In the early hours of 17 June 2017, the Navy Destroyer USS Fitzgerald, collided with the 30,000-ton container ship, the ACX Chrystal, in the South China Sea – killing seven US sailors. As is common practice for incidents of this magnitude, the ship’s captain and executive officer were immediately removed from command.
When the USS John S. McCain was struck by Alnic MC just over two months later (and killing another ten sailors), the ship’s captain again was quickly removed. However, higher up the chain of command, the commodore (in charge of the squadron), the admiral (in charge of the carrier strike group) and finally the three-star admiral (in charge of the entire 7th Fleet) were all removed from command.
A common theme in the investigations that followed was highlighting the command climate that contributed to the incidents. But what is command climate and how is it developed?
As units return to the training year in earnest, commanders at all levels may well be considering their own command philosophies and the climate they want to instil. Yet, command climate is both intangible and subjective, so how can it be established and how can a commander be held accountable for its manifestations?
As Kurt Sanger and Andrew Bell highlight from their own study of the US Marine Corps, there exists no specific course on developing a command climate. Nevertheless, it is this climate upon which all commanders are judged. Historical atrocities are often blamed on command climate just as equally as they are seen as the reason for success in conflict.
Whether it was purposely created or not, every command has a climate. Yet, the command climate instilled by the young platoon commander or troop leader exists within the same command climate instilled by their brigade commander. While these two command climates (and all of those in between) co-exist, there is no guarantee that they will be aligned.
How do we measure the influence of the command climate set by the Commander of the 7th Fleet (an organising spanning 20,000 sailors), on the actions and abilities of the young sailors and officers on watch that night in the USS Fitzgerald? The simple answer is that we can’t, and yet maintaining confidence in our command requires exactly that.
Some might find it confronting to know that the captain of the USS Fitzgerald was asleep at the time of the collision. In that moment, there is nothing he could have done to prevent the incident from occurring. The fact that he was asleep, however, was not the cause of concern. After all, even captains need sleep. Rather, it was the command climate that he created that allowed that incident to occur that would come to be scrutinised.
Commanders are (and should always be) accountable for what occurs within their command. Lives depend on it.
Leaders set the tone of their command. Every time they violate the standard that they set; they establish a new command climate. They must also recognise that command climate extends beyond command. The culture of an organisation can manifest in any number of ways. Setting a command climate without a plan to implement it, is unlikely to alter the climate that already exists within the organisation. Allowing a subordinate’s command climate to exist in a way that violates their own climate, also undermines their command.
How often are the leaders of an organisation talking about the command climate they are nurturing to ensure it is aligned and manifesting the way they intended? How often are they seeking ways to measure it? How effectively are commanders leveraging the influential members of their organisation to support their command climate? If the most junior person in the organisation was asked to define the command climate, what would they say?
In times of peace or war, command climate is essential to the success of an organisation. It ensures the team is working towards a common goal, is resilient to external stress, and can make the best decisions on the worst day.
The case of the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain are just two examples of why we can’t afford to get it wrong.
I like the term "Command Climate". It is somewhat intangible and hard to measure, but of great importance. Much like a workplace's "safety culture". The safety culture of a workplace is set by the leaders, the experienced hands (ie. the NCOs), and by the general attitudes and beliefs of the workers.
While the buck always stops at the commander - as well it should - I think the command climate is also dependent on the followership of subordinate leaders (both appointed and natural) and the ownership of the mission and the organisation by all of its members.