Like several Army employment categories at present, Army’s civil engineers are at a critical point: there are insufficient numbers to fill essential (let alone desirable) positions, and experience in fundamental civil engineering is at an all-time low. Unlike most other employment categories, these particular low-density but high-demand technical specialists are part of the generalist engineer officer workstream, the inclusion of which obscures the poor health of the civil engineer component of the category.
In the absence of substantial expeditionary operations, and with easy access to technical consultants, most civil engineering skillsets are contracted to industry rather than undertaken ‘in-house’. This has resulted in a loss of civil engineering expertise within Army, and an emerging gap in capability to respond across the full spectrum of military engineering required to support the Joint Force, particularly as we approach the conflict end of the spectrum.
Retention of junior civil engineers is also impacted as the job satisfaction expected from undertaking civil engineering tasks becomes evasive and draws them towards exiting the Army for civil industry. A spiral of capability erosion exists which must be unwound before it is too late.
This article will analyse the civil engineer workforce from the perspective of one who has been fortunate to employ many of his civil engineering skills in both peacetime and on expeditionary operations. The article will be broken into four sections:
- Introducing civil engineers and the capabilities they bring.
- Arguing why Army and the Joint Force needs civil engineers.
- An overview of factors contributing to the erosion of Army’s civil engineering capability.
- Options to remediate the civil engineer workforce and be Future Ready.
The proposed options will include workforce structure and remuneration, technical education and training, and increasing opportunities to practice – although other workable solutions are also likely available.
It is hoped this article will generate discussions within Army, specifically regarding civil engineers but also on related issues with other branches of engineering and how Army uses the hard sciences. Noting the current state of civil engineers, it is further hoped the recommendations will be implemented with relative urgency, including informing the Military Engineering System capability review to be undertaken in 2023.
Who are Army’s civil engineers and what capabilities can they bring?
All military engineers are soldiers first, sappers second, and specialists third.[1] Civil engineers are specialised engineer officers and are part of the Corps of Royal Australian Engineers (RAE). Although RAE is considered a ‘technical corps’, the majority of engineer officers do not hold an engineering degree – but are highly trained and qualified in planning and managing most military engineering tasks. RAE officers ‘assist in maintaining the mobility of our own forces, deny freedom of movement to the enemy (counter-mobility), and provide general engineering support.’[2] While all engineer officers can develop engineering solutions to military problems, there are a wide range of tasks for which a civil engineering (or similar) degree is required.
A good starting point for defining civil engineering and the potential civil engineers offer Army is the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), the institution charged with training most of Army’s (and Air Force’s) civil engineers. The University of New South Wales (UNSW), Canberra Handbook identifies ‘Civil Engineering takes its name from the division of engineering in the Middle Ages between military and civilian works.
Present day civil engineering has maintained strong commonality with military engineering – the design and construction of facilities such as roads, bridges, airfields, buildings, water supply and waste treatment facilities, structures of all types, and the associated planning and management of projects.’[3] A degree in civil engineering provides Army officers with ‘professional engineering design, construction, and management skills.’[4] The qualification of Bachelor of Engineering (Civil) – or BE(Civil) – is what provides the doctrinal capability of ‘technically qualified engineer’ (colloquially ‘tech eng’).[5] In civilian terms, civil engineering is a ‘Profession’[6] with Army civil engineers and members of the profession of arms.
The graduate outcomes from the UNSW-conferred BE(Civil) at ADFA provides an overview of the technical capabilities civil engineers provide to Army and the Joint Force. Some of the key graduate outcomes are:
- Relate a quantitative, theory-based understanding of the sciences and engineering fundamentals of civil engineering (encompassing structural analysis and design, infrastructure planning and design, water and environmental technologies, and construction materials, technologies, and project management).
- Demonstrate a comprehensive understanding of design and construction techniques and standards.
- Synthesise engineering design practice, contextual factors, norms, and accountabilities in – and the limitations on – civil engineering.
- Demonstrate proficiency in applying systematic engineering synthesis and design processes, and in critically evaluating and effectively communicating the results and implications. [7]
The focus on analysis, design, construction techniques, and applied knowledge of systematic engineer problem solving are the key technical skills that differentiate civil engineers from the non-technical RAE officers. These skills, however, are rapidly perishable if not applied as a junior officer and without ongoing professional development. If civil engineering skills and knowledge are not applied and atrophy too far, Army’s more senior civil engineers can lack the confidence to volunteer their skills to address engineering problems.
Once found relatively abundantly in most military engineer units, Army civil engineers are now largely confined to the two Chief Engineer Works (12 and 19 CE Works), Army Headquarters, Security & Estate Group and International Policy Division. The Officers Commanding a Combat Engineer Regiment (CER) Support Squadron, as well as the Reconnaissance/Works Officer and usually a Troop Commander, were formerly filled by civil engineers. Likewise, in the Construction Squadrons of the 6th Engineer Support Regiment (ESR) the Officers Commanding, the Construction Officer, Plans Officer and Troop Commanders were all civil engineers, while the Regimental Works Office contained several technical engineers.
