Experiential Learning as a Solution to a Familiar Army Problem
Australian Army units conduct a huge volume of training. Exercises are planned, activities are resourced, and soldiers are exposed to challenge, stress, and complexity. Yet a familiar frustration persists across formations: we often repeat the same mistakes, need to relearn the same lessons, and struggle to translate training experiences into lasting improvements in behaviour, leadership, and performance.
This is not a problem of effort or commitment. Army trains hard. The problem is more subtle – and more consequential. Experience alone does not guarantee learning.
Army leadership and training doctrine identifies this issue directly. It argues that unless experience is deliberately processed through structured reflection and application, learning is left to chance. The solution that the doctrine offers (but is seldom applied) is not more training, but better learning – through the disciplined use of the Experiential Learning Cycle.
The Problem: Activity Without Learning
Across Army, leaders can recognise the pattern:
- A demanding exercise exposes friction, poor communication, or weak decision‑making;
- An after‑action review identifies familiar issues;
- Units propose new procedures that will “fix it next time”;
- No one reads the AAR, new people post in and the next exercise produces similar outcomes so the cycle of not learning continues.
The cycle repeats – not because soldiers are incapable, but because learning, adaptation and evolution is incomplete.
Too often, training ends when the activity ends. Debriefs focus on what happened, not what it means. Reflection is rushed, inconsistent, or dominated by rank. Oftentimes, the important lessons are lost as loud voices take over. Occasionally, lessons are recorded but not translated into changed behaviour. Over time, this creates a culture where experience is mistaken for development.
For field grade officers and senior NCOs, this problem matters deeply. Army’s competitive advantage to win land battles rests on judgement, adaptability, trust, and leadership under pressure – qualities that cannot be programmed or briefed into existence through power point lectures. They must be learned, internalised, and rehearsed.
The Solution: Experiential Learning Done Properly
Army’s leadership and training doctrine publications describe experiential learning as more than “learning by doing”. It defines it as a cycle – a deliberate process through which experience is converted into insight and future action.
The experiential learning cycle consists of four stages:
- Experiencing
- Reflecting
- Generalising
- Applying
Crucially, the cycle is continuous. Learning only occurs when all four stages are completed.
Stage 1: Experiencing – Creating Meaningful Challenge
Army is strong at creating experiences. Field training, adventurous training, command appointments, and deployments all place soldiers in situations of uncertainty, stress, and consequence.
But not all experiences generate learning. The doctrine is explicit: experiences must involve active participation, real problem‑solving, and the possibility of error. If soldiers’ experiences are overly controlled, they are limited to just being passengers in their own experience, which robs them of their opportunities to really learn. If training is over‑controlled or overly prescriptive, soldiers comply – but they do not learn.
For leaders, this means designing training that allows:
- Decisions to matter
- Mistakes to occur
- Consequences to be felt
The discomfort that comes with this is not a flaw – it is a feature and the starting point of experiential learning.
Stage 2: Reflecting – Making Sense of the Experience
This is where many Army training events fall short.
Experience alone is insufficient. Without reflection, learning is accidental. Reflection allows individuals and teams to examine what happened, why it happened, and how they responded – emotionally, cognitively, and behaviourally.
Effective reflection is not a lecture. It is a facilitated conversation. Leaders ask questions, not provide answers. During well facilitated reflection the group should be talking significantly more than the leader who is facilitating the conversation. Here, leaders must be mature and confident in themselves that they can create an environment where they and their people set aside any rank constraints to allow honest sense‑making through respectful conversations together and amongst the group.
When reflection is done well, several things happen:
- Soldiers understand that mistakes are part of learning, not failure.
- Teams surface assumptions that shaped decisions.
- Individuals gain empathy for their fellow soldiers by better understanding others’ perspectives and lived experiences.
- Leaders gain insight into how fear, fatigue, and ambiguity influenced behaviour.
- The team improves understanding of itself.
For Army teams, reflection is where psychological safety and trust are built – or broken.
Stage 3: Generalising – Turning Experience into Insight
Reflection becomes learning only when it is generalised – when teams ask, “So what?”
