Above the treetops of a heavily defended Russian frontline in Southern Donetsk hovers a KA-52 attack helicopter. Using its infrared camera and Vikhr Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs), it begins destroying armoured vehicles from an estimated range of eight kilometres, unimpeded by any combined arms effect of the freshly equipped Ukrainian forces.

Simultaneously, suicide-drones explode into the side of Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs), Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), and logistic vehicles without warning. One by one, newly acquired M2 Bradleys IFVs and Leopard 2 MBTs are destroyed and the Ukrainian counteroffensive is halted.

This counteroffensive had been months in planning, how could a NATO-trained force be so ill prepared for a combined arms assault against a known enemy force in a known location. More importantly, what can the Australian Army learn from this mistake etched in blood?

Very Short Range Air Defence (VSHORAD) systems such as RBS-70, Starstreak, and Stinger must be apportioned to certain tactical tasks in order to negate the destruction of friendly forces. It is imperative as Australia moves away from VSHORAD (RBS-70) to SHORAD (enhanced National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (eNASAMS)) that manoeuvre elements are apportioned assets to enable their unimpeded movement throughout the battlespace as we prepare for large-scale combat operations.

You are not in the bubble

A common misconception of operating with Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) in support is that the maximum kinematic range of the defence system is the safe area, where you and your assets can travel within without threat of air attack. Unfortunately GBAD does not actually guarantee this.

Throughout Western militaries, GBAD assets are costly in nature and light in numbers; they are easily targeted by air and ground assets and generally hold a high priority on an enemy’s targeting list. GBAD commanders are therefore hesitant to turn on their radars or communications due to the risk of being detected and targeted.

This ensures that GBAD commanders must prioritise assets to defend and threats to target – those of which meet the risk threshold to reveal themselves. For example, a helicopter travelling towards a defended asset with ATGMs has a lower threat profile than a high altitude fast flying jet aircraft with multi-thousand-pound bunker busting bombs.

The helicopter in this situation may only be targeted by eNASAMS in self-defence to mask its position until that last safe moment, whereas the fixed wing threat can most certainly receive a radar warning receipt of a missile in flight when it enters the kinematic missile range of the GBAD system, enabling the maximum number of missiles to be shot at the threat to ensure it is neutralised.

This fixed wing threat may also have the ability to remain outside of the engagement perimeter of the GBAD system and target well into the seemingly protected bubble without being affected by GBAD systems.

With this said, a sortie of four $45m fixed-wing jet aircraft which cost thousands to keep in the air each minute, are not likely to be dropping million-dollar guided munitions on a troop of tanks in their hide. Logically, this ‘juice is not worth the squeeze’ when the same task can be completed by ground-based strike or hunter-killer teams for a fraction of the risk and cost.

Simply put, strategic assets target platforms that may have a strategic effect, operational-level assets target those which may have an operational-level effect, and tactical-level effects target the tactical. This is where a layered air defence according to threat profiles and assets defended can be engineered to meet modern battlespace threats.

The current threat profile

Attack helicopters are generally held by either a division or brigade commander as their flank security, counter penetration or reserve force. These expensive, hyper-mobile, low-flying killers are used to achieve or deny decisive victory for Blue and Red respectively.

From this deduction it is calculable as to when an enemy is likely to utilise their rotary wing to achieve the division or brigade commander’s intent. This problem set is then reverse engineered by GBAD commanders in the Military Appreciation Process (MAP) to ensure radars are radiating at the correct time and to also place effectors which are able to defend their assigned assets accordingly.

The proliferation of commercial-off-the-shelf and suicide drones has seen drones pose an equal threat to ground manoeuvre operations as rotary wing aviation. Without adequate air defence measures, armour can be observed and targeted with impunity.

Ukrainian forces in the offence should continue to expect that when certain triggers are met in both time and space, different assets will be activated to treat a certain problem set. The friction of a minefield enables the swift and accurate targeting of high value targets (HVTs) such as tanks by rotary wing aviation and UAS.

These same tanks are easily targeted once they reveal themselves in an assault-by-fire (ABF) position, thus placing pressure on the enemy commander, who is likely to activate their attack aviation to solve a problem of which the platform is made to solve.

eNASAMS and other future ADF GBAD acquisitions will likely be commanded by a central Air Defence Commander and apportioned to defend high-level strategic assets from air and missile threats. Control and engagement authority will be clinically tailored to specific threats and assets defended are unlikely to be a combat brigade and likely to be airfields, fuel storage, command and control nodes, and other integrated air and missile defence assets. This leaves a large gap in Australia’s ability to affect air threats in the close fight – a substantial risk for all ground forces.

The deduction here is that GBAD must be placed in forward deployed areas, with ample mobility to enable the decentralised prosecution of threats, in-turn providing ground commanders the freedom to execute their missions by reducing the air threat to their forces.

Concept of Operations

GBAD, and specifically VSHORAD and Counter UAS (CUAS), must be apportioned during any deliberate breaches, clearances, or assaults where the enemy are lying in wait. Conversely GBAD should be in place to defend forces conducting certain defensive operations.

CUAS assets can treat threats utilising jamming, electronic warfare, high-powered laser, or traditional kinetic means – these assets can be apportioned to GBAD or manoeuvre elements. Ample warning of enemy aviation attack may not be viable in the front line due to radar systems being dislocated from front echelons or from communications denial within the battle; therefore, trained operators with the ability to identify friend from foe must be attached to manoeuvre forces to prosecute the enemy’s air assets and enable decisive victory.

VSHORAD GBAD hunter-killer teams also require platform matching manoeuvre capabilities depending on whether they are attached to mechanised, motorised, or dismounted forces. Similarly, these operators should be able to assess and plan independently of a centralised GBAD command to defend assets in accordance with the tactical task being performed. This would enable true decentralised GBAD to be unaffected by communications denial or the denial of sensor systems.

The mere presence or threat of GBAD assets may also equate to enough risk for an enemy commander to not utilise their aviation. The overt patrol or display of GBAD assets comes with high risk, but if done correctly it pressures the enemy commander to not utilise one of their deadliest assets.

The Australian Army must concurrently study and rehearse passive air defence measures to enable freedom of manoeuvre when free of GBAD support. Strengthening, hardening, dispersal, redundancy, and recovery are important concepts which can mitigate or minimise enemy aviation effects and enable the continuation of the mission.

In summary, it would be wise for the Australian Army to prioritise the acquisition of VSHORAD and CUAS systems which are able to work with in-service vehicles as soon as possible.

It is essential that the Australian Army learn lessons from the largest modern war of our time. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have paid for their mistakes in blood, a price for which Australia can avoid.