What a Trilateral Headquarters revealed about AI, Interoperability and Command Post survivability

For many years, coalition interoperability has been a central objective of major military exercises. Success was often measured by whether participating nations could exchange information, coordinate activities, and collaborate effectively while operating through largely separate command-and-control structures. During Exercise Yama Sakura 91, however, a different picture began to emerge.

As a member of the Australian Army Battle Lab observation team, I had the opportunity to observe a complex headquarters environment involving Australia, Japan, and the United States. While Battle Lab personnel were not participants in planning or decision-making activities, the role provided a unique vantage point from which to observe emerging trends in command and control, artificial intelligence (AI), intelligence integration, coalition targeting, and headquarters design.

The value of Yama Sakura 91 was not simply in demonstrating new technologies or coalition procedures. Professional military education seeks to examine how operational experiences challenge existing assumptions and inform future preparedness. The observations discussed below are therefore presented not as a report on what occurred during the exercise, but as a contribution to professional discussion regarding the future of Australian Army headquarters and coalition warfighting.

The exercise raised an important question:

Are we merely improving interoperability between coalition partners, or are we witnessing the emergence of genuinely integrated coalition headquarters?

Beyond Interoperability

One of the most striking aspects of Yama Sakura 91 was the extent to which coalition partners operated within shared systems, processes, and information environments.

Rather than producing separate national products and reconciling them through liaison networks, personnel increasingly collaborated within common digital workspaces. Intelligence products, operational planning, targeting activities, and common operational pictures were developed collaboratively across national boundaries. This distinction is important.

Traditional interoperability assumes separate organisations exchanging information when required. What was observed at Yama Sakura suggested movement towards integrated coalition headquarters where national boundaries become less visible within daily staff processes.

If this trend continues, Army may need to reconsider whether current command-and-control concepts sufficiently account for operating within highly integrated multinational headquarters. Future coalition operations may require officers and soldiers who are as comfortable operating within multinational systems and processes as they are within Australian ones.

This trend also challenges a longstanding assumption that coalition effectiveness is achieved primarily through liaison and procedural compatibility. Yama Sakura suggested future coalition headquarters may operate as integrated organisations, sharing data, planning products, intelligence assessments, and targeting processes in near real time. If this proves indicative of future conflict, Army's concepts, training systems, and staff development pathways must increasingly prepare personnel to operate within integrated coalition teams rather than simply alongside coalition partners.

AI is changing staff work

Artificial intelligence featured prominently throughout the exercise. AI-enabled tools were integrated into routine workflows and supported functions including information discovery, translation, intelligence analysis, planning support, and collaborative decision-making. Importantly, AI was not replacing staff officers or making operational decisions independently. Instead, it reduced administrative burden and accelerated access to information.

The more significant question is not whether AI makes staff work faster, but whether it changes the nature of staff work itself.

For generations, staff officers have invested considerable effort collecting information, creating briefs, producing presentations, and manually synthesising data from multiple sources. If AI increasingly performs many of these functions, the value of the staff officer may shift from information production to information validation, judgement, risk management, and decision support.

This presents both opportunities and challenges. Staff officers may have more time to focus on critical thinking and commander-centric problems. However, they will also require a deeper understanding of data, AI limitations, information assurance, and human-machine teaming.

This also presents an important PME challenge. For decades, junior and mid-level staff officers have developed expertise through repetition of administrative and analytical tasks. If AI increasingly performs portions of that workload, Army must consider how future leaders develop professional judgement, operational understanding, and critical thinking. The comparative advantage of military professionals may lie less in generating information and more in interpreting context, applying operational judgement, challenging prevailing assumptions, and making decisions where experience and accountability remain essential.

Challenging existing staff assumptions

Several observations from Yama Sakura challenged assumptions that remain common within headquarters environments.

First, information was often accessed directly through digital collaboration tools rather than being transmitted through hierarchical briefing structures. This called into question the extent to which traditional battle rhythms remain fit for purpose in increasingly networked headquarters.

Second, coalition personnel routinely collaborated within shared information environments. This challenged assumptions that national systems and products remain the primary basis for operational decision-making. Third, AI-enabled tools demonstrated an ability to accelerate information management and support staff functions. This challenged assumptions regarding how staff effort is allocated and where military expertise provides the greatest value.

Finally, the exercise highlighted the tension between headquarters effectiveness and headquarters survivability. Modern command posts seek greater integration and connectivity, yet contemporary threats increasingly punish large, concentrated, and electronically visible headquarters.

While none of these observations independently invalidate existing approaches, collectively they suggest that future headquarters may require different structures, processes, and skillsets than those that have traditionally characterised Army command posts.

Rethinking staff processes

The exercise also highlighted potential challenges to some of Army's current headquarters practices.

In many areas, digital collaboration environments replaced traditional briefing-centric workflows. Information was updated continuously within shared platforms rather than being presented through scheduled slide presentations. Staff could access information directly rather than waiting for battle rhythm events.