Generalising connects the specific experience to broader contexts:
- What does this tell us about how we communicate under pressure?
- What does this reveal about our approach to mission command?
- How does this behaviour show up in barracks, not just the field?
- What would this look like if we behaved like this under different circumstances?
This stage is where Army leaders add the most value. It is where experience is linked to doctrine, values, leadership principles, and operational reality. Without generalisation, lessons remain trapped in the training area.
Stage 4: Applying – Changing What We Do Next Time
The final stage is application: “Now what?”
Learning is only proven when behaviour changes. Application requires individuals and teams to commit to doing something differently – and then testing that commitment in the next activity, exercise, or workplace interaction.
This stage often fails because it is deferred or forgotten. Effective teams make application explicit:
- What will we do differently next time?
- Who is responsible for reinforcing it?
- How will we know it worked?
In training contexts, teams may publicly commit to behavioural changes. In unit environments, this may translate to new decision‑making norms, communication practices, or leadership behaviours. This is better if it is included in an AAR – even better if someone actually reads them – but it will only work if the learning comes off the AAR and finds its way into SOPs or orders.
This means that someone needs to take ownership, responsibility, and lead (hint: that’ll probably be the leader).
Why This Matters: Benefits for Army Teams
When experiential learning and reflective practice are applied deliberately, the benefits are significant and cumulative.
- Better Decision‑Making Under Pressure. Structured reflection helps individuals understand how they think under stress. Over time, this builds judgement, not just competence – an essential capability for operations in complex environments.
- Stronger Teams and Trust. Teams that reflect together develop shared understanding. They learn how each member responds to challenge, which builds trust and reduces friction when it matters most.
- Improved Leadership at all levels. Experiential learning develops leaders by allowing them to test behaviours, receive feedback, and adapt. It accelerates leadership growth far more effectively than instruction alone.
- Increased Adaptability and Initiative. By focusing on learning rather than compliance, teams become more comfortable with uncertainty. This supports mission command by reinforcing intent‑based thinking and disciplined initiative.
- Reduced Repetition of Mistakes. Perhaps most importantly, experiential learning breaks the cycle of relearning the same lessons. Teams that complete the learning cycle improve between activities, not just during them.
The Leader’s Role: From Instructor to Facilitator
The experiential learning cycle places a clear responsibility on leaders. Officers and NCOs are not just trainers – they are facilitators of learning.
This does not require complex tools. The doctrine offers a simple framework:
- Do the experience!
- Ask: What happened?
- Ask: So what does that mean?
- Ask: Now what are you going to do about it?
Used consistently, these questions change the quality of learning across a unit. There are other tools as well, but this four stage process for experiential learning is something every leader can use for significant individual and team development.
Conclusion: Training Is Not Enough
Army will always train hard. That is not in question. The challenge for leaders is ensuring that training produces learning, not just experience.
Experiential learning offers a solution to a persistent problem: it provides a disciplined way to convert experience into insight, insight into action, and action into improved performance.
For Army teams operating in environments defined by friction, uncertainty, and risk, that conversion is not a luxury. It is a necessity.
Forming a hypothesis, then testing it through some sort of experiment is the gold standard to acquiring new information. And usually the minimum required for an experiment is A/B testing. With limited time and resources, could you add a hypothesis step in there? Is that just "the plan" before execution? Is there a genuine way to incorporate flexibility into a training event to enable an out of left field insight?
I understand that often new people just need to experience the basics, to give a level of confidence in their capability and unit readiness. The focusing on the basics is good, but can leave us vulnerable to tunnel vision and surprises. Perhaps alternatives beyond the training event could be explored if even as a thought experiment.
So what this means for us as field grade leaders? well the four stages I described in the article are a cycle. Once you go through the: do it, what, so what and now what; the leader needs to revisit the "now what" before they start the next activity.
Alternatively, to get to Peter's question, the cycle could start with a "now what" question to the group. The leader could facilitate the group to discover what they think will happen, what failures or risks might occur and what success might look like and what they will need to get them there. This is a particularly powerful way to frame the learning required -before- the activity. This is often referred to as a Pre or Before Action Review.
