‘Intelligence is the ability to adapt to change’ – Stephen Hawking

With the release of the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) in 2023 and the temporally significant National Defence Strategy (NDS) in April 2024, the Australian Government has provided explicit direction on the future form and functions of the ADF. The NDS directs the reconfiguring of the ADF, and the Australian Army in particular, from a ‘balanced force’, capable of a broad range of military tasks, to a ‘focused and integrated force’ with a limited set of clear objectives and a designated primary operating environment (POE).[1] The direction is unambiguous, the Australian Army must adapt rapidly to meet the demands of becoming a focused and integrated littoral force capable of high intensity conflict in the Indo-Pacific. In strategy, context is key, and the NDS highlights the rapidly deteriorating contemporary strategic environment and a severely reduced strategic warning time as the driving force for change within the ADF.[2] This has made urgent the requirement to adapt to the littoral environment of the Indo-Pacific and develop the capabilities to rapidly project credible force in defence of Australia’s national interests. 

Meeting this challenge by achieving a 'functional form of balance' involves strategically enhancing our capabilities, aligning them with the NDS without resorting to a 'jack of all trades, master of none' approach or misrepresenting a wide-ranging and undirected set of skills. Instead, it signifies understanding the enduring nature and changing character of war and the inherent requirement to optimise the Army for littoral manoeuvre through the creative employment of all capabilities, while ensuring the maintenance of the Army’s primary role of prosecuting close combat in the land domain. Just as a professional boxer requires balance to deliver effective blows, the Australian Army must be versatile and flexible, with a comprehensive set of capabilities to adequately augment a focused littoral force. The Army will contribute to the littoral force by achieving internal balance through three key pillars: a robust, resilient and highly trained Pre-landing Force (PLF) and Ground Combat Element (GCE), the optimisation of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities, and the enhancement of Australia’s A2AD systems through the establishment of land-based long range strike capabilities.

Historical Background 

Amphibious operations and the conduct of manoeuvre within the littoral environment are far from novel concepts for the Australian Army. Gray and Freedman speak to history's utility in crafting strategy, providing our most ‘compelling and insightful guide to the future’.[3] Adaptation is deeply embedded in the history of the Australian Army, enabling it to meet the challenges of ever-changing contexts. These traits have been pivotal since the Army's inception, characterised by ingenuity, creativity, and innovation. A prime example is the successful withdrawal from the Gallipoli Peninsula, a testament to strategic brilliance and operational adaptability. World War Two saw the projection of Australian forces by sea throughout the Indo-Pacific and further afield. In coordination with our allies the Australian Army conducted an extensive expeditionary, maritime campaign against the Japanese.[4] The history of the Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) is replete with examples of Australian soldiers deploying from ship to shore and projecting force.[5] Operation Morris Dance, INTERFET and Operation Astute all saw the rapid deployment of Australian forces by sea.[6] The failure throughout history to find a simple solution to the enduring challenge of close combat, as demonstrated by the recent conflict in Ukraine, speaks to the importance of maintaining balance within a force, ensuring it is capable of rapid projection and gruelling close combat.[7]

Teams 

The ADF’s most ‘impactful projection’ has historically been, and will continue to be, the deployment of its people.[8] People are Defence’s most important asset and the key component of Army’s teams. The PLF and GCE are Army’s primary contribution to the littoral force, and these must be constantly refined to ensure a credible, capable force, able to dominate the land domain within the Indo-Pacific.[9] The combined arms teams that constitute the GCE must have sufficient modern platforms and capabilities to generate overwhelming combat power within the littoral environment.[10] A paucity of roads and bridges capable of being accessed by heavy armoured vehicles in some areas of South-East Asia and the Western Pacific islands does not negate the need for modern tanks, Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV), and their associated capabilities.[11] Again, history guides us, with numerous examples of the utility of armour in the jungles of Southeast Asia (Coral/Balmoral) and Papua New Guinea (Buna).[12] .