The dwindling number of civil engineers has resulted in only ‘essential’ positions in the Gazette requiring ‘Technical Officers’, although even these approximately 50 positions (which should be at least 75) are now not able to be filled with civil engineers. Even the commanding officers of the Chief Engineer Works and 6 ESR cannot always be filled with a technical engineer officer.
The elimination of ‘unfillable’ civil engineer positions from most engineer units has reduced the ability of civil engineers to apply their fundamental skills and has denied field force engineer commanders ready access to civil engineering expertise. It has also removed redundancy as well as senior engineer supervision and mentoring. More broadly, in domestic infrastructure delivery, it has lessened Defence’s ability to be an informed client. Is this an issue? Does Army and the Joint Force need technically proficient Army civil engineers?
Why Army and the Joint Force need civil engineers
Civil engineers have historically played important roles on military operations. RAE civil engineers have served with distinction in both World Wars, Malaya, Vietnam, East Timor, Solomon Islands and Afghanistan, as well as served in peacetime roles delivering strategic effects in remote Australian indigenous communities and throughout the Indo-Pacific, and on humanitarian assistance missions. It is this hard-won experience, as well as contemporary demands and anticipated future needs that provides the basis for Australian Army doctrine for employing military engineers.
Australian Army doctrine for military engineering, as well as Australian Defence Force (ADF) doctrine for Infrastructure Engineering and Maintenance, frequently refer to ‘qualified technical engineers’. For design tasks, this is defined as a ‘person who has completed a Bachelor of Engineering in civil or structural engineering and is competent in [the relevant type of] design.’[8] In general doctrinal usage, this term refers to a competent person who has a BE(Civil and/or similar) qualification and is skilled in analysis, design, construction techniques, and systematic engineer problem solving.
A range of military engineering tasks require a technical engineer to be undertaken including intelligence and reconnaissance, mobility, force protection, and infrastructure delivery. These tasks can be tactical, in support of theatre-level operations, in direct achievement of strategic objectives, or supporting capability generation.
The doctrine Engineer Operations in Support of Formation Tactics provides a useful overview of military engineering support to brigade-level and below tasks and activities. Regarding engineer reconnaissance, the spectrum of ‘tactical’ to ‘technical’ demonstrates when a combat brigade needs technical engineers. These technical reconnaissance tasks, as a prelude to military engineering support, include complex route and bridge assessments, building damage assessments, infrastructure assessments and surveys, and airfield assessments.[9]
Historically, these assessments are routinely undertaken on expeditionary operations, be they combat operations or humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) missions. The Combat Engineer Squadron’s integral reconnaissance assets would normally conduct both technical and tactical reconnaissance tasks while support or construction squadrons would generally only be focussed on technical tasks.[10] Combat brigades, however, currently possess limited organic technical engineer capabilities to provide most technical reconnaissance functions.
More broadly in doctrine, technical engineers are required for design, assessment, and quality assurance tasks across the spectrum of operations (from Campaigning in Competition to high-end warfighting) and at all levels. Doctrinally, Army’s civil engineers are required for a wide range of tasks including the design and/or certification of non-equipment bridges; the design of roads, airfields, and wharfs; the design and certification of force protection structures, including many field fortifications; the assessment of existing buildings and essential infrastructure (damaged or otherwise); and the design of new infrastructure, including essential services (water, sewerage and power) for deployed forces.
Structural failures have occurred on operations through lack of supervision by technically competent engineers. Even the construction of large capacity military equipment support and line-of-communication bridges must be supervised by a civil engineer (as was the case in response to the 2013 floods in Bundaberg).[11] Likewise the use of damaged equipment bridges requires a technical engineer’s certification – the latter was a task undertaken by the author in an exercise ahead of an armoured battle group fighting withdrawal over a fixed-modular bridge damaged during night construction. At the strategic level, the technical authority to accept design changes to infrastructure projects being delivered across the Indo-Pacific rests with a competent and qualified civil engineer colonel.
Finally, Technical Control (techcon) of military engineering forces and tasks necessitates civil engineering advice. Techcon is the ‘provision of specialist and technical advice by designated authorities for the management and operation of forces.’[12] In an operational setting for military engineering, techcon ‘constitutes engineer advice to maintain technical standards, comply with legislation, meet explosive hazard reduction policy and generally ensure the most effective employment of engineers.’[13]
With regards to operational infrastructure, ADF doctrine emphasises techcon ‘constitutes advice on infrastructure inception, design, delivery, operation and maintenance and disposal matters with compliance, safety, and environmental management’ and ‘personnel with authority to exercise techcon are to ensure that the procedures and processes being employed comply with the approved Defence [Quality Management System].’[14]
The lack of experienced civil engineers has also meant our technical processes and quality management systems do not receive the focus needed to remain contemporary. Regardless at which level techcon is held (higher tactical through to strategic), a competent civil engineer is required to provide the techcon authority specialist technical advice on civil engineering matters – particularly involving standards and legislation.
Often those with the ability to influence the civil engineering capability do not understand the complexities surrounding the scoping, design, construction, and certification process. The complex and technical work completed by Army’s civil engineers (or consultant engineers) is completed in the background and is not visible to senior leaders and decision makers. The removal of the force engineer position and current lack of centralised control of military engineers has exacerbated this issue.
