On the 14th of February 2024, the Russian Landing Ship Caesar Kunikov was undertaking a routine transit of the Black Sea, moving ammunition to the garrison in Crimea, when it was attacked.[1] Despite the Ukrainian military having no naval vessels in the Black Sea, by the end of the night the Caesar Kunikov was on the bottom of the ocean. It sunk after being attacked by Uncrewed Surface Vehicles (USVs), likely launched from Ukrainian territory.[2] The proliferation of technology has increased the ability of land forces to attacks targets in the littoral environment, increasing the threat to all watercraft. As the Australian Army prepares to meet the challenge of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review to optimise for littoral warfare,[3] it is critical that watercraft are not simply seen as a means of transport but instead as combat vehicles. The Iron Triangle design approach should be used to ensure Army watercraft are ready for the contemporary operating environment.[4] This short paper will first outline the threat and requirements, before using the Iron Triangle principles to analyse the Army’s current fleet of watercraft. It will then discuss how the Iron Triangle design approach should be applied to future watercraft if the Army is to optimise for littoral warfare. 

The war in Ukraine, as well as the more recent Houthi attacks on civilian shipping in the Red Sea,[5] has demonstrated the risk posed to lightly armed or unprotected watercraft. Increases in the capacity and availability of technology has grown the size of the littoral environment, where forces on the land can influence those in the maritime domain and vice versa. As shown by the Russian experience in the Black Sea, in the contemporary operating environment no watercraft is immune from attack. While naval and air capabilities do provide some level of mitigation to this threat, there is no guarantee in conflict that they will be available to protect Army watercraft. With the increase of the littoral environment however, there is also opportunity. The littoral environment provides more manoeuvre space for the Army. In the littoral, watercraft can do so much more than simply move personnel and materiel. They can be a fire support platform, command and control node or a location to provide medical support to name a few functions. There is potential to develop a combined arms fighting system for watercraft. To optimise for littoral warfare, the Australian Army must have watercraft that can survive increasing threats and contribute to the combined arms fighting system.

The Australian Army has a long history of operating watercraft, with the Royal Australian Engineers operating approximately 1900 watercraft during the Second World War.[6] The contemporary Army however, has far fewer watercraft, with the majority limited to simply transporting personnel and materiel.[7] The Defence Strategic Review recognised the importance of the Army possessing integral craft to conduct littoral manoeuvre, accelerating plans to acquire new medium and heavy littoral warfare capabilities.[8] While the exact shape of these future craft is not yet clear, the current fleet of Army’s watercraft is poorly suited for the contemporary operating environment. They have limited mobility, no firepower,[9] and limited protection – not only from enemy action, but often from the maritime environment also. To address this shortfall Army should utilise its hard-won experience from operating in the land domain and apply it to the littoral. The Iron Triangle is a design approach that is commonly used in armoured vehicle design.[10] Using the three characteristics of mobility, firepower, and protection; this approach prioritises one of these characteristics dependent on the role of the vehicle, while still providing a baseline in the remaining two. To optimise for the littoral environment and contemporary threats, this design approach must be applied to the Army’s watercraft. 

Currently the F470 Zodiac and the LCM-8 form a large part of the Army’s littoral manoeuvre capability; however, both watercraft have significant shortfalls when considered in the contemporary operating environment. When comparing the F470 against the Iron Triangle principle, it performs poorly. The only firepower is from un-stabilised small arms fired by passengers. The only protection provided is via the rubber construction reducing its signature. There is little environmental protection apart from clothing worn by the soldiers themselves, meaning that they are likely to arrive on task in a sub-optimal state. Finally, mobility reduces once numbers exceed three personnel or sea state rises. In summary the F470 relies upon avoiding detection to conduct its tasks and has little chance to survive an encounter with the enemy. The LCM-8 has similar shortfalls in all characteristics, with no integral firepower, only slightly better protection from the environment and, while it has a longer range than the F470, it has a much larger signature. Not only are the two current mainstays of the Australian Army’s littoral manoeuvre capability ill-suited to the contemporary operating environment, but they offer little support to the force once it is on the land. They are not optimised for littoral warfare and the Iron Triangle approach should be applied to future Army watercraft to remediate these shortfalls. 

