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*Images courtesy of the Australian War Memorial.
On the 21st of July 1942 forces of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) landed at Gona, on the northern coast of what was then the Australian Territory of Papua, now Papua New Guinea.
This landing by the Japanese marked the opening of the Kokoda Campaign – a campaign by Australian forces of the New Guinea Force, based around the 7th Division – to defend Port Moresby, delay the IJA advance until additional Allied forces could muster, and ultimately defeat the IJA forces in Papua. Following the IJA landing, the Japanese quickly advanced inland, seeking an overland route across the Owen Stanley Mountain Range to capture Port Moresby. The most direct and traversable route was the Kokoda Trail, a pathway that snaked through the dense, mountainous and nearly impenetrable jungle of Papua New Guinea. The Kokoda Trail was to become the scene of one of the most well-known campaigns of Australian military history.
Over the next four months, Australian soldiers would twice traverse the Kokoda Trail: first withdrawing, then advancing. Major battles would be fought at Oivi, Kokoda Village, Isurava, Eora Creek, Templeton’s Crossing, Efogi, Mission Ridge/Brigade Hill, and Ioribaiwa. Australian victory at Oivi-Gorari over 05-11 November and reaching the Kumusi River on 13 November would signal the end of the Kokoda Campaign. Although further battles would be fought at Buna-Gona and Sanananda to secure Papua New Guinea, the hard-fought campaign across the appalling conditions of the Trail was over. 625 Australian soldiers were killed during the Kokoda Campaign, and over 1,600 wounded. Additionally, in excess of 4,000 soldiers became casualties due to illness. More than 150 Papuans died as members of the Papuan Infantry Battalion or as carriers of critical supplies and wounded along the Kokoda Trail.
The four month campaign was fought in some of the worst conditions Australian soldiers have fought in. The dense jungle, rugged and mountainous terrain, illness, and lack of supplies was just as deadly to Australian soldiers as the Japanese forces. While we know today that Japanese invasion of the Australian mainland was not planned, the Kokoda Campaign was seen at the time to be the final line of defence between the ever-advancing Japanese war machine and home. These factors, along with the skill, endurance, determination, and courage shown by the Australian soldiers have ensured that the Kokoda Campaign has a special place in Australian Army battle honours, and the Anzac legend.
The Cove proudly brings to you the third in our Australian Army Battle Honours Series, the history of Australia's Kokoda Campaign.
This video has been a collaboration between The Cove, Australian Army History Unit, Interserv, and Effective Animations.
Contemporary Tactical Companion
What lessons can we draw from the Kokoda Campaign? Despite taking place in the Second World War, there are many lessons still of relevance to the Profession of Arms. Watch our Kokoda Contemporary Tactical Companion video below for more.
*Images courtesy of the Australian War Memorial.
The Cove
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A great synopsis of the Kokoda Campaign.
One small detail requires correction.
The list of the 10 Reserve Battalions showing the Kokoda Trail Battle Honour on their colours ends with 16th Battalion Royal Queensland Regiment.
It should read 16th Battalion Royal Western Australia Regiment.
Over to you ...
Mick Matthews
fmr CSM Spt Coy, 11/28 RWAR
It would appear you are correct - a typo error on our part! Thank you for identifying this to us. Unfortunately the final product cannot be edited, but your comment will remind us all in posterity!
Great to see that posterity will not now have to rest on my comment but on your work in editing the video.
Well done!!
Wishing you and your families a safe and happy holiday season.
Cheers,
Mick M
However, in order to improve the accuracy & content may I suggest an inaccuracy be removed and some additions be made.
Firstly, remove the statement that an invasion of Australia was not planned.
That is not correct, although it did not eventuate. An Intelligence Officer of the IJF with whom I was friends with from 1996 to 2004 (when he passed at 88 years of age) informed me of his time as an Intelligence Staff Officer on the IJF GHQ in Manila following their defeat of MacArthur and successful occupation of the Phillipines.
He told me of seeing on their Ops Room wall the Battle Plans for “OPERATION NORTH AUSTRALIA.” At a time when there was little happening in Manila this young ambitious Officer approached his General and asked to be sent to Papua New Guinea where the operation had commenced.