Unfortunately, expeditionary operations requiring such technical engineer support have not been required for nearly 15 years, less several HA/DR operations (although Reserve officers have sometimes been brought in to provide technical engineer support). Similarly, unless included by a CER commanding officer with technical engineer experience, Army collective training exercises almost never include training serials that require technical engineer support.
International engagement activities are the biggest employer of Army civil engineers; however, this is usually in a project management role. This means the need for, and opportunities presented by, civil engineer support is not well understood across Army and the capability has severely degraded. This is a significant risk for future joint operations in a contested environment and in difficult terrain where industry and civilian engineers are likely not available. Understanding why the Army’s civil engineer capability has diminished will enable remediation options to be proposed.
The factors contributing to the erosion of Army’s civil engineering capability
The fundamental skills of Army’s civil engineers have been eroding in a spiralling manner for over two decades. Up until the 1990s, and even into the early 2000s, Army civil engineers regularly undertook design tasks for infrastructure projects on the domestic estate, in Papua New Guinea, across the Pacific and as part of the Army Aboriginal Community Assistance Program (AACAP). Until more recently, Army’s civil engineers also directly managed a wider range of construction tasks including airfields, bridges, multi-storey buildings (including timber, steel, concrete and masonry), sewage systems, and simple port facilities.
Now, and likely due to over-tasking the limited RAE civil engineer workforce and compressing delivery timeframes, most of these tasks are contracted to civilian industry with comparatively inexperienced Army civil engineers filling the role of principal or client’s representative. This has resulted in almost all Army civil engineers who reach the rank of lieutenant colonel not having significant design or construction experience; instead, they are experienced project managers and contract administrators.
It is observed the types of people who are often attracted to engineering are intelligent, curious, driven, and creative problem-solvers who are physical learners and enjoy getting their hands dirty on a task. Gaining experience only in project management and contract administration does not satisfy many of the engineers (although some enjoy this type of work) as they are not able to use their natural traits. As a result, many depart Army while looking to continue working with Defence on projects as a civilian consultant, as this is currently the only way most believe they can get the civil engineering experience they seek.
The spiral of erosion is created when successive cohorts of graduate civil engineers do not work for or with experienced civil engineers, thereby generally not using or enhancing their technical skills, before promoting to more senior ranks where they are insufficiently experienced to mentor the next generation of graduate civil engineers. This lack of applied civil engineering design and construction skills has also resulted in infrastructure project managers who lack the experience and confidence to quality check and challenge industry contractors. While suitably qualified as project managers, the benefits of civil engineering knowledge, insights, and experience once gained as junior engineer officers has been lost to Army and Defence, who are not getting as great a return on investment from their ADFA civil engineer graduates.
There are several compounding factors that have led to the poor health of Army’s civil engineer capability. These factors are the lack of structure for the capability; lack of remuneration commensurate with professional requirements; no Army-coordinated or sponsored technical education or training after graduating from ADFA; and limited opportunities for ‘in house’ design, assessment, and construction tasks that are associated with significant expeditionary operations.
These factors will be explored in more detail so that the problem set is fully understood. It should be acknowledged that RAE centralised its technical engineer capability in response to an Army-driven adjustment, and elected not to buy-in fully to the Technical Engineer Review; both short-sighted ‘sugar hits’ that have contributed to the present non-agile situation.
As noted above, all military engineers are soldiers first, sappers second, and specialists third.[15] This is no different for Army’s civil engineers who form part of the engineer officer workstream and are not differentiated from any other RAE officer. Remuneration is the same despite the need to remain technically proficient and assume higher levels of risk associated with assuring the integrity of engineer works.
The lack of differentiation in the engineer officer workstream means there is no way to track the health of the specialisation nor a sustainable career model for civil engineers that considers what skills they should use and develop at different times throughout their career – some positions are suited to more experienced civil engineers (such as strategic project officers), while others are steps to these advanced positions.
This means the ill-health of civil engineers is lost in official reporting. Army people capability reporting of engineer officers shows consistency in the trained asset against establishment at nearly 100 percent – an apparent healthy category.[16] This does not show the number of civil engineer positions that are filled by ‘non-tech’ engineer officers that should not indicate a healthy specialisation. Further, Career Management has indicated the exit rate of civil engineers has been consistent; however, if this exit rate has resulted in the loss of civil engineers across engineer units, then the rate should be lowered. The problem of civil engineer health is out of sight and lost in the noise of general workforce reporting.
The lack of workstream differentiation also means Army’s civil engineers follow the typical ‘balanced’ Army officer career path and complete the combat engineer-focussed career courses: the Regimental Officer Basic Course (ROBC), the Engineer Officer Operations Course (EOOC), and the Combat Officers Advanced Course (COAC). While these courses are necessary to be an effective engineer officer who can provide advice on the full suite of military engineering capabilities, the lack of any further civil engineering courses does not align to Army’s approach to education and training.
Army’s civil engineers are deficient a formal process for professional development: ‘the pursuit of professional mastery through training, education, and experience.’[17] Noting Army’s civil engineers are Professionals (big ‘P’), an absence of structured professional development – common in almost every industry organisation employing civil engineers – is detrimental to force generating this Army capability and being Future Ready.
