Introduction

Army does not prepare for war in isolation. It competes for finite resources within a broader Defence organisation confronting an increasingly demanding strategic environment. Discussions surrounding force design and capability acquisition therefore understandably focus on platforms, technology, and emerging threats.

Yet Army ultimately generates combat power through people organised into teams, and one of its most important warfighting capabilities receives comparatively little attention.

Teamwork.

Teamwork is often discussed as a cultural virtue or professional expectation. It appears in leadership courses, unit mission statements, and organisational messaging. Yet its importance is more fundamental. Military effectiveness depends upon teams capable of maintaining trust, sharing understanding, and adapting under pressure. Teamwork is not simply desirable workplace behaviour. It is a warfighting capability.

This belief developed gradually throughout my military career. As a soldier, I often viewed the profession of arms through the lens of professional sport.

The comparison is imperfect. War is not sport. Sport entertains; war destroys. The profession of arms exists to apply organised violence on behalf of the state against a declared enemy in pursuit of political objectives. Yet both involve preparing individuals and teams to compete against an opponent under conditions of pressure, uncertainty, and consequence.

The Army trained constantly. Soldiers conducted field exercises, rehearsed battle drills, completed physical training, practised communications, and refined tactical procedures. The institution invested enormous effort in preparing its people for combat. Yet deployments were never guaranteed.

At times, the experience felt like a football team preparing each week for a grand final that might never occur. Coaches still demanded discipline. Players still trained for contact. Teams still rehearsed drills under pressure. Standards still mattered. The game itself remained uncertain.

As I transitioned from soldier to officer, however, my perspective changed. The challenge was not simply preparing a team to play. The challenge was determining what game the team might actually be asked to play in the first place.

Army cannot predict the character of its next war. It can, however, prepare teams capable of adapting to it. Understanding why teamwork remains important despite this uncertainty requires an understanding of the distinction between the nature and character of war.

The Nature and Character of War

Carl von Clausewitz argued that war possesses an enduring nature despite changes in the means through which it is fought (Clausewitz, 1976). Contemporary Australian doctrine similarly recognises that the nature of war remains constant while its character continually evolves (Australian Army, 2018, p. 8).

Technology evolves, societies change and adversaries adapt, but war remains a contest of opposing wills conducted for political purposes. Its enduring nature is often described through the realities of friction, uncertainty, chaos, and chance.

Friction prevents plans from unfolding as intended. Vehicles break down. Communications fail. Weather changes. Fatigue accumulates. Simple tasks become unexpectedly difficult.

Uncertainty clouds decision-making because commanders never possess complete information. They rarely know exactly where the enemy is, what the enemy intends, or how a situation will develop.

Chaos emerges naturally from human interaction under conditions of violence. Fear, confusion, and fatigue combine with the actions of an adaptive enemy to create disorder that no headquarters can fully control.

Chance influences every operation. A single decision, mechanical failure, or unexpected opportunity can alter events significantly.

While these characteristics endure, the character of war continually changes. The character of war describes how war is fought. It is influenced by technology, geography, politics, doctrine, society, and the adversary. Every generation experiences a different character of war because every generation fights under different conditions.

In sporting terms, the game may change, but many of the qualities required to compete successfully do not. Preparation, communication, trust, resilience, and teamwork matter whether the contest is football, rugby, basketball, or tennis. The rules, equipment, playing field, and techniques may differ, but the underlying demands of competition endure.

War is similar. Weapons, ranges, domains, technologies, and tactics change the way military forces compete, even while the underlying nature of that competition remains. Soldiers may fight in cities, jungles, or deserts; effects may be delivered through armoured manoeuvre, information operations, electronic warfare, cyber capabilities, or long-range strike.

The challenge for Defence lies in preparing for a game before anyone fully understands which game will emerge.

Current strategic direction provides greater clarity. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review began a significant transformation of the ADF towards a more integrated and focused force, while subsequent National Defence Strategies established a Strategy of Denial as the cornerstone of Defence planning (Australian Government, Defence, 2023; Australian Government, Defence, 2024). Army’s contribution increasingly emphasises littoral manoeuvre, long-range strike, close combat, and integration with the joint force (Australian Army, 2026). These priorities rightly shape force design, capability investment, and training.

Yet strategic direction cannot eliminate uncertainty. It can define the effects Army must be prepared to achieve, but it cannot precisely predict how the next conflict will unfold, how an adversary will respond, or how technology and circumstances will reshape the contest.

As a middle power with finite resources, Australia cannot prepare for every contingency. Army must therefore prepare deliberately without becoming so specialised for one anticipated character of war that it loses the capacity to adapt when reality proves different.

