Introduction

In the evolving landscape of modern warfare, adaptation remains the decisive factor in gaining and maintaining operational advantage. Combat, at its core, is a contest of adaptation; a dynamic interplay of action, reaction, and counter-action. The military force that adapts faster, more effectively, and more systemically will outpace its adversaries. This principle is not new, but its urgency has intensified in an era where technological, tactical, and procedural change occurs at unprecedented speed. Adaptation requires wisdom and the beginning of wisdom is the definition of terms.

Adaptation, as defined in the Australian Defence Glossary (ADG), is “the ability of the Australian Defence Force to effectively anticipate or respond to events in its operating environment with sufficient timeliness, relevance, coherence, and scale to gain an advantage over an adversary.” This definition underscores the importance of not just reacting to change, but doing so in a way that is timely, strategically aligned, and scalable across the force.

Closely linked to adaptation is experimentation, which the ADG defines as “the means to test, enhance the development of guidance, concepts, plans and design, and define requirements for future capability.” Experimentation supports assurance, informs adaptation, and enables better decision-making. Army can validate or invalidate ideas, refine concepts, and accelerate the integration of new capabilities through experimentation.

Complementing experimentation is innovation, defined in the ADG as “a process by which Defence identifies and creates opportunities to improve capability outcomes or achieve a capability edge, by exploring and developing new concepts, processes, techniques, or ideas.” Importantly this term relates to the Defence Capability System, specifically the Joint Mission Design Process, and is the deliberate pursuit of better ways to achieve operational effect and advantage. Do not begin by confusing innovation and novelty.

This paper explores five key dimensions of adaptation in Army: the nature of combat as a contest of adaptation, the emerging character of war, the cultural imperative of adaptation, the relationship between adaptation and capability, and the institutional mechanisms for strengthening adaptive systems. It concludes by proposing principles and an adaptation model for Army.

The Nature of Combat: A Contest of Adaptation

Combat has always been a battle of minds and mechanisms, where adversaries seek to outthink, outmanoeuvre, and outlast each other. However, the tempo of this contest has accelerated. In contemporary operations, adaptation is no longer episodic – it is continuous. The adversary is not static; they learn, evolve, and exploit vulnerabilities in real time. This demands that Army not only respond to change but anticipate it, embedding adaptation into its soul.

The concept of adaptation in combat is best understood as a cycle: an initial action provokes a reaction, which in turn invites a counteraction. This cycle is iterative and relentless. Victory belongs to the force that can compress their decide/act process, learn faster than their opponent, and implement change at scale. This is not simply a matter of tactical agility: it is a strategic imperative.

Even at a philosophical level, the enduring relevance of Boyd’s OODA[1] loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) remains central to understanding adaptation in warfare. The OODA loop is not merely a tactical decision-making tool; it is a conceptual framework for competitive advantage. Forces that can observe more, orient more accurately, decide more coherently, and act more decisively will dominate the adaptation cycle. In this sense, adaptation is the institutional embodiment of OODA at scale across time, echelon, and operational domains.

The Emerging Character of War: Software, Systems, and Speed

The character of war is undergoing a profound transformation. Previously, years marked the pace of change; progression of days see changes today. Software evolves daily, introducing new capabilities, vulnerabilities, and operational possibilities. Upgrades to equipment are weekly, often remotely, with firmware updates and modular enhancements. Tactics and formations shift monthly, informed by lessons learned in real time from operations, exercises, and simulations.

This rapid evolution challenges traditional military planning cycles and capability development timelines. The conventional model of multi-year acquisition and doctrinal review is increasingly misaligned with the tempo of technological change. Army must therefore embrace a new paradigm; one that is agile, iterative, and responsive. This requires not only new processes but also a new mindset: one that views change not as disruption but as necessary opportunity. Army must culturally be comfortable with change, immune to change fatigue, and ultimately always ready to challenge the status quo.

A Culture of Adaptation: From Recruit to Chief of Army

Adaptation is not solely a function of systems and structures. It is a cultural imperative. Every soldier, from the newest recruit to the Chief of Army, must internalise a culture of adaptation. This culture must empower individuals to take acceptable risks in pursuit of positive change, to challenge orthodoxy, and to contribute to the evolution of capability and doctrine.

Mandating such a culture is impossible, it must be cultivated. It begins with education and training that emphasise critical thinking, experimentation, and feedback. Leadership that rewards initiative and tolerates failure as a necessary step in learning reinforces a culture of adaptation. A professional body of knowledge sustains a culture of adaptation through institutional mechanisms that capture, analyse, and disseminate insights from across the force.

Importantly, a culture of adaptation must be inclusive. Adaptation does not reside solely in laboratories or headquarters, it emerges from the field, from soldiers solving problems in real time. Army must therefore create pathways that enable ideas to flow from tactical edge to strategic centre. This requires trust, transparency, and a shared commitment to continuous improvement.

