Learning lessons from contemporary conflicts is important. The rapidly changing character of war, driven by the acceleration of technology in warfare, should drive The Australian Army to make changes to force structure, doctrine, equipment, and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). Learning from overseas conflicts enhances Army’s preparedness to address Australia’s most significant strategic risks. History is replete with examples of armies that are not prepared to fight at the start of a conflict due to a failure to adapt beforehand. These forces often pay a price in blood.

Distilling the appropriate lessons from contemporary overseas conflicts is far from easy. Just as the character of war is changing due to the emergence of new technology, the character of each conflict is different because each is shaped by the geography, resources, and the cultures of the nation and military forces involved.

It is vital that if the Australian Army makes force structure changes or invests resources as a result of lessons learnt from overseas conflicts, those lessons are relevant to the character of the war that we are likely to fight. If we learn the wrong lessons from overseas conflicts, we may find ourselves as unprepared to fight as if we had not adapted at all.

In this article, I propose guidelines for learning lessons from contemporary conflicts:

• The lesson must be geographically relevant
• The lesson must fit the Australian context
• The lesson must be applicable to the likely threat
• The lesson must not be easily countered
• A video on social media is not evidence of a lesson

The lesson must be geographically relevant

The National Defence Strategy highlights the importance of the Indo-Pacific for the ADF[1]. As we analyse overseas conflicts it is important to understand what is relevant to the region that we are most likely to operate in. The Indo-Pacific is dominated by littoral terrain including urban littoral. It is a vast geographic area that includes culturally, ethnically, and ideologically diverse populations[2].

Trends observed in Ukraine point to the accession of the defensive over the offensive. Layers of defensive positions including trenches and minefields, overlooked by persistent observation and supported by massed artillery and precision fires have resulted in almost static front lines for several years[3], with only occasional examples of manoeuvre possible[4]. This type of largely static warfare has led both sides to adopt widespread use of certain technologies. However, as the VCDF, Air Marshall Chipman, has said in media reporting “The conflict that we envisage that we need to be prepared for, that's outlined in the national defence strategy, requires us to operate over very long distances … it will require systems that have long range, long endurance and higher payloads. They are not the types of systems that we're seeing in the Ukraine fight at the moment.”[5]

The lesson must fit the Australian context

Just as lessons must fit the geography that we are likely to fight in, they must also align to the nature of our forces. The Australian Army is a small, highly trained, and well equipped force. Even if the Army were expanded as part of a national mobilisation, it would likely remain smaller than many land forces in the Indo-Pacific. Australian soldiers are highly professional; our organisation demands high physical, intellectual, and moral standards. We leverage this professionalism to build asymmetry against larger adversaries[6].

The size of the Australian Army means that some lessons relevant to larger forces will not be applicable to us. For example, much is made of the enormous expenditure of ammunition in Ukraine[7]. Australia will require guided weapons and explosive ordinance to execute the strategy of denial. It is vital that a significant proportion of those munitions are produced domestically. However, the scale required of production is not in the numbers that are reported from Ukraine, where artillery is firing up to 6000 rounds a day[8].

The lesson must be applicable to the likely threat

The ADF requires the ability to hold at risk any potential adversary forces that could target our interests during a conflict^[9]. The likely threat forces that the Australian Army may face in conflict are not necessarily the same as those fighting in conflicts overseas. This is not to suggest that Army should not be prepared to fight a well-equipped, trained, and motivated force. Quite the opposite, as the then CDF, General Hurley, said “we cannot benchmark ourselves against the Taliban”[10]. Army must be able to deter potential adversaries from taking unwanted actions and that deterrence is founded on a credible ability to defeat adversary forces, of all forms, in combat.

When considering the allocation of resources to capability and training, it’s important that the training adversary represents a likely foe. As Israel has conducted operations in Gaza and Lebanon it has encountered a network of subterranean tunnels and the IDF has had to adapt its approach[11]. There have been calls for western militaries to follow suit. Hamas spent nearly 20 years building more than 500 km of tunnels to fortify Gaza. It is unlikely that any potential adversary in the Indo-Pacific will have the opportunity to develop such a network. Training our soldiers in subterranean warfare is an opportunity cost that means they aren’t building skills for other environments.

The lesson must not be easily countered 

One of the lessons drawn from Ukraine is the emergence of a rapid battlefield “technological-tactical innovation cycle”[12]. Although this has largely been a race between drone and Electronic Warfare technologies, it can be applied to a wide variety of areas. If a lesson from a contemporary conflict can be easily countered, then adopting it will prove counterproductive. For example, in the initial phases of Russia’s invasion, the TB2 Bayraktar drone received a large amount of publicity. The Ukrainians were able to take advantage of the lack of preparedness of the Russian Armed Forces to conduct strikes on Russian vehicles. Since those early stages of the invasion, Russia has adapted and improved their air defence. As a result, the Bayraktar has been far less effective[13].

A video on social media is not evidence of a lesson

One of the reasons the Bayraktar received so much publicity is that it records full motion video of the targets it destroys. Ukraine took advantage of this by releasing footage of successful strikes to achieve an information operations effect. On social media there is now hundreds of videos, from multiple conflicts, of drones destroying vehicles and killing soldiers. Unlike drones; 155mm artillery, 120mm tank, and 5.56mm rifle rounds don’t have cameras constantly recording. This produces an asymmetry in the information environment. An amateur observer scrolling through social media may conclude that drones are far more lethal than other weapons.

One of the best examples of this information effect was during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. The Azerbaijanis used the Bayraktar and loitering munitions to destroy Armenian targets. The footage of this destruction was released on social media, which undermined the Armenian will to fight by giving the impression that death and defeat were inevitable. The truth behind the Azerbaijanis success is somewhat more complicated. They employed deception to destroy most of Armenia’s Air Defence and the Armenian Air Force was unable to counter air attacks due to their low preparedness. The decisive battle to win the war was fought by an Azerbaijani light infantry force[14].

There are better sources than social media to find evidence for how Army should be learning lessons. RAND and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) are both excellent sources of information about contemporary conflicts. As is The Cove, Australian Army Research Centre, and the Battlelab.

Conclusion

The current pace of exponential advancements in technology is driving a change to the character of warfare. It is vital that the Australian Army learns lessons about the effects of this change from contemporary conflicts. Learning lessons from overseas enhances our preparedness and reduces the risk of undergoing a strategic shock. It also increases our chance of winning battles and will save the lives of soldiers. In a resource constrained environment, it is vital that we learn the right lessons and that the lessons we apply are relevant to our strategic circumstances and geography.

End Notes