity, whilst maintaining a consequence to ensure the correct employment of platforms or execution of Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, and Standard Operating Procedures – that consequence being pain. In accordance with Chapter 6 of LWP-G 7-7-8 Train the Battle Shot, the prospect of a pain consequence will, in the first instance, ensure adherence to skills and drills. Subsequent failure to adhere are quickly remedied on receipt of NLTA rounds to exposed limbs or the loss of communication mid contact due to enemy EW; an experience which many commanders will attest is an existential pain in and of itself.
The benefit here is clear: soldiers and officers who are psychologically conditioned to expect pain or frustration as a consequence for failure to conduct tactical actions in accordance with trained behaviours are more likely to execute missions on operations with a refined understanding of the consequence of failure.
As private entities like High Fidelity Training continue to fill a gap in the training provider market, it has become evident that Army must first be introspective and find organic solutions to avoid extensive financial liabilities to modernise training. Reserve soldiers and officers are best placed to support the regular force. Their employment and use of current in-service platforms as dedicated OPFOR vehicles will enable parity in qualification and employment whilst also providing a means by which to simulate a live, thinking OPFOR. An enemy fighting to win is far more likely to impose a dilemma and disrupt a commander’s decision-making cycle than a Figure 11 target mounted on a range.
As the Army continues to contend with a highly agile and unpredictable operating environment, and attempts to mitigate against the imposts of Accelerated Warfare on a future deployed force, it is imperative that the adaptation gap, as described by Lieutenant General David Barno in Adaptation Under Fire, is reduced to the point of tactical decision making at H-Hour. Synchronisation and integration of reserve capability into the regular training space is field tested both at home and by our allies. Now is the time to expand, enhance, and enable lethality as never before and to field a force capable of countering the dangers of modern warfare across all its domains.