There are few opportunities for civil engineers to practice their craft, particularly in design and construction management. Unlike during expeditionary operations, where delivery is within days and weeks, ‘peacetime’ projects since the turn of the century are larger scale with delivery taking place in terms of months and years. The increasing scale and volume of these projects – both domestically and as part of international engagement / security cooperation – combined with a shrinking workforce over the past two decades, has resulted in an almost complete shift to contracted technical services.
While 12th Chief Engineer Works was re-raised in recent years to support the delivery of Indo-Pacific Enhanced Engagement projects (after being removed from the Army’s order of battle in 1999), several unit establishment reviews tried to similarly remove 19th Chief Engineer Works in the preceding decade to free up positions for elsewhere in Army. The 6th Engineer Support Regiment, who provide force-level engineer effects including construction, have only undertaken limited horizontal design in recent years and junior engineers are receiving less and less exposure to construction planning and quality inspections.[18]
These practices in project delivery and training have resulted from an aggregate of decisions over many years but are partially or fully reversible if it is agreed Army civil engineers are required for more than large-scale, peacetime project delivery and are integral to ‘enable the Joint Force in peace and war’[19].
Options for remediating Army’s civil engineering capability
The three factors contributing to the degradation of Army’s civil engineer capability – workforce structure and remuneration, technical education and training, and opportunities to practice – all need to be systematically addressed. While the Military Engineering System capability review should look at this matter holistically, some of the following proposed remediation options could be implemented earlier. Early adoption would be a matter for RAE commanders who are responsible for force generating the capability.
Overall, however, remediation will take many years – a new entry to ADFA will take five and a half years to reach units and then another seven years to reach the rank of major (where they are senior project engineers and officers commanding). A director-general will take 28-30 years to generate, so Army’s attention should be turned to this matter at the earliest possible opportunity.
Firstly, a trade and career model for civil engineers must be developed within the engineer officer workstream to include remuneration. All civil engineers should be qualified engineer officers (a view not shared by all) – we have insufficient numbers to provide military engineering advice across Army without them – but the trade needs to be reviewed from first principles and structured for long-term capability generation. The trade model needs to include all Army civil engineer positions across Defence – including in Security & Estate Group and International Policy Division – and must look at where civil engineer expertise is required across the spectrum of operations, from peacetime competition through to high-intensity conflict.
These positions must extend from lieutenant to brigadier to ensure a sustainable and healthy model is developed. A longitudinal career path should be mapped consisting of increasingly complex roles upon which to develop and improve technical experience, ensuring junior civil engineers are not overwhelmed and discouraged. Two captain postings need to be in a civil engineer role. The positions of commanding officer in 6 ESR and the CE Works (and construction engineers more broadly) need to be seen as on an equal footing as the CERs for attendance at a Command and Staff Course and in promotion boards.
The remuneration of technical engineers needs to consider the requirement to remain technically proficient and assume greater levels of professional risk than most general service officers (as well as the need to be registered in most states). A solution somewhere between a pilot and lawyer/doctor should be considered. A trade model can then be monitored for health by Army People Capability, both as it is rolled out and then when it reaches a sustainable level, like other technical trades[20].
Secondly, formal technical education and training must ensure that knowledge and skills from graduate to senior project engineer are current and best practice. Such an education continuum must commence upon entry to ADFA and continue through to senior captain or junior major. ADFA students must have a tailored program with greater practical application of engineering theory to ensure graduates are able to work with reduced supervision and mentoring than that found within civilian consultancies. Holistic design of simple structures and civil works, as well as specialist military-focused electives such as blast design, are key graduate skills. To achieve this, greater investment in the UNSW@ADFA External Advisory Committee is essential.
Junior officers should attend a two- or three-week Civil Engineer Intermediate Course that uses external training providers to teach a series of sequential short courses on earthworks, timber design, masonry design, steel design, composite material design, scheduling, and other technical one- or two-day courses. Prospective senior project engineers should attend a one-week course that includes construction law, negotiation skills, and more advanced construction management techniques.
Like the specialisations for Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps officers (petroleum operations, ammunition, and parachute rigging), a qualified senior officer (colonel) sponsor supported by an advisory body is required to provide oversight and direction for the professional development of the civil engineer capability. Such a professional development continuum will ensure Army’s civil engineers are current and competent masters of their profession, with appropriate remuneration to acknowledge the additional expertise and technical training.
Finally, Army’s civil engineers need greater opportunities to practice design, technical assessments, and construction management. This will require centralised planning and coordination from the tactical to the strategic levels across Army and Defence. For International Policy Division projects, 12 and 19 CE Works should be used for smaller scope projects that can be designed (and even constructed) by Army while the larger projects (such as the Blackrock Camp in Fiji[21]) can use industry project managers/contract administrators (PMCAs), possibly with an embedded Army engineer.
Alternatively, a joint Army-industry PMCA approach could be taken where Army designs some scope items. Similarly, smaller scope items for the annual AACAP projects – such as large portal-frame structures – should be designed ‘in house’ by 19 CE Works. For the domestic estate, scope items such as roads (including culverts and small bridges), airfields, grenade ranges, camps, and training shelters can be designed and delivered by 6 ESR and the CER support squadrons. During collective training, technical civil engineering serials (such as bridge assessments and construction, force protection, and building damage assessments) should be included rather than just using construction engineers for ‘out-of-exercise’ support tasks such as road remediation and damage control.
