Introduction

The strategic direction is clear: The Army is now a littoral force. [1] [2] While that is a bold statement, how a ‘littoral force’ differs from a ‘conventional force’ remains unclear. This submission proposes adopting ‘Minimum-Mass Tactics’ (MMT) to allow disaggregated manoeuvre between domains to realise this vision of a littoral force. These tactics envision small, “hard to find – hard to kill” [3] combined arms teams dispersing in the littoral to detect and defeat opposition directly or with Joint Fires.[4] The reasoning for and adoption of MMT in the littoral environment are explored below, ultimately proposing MMT allows the Army to exploit the littoral environment rather than be constrained by it.

A New Operating Environment

The focus on the littoral environment must not overshadow the broader changes in warfare. Increasingly, the battlefield is dominated by persistent sensors, which can cue lethal effects onto a target shortly after detection occurs.[5] [6] This is not just at higher echelons, as improvement in communication networks and the proliferation of drones and other autonomous sensors means even small units can now have substantial organic sensors that can direct massed precision fires. This is accelerated by the increased range of fire platforms, which can remain dispersed without sacrificing their ability to concentrate their fire. The collective impact of these developments is that when units mass together, rather than creating strength by concentrating combat power, it creates a vulnerability to opposing Joint Fires.[7] [8] Consequently, the Army’s adaption to littoral manoeuvre cannot just be limited to overcoming the physical environment but must concurrently adapt to the changing character of modern war. 

What is Minimum-Mass?

Minimum-Mass Tactics seek to maximise combat power without a reliance on physical mass. This balance between concentrating combat power and dispersion is a perennial challenge for militaries as technology develops.[9] [10] In 2006, then-Colonel Krause (now MAJGEN [Retd]), proposed the Army was overdue to rebalance given contemporary trends in technology. Labelling the concept Minimum-Mass Tactics, Krause called for combined arms teams at the lowest possible echelon – often down to composite platoons – which have the inherent flexibility to operate while dispersed over a wide enough area to avoid detection.[11] These teams balance being small to reduce their signature but retain enough combat power to achieve local victories against opposing forces. Further, the teams are network-enhanced to allow for Joint Fires to be employed, but also avoid network-dependence and achieve effects if the network is denied. Krause provides an example of an MMT team consisting of a six-vehicle element of dismounts, reconnaissance vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, and fire support vehicles/tanks; displaying combined arms integration at a lower echelon than customarily employed.[12] 

While Krause’s proposal was not operationalised in Australia, the concept has been used elsewhere. The French Army adopted MMT due to the vast distances on Operational Serval,[13] but it now forms a core concept in their adaption for modern conflict.[14] The French employ task-organised platoon groups, which forego mass and instead rely on, “audacity encouraged by subsidiarity that makes it possible to seize opportunities.” [15] The concept is used in the United States Marine Corps’ (USMC) Marine Littoral Regiments. These regiments form “Stand-In Forces” which are ‘”small but lethal, low signature, mobile forces” that form “the leading edge of a maritime defense-in-depth.”[16] [17] Minimum-Mass is has also extended to discussions how to enhance the survivability of forward-deployed logistics nodes.[18] While specific employment varies between countries, they all share the aim of minimising mass to allow teams to achieve effects within the range of enemy fires. 

MMT does not exclude using conventional massed combat power where conditions permit. Instead, MMT proposes that the massing of combat power should only occur once fire supremacy has been obtained or if the friendly force can be shielded in some other way.[19][20] What is notable then is that because of the increasing range and dispersion of enemy artillery, the time to achieve fire supremacy is increasing, and so the earliest time when massing combat power might become feasible is becoming delayed.[21] [22] So, while massing combat power remains valid, structuring for MMT offers a method to commence manoeuvre earlier in an operation.