His General, responded “Tota do not be in a hurry to die”. I have never forgotten those words. He ended up being captured in the Japanese withdrawal through Korea.
Also, my Uncle who fought on the Kokoda Track, like many others, returned with Japanese printed “Occupation money, as was used throughout the territories invaded and taken by the IJF in the preceding months to the Kokoda campaign.
Yes, there was significant disagreement between the IJF Army and Naval Commands but their combined success over the period 7 Dec ‘42 (Pearl Harbour) sweeping all aside to the landings at Gona (21 Jul ‘42) gave them hubris & confidence to not just plan an occupation of the Australian mainland but steps to execute it.
From the multiple bombings of Darwin, Broome & NW Australia as early as February’’42, to three Japanese submarines successfully entering & attacking Sydney, is evidence alone of their intent.
Although it may not have eventuated, it was as possible as the “impossible” of the taking of “impregnable Singapore. So there was a plan but it ended up a “bridge too far.”
Secondly, at the conclusion there is a summary of the 10 Reserve Units & direct lineage to those who fought on the Track in ‘42.
However, no mention of the Regular Unit raised in 2006 to honour & redress the shameful disbandment of the 39th Bn in 1943.
Although there is justified recognition & very good account of their actions, in the opening sequence of the presentation, there’s no acknowledging the re-raising of the 39th onto the ORBAT as the 39th OPERATIONAL SUPPORT BATTALION bearing the WWII 39Bn colours, Battle Honours, Badge etc is a serious omission.
As is the lack of mention that both the 39th Bn & Papuan Infantry Battalion are the only two Units who fought in the Campaign to be awarded and bear the Battle Honours KOKODA-DENIKI. Which you cover the two Kokoda Battles in very good detail. The second being the 8-10 Aug which to this day is recognised by both surviving WWII Unit Associations (39th & PIB) as Kokoda Day. Commemorated in Melbourne and on the Gold Coast every year and acknowledged by the Gold Coast City Council in recognition of Kokoda Barracks, located in the Hinterland with its geographic & historical links and to the region.
One final comment at the conclusion, there should be respectful acknowledgement that the crucial naval Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. These were also crucial & major contributors to the overall defeat of the IJF in those dire days.
Otherwise congratulations for keeping this very important story alive & may I recommend you watch the 1992 documentary KOKODA THE BLOODY TRACK produced by Training Command for the 50th Anniversary of the Campaign.
Finally, well done in the supplementary tactical video highlighting the importance of a tactical withdrawal rather than “retreat”. Which unfortunately Keogh 1950’s very good book & account of the Campaign blemishes the magnificent actions of Maroubra Force with the misnomer title of RETREAT FROM KOKODA.
Your production goes some way to redress that unintended slur. Thank you for that. George Friend OAM Producer KOKODA THE BLOODY TRACK 1992.
We are not able to make edits or amendments to our final production. Our battle honours animated history videos undergo a lengthy production process and are thoroughly research and vetted prior to publication. We would like to note that our content is based on accepted academic accounts by historians and then endorsed by Army’s official historians of the Australian Army History Unit (AAHU). Of course, it is not surprising that there are variations in accounts, as would there be after any significant event! We welcome different opinions as part of the contest of ideas.
To provide some clarity as to our editorial decisions that you have identified in your comment, it must be noted that to achieve our purpose of concise, accessible history video suitable for a wide audience, certain details may not have received as much attention as others. As you correctly note, 39 Bn and the PIB received the subsequent battle honour of Kokoda-Deniki. Our video was focussed largely on the conduct of the campaign itself, and the Kokoda Trail battle honour that followed. Had we enough time and resources, we would love to cover every battle of this campaign in great detail! For that same reason, we did not choose to include detail on other actions that surrounded Kokoda, such as Midway, Coral Sea, Milne Bay, or Guadalcanal. Whilst also significant, it was an editorial decision to focus on the conduct of the Kokoda Campaign itself to avoid lengthy production overruns. This was also why contemporary commemorations of Kokoda, such as the memorial events or named barracks, were not detailed.