These types of projects and training serials are equivalent to those that may be required on large-scale expeditionary operations when time and/or threat does not allow for the use of consultants and contractors.
Successfully undertaking such civil engineering tasks cannot wait until both the trade model and professional development continuum have been established. It must start now; however, there are risks brought about by the lack of current experience. To reduce this risk, Army should engage qualified and experienced industry professionals to be ‘synthetic mentors’ until the civil engineer workforce has suitably matured and is self-sustaining.
Where possible, our experienced Army Reserve civil engineers could be used; however, it would require consultants engaged on a full-time or part-time basis. The CE Works and
6 ESR should each have a full-time professional to advise on design, assessments, and construction management while a separate technical mentor should be engaged to support the training of our CERs on exercise. Additional industry placements should be considered for junior captains. Such support will be required for the period it takes for the first lieutenants to become majors, at which time the system should be self-sustaining.
Conclusion: redesigning and reconstructing Army’s civil engineers cannot wait
Army and the joint force need the technical skills of civil engineer professionals at all levels – from supporting brigade-level manoeuvre to delivering strategically important projects – and across the spectrum of operations – from competing during peacetime to expeditionary, high-intensity conflict. Army civil engineers can use their grounding in first principles and technical awareness to diagnose and design the simple, proficiently deal with the immediate, and skilfully guide the specialist.
The health of our civil engineer workforce has deteriorated significantly over the past two decades and is a bit like concrete cancer[22] – invisible from the outside but liable to structural failure with limited warning. Army’s civil engineers have gone from practiced designers and construction managers to experienced project managers and contract administrators. While the latter are needed and do require some civil engineering competences, it is the skills of the former that Army and the Joint Force need when time and/or the threat environment do not permit the use of industry.
The pending Military Engineer System capability review must consider the civil engineer capability holistically (as well as other hard sciences). The review must develop a sustainable trade and career model that appropriately employs and remunerates civil engineers across Army and Defence commensurate to their skill and experience level. Supporting the model must be a professional development continuum that provides post-graduate technical education and training on the types of design, assessment, and construction tasks Army civil engineers are required to undertake in support of the joint force.
A qualified colonel, supported by an advisory body, should provide oversight and guidance to both the trade model and the professional development continuum. Finally, Army must start re-employing their civil engineers on design, technical assessment, and construction management tasks rather than exclusively contracting industry. Reconstructing the civil engineering capability will take considerable time and require our Army Reserve and industry partners to provide synthetic mentorship until the trade is self-sustaining. Action must be taken immediately before the spiral closes and all experience is lost – lest we lack the capability when it is needed most and Australia is in a dire security situation.
This article is eye opening and honest. I am afraid that the issues raised and analysed might unintentionally nudge some engineer officers towards separation, to seek out those technical ‘hands on’ experiences that they are increasingly unlikely to obtain in Army, now that they have this clearer insight to the reality that is.
Your assessment is timely and absolutely needed to be conveyed. I thank you, Sir, for your time and effort in preparing this article. I offer in response some personal insights, and some very specific, but readily workable, solutions to each the three problems areas.
Problem 1: Lack of workforce structure and competitive remuneration for the capability.
In Army, there is a recognition of prior education (RPE) program whereby officers with a relevant post graduate degree, that have served as Major for at least two years since obtaining that degree, can be considered for salary progression to pay group seven. This initiative got myself to a salary point commensurate with what I could (but not necessarily ‘should’) earn in private industry. It certainly has me questioning my transition plans. There is opportunity to implement a similar incentive earlier in the Army civil engineer officer career, and to link it to chartered engineer status, at the point where the propensity to leave is high: completion of the return of service obligation (ROSO). Currently, an RAE officer progresses to pay group five once they have completed three years as a Captain. There could be a supplementary progression to pay group six if they were also a chartered engineer by that point, or at some point thereafter. This would incentivise the civil engineer officer to undertake, and record, the necessary continual professional development activities over a reasonable timeframe in the early graduate years (Lieutenant to junior Captain) which is arguably the timeframe in which the civil engineer officer will undertake a substantial amount of technical engineering work and benefit most from the development that goes with it. At the point where many would complete their ROSO, they would have hopefully obtained chartered status (or not be far from it) and would be incentivised to Stay Army by a higher pay grade for which they would otherwise not be eligible. By the time they reach Major / Officer Commanding, they would progress to pay group seven (instead of pay group six as is the current progression upon promotion from Captain to Major) and could then be considered for another pay group progression under the aforementioned RPE scheme, to pay group eight, upon completing two years as a Major with a relevant post graduate degree. This doesn’t go so far as renumerating somewhere in between ‘pilot and lawyer/doctor’, but it’s a start. It offers a clear, stepwise salary progression linked to one’s own dedication to technical development, above and in addition to the salary increments that occur automatically when time-in-rank milestones are achieved.
Further, it has become common for ADFA civil engineering graduates to commence post graduate study within a few years of completing the undergraduate qualification. Typically, this is in Project Management. Perhaps the undertaking of technically focused professional development activities, such as short courses, in those formative graduate years, is better placed. There is nothing stopping those with a higher affinity to self-education to do both, concurrently.