This is the central challenge. Army must prepare, in every respect, for war, but it cannot know with certainty what character the next war will take. The answer is not to abandon specialisation or preparation. It is to distinguish between what must endure and what must adapt.

Teamwork Bridges Nature and Character

This is why teamwork deserves greater recognition.

Platforms are often designed for specific purposes. A vehicle cannot redesign itself. A weapon system cannot reinvent its employment during battle. A doctrine publication cannot rewrite itself once the fighting begins. A cohesive team can. Teams are adaptable.

A vehicle may become obsolete. A weapon system may be surpassed. A particular tactical concept may prove less relevant than anticipated. Cohesive teams, however, retain the ability to learn, adapt, and evolve.

Friction is mitigated through mutual support. Uncertainty is reduced through communication and shared understanding. Chaos is managed through trust and cohesion. Chance is more readily exploited by teams capable of rapid adaptation.

A combat team built upon trust can integrate new technology. A headquarters with strong cohesion can adjust drills rapidly. A platoon with a healthy culture can adapt more effectively than one dependent upon rigid direction and detailed supervision.

Technology influences capability. People convert capability into operational effectiveness. Mission command depends upon trust, shared understanding, and disciplined initiative. These qualities are not created by organisational structures or doctrine alone. They emerge from cohesive teams that train together, learn together, and trust one another under pressure.

Modern militaries most capable of adapting to future conflict will not necessarily be those possessing the most sophisticated technology alone. Technology matters, but its effectiveness ultimately depends upon people capable of employing it, adapting its use, and continuing to operate when circumstances change.

No patrol succeeds through individual talent alone. No combat team functions without trust. No headquarters succeeds without cohesion among subordinate elements. No military organisation can effectively adapt if its people are unable to work together.

In many respects, teamwork forms the bridge between the enduring nature of war and its changing character.

The enduring nature of war ensures friction, uncertainty, chaos, and chance will remain. The changing character of war ensures military organisations must continually adapt. Teamwork enables forces to do both.

For these reasons, teamwork should be viewed as a warfighting capability in its own right.

The Art of Teams

Creating great teams is an art. History provides countless examples from both war and sport where success was achieved not by individuals alone, but by teams united by trust.

I acknowledge a personal bias in my first example. I have spent many years serving in 3 RAR and experienced first-hand the culture of Old Faithful, where teamwork and belonging to the battalion are deeply ingrained across generations of soldiers.

Well before my time, those qualities demonstrated their value at Kapyong in 1951. Old Faithful fought from exposed and increasingly isolated positions, endured repeated attacks, and ultimately conducted a fighting withdrawal despite exhaustion, isolation, and sustained enemy pressure. The Australian War Memorial describes the battalion as having achieved a “smooth integration born of mutual confidence” and identifies its high morale, cohesion, and spirit as distinguishing features of its performance throughout the battle (Australian War Memorial, n.d.-a).

Kapyong demonstrates what happens when individual competence becomes collective capability. Soldiers trusted each other. Sections remained part of platoons, platoons remained part of companies, and the battalion retained its cohesion despite exhaustion, isolation, and uncertainty. Under those conditions, teamwork was no longer simply a desirable cultural characteristic. It became combat power.

The Rats of Tobruk provide a powerful example of what a determined and cohesive team can achieve under extreme pressure. In 1941, Australian soldiers formed the core of the besieged Tobruk garrison and endured months of assault, bombardment, and isolation. Yet Tobruk held, forcing Axis forces to divert troops and sustain a long desert supply line (Australian War Memorial, n.d.-b).

Rommel remains one of the most studied commanders of the Second World War, yet even highly effective operational plans ultimately had to confront the human organisation occupying Tobruk. The defenders adapted, remained cohesive, and continued fighting despite months of pressure. Tobruk does not prove that teamwork defeats superior tactics or technology. It demonstrates something more useful: even the best tactical plan eventually meets people, and cohesive teams are extraordinarily difficult to break.

The same principle exists outside war. One of my favourite books is James Kerr’s Legacy, which explores the culture behind the sustained success of the New Zealand All Blacks. I first read it because of my interest in sport, but many of its lessons have stayed with me throughout my Army career.

Kerr describes a team that understood talent and technical ability were not enough. The All Blacks deliberately built a culture around humility, responsibility, leadership, shared standards, and belonging to something greater than the individual.

One idea that particularly stayed with me is the responsibility to leave the jersey in a better place for those who follow (Kerr, 2013). That concept translates naturally to Army. We inherit our teams temporarily. The section, platoon, company, or unit existed before us and will continue after we leave. Our responsibility is not simply to perform while we are there, but to strengthen the team for whoever comes next.