The question of whether an invasion of mainland Australia by the IJA was intended by 1942 is certainly a fascinating one, however based on current academic sources we cannot state definitively that an invasion of our continent would have occurred should Port Moresby have been captured.
Regarding our highlighting the Kokoda Trail battle honour and the lineage units, the 39th Bn has indeed been returned to the Australian Army Order of Battle by the naming of 39 OSB (formerly PSB), and their patches and badges (including the motto) are modelled off the original 39th. However, it should be noted that 39 OSB did not inherit the regimental colours nor the Kokoda Trail battle honour, hence why it did not appear in our list of extant colours bearing the battle honour at the end of the video.
Thank you for your deep interest in our historical video, it is great to be able to discuss this fascinating campaign and surrounding topics. And thank you for highlighting your production, another important resource for us history buffs!
However, I will make two very important points if clarification.
Firstly, with all due respect to the Army History Unit, I have operated & produced well outside of their reach & expertise in this particular space since 1988 up until recently.
Having walked the Kokoda Track then as my Bi Centenary project (at my own expense) and compulsorily retired on 30 Jun 23 as the “History & Heritage officer” at Kokoda Barracks, I do have the privilege of having some unique insights & expertise of this unique Australian story. Especially as having the great privilege & honour since 2007 of being given Life Membership of the 39th Australian Infantry Battalion (1941-1943) Association.
Secondly, as the initiator (following my 1988 PNG Trek) & Producer of the Training Command WWII PNG Kokoda Campaign 50th Anniversary documentary, broadcast prime time ANZAC
day 1992 (the only commercially broadcast Defence production to actually make any revenue: back then) I engaged personally with over 300 Australian, Japanese & PNG WWII Veterans between 1989 & 1991. I still have my original 1989 submission to the “Trg Comd” & 1991 production “Kokoda” file.
As well as maintaining life long friendships & a relationships with those magnificent men (& their wives/families), as well as their respective Unit Associations. This was the case till they all passed, as recently as last year: George Turner at 102 years of age only two weeks after 8 Aug Kokoda Day 2022.
As I said then & I maintain to this day, unlike most of the Historians you quote & those academics who pass their opinion (which their entitled to) I had the unique opportunity & privilege to engage with, interview & spend real “one on one” time with those who actually were there.
Including many hours with LTCOL Ralph Honner, CO 39Bn as well as the CO of the 2/14th Bn LTCOL Phil Rhoden.
It’s a challenging & difficult task to source, identify & vet or interpret accounts either written or those provided living souls.
Especially some 50 years after those events occurred but vectoring accounts between three primary source's, whilst so many (in their 70’s back then) were still very lucid & engaged, was the most enriching & privileged part of my life.
This “vectoring” was conducted at three levels, through vetting of official accounts ie unit or Official histories as the primary sources, DVA/AWM references, Unit Association records/Executives or elected Members verification and individual/family records and interviews. Including Association Newsletters & publications from WWII to present day eg the 39Bn aptly named the “Good Guts.”
Your statement “based on accepted academic accounts by historians and then endorsed by Army’s official historians of the Australian Army History Unit (AAHU)” can easily be challenged & where mistakes are made in recorded history they can & should be corrected.
Without labouring the point, Dr David Horner, who was our Official Historian for the documentary and had oversight of the contents of the production will well recall after my return from Japan in 1991 informing him that “Wada was alive!”
This was in reference to the “Pte Wada” Chapter in Keogh seminal 1952 work “RETREAT FROM KOKODA” after whom the entire Chapter was named. His personal “diary & family photos” had been recovered “off his body” on the battlefield & beach of Buna. A moving account giving the very human & personal insights of the enemy in the book.
Problem was, some 50 years later, when we were conducting the interviews in Kochi (Capital of Shikoku, in Japan) of some 26 WWII Japanese Kokoda Veterans from both the 144th & 52nd IJF Regiments, Wada-san turned up! Bless him.
