The transition of the ADF’s focus to the Indo-Pacific region has increased the need for the Australian Army to focus on littoral warfare and the employment of land capability from ship-to-shore and to use it as an additional domain to gain the advantage on land. 

Littoral Warfare is derived from the Latin term “shore” and can be defined as the battlespace consisting of the sea that can be influenced from the land and the land that can be influenced from the sea. In effect, the size of the “littoral” battlefield will forever be expanding and increasing as advancements in weapon systems will allow militaries to project effects further from both sea and land.

The Australian Army has begun to train and develop its skills across the board in amphibious operations. A Ground Combat Element (GCE), Logistic Combat Element (LCE), Air Combat Element (ACE), and Joint Pre-Landing Force (JPLF) are participating in the Sea Series each year to develop and provide the experience to infantry commanders and soldiers of deploying from ship-to-shore. 

We can assume that if a Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) like HMAS Canberra or Adelaide is deploying land elements to shore, the enemy are going to know that a LHD is just off the coast. With this knowledge, the Australian Army should be taking a more clandestine approach when deploying the GCE to the shore. Currently, in a contested beach front, JPLF deploy early to provide surveillance and reconnaissance of the immediate area. 

Following this, the GCE deploy to the shore via the LLCs or LCM8s. The issue here is the level of noise and the size of the target that the LLC and GCE present when reaching the shoreline. If a motorised or mechanised company are deploying to shore, it only takes an enemy with a light Anti-Tank Weapon to target the vehicle aboard the LLC, which would cause maximum destruction and casualties. Our near region presents an ideal shoreline of jungle and thick vegetation to allow the enemy to hide and target us whilst we attempt to make it to shore. 

With this in mind, the Australian Army should focus at getting the GCE ashore in a more clandestine way.

Firstly, the employment of zodiacs organically in an infantry platoon in littoral warfare would provide rifle platoons with the option to employ ashore in a quieter and less targetable manner. Allowing the rifle platoons to get ashore and secure the beach landing site would allow for a higher level of security when getting their vehicles ashore. 

Looking at the cons to this idea, it’s clear that the driver qualifications, the training, the maintenance, and acquiring the number of zodiacs needed would be a challenge for rifle companies. Recent advances in Anti-Access and Area Denial technologies make modern amphibious operations difficult and near impossible to get ashore undetected. A professor at UNSW-Canberra, Albert Palazzo, has identified that littoral warfare is a difficult type of warfare to get the advantage in. Modern weapon systems have the ability to target and destroy landing craft from kilometres away. 

Alternatively, the use of the LARC-Vs to deploy infantry elements ashore provides an option that is more manoeuvrable and clandestine. Having the capability of deploying a rifle platoon per LARC-V would see land forces deploying ashore much quicker. The benefits of utilising the LARC-Vs instead of landing craft would decrease the need for more precise surveillance of the shoreline by the JPLF. The GCE would be able to land and secure the beach which would provide the JPLF with more security when surveying the shoreline for the landing craft. 

The negative to the LARC-Vs is the level of firepower that they have organic to them. To fix this, 50 calibre machine guns could be mounted to the port and starboard sides of the vehicle to increase the firepower. The use of these vehicles at the infantry level for littoral operations would provide greater manoeuvrability when deploying from ship-to-shore. 

The intent would be to use these vehicles solely to transport ground forces onto the shore, allowing the LLCs and LCM8s to move vehicles, armour, and battlegroup assets once the beach has been secured by the rifle platoons. The driver and crew of the LARC-Vs can remain the responsibility of the ABT to minimise the need for driver qualifications and training within the rifle platoons. 

As littoral warfare becomes more prominent within the Australian Army’s focus, it is imperative that we look at alternative methods for deploying land forces from ship-to-shore. We must always look to gain the advantage within the battlespace through increased security and firepower. With the advancements in A2AD and the modern weapon systems on the battlefield, deploying infantry elements in a more clandestine style will provide more success in amphibious operations. Utilising current vehicles in service and re-rolling them with infantry elements provides options for the Australian Army to adapt and contribute to littoral warfare.