Capability and the Abstraction of Army at all echelons

Adaptation and capability are intimately linked, and by capability, this paper means whole capability, not merely major systems. Army at all echelons is an abstraction of capability. Capability in the Defence context is the combined effect of multiple inputs, known as the Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC)[2]. It is not the sum of those inputs, but the synergy that arises from the combination and application of those inputs that determines the level of capability in a particular context.

For every FIC there is an adaption mechanism available. Army swiftly implements well-understood adaptation mechanisms, while others stall under layers of complex, risk-averse staff work controlled by central authorities. For example, Army updates training curricula and tactical procedures quickly when needed. Others, such as structural reorganisation, materiel acquisition, and facilities are more complex and slower. Knowledge of applicable process and ability to participate are barriers to entry, often creating friction and misalignment between Army’s historical[3] intent for adaptation and implementation.

To address this, Army can draw on international examples of adaptive practice. The United States’ Defence Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx)[4] actively mitigates bureaucratic friction through a model that empowers rapid decision-making and escalation. DIUx possesses the authority to request waivers from policy or regulatory owners when such constraints impede adaptation progress. If the owner does not respond within 14 days, the matter escalates directly to the Secretary of Defence [War]. This mechanism exemplifies how structural empowerment and time-bound escalation can accelerate adaptation, bypassing traditional bottlenecks and enabling rapid capability development. More practically though, Army must develop an adaptive model in place of initiatives. This includes mapping the pathways through which change occurs, identifying bottlenecks, and designing interventions that accelerate adaptation. It also requires a shift in perspective from viewing capability as static to seeing it as dynamic, emergent, and context dependent. All adaptation must start with knowledge or the production of knowledge.

A Body of Knowledge in practice

A professional body of knowledge includes core teachings and skills necessary for entering a profession, inclusive of concepts, terms, and activities that make up a professional domain. Doctrine and concepts represent the foundation of the Army’s body of professional knowledge. Doctrine is educational in purpose, it underpins military education and training and drives consistency. Concepts are exploratory in nature and are a mechanism to explore military problems for which extant doctrine is insufficient, and does so through recommending the application of new technology, processes, or forces. A professional body of knowledge must change over time (lest we continue administering leeches as medicine).

Recognising the centrality of adaptation, Army has established a number of frameworks to support the development, testing, and dissemination of professional knowledge. The Land Concepts Framework provides a structured approach to exploring future operating environments, identifying capability challenges and informing force design. Complementing this, the Army Experimentation Framework provides a disciplined method for generating evidence, reducing uncertainty, and informing capability decisions through experimentation.

While these frameworks were developed to address distinct functions, they are increasingly complementary. Concepts identify and frame problems, experimentation generates knowledge to refine or validate potential solutions and lessons, doctrine and capability development translate those insights into enduring capability outcomes. Collectively, these activities represent interconnected elements of a broader adaptation system rather than standalone functions.

This evolution points towards the emergence of a more integrated Army Adaptation Framework. Such a framework would synthesise existing concept, experimentation, innovation, lessons, and doctrine processes into a coherent approach for managing adaptation across the force. Rather than treating adaptation as a series of discrete initiatives, the framework would provide Army with a common model through which knowledge is generated, tested, prioritised, and disseminated in pursuit of competitive advantage.

The value of this approach lies not in replacing existing frameworks, but in connecting them. The Land Concepts Framework, Army Experimentation Framework, and associated knowledge-management processes each make distinct contributions to adaptation. Together, however, they can form a unified mechanism that enables Army to detect change, assess implications, make informed decisions, and implement capability outcomes with greater speed and coherence.

It is therefore likely that future refinements will increasingly focus on the integration of these complementary frameworks into a comprehensive Army Adaptation Framework. Such a development would establish adaptation as a deliberate and enduring function of Army, supported by common governance, shared terminology, and clear pathways for transforming learning into capability. In doing so, it would provide the institutional foundation for a formal model of adaptation across the force.

Toward a Model of Adaptation

To institutionalise adaptation effectively, Army must adopt a model that supports decision making in a way that is rational, robust, simple, and manageable while relentlessly pursuing competitive advantage in war. The following principles underpin such a model and are largely contingent upon their incorporation and expression through leadership:

Top-down. Traceability to Government Strategic Priorities must be central to the adaptation as a form of validation; the logic of ways and means to meet strategic ends must be inherent. Specifically, adaptation must be aware of strategic circumstances – including threats – and fundamentally cohere Government-directed roles for the ADF.

Bottom-Up. Whilst top-down aligns with the highest goals of the organisation, the bottom-up approach seeks to understand how to perform specific tasks most effectively while employing the most effective mix of capabilities, new and/or old. Suitable delegations and authorities create the conditions for bottom-up adaptation.

Flexibility. Notwithstanding the top-down approach required for effective capability planning, the model must support the ability to respond to change in the environment stimulated by short-loop learning. In turn, short-loop learning can prompt reordering of capability development priorities; augmentation of tactics, techniques, and procedures; and rapid acquisition to fill newly revealed gaps. The capacity to absorb change and remain agile are central to the adaptation model.