Problem 2: No Army coordinated or sponsored technical education or training after ADFA.
Army used to offer the Land Engineers Professional Development Program (LEPDP). The program provided the funding for civil engineer officers’ membership with the institute of Engineers Australia (EA), and funding for professional development pursuits. I accessed the LEPDP for both. At no cost to myself, I undertook several short courses including the design of residential slabs and footings, the RMS B80 bridgework specification application course, a bridge assessment course, the design of cold formed steel structures, and the design of concrete structures, to name a few. I even had some technical publication purchases (like engineering handbooks) reimbursed by the LEPDP. I attended numerous technical seminars, mostly on weekday evenings in Brisbane and Sydney, sometimes with my fellow civil engineer officers. I thoroughly enjoyed, and benefited from, that immersion and interaction in a professional technical setting, out of uniform. The funding of my annual membership with Engineers Australia further widened access to these professional development opportunities and provided a proud sense of professional standing, above and beyond the professional standing of being an Army Officer in the Royal Australian Engineers. The program then funded my chartered engineering application which was ultimately obtained in my fourth year as a Captain. Of note, the pathway to chartered had to be undertaken in the same way that a civilian would undertake it.
The conventional pathway to chartered encompasses providing evidence and self-assessment against 16 areas of competency, which are reviewed by mentors chosen by the applicant, then reviewed by Engineers Australia prior to an interview board. This journey, in and of itself, is extremely important: it requires the applicant to critically assess and demonstrate performance and experience in a particular area of practice, and the degree to which they satisfy the competencies within. An open-source search of ‘academic self-reflection’ will showcase its growing mandate within tertiary education and professional development schemes. Importantly, it cements the principle of carrying out engineering work only to the extent to which one is confident and competent, a critical attribute of the civil engineer officer.
The LEPDP was abandoned in 2020 in favour of the Defence Engineer and Senior Technician Agreement (DESTRA). The DESTRA does not provide funding for the EA membership, nor the professional development, of Lieutenants and junior Captains. Rather, it provides a framework whereby engineer officers that have reached the rank of Major can be assessed by Army ‘in house’ for Chartered recognition in the EA Leadership and Management college. Under the DESTRA framework, ‘membership’ and ‘chartered’ are conflated. While mutually supporting, they are separate schemes. We should be encouraging and providing for our civil engineers to become members of EA as soon as possible, and to maintain that membership throughout. Of note, civil engineering students can join EA as ‘student’ members as soon as they commence their undergraduate studies. They are eligible for ‘graduate’ membership as soon as they graduate, then are eligible for ‘full’ membership after three years of postgraduate experience. Army’s funding of EA membership at these levels will encourage participation in the wealth of professional development offered by EA, that I got to enjoy, at the point when it is perhaps most beneficial: the graduate years. We should then fund and support the applicant’s pathway to chartered status in the conventional, self-reflective and self-initiated way – in the same way that every other graduate must follow. (It is recognized that there are alternate pathways for those with 15 years or more civilian industry experience.)
The DESTRA, however, limits funded membership for EA, and access to Army funded courses on offer by EA, to the civil engineer officers that have at least served as a Captain for three years. Those Captains, by that time, have missed out on at least five years of membership benefit associated with, and professional development offered by, our representative professional institution. If and once joined, those Captains then, by and large, only need to bide time until they obtain Major rank where they are eligible for streamlined credentialing for chartered status. The assessment for which is based largely on their career profile; minimal effort and input by the applicant is required, except for filling out a web form and ensuring their PMKEYS is up to date. The end state: the engineer officer Major is awarded chartered credentials with a professional institution for which they have never been a part of, nor interacted with, until then. Therefore, the DESTRA (in place of the LEPDP) is not much more than a retention tool, designed to encourage engineer officers to serve until they reach the rank of Major and be rewarded with a set of credentials for doing so. It completely misses the point of chartered recognition and the journey to it. For that reason, the DESTRA, in its current form, is, and forever will be, a mistake.
It is true that civil engineers have the option of joining EA and following the conventional approach to achieving chartered status, without relying on DESTRA. The draft policy of DESTRA makes this clear. However, it is essential to note that they would have to undertake the process individually and incur the associated costs, on their own. I commend and encourage those who choose this route. Despite the necessity for structured technical education following ADFA, and the limitations of DESTRA, the obligation for professional development and the preservation of technical skill will always rest with the individual. This leads to some insights and solutions related to the third problem area.
Problem 3: Limited opportunity for in house design, assessment and construction tasks.
The onus is on the Army civil engineer, as an individual, to seek out opportunities to maintain and apply their technical skill, in support of the mission, or otherwise. There is ample opportunity in both tactical and peacetime settings. The civil engineer must advocate for what they can bring to the table, then bring it to the table, in either order. Complaints like “they don’t know how to employ us” are, more often than not, obtuse, particularly when coming from field grade officers and above.