The inherent physicality of warfare and the need for mentally and physically resilient soldiers are realities that cannot be overlooked. The Army’s training system must support the consolidation of small team tactics and combined arms training to enable genuine multi-domain integration.[13] Maritime and land based long-range strike, cyber capabilities, and unmanned systems all create offsets that enable the integrated force, but Army’s key requirement to effectively prosecute close combat in the littoral environment remains extant. The Strategy of Denial places a premium on credible deterrence which requires a well-trained and carefully calibrated littoral force.[14]

Situational Awareness 

The information requirements demanded by operations within the littoral environment are exponential. The requirement for situational awareness across all domains highlights the need for an integrated system of layered effects that inform commanders on all aspects of the battlespace within the operating environment.[15] Clarification is required around ownership, access to, and responsibility for ISR assets within the littoral environment. A vast range of sensors exist from the reconnaissance teams of the PLF to National Strategic Assets. Littoral manoeuvre must be enabled by timely and accurate information, and the Army’s ISR system must be optimised through the continuous training of ground reconnaissance elements and embracing surveillance technology such as small unmanned systems, unmanned sensors, and ground surveillance radars. Targets must be acquired before they can be struck, and the imposition of costs on the adversary within the dense jungle foliage and urban clutter of the littoral environment relies on Army’s eyes – both physical and electronic – to inform it. 

Access and Strike 

Ensuring access for the Army's littoral force involves a variety of mechanisms, including surface connectors, aerial insertion methods, and vehicle platforms. Additionally, strategic operations such as Phase Zero shaping and ongoing regional engagement during times of strategic competition are crucial. Together, these elements form a comprehensive approach to maintain and enhance the capabilities of Army's littoral operations. In order to control maritime chokepoints and deter an adversary from our northern approaches, Army must establish enduring relationships through people-to-people engagement and regional defence partnerships.[16] Army’s landing craft projects are essential to achieving balance as the Army’s ability to conduct Ship to Objective Manoeuvre (STOM) and rapidly project force is currently impeded by a lack of heavy landing craft. Infantry operating in the littoral need the same range of insertion methods (Parachute Capability/Helicopter Insertion and Extraction Techniques) available to peers (allies and adversaries) to enable flexibility and the ability to achieve surprise and deception. Ground based teams will be required to establish footholds across the Indo-Pacific to employ long-range strike capabilities to their maximum effect. The ability to achieve access and impose costs will be a vital component of the employment of Army’s teams and enable littoral manoeuvre. 

In conclusion, the release of the DSR in 2023 and the NDS in April 2024 provides a clear and decisive directive for the Defence Force. The Australian Army must rapidly adapt to effectively contribute to littoral warfare and optimise its capabilities to project force throughout the Indo-Pacific, supporting Australia’s vital national interests. As the Army undergoes this critical transformation into an 'integrated focused force', it must draw on its historical adaptability and operational ingenuity. Lessons from past engagements are invaluable in shaping current strategies. As the ADF transitions, maintaining a functional form of balance is crucial, not only as a military necessity but also to ensure the optimisation of our Land Forces for success in future competition and conflicts.

Bibliography

Department of Defence, Defence Strategic Review (Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 2023), https://defence.gov.au/publications/.

Department of Defence, National Defence Strategy (Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 2024), https://defence.gov.au/publications/.

Di Felice, Fabio. ‘Is the 39th AIB a Perfect Example of EABO and Littoral Warfare?’ July 2024, https://cove.army.gov.au/article/39th-aib-perfect-example-eabo-and-litt….

Freedman, Lawrence. The Future of War: A History. London: Penguin Books, 2018.

Gray, Colin S. The Future of Strategy. Cambridge: Malden, 2015.

Horner, David and Bou, Jean. Duty First – A History of the Royal Australian Regiment (2nd Edition), Melbourne: Allen and Unwin, 2008.

Pavlis, Yvette. ‘Future Land Warfare Collection 2021: Creating the Joint ISR Enterprise that Was Needed Yesterday’, 27 July 21, https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/land-power-forum/creating-jo….

Smith, Christopher. ‘Allies LSCO & the INDOPACIFIC’ U.S. Army Maneuver War Fighter Conference, 17 February 2022, https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/land-power-forum/allies-lsco….

Stuart, Simon. ‘Opening address - Chief of Army Symposium 2023’, 29 August 2023, https://www.army.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches-and-transcripts/2023-0….

Westerman, William. ‘Entry by Air and Sea: The Littoral Challenges of Operation ASTUTE, 2006’ Australian Army Journal 19, no.2, (2024): 119-147.

End Notes