What is Deterrence?
What is deterrence? On the surface, the answer is straightforward: Deterrence is the practice of discouraging or restraining an actor from taking unwanted actions, such as an armed attack. It involves an effort to stop or prevent an action before it has happened. This is opposed to the closely related but distinct concept of “compellence” which is an effort to force an actor to do something it was not intending on doing.
Deterrence is an all-or-nothing proposition: it either exists, or it doesn’t. Its purpose is to prevent war. So, when hostilities break out it means that deterrence has failed.
But the process of trying to deter an adversary is more complex. To begin with, capabilities are needed, otherwise there is no way to threaten a response to an unwanted action. And there must be the will to use those capabilities, otherwise the threat is simply a bluff.
This is because deterrence is about perception – it is fundamentally concerned with shaping an adversary’s thinking. So, to deter effectively requires both capability and intent – i.e. the necessary instruments with which to make good on deterrent threats, but also to have that capability recognized by the adversary.
To fully appreciate deterrence, we need to understand some foundations. First, we need to remind ourselves of the original and most destructive deterrent – nuclear weapons. This led to building a framework underpinning deterrence strategy that formed the basis of how we can now strategise, plan, and operationalise deterrence. Third, for our Australian purposes given we have no nuclear capabilities we need to need to know how to make deterrence appear credible to an adversary through capability, intent, and strategy. Finally, we look at can we measure whether an adversary is being deterred (i.e., can you measure deterrence).
Nuclear Deterrence: The Original Deterrence Capability
There is no denying that nuclear capabilities are the ultimate weapon. World War Two demonstrated their efficiency, yet ultimately horrific effects inflicted through the initial devastation and the persistent radioactive destruction. However, this did not stop the development of nuclear arsenals among States in the aftermath of WWII and into the Cold War.
Nuclear weapons were and are considered the ultimate show of strength and deemed by the nations who have sought to attain them as vital to their national security and demonstration of power. However, the sheer destructiveness of the capability and possible crises to humanity they created, effectively started the negotiations of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War.
In short, the growing US and Soviet arsenals now effectively cancelled each other out if the war ever turned ‘hot’. Nuclear deterrence was born with the understanding that one nuclear capability deters the other’s possible use. It didn’t mean war wouldn’t occur – just that all conventional means would be exhausted before a threat of nuclear use would be invoked. However, given the possibility of a non-nuclear weapons state falling into conflict with a nuclear armed power, ‘extended nuclear deterrence’ (END) was born. It is known as being under a nuclear umbrella where a nuclear armed state gives assurances under alliance obligation to threaten nuclear use in response to conventional aggression.
If there can be any light at the end of the tunnel when discussing nuclear weapons, is that extreme parameters were agreed to globally to minimise their proliferation through the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). While this limited the nuclear spread, it did not discount their effectiveness for national security. But with legally binding treaties, END provisions, the debilitating expense and curbing of nuclear sharing, there remains only a small cohort of nuclear capable nations.
There are currently nine states with nuclear weapons capability - United States, Russia, France, United Kingdom, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel (undeclared), and Iran rumoured to be developing.
The Framework
Communications – What is your intent?
Capability – What do you have?
Credibility – Does the adversary believe you?
Capability: It doesn’t just mean what tools you have. Capability covers all aspects of national power which is especially important for countries like Australia who do not possess the ultimate threat – a nuclear capability. So, we can be extremely effective utilising our diplomatic efforts, political capital, economic power, supply chain diversification, technological/cyber capabilities, irregular warfare expertise, and information, psyops * electronic warfare just to name a few. The key is coordination and integration across our Services and Whole of Government efforts.
Communications: You must effectively communicate your intent. For many, communications are actually the crux of deterrence strategy because what matters is the perception of your target. The threat is only credible if your opponent perceives that you have the capability, and credibility or political will, to follow through on the actions you have stated.
Credibility: Your target must believe that you have the ability and the will to follow through on your threats. This can be achieved a number of ways, for example: a history of following through on actions is a great demonstration of strength and credibility; confidence that the government of the day has the political will to carry through on its intent – even if there is a cost to their own political capital or public backlash; credible capabilities that can withstand retaliation in the event of an adversary escalating to more aggressive stance
During the Cold War deterrence generally worked due to three factors. First, the West had the political will to act as one against the adversary. Second, the West had the military power to back up its own threats. And third, there was a clear and consistent message that the West would—without doubt—be ready, willing and able to defend the alliance. But, like anything that relies on the perception of others, deterrence and international relations are often characterised by the competition of risk-taking—not so much by a test of force but a test of nerve. The test is not who can bring force but who is willing to bring the most force to bear or at least make it appear so.
Conventional Deterrence: Capabilities and Strategy
Using conventional capabilities to deter an adversary raises some diverse challenges. Attempting to deter an adversary with conventional force creates the problem of ‘imposing costs.’ Will conventional means be effective? Yes. However, the effectiveness of conventional capabilities depends on the specific quality of them in the first place, how skillfully they are deployed, and how effectively an adversary can use counter-capabilities.
Because deterrent effects also rely on the relative destructiveness of conventional capabilities, the types of costs that they can impose on an adversary will only be felt over time. This is unlike nuclear weapons, for instance, because the effects are ultimately immediate as well as long-lasting. For the adversary, there is always the potential to develop counter-measures that either destroy conventional capabilities or mitigate the costs they might impose. In that sense, it can be challenging to deter adversaries by conventional force unless it is or perceived to be overwhelming.
In conventional deterrence, the capability part of the ‘capability + intent = deterrence’ equation is where the credibility of the deterrer is the most questioned by the adversary. This is because although the threshold for using conventional capabilities might be lower and more politically palatable unlike the decisions to nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the effectiveness of conventional capabilities in imposing costs is often unclear.
Can you ‘measure’ deterrence?
The short answer is no, at least not with any confidence. There have been attempts to examine ‘resolve’ in terms of intent – or the political willingness to use capabilities. But these ignore how the adversary sees and perceives deterrence, which is the most crucial piece of the puzzle. Without perfect information about adversary perceptions, whether it has been deterred is effectively unknowable. This also means that is difficult to replicate the deterrent effect because what deterred today, may not deter tomorrow.
Given that there either is deterrence, or there isn’t means that deterrence cannot be measured on a spectrum. But we can examine the quality of capabilities and the intention to use them. High quality instruments as well as high confidence in intentions creates the maximum potential for deterrence to be credible to an adversary. Even so, this cannot overcome the issue of imposing costs, or how the adversary perceives the attempt to deter it.
For these reasons, conventional deterrence should not be relied upon just because we have conventional weapons, but rather as an instrument of force that must be consistently demonstrated through both capability and intent over time. It is therefore an important part of a state’s strategic toolkit, and it must also be viewed in conjunction with other instruments of national power that can alter an adversary’s calculus. These include economic and political leverage, diplomatic pressure, alliances, and international legal and normative regimes.
Just remember….
Deterrence is ultimately the act of persuasion. If your target remains unconvinced of your threat, deterrence will fail. We can deter by threatening our target with punishment if they act against out interests, but they will only be deterred if they are confident we will follow through. Equally we can deter without making explicit threats, where our adversary may plan to attack, but knowing our reaction, ultimately decide not to go ahead. For Australia, we can be effective through many avenues, but it involves coordination, integration and communication across all arms of national power for success.