Minimum-Mass in the Littoral Environment

Before exploring MMT in the littoral, it is worth considering what explicitly littoral manoeuvre is. Much of current writing on Australia's littoral manoeuvre focuses on littoral manoeuvre seaward, emphasising the Army’s contribution from the land to the sea. [23] There is comparatively less focus on how the Army fights on the land to achieve land-force-focused objectives. It is helpful then to consider peer nations’ conceptualisation of littoral manoeuvre. Generally, these view littoral manoeuvre as operations that exploit the unique ability of littoral forces to rapidly transition between domains to insert and extract forces in unexpected areas and at unpredictable times, which dislocates the enemy.[24][25] These unexpected manoeuvres allow even numerically inferior forces to create surprise, achieving an outsized effect. Cross-domain fires, such as naval surface fire support or sea-based attack aviation, further enhance this impact, which allows disaggregated fire platforms to contribute firepower irrespective of where and when contact occurs.[26] [27] This agility in transition between domains allows the littoral force to avoid unfavourable decisive engagements by withdrawing to the sea if required, preserving the force for future action. In this way, littoral manoeuvre is differentiated from contemporary land manoeuvre – littoral manoeuvre exploits rapid transitions between domains to dislocate the enemy, generating surprise and momentum, which allows outsized effects to be achieved by even numerical inferior forces.

Littoral warfare is not isolated from the challenge of dispersion and mass, but it is likely dispersion will be the status quo. Any littoral operation will likely be enabled by substantial naval and air power to attrit opposing enemy land forces as a necessary pre-condition to permit a landing.[28] Because of the lethality of these joint fires, they will either disrupt the enemy force directly or force them to disperse to preserve combat power. This trend leads to the opening stages of littoral land combat not being a decisive central thrust against a distinct centre of mass but rather a conflict between dispersed manoeuvre elements.[29] These elements aim to detect their opponent first and then use Joint Fires to destroy them, with success being achieved by the force that can win the “reconnaissance-strike contest.”[30] [31] 

Considering the conditions above, MMT teams will likely excel in the littoral. MMT rejects mass in favour of creating combat power through combined arms at lower echelons, which makes the force “hard to find – hard to kill” but retains “operationally relevant capabilities that cannot be ignored” by the opposing force.[32] Multiple MMTs can then operate over a broad area, empowered with the flexibility to seize emerging opportunities and the combat power to create effects against a disaggregated opposition.[33] Importantly, because each MMT team is a minimum-sized force package, fewer sea-lift platforms are likely to be required to lodge a manoeuvre-capable force element. This reduces the time between sea-to-shore transitions and allows multiple landings to occur simultaneously, each presenting a viable risk to the opposing force. This ability to operate dispersed over multiple axes confounds the enemy's response to landings. In summary, MMT provides a general value in reducing susceptibility to enemy fires and a specific value in the littoral because it enhances dispersed manoeuvre groups’ ability to apply combat power against an opposition that cross-domain fires have disaggregated. 

Experimentation for Minimum-Mass Tactics

Any advocacy for MMT needs to be supported by robust experimentation. MMT provides immediate utility for the Army as experimentation can begin with the platforms available to the Enhanced Force-In-Being.[34] With the anticipated delivery of L400-3 and L907-2, the Army has the platforms to form potent MMT teams within the planned Objective Integrated Force, removing the need for further major platform acquisitions to adapt to MMTs.[35] 

This would not be the final form of the MMT, but would be a baseline that would be adapted and enhanced as new capabilities enter the Army. For example, autonomous sensors and effectors offer attractive advantages in adding combat power without significantly increasing signature. For this reason, autonomous systems are heavily featured in USMC and Royal Marines’ future littoral concepts and experimentation programs.[36][37] 

Importantly, this experimentation needs to have a bottom-up character, as the key MMT outputs happen at the scale of vehicle pairs and platoons, which are not well simulated in extant ADF experiments. Army has a fortuitous opportunity then given 1st Armoured Regiment’s new role as an experimental unit, which can be matched with its institutional knowledge of armoured operations. [38] 

Conclusion

The Army faces the dual challenge of adapting to increasingly lethal modern operations in an operating environment that constrains conventional manoeuvre approaches. Minimum-Mass Tactics provide a method for the Army to generate combat power without a reliance on mass, creating a force structure better suited for future conflicts where mass hinders agility and creates vulnerability. Importantly, MMTs allow the Army to exploit the littoral environment to its advantage rather than be constrained by it, realising the Army’s vision of becoming a littoral force.

Reference List

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End Notes