To extend, Peter's point is excellent and well made. We do do thought experiments and other activities. We often call these staff exercises, TEWTS, QDE's walk-through and rehearsals. Combined as a deliberate part of the learning cycle the team's development and acceleration can become very powerful indeed.
Thanks for reading and the comments!
Objective folders are often archived and hard to navigate as clerks create new folders for the new year. Some sub units experience entire command changeovers with OC, 2IC, CSM and platoon commanders all on the same posting cycle. Units try to fix this with SO3 officers from BHQ doing 1 year tenures as SU 2IC to try build continuity, but often fails as they take that year to learn their job role first.
Your topic issue was also discussed at a meeting with 17X Commander a few years ago. The answer provided was that these same mistakes are made on exercises, so that the current personnel posted in these positions can learn how to plan and execute within their respective roles. Although it frustrates the troops as they see the same mistakes again and again, but as an organisation, we have stronger leaderships who have made these mistakes in the past and learned off them.
Regardless, your systematic approach in training, along with an organisational culture change should see faster improvements in training over time. Many leaders, including the current curriculum for the MIC, emphasises on facilitated discussions for learning rather than death by PowerPoints and answers given directly. We are definitely headed in the right direction, but we could do better.
Yes, I've had the same frustrations myself and that is a good example of what the article describes. So often is is just our systems of postings or data management that prevents us from moving forward by learning from previous experience. I hear you about hand overs too. I've had quite a few postings where there has been no hand-over, wither because the person left early, or the role changed significantly.
I can't help but recall (and show my age here) as to how I used to overcome some of these issues, at least in a small way. I remember being tasked to run an activity, so the first thing I did was to go to the clerks in the orderly room and sign out the paper copy file for that exercise. I could read all the previous instructions, bookings, requests and reports. That was some time ago now. I agree with you that now it is often quite difficult to even find the relevant information, that discovery is often a mission in itself!
I think the key thing I'm getting at here and in the article is that we will always make mistakes, and do things really well, or be lucky. Sometimes we learn from those experiences. Rather than keep 'learning from the same mistakes', what I am arguing for is that we should learn from the past experiences of others and our past selves. In doing so this will allow us to move forward, make 'new mistakes' or 'better mistakes' that can help us all to develop better individually, in teams and as an Army.
Great comments Guan Liu and thanks for reading and reflecting!
Great article and a significant prompt for many of us involved in the planning and delivery of training.
I 100% agree that we need to plan training events that seek to elicit responses in the training audience that are aligned to the intended development needs of the individual and the team. I’ve seen plenty of major training activities where serials are injected, to use up available time, rather than to refine the training audience response to valid stimulus.
To that end, we need to apply rigor in the training environment development and the validity of stimulus being provided. It should be likely (and at worst conceivable) that the stimulus would occur within a real world operation and we should have relevant objectives that the training serial seeks to meet.
I also agree with the underlying premise around reflection and learning that aids understanding of individual and collective responses to stress and ambiguity.
Possibly the best experiences of this nature was several years ago on an adventure training activity. One of the team members was a very good facilitator and we actively took time at the end of each major phase of the training to examine how people felt, what their stress response was in themselves and others. We did this after relatively benign as well and far higher risk components. This turned a planned and well-executed adventure training experience in one of deep personal understanding, certainly for myself and I suspect, for several others.
Taking this approach back into the collective training environment (as you advocate), there is real value in helping individuals understand (and be honest) about their response “in the moment”, rather than allow some of that learning opportunity to slide by based on limited AAR time and a failure to ask the key questions that you’ve posed in this article. This includes planning time for the AAR and seeking that honest disclosure within a timeframe that allows stronger linkage between experience and reflection. Ideally then linked to an activity that allows application, again with a relevant timeframe.
Great article, great messages for all.
Thanks for commenting.
I'm glad you pointed out the observation that it was "good units" do do AARs after training events and then do something with that gained insight.
Thanks for commenting.