Turns out, in early 1943 during the closing phases of the bloody Buna & Gona Campaigns when the Japanese were being annihilated, Wada, didn’t think he’d survive (as most thought at the time). So he handed over his diary, dog tags & family photos to his best friend to send or take home. Turns out his mate was killed & he managed to get home safely, but account “of his demise” lay dormant as the sole record for nearly 50 years. A common occurrence on both sides & similar instances have occurred on both sides during times of conflict.
Nonetheless, a unique but telling illustration of how wrong history can be, or its interpretation at least.
Lucky he turned up at that interview in Kochi that day so we could correct the record. Which he was most grateful for.
As a result, in producing the documentary KOKODA THE BLOODY TRACK (1988 to 1992) & a feature film project (1996 to present day), I’d rather trust the words of those who were there than those who write about it, but were never there. .
I also give full credit to the production team around me. Just google You Tube & KOKODA THE BLOODY TRACK, you will see the entire team behind the project. Sadly not the names nor 96 hour plus of all the interviews we conducted of over 300 Veterans at the time.
Nonetheless, it’s as fresh & relevant today as it was then.
Lest We Forget.
George Friend OAM.
Producer
KOKODA THE BLOODY TRACK
A Training Command Production 1992
The Japanese air raids on Australia are not proof that they were planning an imminent invasion either, Darwin in particular was bombed numerous times up until 1943 as it was an important logistical and operational node for operations into Japanese occupied territory to the north, particularly bombing raids. Their intent behind attacking Darwin was do disrupt these operations and damage and destroy infrastructure that was supporting them (and no doubt a bit of of a morale factor as a secondary task). Many Allied air raids on Rabaul were also staged out of Cairns and Townsville too, if a commander has the reach and means why not use it to cause disruption and damage if possible? As for the Japanese midget submarine attack on Sydney Harbour, again this is not evidence of imminent Japanese invasion, it was an opportunistic raid to inflict damage (and again no doubt shake Australian morale) and nothing more, remember similar raids had been conducted by the Italians in the Med, notably Alexandria, and indeed by the Japanese in Madagascar in 1942, that were not precursors to any invasion, more about hitting the enemy where you can and where they least expect it.
In terms of the "Invasion Money" this is also often quoted as proof but simply put the intent of this currency was always to be used in Australian mandated territories in the Pacific, Solomons, Papua, New Guinea, New Britain etc
Again, there is no doubt that the threat of invasion was real enough to all concerned in 1942, and we are looking at this with the luxury of analysis conducted in hindsight, it would indeed have been remiss of the Government and the Defence Force to disregard such an eventuality as being logistically impossible. If Japan had been successful and a peace was brokered who knows what the consequences to Australia would have been but I agree with the Coves analysis of this and the content of the video regarding it.
In the main 16 minute video, the battle action is well portrayed and it was rewarding to see the credit given to the Papuan Infantry Battalion. One Platoon of the PIB were the first soldiers to confront the Japanese Army in Papua, through a planned ambush on 23 July 1942. I was pleased to see that Battalion shown again in the short 3 minute (Tactical) video. If the soundtrack of the main video can be edited, then we might hear the correct pronunciation of Ioribaiwa and Mt. Bellamy.
What can and must be edited is one word in paragraph four of the introductory text which appears above. It is historically incorrect to say, "While we know today that Japanese invasion of the Australian mainland was not planned..." It will avoid criticism from expert historians and knowledgeable subscribers if you deleted the word "planned" and substituted the word "executed". Other than that one word, many would endorse your introductory text on the page above.
Overall, these are valuable resources worthy of appreciation.
I would like to note that the question of an invasion of Australia by Imperial Japan is certainly an interesting topic, but it is not correct to state definitively that it was planned and would have been executed had the Australian Kokoda Campaign failed. The study of history can have many views, but it is worth noting that there is significant academic evidence that demonstrates Imperial Japan had not planned out an invasion to any significant degree. The most notable of these being former Principal Historian of the Australian War Memorial, Dr Peter Stanley, who draws upon multiple primary sources.
Of course, this does not detract from the sterling defence of PNG by the Australian and Papuan forces of Maroubra Force and the 7th Div - defeat in this campaign would still have been disastrous for the Allies.