For example, when an Adjutant at a Combat Engineer Regiment in 2020, I found myself supporting the Brigade S2 cell in OPFOR Engineer planning – reverse BOS-ing i.e. what was the OPFOR engineer going to do, and how might we dislocate that plan. I was providing advice based on the relatively new DATE OPFOR construct in an SMAP environment. It was very ‘tactical’ and doctrinally focused work. While in that setting, I came across a technical engineering problem encountered by one of the battlegroups conducting exercise planning nested within the Brigade SMAP. The problem: they didn’t know which bridges in the AO were trafficable by their armoured vehicles. Someone had obtained a list of those bridges that categorised them by the standard/code to which they were originally designed and built to. For example, some of the bridges were built to withstand the H20-S16 truck configuration, some T44, and others to more modern standards such as the HLP400. The problem, and that list, came to me. I plunged into this problem set it by calculating the design actions (bending moments and shear forces) imparted by those truck axle loadings on each bridge, and compared them to the design actions that would be imparted by the axle/configuration loadings of our fleet of armored vehicles, on the same bridge. The data was readily available, as was an online software package that was used to hasten and check the calculations. Through this simple analysis, within a few hours I was able to conclude which bridges could be trafficked by which armoured vehicle type. Yes, many will baulk at this approach and argue it was grossly inadequate for a multitude of valid reasons. However, in real time, without access to consultants with the time and resource for more advanced modelling and analysis, it was a pretty good estimate. I would certainly vouch for the findings and stand by their reliance in a real, operational setting (hopefully I would have a bit more time, though probably wouldn’t). I relished this opportunity to apply technical skill in a tactical setting and learnt a lot about bridge design specifications in the process. After providing that technical input, I got back to developing the red engineer overlay – the SITEMP...
As another example, in my first year an as OC, I was to deploy the squadron to the field to plan and conduct limited engineer operations among other stock items on the RAE tactical task list. Cutting to the chase: for one of the serials, we wanted to build an NEB, then blow it up (ie conduct a reserve demolition on it). This was a highlight activity of my ROBC in 2012. I wanted one of the troop commanders (a civil engineer), and their troop, to experience the same opportunity, especially given that at some point after 2012, the actual construction of an NEB was disappointingly removed from the ROBC syllabus. Even though the design, build and demolition of an non-equipment bridge (NEB) would hit many training outcomes, it was a hard sell convincing others to allow me to do this. Why? Risk aversion – enough said. But we did it: the team built NEB that spanned a dry gap in the demolitions range. Furthermore, once constructed, and much to the surprise of many in the squadron, we drove a military vehicle over it. The bridge performed as expected: brilliantly. Of course, there were many checks of the limit states, particularly as for the slope stability of the abutments, to ensure this was a safe and controlled test. Allowing for the NEB to be live loaded, with an actual military vehicle – with people in it – cemented trust and confidence in the troop commander’s design, and in the construction ability of the combat engineers who constructed the NEB. They then executed a successful reserve demolition, also to great effect. The troops and their troop commander were immensely proud and morale was at an all-time high. This example demonstrates that there is still opportunity to practice ones technical skill, in a tactical setting, achieve brilliant training outcomes, and provide life long memories for those who participated. I’m sure that many reading this, upon reflection, can draw on similar experiences that support this argument.
Some reading this might also correctly point out that the design of an NEB in a lot of situations does not even explicitly require the input of a technically qualified engineer. This only supports the point: there is ample opportunity to practice technical design. In any case, in the design of engineering structures, if concerned about professional indemnity, licensing and accountability: there is writing in the ADF CPMS that is a starting point for understanding this concern and in where one is constrained, and not constrained, by such issues. Civil engineers in the Army are, in the course of their duty, covered by organisational professional indemnity and general liability insurance.
The instance shared by Mick Scott about designing and building portal frame structures, in house, is resonating. The design of such structures is well within the ability of a (graduate) Army/ADFA civil engineer, if they apply themselves. Yes, they are brutish in form and design, but portal frame buildings offer immense utility, constructability and robustness for delivering on semi-permanent and permanent infrastructure requirements, particularly in remote settings, domestically and abroad. From where I write this post/reply, there is a portal frame building that I contributed to the design of, under a brilliant RAE mentor, in 2016. These buildings have been fitted-out with various functional spaces to suit the operational circumstances of the time – offices, warehousing, etc – all of which can be delivered by the construction squadron – demonstrating the operational versatility of such buildings. They might not offer much in the way of force protection, but internal compartmentalisation and hardening within the internal space of a portal frame building is easily achievable using methods directly out of the PAM. On the annual AACAP, instead of building bespoke facilities (designed by others) that are worthy of feature in a glossy ‘Architecture Now’ magazine, let’s build portal framed buildings, and design them ourselves. As they do for operational purposes, from firsthand experience, such buildings offer equal versatility and robustness for remote first nations communities: they are the among the most utilised and beneficial facilities out of all I have seen in such settings.
It is acknowledged that the assortment of insights and solutions offered here are nuanced and specific. But solutions to engineering problems are always exactly that. In conclusion, some of the specific, workable solutions to the three problem areas addressed by Mick Scott are summarised as follows.
Incentivise the achievement of chartered engineer status, by the mid-Captain rank, by linking it to a pay group advancement (pay group six) as an optional supplement to the advancement that occurs automatically at that point – pay group four to pay group five, after three years a captain. Deliver this in addition to the existing RPE scheme whereby Majors who have held a relevant post-graduate qualification for two years are eligible for pay group advancement. This will incentivise the pursuit of technical development, by rewarding it with salary progression beyond the automatic time-based increments.