The All Blacks demonstrate that teamwork does not simply emerge when talented individuals are placed together. It must be deliberately built through culture, leadership, trust, and shared purpose.

There is, however, a limit to this argument. Teamwork alone does not win wars. I have long been fascinated by the samurai and the values of loyalty, discipline, duty, and collective purpose associated with their warrior tradition. Their final years, however, provide an important counterpoint to this argument.

During the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, former samurai under Saigō Takamori resisted a Meiji state increasingly capable of fielding and sustaining a modern national conscript army. Their cohesion, identity, and fighting spirit remained formidable, but these qualities could not indefinitely compensate for the transformation occurring around them. After months of fighting, retreat, and diminishing resources, Saigō’s rebellion ended at Shiroyama in September 1877 (Ravina, 2004).

The lesson is not that teamwork failed. It is that teamwork without adaptation has limits. A cohesive force that cannot adapt to the changing character of war can still be defeated. Equally, a force that relentlessly pursues technological and organisational change while neglecting the human relationships required to make those capabilities work risks becoming impressive in spreadsheets but fragile in combat.

That is the balance Army must strike. We should build teams around those things that endure: trust, cohesion, discipline, leadership, and shared purpose. However, those teams must remain capable of adapting to the technologies, threats, and conditions that change around them.

Kapyong shows that cohesion can become combat power. Tobruk shows how difficult a resilient team can be to break. The All Blacks show that great teams are deliberately built. The samurai remind us that even the strongest culture cannot stand still while the world changes around it.

Teamwork, Trust, and Readiness

If teamwork is a warfighting capability, Army must create the conditions in which it can develop.

This argument reinforces a theme explored in my previous article, Rat Catchers vs Regulators: The Risk of an Over-Regulated Defence Force.

Military organisations require governance, accountability, and regulation. However, excessive centralisation can undermine the very qualities that allow teams to perform effectively under operational conditions.

Over-regulation suppresses initiative, discourages trust, and reduces adaptability. These effects are not simply cultural concerns. They directly influence military effectiveness. Organisations often appear efficient in peacetime when activities occur under controlled conditions. War rarely offers controlled conditions.

When friction, uncertainty, chaos, and chance disrupt carefully constructed plans, cohesive teams become essential. Trust allows decentralised decision-making. Initiative enables adaptation. Strong professional relationships preserve cohesion when systems fail and information becomes incomplete.

Institutions adapt through committees, budget cycles, and procurement processes. Operational environments adapt far more rapidly. Effective teams bridge this gap because they learn and adjust at the speed demanded by events.

This has implications for how Army thinks about readiness. Readiness should consider not only whether people and equipment are available, but whether teams have developed the cohesion required to employ them effectively. Leaders require time to build teams, opportunities to fail together, and sufficient freedom to develop trust before those relationships are tested on operations.

This can create tension. The demands of training, certification, and major exercises often place significant pressure on units to achieve outcomes within compressed timeframes. Yet cohesive teams cannot be generated on demand. They require deliberate investment long before they are tested under operational conditions.

For junior leaders, this distinction matters. They cannot predict the next war. They cannot influence government policy or accelerate acquisition programs. They can, however, build cohesive teams capable of performing under pressure and adapting to uncertainty.

That may be one of the most important contributions they make to Army’s future readiness.

Conclusion

Army rightly invests in platforms, weapons systems, and technology. The Strategy of Denial demands a more integrated, focused, and lethal force capable of deterring adversaries from projecting power against Australia (Australian Army, 2026). These capabilities matter, and Army must continue preparing deliberately for the strategic challenges identified by government.

Yet Army ultimately generates combat power through people organised into teams.

One of Army’s most important warfighting capabilities cannot be acquired through procurement, accelerated through acquisition programs, or delivered by industry.

Teamwork.

If teamwork is a warfighting capability, Army must invest in it with the same seriousness applied to any other capability. Platforms, technologies, and force structures will continue to evolve as the character of war changes. The trust, cohesion, and shared understanding that allow teams to adapt under pressure, however, remain tied to the enduring realities of war itself.

The character of war will continue to change. New technologies will emerge. Strategic priorities will shift. Future conflicts may look very different from those anticipated today. The nature of war, however, remains remarkably consistent.

War will continue to involve friction, uncertainty, chaos, and chance. It will continue to reward organisations capable of adapting faster than their adversaries. It will continue to depend upon trust between soldiers, leaders, and teams.

Army cannot predict the next character of war. It can prepare soldiers and teams capable of adapting to it.

That is why teamwork should not be viewed merely as an organisational value or cultural aspiration.

It is a warfighting capability. It is combat power.