Concept-led. The development of new concepts must occur in parallel with the development of new capabilities, as the doctrine of today will unlikely be suited for threats and technologies of the future. The concept-led approach calls for thinking broadly about the available concepts and assessing them rigorously to determine which ones represent best value for money.

Capability-based. The capability-based approach contrasts with the threat-based approach. A force expressly designed against one or two specific threats is likely to be inflexible. Capability-based planning does not entail ignorance nor complacency regarding a particular threat or threats but instead aims to think more broadly about the nature and severity of possible threats, and to test capability options against a diverse set of scenarios.

Productive Failure and Reduced Risk Thresholds. Army must inculcate a culture of adaptation through individual training and nurture a culture of adaptation through collective training. Acceptable and tolerable risk that does not abhor failure, but instead pursues codified desirable failure, marks a culture of adaptation. Individuals in Army know to fail small and fail quickly to learn at the tactical edge, supported by leadership to innovate and explore.

Proposed Model for Army Adaptation

Cognisant of the principles above, the proposed model for Army adaptation requires three primary functions and six subordinate components to translate learning into capability at the speed of relevance in contemporary warfare. Each function comprises discrete functional components as follows:

Detection: Discovering or identifying the presence or existence of developments, threats, or changes in the environment (including strategic/‘top-down’ and tactical/‘bottom-up’ stimuli) with implications or opportunities for competitive advantage.

• Innovation encompasses the identification and creation of opportunities to improve capability outcomes or achieve a capability edge, by exploring and developing new processes, techniques, or ideas.
• Exploration requires an unconstrained ability to consider all applications of technology processes or forces for Future and Conceptual Force Design. Exploration seeks to anticipate changes to the physical and intellectual components of fighting power in response to the changing character of war.

Decision: Resolving the implications or opportunities for competitive advantage through analysis, experimentation, prioritisation, and/or validation.

• Concepts explore military problems in ways that exceed the limits of current technology, doctrine, and procedures. Ultimately, recommending the application of new technology, processes, or forces is a function of conceptual thinking in support of Future and Conceptual Force Design.
• Experimentation is the rigorous process to identify the information necessary to refine, validate, or invalidate the central and supporting ideas of a proposed concept or capability solution. This process supports decision making for capability outcomes.

Dissemination: Distributing timely materiel, codified information, and communication to consolidate gains that further or bring about competitive advantage.

• Employment pursues a proportionate balance of “in use” and “in service” capability. Employment supports capability development through Operational Test and Evaluation processes to determine capability effectiveness and suitability. Informed by risk management, “in use” capability will enable genuine spiral capability development.
• Codification translates learning into capability for competitive advantage in war. The dogged pursuit of communication ensures any proposed solution informs lessons and doctrine. Effective information management, as a means of capturing lessons and conveying insights, ensures the utility, availability, and timeliness of data and information generated through adaptation.

Conclusion

In sum, adaptation is not a peripheral concern, it is the central challenge of contemporary military operations. The nature of combat demands it, the pace of technological change necessitates it, and the future of Army depends on it. To succeed, Army must embed adaptation into its culture, structures, and systems. This requires leadership, investment, education, and a shared commitment to continuous improvement.

The emerging character of war with its rapid evolution of software, equipment, and tactics, demands a force that can learn, evolve, and act faster than its adversaries. This is not simply a matter of agility it is a matter of survival. Army must therefore cultivate a culture of adaptation that empowers every soldier to explore, take sensible risks, and contribute to the evolution of capability.

Adaptation must also be understood in terms of capability at echelon, recognising the complexity and interdependence of the FIC. Strengthening adaptive mechanisms across these inputs is essential to ensuring coherence and effectiveness.

As Army continues to strengthen the institutional mechanisms that support adaptation, we stand at a pivotal moment. The challenge is no longer simply generating ideas, concepts, or experiments, but integrating them into a coherent system that can detect change, make informed decisions, and disseminate capability outcomes at the speed of relevance. The decisions we make now will shape Army's ability to learn, evolve, and maintain competitive advantage in the future. By embracing adaptation as a strategic imperative, Army can ensure it remains ready, relevant, and resilient in the face of an uncertain and rapidly changing world.

End Notes

[1] Conniption over OODA vs ASDA are unwelcome and unhelpful.

[2] Best defined by the 2006 Defence Capability Lifecycle manual as Personnel, Organisation, Collective Training, Major Systems, Supplies, Facilities, Support (which has always included Industry) and Command and Management (which always included Data)

[3] A review of Army Strategic documents from the last 20 years reveals we seek new adaption initiatives once every five years. 2004 and 2005 Complex Warfighting, 2009 Adapting Army Initiative, 2015 The Army Modernisation Plan, 2020 Army in Motion

[4] Shah, R.M. and Kirchhoff, C. (2024) Unit X: How the Pentagon and Silicon Valley Are Transforming the Future of War. Scribner.