Bring back, for our Lieutenants and Captains, LEPDP-like sponsorship for membership with Engineers Australia (EA) and the professional development offered by EA and others. This will encourage formal professional development in the early graduate years, arguably when it is most impactful and important. This should be viewed as a supplement to the DASS and should not detract from the DASS which serves a different but equally important purpose.
Let’s design and build more NEBs and portal frames. This a good starting point for the rejuvenation of in-house design ability in Army. They are easy to design and the former fun to blow up. No apologies for the colloquialism here: it is how such experiences are fondly and proudly remembered by our civil engineers and sappers.
Workforce re-structuring should provide more opportunity for civil engineer officers to apply their technical skill, however; the onus will always be on the civil engineer officer to seek out, and advocate for, the ample opportunity there is to do this. The same applies for the pursuit of continual professional development in all things technical engineering.
I acknowledge the risk you highlight at the beginning and have asked all full-time RAE COs to speak to their civil engineers and reassure them that action will be taken by the Corps' senior leaders. I ask you and your peers to do likewise.
I acknowledge you support my solutions in addition to offering your own complementary ones. Specifically:
- I like the idea of incentivised renumeration linked to accreditation and CPD - a likely workable interim renumeration solution.
- I used the LEPDP in a similar manner as a CAPT and MAJ (as well as used unit funding in some cases for technical design courses required for design tasks I was given) and it was a suitable way of achieving PDP for civil engineers, but lacked structure and was reliant on the motivations of those wishing to use the program. I acknowledge the areas where DESTRA could be improved and note their is some work being undertaken in the RAE community to try to tailor DESTRA to better accommodate the different development and progression needs of civil engineers.
- I agree that civil engineers (like military engineers more broadly) need to step up and ensure support commanders understand their capabilities, including opportunities, limitations and training requirements. Having understanding and supportive commanders is also required - education is required at all levels.
- NEBs (and portal framed buildings) are a perfect training tool - as a CO I also tasked a Sqn to build a steel-timber bridge (including design work and using self-milled timber) and then executed a reserve demolition on the bridge. The activity was suitably risk managed - better to do such a task without a real enemy bearing down upon the bridging site.
Thanks again for your contribution. I ask you to please be part of the solution. Ubique.
I hope this letter finds you well. I am writing to you in my capacity as an officer student currently enrolled at the Royal Military Academy in Belgium. I am in the final year of pursuing my Master of Science degree in Structural Engineering, and currently, I am engaged in conducting research for my master's thesis in Australia.
Upon completion of my studies, I am set to graduate in September 2023. However, my officer training is scheduled to commence only in March 2024. Consequently, I will have a period of approximately six months, from September 2023 to March 2024, during which I would like to engage in an internship at the Corps of the Royal Australian Engineers
I am aware that presently, there exists no established partnership or collaboration between the Belgian and Australian military institutions. Nonetheless, I am curious to understand the procedure and the feasibility of arranging such an internship opportunity within the Royal Australian Engineers.
I would be deeply grateful if you could kindly provide me with information and guidance on the matter. Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.
Yours sincerely
Phommasone
In addressing the concerns identified (and I might be duplicating what others have already said), you already mentioned civil secondments and I might suggest that from my SR/GRES/ARES experience a program where military engineer officer (and this could be spread out to the other engineer technical trades) to take secondments to regional councils to work on specific projects for those LGA’s. Having worked in regional councils I know they struggle to get engineers which is a pity because working in a regional council means exposure to all facets of engineering, project management and the administration of all types of construction tasks as well as working hand in hand with other senior engineers. You could say it’s a reverse of the SR concept, as when I worked for the MMBW and various councils I took two weeks off to do Army training, regular officers take time off to do Civil training. It could start with a six-month placement as a Lt graduate after ROBC and then annually as a two-to-four-week assignment to work on a specific project until maybe promotion to Major. Early liaison with regional councils would allow them to factor this into their CAPEX and I am sure some councils will jump at the chance. While not that dissimilar to the project you worked on this is for a shorter time and repeated more often, in general civil engineering and not a single project or function within that project.
Further to membership of professional organisations, officers will benefit from belonging to organisations such EA and the IPWEA where they can attend training for CPD and conferences which will give them the chance to get to know current trends. I have always found these a valuable experience in keeping up with what is going and in developments in the infrastructure industry. I fear the problem though will be with OC’s and CO’s giving time for attendance at these events, but they could be managed from a higher level as mandatory training and scheduled into the training program.
I only hope that someone is listening to your concerns and thinking about addressing the problem, because once skills are lost, they are difficult to get back.
Ubique,
Ashley Bishop
Thank you for providing a comprehensive analysis of the critical state of the Army's civil engineer workforce. It highlights the urgent need for structural reforms, enhanced education and training, and increased opportunities for practical application of skills. The detailed recommendations offer a clear path to revitalizing this essential capability, ensuring that the Army can effectively meet current and future operational demands.
I hope that these insights will prompt timely action and meaningful discussions within the Army to address these pressing issues. Thank you for sharing.