Even though Irregular Warfare (IW) has been used in multiple conflicts, it has not been translated to many allied countries' military educational institutions, even as a concept. This just clearly shows how US military doctrine used to categorise all forms of action where traditional forces were not the central players as unnatural, undesirable, or dishonourable.
If American policy makers want countries to look up to the US for leadership, it must help allies and partners to understand that using IW does not make a country less of a state, but instead it confronts challenges better than methods used by our adversaries. While exporting the American IW doctrine is not a panacea, it can leverage security assistance to encourage nations to adhere to democratic principles.
The US, challenged on all instruments of national power (DIME), confronts what can be an irreversible decline. The US armed forces, a cultural symbol and a defining characteristic of American might, simply didn't have the standing it has today until after World War II, when the US emerged as a superpower and was confident enough to develop and sustain engagement at a global scale.
Even the outcome of this process hasn't been all a rosy picture. By succeeding in this conflict, using industrial war became a way for its politicians to convey the country's image as a powerful, warrior-like nation. Andrew Bacevich tells us that the failures in the Vietnam War resulted in the militarization of foreign policy. Just like in this conflict, during the Afghanistan War it continued to use conventional warfare and did not achieve its intended strategic outcomes. Concurrently, by using the same strategy during its campaign against Saddam Hussein in 2003, it did achieve its goals, but was also responsible for the birth of ISIS.
Ignoring Jus Post Bellum and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in these places not only sparks criticism from the international community and human rights organisations, but also becomes “candid proof” of the alleged adverse effects of American involvement. In Anatomy of Failure: Why America Loses Every War It Starts, it’s pretty straight forward, “absence of sufficient knowledge and understanding of the conditions in which force is to be used” leads to failure.
Fast forward to today, we know China and the Russian Federation are successfully hijacking the rule-based international system. It is not that countries don't see the aggressive nature of Putinism, or that Chinese economic aid is an enabler of economic coercion, but rather, that this is an acceptable alternative.
Friendly nations and even allied nations face ever powerful complex threats. If the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation continue to provide economic and counterterrorism support while the American decision-makers look for ways to find a place in a multipolar system, countries will continue to de facto revive the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).
If the US wants to maintain the international liberal order it must prepare to be able to do it with as many friendly nations on its side as possible. It has shaped the It has shaped the global system for decades, but has not done so alone. Although the US military force is unmatched, when it engages with partners, it often fails to ensure that the logic of the action plan is understood, leading to long-lasting grievances.
There is, however, a way for the US to bring together as many partners as possible. While IW has gained much attention in recent years as one of the most indispensable frameworks that would counter this trend, as a consolidated American doctrine, it has yet to reach where it is most needed.
Asking NATO allies at the 2019 summit to spend more was considered troubling by some, but the renewal of European strategic autonomy opens the door for investing in IW as a cost-effective alternative. If true, it can also apply to other nations that are currently dependent on the US for defence and security.
In 2018, the US National Defense Strategy featured strategic competition, and by 2020 the annex on IW was released. This was an uncomfortable development for those who the US supported in suppressing violent non-state actors under the "national security doctrine" during the Cold War. None of the concepts in those two documents were new, but the fact that they came together meant that they would need to choose a side once again in this new global struggle.
During the Cold War, while US military doctrine addressed various securities that nation-states needed to function, without monitoring, instead of enhancing national security, they ended up with long dictatorships and widespread human rights violations that continue to shape those countries today.
Such is the case of Cuba, Chile, Iran, or Congo to name a few. It took nearly a decade in the Global War on Terrorism for the US to think of different ways to combat threats more effectively. In the words of the IW 2020 annex, to favour “indirect and asymmetric approaches”.
Even though IW has been used in multiple conflicts, they have not been translated to many allied countries' military educational institutions even as a concept. This clearly shows how US military doctrine used to categorise all forms of action where traditional forces were not the central players as unnatural, undesirable, or dishonourable.
If American policy makers want countries to look up to the US for leadership, it must help allies and partners to understand that using IW does not make a country less of a state, but instead it tackles challenges better than Russian mercenaries or Chinese investments. While exporting the American IW doctrine is not a panacea, it can leverage security assistance to encourage nations to adhere to democratic principles.
The longer it takes for allies and partners to develop such capabilities, the more difficult it will be to help them enhance their readiness and adaptability in an IW setting, as well as for the US to take the necessary actions to materialise such support.
During the last decades, autocratic powers not only have used this approach to warfare far more effectively than the US, but integrated it to their conception of war, while the US has "largely abandoned the kind of information, special operations, intelligence and economic and diplomatic action that helped win the Cold War."
As has been pointed out by other authors, ensuring the resources to rapidly regenerateIW capacities are available in case major contingency will be essential in the future. However, going even further, it can be a competitive edge in the Great Power competition. There must be the certainty that if a country wants to use these tools to spread tyranny, it will have a place among the tyrants and be dealt with decisively. Nevertheless, there will be guidance and support from America and its allies if they use it for good.