The acquisition of medium and heavy littoral manoeuvre capabilities has accelerated in accordance with the recommendations of the Defence Strategic Review. [11] While it is unclear what these craft will be, as shown by the Caesar Kunikov, they cannot be simply landing craft that move personnel and materiel. To optimise these craft for littoral warfare, the Iron Triangle should be applied. While ideally protection would be afforded by naval power, these vessels should be able to protect themselves from asymmetric threats from the air and the sea. The success of USVs in the Black Sea and the proliferation of small aerial drones means these could easily threaten future Australian Army medium and heavy craft. Either through kinetic or non-kinetic means, these craft will need to detect, track and defeat these threats. While it is impractical to think these vessels will be armoured to survive an encounter with an enemy naval vessel, they must cater for these asymmetric threats. With the Army optimising for littoral warfare, it would be an opportunity missed not to equip these vessels with their own integral firepower, not just to protect themselves, but to provide support to land forces. The introduction of medium and heavy littoral manoeuvre craft presents an excellent opportunity to elevate these watercraft beyond simply a means of transport. This approach also needs to be applied to the Army’s fleet of light watercraft. 

For the units of the littoral focused 1 Bde, and the amphibious 2 RAR, the F470 is the key light littoral manoeuvre craft.[12] Unfortunately, as discussed earlier, it has many shortfalls when considered in the contemporary operating environment. If these units are to be optimised for littoral warfare, they require a watercraft that can be used in a similar way that the Bushmaster is used on land. While not designed to deliberately take part in combat, the Bushmaster provides protection, mobility, and adequate firepower.[13] Soldiers can be delivered to the battlefield, with the Bushmaster also providing a command-and-control node and a casualty evacuation platform. The littoral focused units of the Australian Army need a watercraft that fills this role. The watercraft operated by the United States Special Operation Command provides exemplars of what could be acquired to operate in this role. The Close Combatant Assault (CCA) craft for example is a high speed, low signature watercraft that not only provides protection from the maritime environment, but reportedly can have integral firepower and serve as a command-and-control node[14]. Watercraft of these nature provide an optimal light littoral manoeuvre capability, increasing survivability and ability to support the force on land after they disembark. To optimise for littoral warfare the F470 needs to be replaced by a platform that meets the characteristics of the Iron Triangle.

The threat of the contemporary operating environment and the need to optimise for littoral warfare means that the Australian Army needs to adapt how it thinks about watercraft. We can no longer simply think of watercraft as a means of transport. Instead, the Army must use its experience from armoured vehicle design, the Iron Triangle, to ensure that watercraft survivability is increased, and they are able to support the land force. The F470 and LCM-8 currently do not meet this need. It is critical that this mindset shifts to support the acquisition of medium and heavy littoral manoeuvre capabilities, and the F470 replacement equally optimised for littoral warfare.

Bibliography

Australian Army. ‘Bushmaster’. Australian Army, 4 August 2023. https://www.army.gov.au/equipment/vehicles-and-surveillance/bushmaster.

Australian Army History Unit. ‘Moving Tanks by Water: A Short History of Australia’s Tank-Capable Amphibious Capability | Future Forge’, 29 July 2019. https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/moving-tanks-water-short-histor….

Australian Government. ‘National Defence - Defence Strategic Review’. Australian Government, April 2023.

Axe, David. ‘Looks Like Another Russian Landing Ship Just Blew Up’. Forbes. Accessed 21 April 2024. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/02/14/looks-like-another-rus….

Berman, Noah. ‘How Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea Threaten Global Shipping’. Council on Foreign Relations, 12 January 2024. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-houthi-attacks-red-sea-threaten-global….

Department of Defence. ‘Amphibious platoon shows its versatility’. Website. Department of Defence. Defence, 21 November 2022. https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2022-03-01/amphibious-plato….

Kajal, Kapil. ‘Sea Change: Australian Army Starts Shift towards Littoral Operations’. Janes, 3 July 2023. https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/sea-change-australian-ar….

Ong, Peter. ‘USSOCOM Combat Craft Assault Photo Reveals Some Key Features’. Naval News (blog), 28 December 2020. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/12/ussocom-combat-craft-assau….

Palazzo, Albert. ‘Adding Bang to the Boat: A Call to Weaponise Land 8710’. Australian Army Research Centre, 1 December 2020. https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/land-power-forum/adding-bang….

Purdy, Leo. ‘Understanding Armour and Why the IFV Matters to Australia’. Australia Defence Magazine, 26 July 2022. https://www.australiandefence.com.au/defence/land/understanding-armour-….

End Notes