Australia’s National Defence Strategy (NDS) 2026 reflects a subtle yet significant shift in how Canberra views India. Whilst not framed as a headline change, the NDS quietly elevates India’s strategic relevance within Australia’s defence posture and future planning. It builds on the deepening strategic partnership between the two countries, moving beyond diplomatic signalling and symbolic meetings towards greater defence cooperation and growing trust on regional security issues. What was once seen mainly through the QUAD lens is now steadily developing into a strong bilateral partnership amid a deteriorating Indo-Pacific strategic environment.

Australia’s closer ties with India stem from a steady evolution since Prime Minister Modi’s first visit to Australia in 2014, the first in nearly three decades. In his address to the Australian Parliament, Modi pledged to shift Australia from the ‘periphery’ to the centre of India’s foreign policy. This trajectory has been reinforced by a series of defence and strategic agreements, including the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) and the Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement (MLSA).

China’s growing military power, use of grey-zone tactics, pressure on supply chains, and risks to freedom of navigation and sea lines of communication have reshaped how Canberra and New Delhi assess and respond to emerging security issues. For Australia, this means working closely with capable security partners. India, given its size, strategic location, military modernisation, and growing role in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), is a natural partner for Australia.

India’s quiet elevation is evident in how NDS 2026 frames Australia’s strategic geography and regional partnerships. It identifies Australia’s primary area of military interest (PAMI) as the ‘Northeast Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia into the Pacific’. Rather than treating the IOR as a secondary theatre, the strategy recognises the Indian Ocean’s significance in Australia’s broader defence planning.

This framing aligns with India’s Maritime Doctrine 2025, which emphasises the Indian Ocean as a space of continuous strategic competition and India’s role in upholding maritime stability, including as a ‘preferred security partner’ and ‘first responder’ in the region. This alignment suggests a growing convergence in how both countries now conceptualise the Indian Ocean as a strategic theatre rather than a peripheral space.

The NDS also highlights greater cooperation with India through interoperability, defence industry collaboration, information sharing, and practical bilateral and multilateral engagement. These developments indicate that India is becoming increasingly central to Australia’s long-term strategic outlook.

The strengthening of Australia-India relations did not begin with NDS 2026. Efforts to deepen the partnership were already underway through high-level defence engagement between Canberra and New Delhi. Rajnath Singh’s visit to Australia resulted in the signing of three key agreements. These included agreements on information sharing, submarine search and rescue cooperation, and Joint Staff Talks. These agreements were practical outcomes that laid the foundation for stronger operational coordination, trust, and defence cooperation between Australia and India.

This also reflects the common challenges faced by Australia and India in an evolving geostrategic environment, particularly regarding maritime interests, supply chains, and regional stability. Accordingly, the NDS 2026 should be seen as part of a broader policy evolution that formally recognises India’s strategic importance.

Australia and India are drawing closer because they face similar strategic challenges, though in different ways. Australia’s concerns include coercion, grey-zone activities, maritime vulnerabilities, risks to its sea lines of communication, and the regional balance of power. India has ongoing border issues with China, growing competition in the Indian Ocean, and the need to match China’s military capabilities and modernisation pace to deter persistent threats.

Whilst the immediate security priorities for Canberra and New Delhi are not identical, both countries need to respond to the deteriorating strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific. This commonality provides practical grounds for deeper security cooperation, particularly in maritime security, freedom of navigation, and regional stability.

Despite the potential for cooperation and convergence of interests, challenges remain. India’s emphasis on strategic autonomy, Australia’s alliance with the US, and differences in perceptions of immediate threats and regional priorities will shape the depth and pace of cooperation.

As Australia prepares for Indian Prime Minister Modi’s visit, the next phase of Australia-India relations is likely to yield further practical outcomes. The NDS 2026 highlights sovereign capability, resilient supply chains, defence industry cooperation, and India’s role as a ‘top-tier security partner’ for Australia. This presents clear opportunities for Canberra and New Delhi to expand cooperation in areas of overlapping interest, such as maritime technology, undersea autonomous systems, maintenance support, cyber capabilities, and defence manufacturing.

This could include joint development and sustainment of undersea capabilities, expanding logistics integration under current arrangements, and advancing information-sharing frameworks to support real-time operational coordination. Australia could also benefit from India’s indigenous weapon systems, which performed exceptionally well during Operation Sindoor last May. Modi’s upcoming visit will provide an opportunity to address existing constraints in the relationship, including aligning priorities and advancing practical mechanisms for cooperation.

The relationship between Canberra and New Delhi is expected to strengthen further. However, these developments should not be interpreted as a formal security alliance. Deeper security cooperation between Canberra and New Delhi is not contingent on a formal alliance or treaty. The NDS 2026 reflects the practical reality that India has become an important partner in Australia’s regional security outlook.

Together, both countries, along with like-minded partners, can play an active role in the Indo-Pacific to support a rules-based order, freedom of navigation, and the balance of power, whilst enhancing their cooperation and interoperability. This reflects a broader shift in Australia’s strategic posture, where partnerships beyond traditional alliances are becoming key to managing regional security challenges. India’s elevation in Australia’s NDS 2026 is therefore quiet but strategically significant and will continue to shape the next phase of Australia-India relations.

Still Interested?

Why not read the Know Your Region article on India, or this article by Arushi Singh titled, ‘Future Countermeasures for Drones and Drone Swarms: India as a Case in Point’.

Or

Why not explore Cove+, which offers short education courses on Strategy and Security in the Indo-Pacific?