On several occasions, information was updated and shared through collaborative digital environments before it appeared in scheduled briefs. Staff were often working from a common information picture in near real time, reducing reliance on traditional briefing cycles.

This forced us to consider:

If information is continuously available, do current battle rhythms require adjustment? If commanders can access information directly, what purpose should existing briefing activities serve? How should staff processes evolve when information sharing becomes persistent rather than event-driven?

PowerPoint will undoubtedly remain part of headquarters activity. However, future headquarters may rely less on briefing information and more on maintaining shared understanding within digital environments that continuously update and support decision-making.

Coalition targeting at Operational Tempo

The targeting enterprise provided another glimpse of how coalition operations are evolving.

During the exercise, multinational intelligence, targeting, and fires personnel operated within shared systems and processes that enabled rapid collaboration across national boundaries. Shortened sensor-to-shooter timelines demonstrated what becomes possible when authorities, networks, processes, and data are aligned.

For the Australian Army, this raises important questions regarding legal authorities, integration, and readiness. Future coalition operations may demand a greater understanding of multinational targeting processes and greater comfort operating within coalition rather than purely national decision cycles.

The lesson is not simply about technology. It is about the organisational arrangements, authorities, trust, and professional relationships required to enable coalition decision-making at speed.

The Headquarters Survivability Challenge

Perhaps the most significant question emerging from the exercise relates to command post survivability. Modern headquarters seek greater connectivity, deeper integration, richer data environments, and increased collaboration. Yet contemporary battlefields are characterised by persistent surveillance, cyber effects, electronic warfare, long-range fires, and precision strike systems.

The very characteristics that make a headquarters effective can also make it vulnerable. This creates a fundamental tension:

How do headquarters remain connected without becoming detectable?

Throughout Yama Sakura, dispersed command-and-control arrangements reflected recognition of this challenge. Future headquarters will likely need to be smaller, more mobile, and more distributed while still maintaining shared understanding across large geographic areas. Delegated authorities, mission command, resilient communications, and distributed decision-making may become increasingly important enablers of survivability.

For Army planners, this presents implications for future headquarters design. Future command posts may require:

• Smaller physical footprints.
• Greater functional dispersion.
• Reduced electromagnetic signatures.
• Increased delegation of authority.
• More resilient communications architectures.
• Greater ability to operate during periods of degradation or disconnection.

The challenge is not simply technological. Army must determine how to balance integration and survivability while preserving the commander's ability to understand, decide, and act faster than an adversary.

Human Interoperability remains decisive

Despite the prominence of emerging technologies throughout the exercise, the most consistent lesson emerged from interactions across the headquarters. Relationships mattered.

Professional trust built through previous exercises, liaison appointments, overseas postings, exchanges, and multinational engagement repeatedly enabled collaboration and problem-solving. In many cases, established relationships accelerated outcomes more effectively than technical solutions.

As AI and digital systems become increasingly sophisticated, there may be a temptation to view technology as the primary enabler of coalition effectiveness. The observations from Yama Sakura suggest otherwise.

Technology may facilitate integration, but trust remains the foundation upon which coalition operations are built.

This finding is particularly relevant to professional military education. The technological enablers observed during Yama Sakura were significant, but they were often most effective when underpinned by pre-existing professional relationships. Trust accelerated collaboration, facilitated understanding, and reduced organisational friction.

Consequently, leader development should continue to prioritise multinational exposure through exercises, exchanges, liaison appointments, overseas postings, and language development opportunities. Human interoperability remains a capability that cannot be automated.

Implications for Army

While Yama Sakura 91 cannot predict the future with certainty, it provided valuable indicators of how coalition headquarters may evolve. Army should continue investing in AI literacy and human-machine teaming to ensure leaders understand both the opportunities and limitations of emerging technologies.

Headquarters training should increasingly focus on operating within integrated multinational digital environments and under conditions of communications degradation. Command post experimentation should continue to explore survivable, distributed, and low-signature headquarters concepts suitable for future contested environments.

Investment in multinational relationships through liaison networks, exchange programs, and coalition exercises should remain a priority, recognising that trust remains a critical enabler of coalition effectiveness.

Finally, Army should encourage continued professional discussion regarding whether existing staff structures, battle rhythms, and command-and-control concepts remain appropriate for a future characterised by AI-enabled decision support, integrated coalition networks, and persistent threats to headquarters.

Conclusion

Exercise Yama Sakura 91 was more than an interoperability exercise. It provided a glimpse of a future where coalition headquarters are increasingly integrated, AI-enabled, data-driven, and connected. At the same time, it highlighted enduring challenges relating to headquarters survivability, decision-making, and human trust.

The most significant lesson may be that future coalition advantage will not come from technology alone. Success will depend upon an Army capable of combining advanced digital capabilities with adaptable staff processes, resilient command-and-control structures, and strong multinational relationships.

The challenge for Army is not recognising these trends, but adapting fast enough to harness their advantages while preserving the human judgement, trust, and resilience that remain central to warfighting.