The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is rapidly modernising. New aircraft, autonomous systems, long-range strike capabilities, cyber effects, and emerging technologies are becoming central to Australia’s future force design.

The 2026 National Defence Strategy (NDS) reinforces this direction through its emphasis on integrated capabilities, accelerated capability delivery, resilience, and greater self-reliance in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific region.

However, as Defence focuses on building more advanced capability, an important question remains largely unanswered: are we preparing our people for the complexity these systems create?

There is no doubt that modernisation is necessary. Future conflicts will demand technologically advanced forces capable of operating across air, maritime, land, cyber, and space domains simultaneously. However, future operational advantage will not come from platforms alone. It will come from personnel who can think critically, adapt quickly, and operate effectively in uncertainty.

From my own experience operating within air mobility and multinational environments, complexity is rarely theoretical. Even junior personnel are increasingly exposed to rapidly changing situations, competing operational priorities, coalition coordination challenges, and large volumes of information requiring rapid decision-making.

Modern military operations are becoming more interconnected, faster-paced, and less predictable. Yet training can still prioritise procedural certainty over adaptability. There is a risk we become exceptionally good at operating platforms while becoming less prepared to operate in uncertainty.

The challenge is not technical proficiency itself. The ADF has traditionally produced highly capable operators and specialists. The problem is that modern systems now exist within increasingly complex operational environments. A fifth-generation aircraft does not operate in isolation. Neither does a cyber capability, autonomous platform, or long-range strike system.

History provides several examples of what can happen when military organisations underestimate complexity. During operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, coalition forces often possessed overwhelming technological advantages over their adversaries. Yet technological superiority did not automatically translate into strategic success.

Military forces were required to navigate complex political environments, local power structures, information campaigns, and cultural dynamics that could not be solved through technology alone. These campaigns demonstrated that success depends not only on advanced capability, but also on personnel who can understand and adapt to complex operating environments.

The war in Ukraine provides a contemporary example of this challenge. Modern operations now involve the constant interaction of drones, cyber effects, electronic warfare, long-range strike systems, intelligence networks, and information operations. Conditions change rapidly, and personnel are often required to make decisions with incomplete information. The conflict has highlighted that operational advantage frequently belongs to organisations that can learn, adapt, and respond faster than their opponents, rather than those that simply possess the most advanced technology.

They operate within larger networks of intelligence, logistics, communications, coalition integration, information effects, and command relationships. When these systems interact in contested environments, complexity increases rapidly. The 2026 NDS acknowledges that Australia’s strategic environment is becoming more contested and uncertain, with reduced warning time and growing strategic competition.

Future conflict is unlikely to provide the luxury of stable communications, uncontested logistics, or perfect information. Personnel may be required to make decisions while managing degraded systems, disrupted networks, and ambiguous operational conditions. This is where training becomes critical.

Good complexity training does not necessarily require new courses or major organisational reform. Instead, Defence should deliberately introduce uncertainty into existing training activities. Communications outages, conflicting information, changing mission requirements, degraded logistics networks, and competing operational priorities should become routine features of exercises.

Personnel should be challenged to make decisions with imperfect information and adapt when plans fail. In future conflict, complexity will not be the exception – it will be the operating environment.

There are already examples Defence can learn from. The United States Marine Corps and several NATO militaries place significant emphasis on mission command, which empowers personnel to exercise initiative and make decisions based on a commander’s intent when circumstances change. This approach recognises that complex environments rarely allow perfect adherence to plan.

Developing personnel who can think independently and adapt under pressure is increasingly important in modern operations where information, conditions, and priorities can change rapidly.

If Defence is serious about preparing for future conflict, complexity should become a deliberate training objective rather than an incidental by-product of exercises. Multi-domain ambiguity, disrupted communications, information overload, and degraded decision-making environments should be intentionally embedded into training serials across all levels of Defence.

Professional Military Education (PME) also has an important role to play. PME should not be viewed as something separate from operational capability or reserved only for senior leaders. Understanding strategic competition, systems thinking, and cross-domain integration directly contributes to operational effectiveness. Personnel do not need to become strategists, but they do need to understand the broader operational systems in which they operate.

Responsibility for this change cannot sit with PME institutions alone. Training establishments, workplaces, and commanders all have a role to play. Training organisations should expose personnel to uncertainty earlier in their careers. Workplaces should design scenarios that reflect the ambiguity and friction of contemporary operations. Commanders should encourage initiative and critical thinking rather than rewarding procedural compliance alone. Preparing personnel for complexity is ultimately a whole-of-force responsibility.

Exercises such as Talisman Sabre and Pitch Black already expose personnel to multinational and multi-domain environments. However, the value of these activities should extend beyond tactical interoperability alone. They should also develop adaptability, initiative, and comfort operating in uncertainty.

Future conflict will not unfold under controlled training conditions, and our training environments should increasingly reflect that reality. Importantly, complexity is not generated by technology alone. Geography, coalition operations, logistics, political constraints, information effects, and cultural considerations all contribute to operational complexity within the Indo-Pacific. Advanced platforms remain essential, but they are only as effective as the people integrating and operating them.

Defence modernisation matters. But if we focus solely on acquiring increasingly sophisticated systems without equally investing in preparing personnel to manage complexity, we risk creating a force that is technologically advanced but cognitively underprepared.

The future fight will not simply test our platforms.

It will test our ability to think.

Still Interested?

Why not also read: Lessons from the Eastern Front.

Cove+ also has short learning courses on similar topics, including Modern Warfare.