“If you emit, you die” 
– General John Hyten, US Army

Introduction

1. In the military context, when one hears the term Emissions Control or EMCON, most would assume this to be the management and suppression of radio frequency (RF) emissions, generally through radio and satellite systems. This is closely linked to survivability in that EMCON seeks to reduce the amount of RF that can be intercepted and identified by adversary electronic warfare sensors and capabilities, and this is particularly true of high value targets such as Command-and-Control (C2) nodes. In military operations, C2 nodes are critical hubs of communication and decision-making, making their protection a priority. RF emissions, if not controlled, can reveal the location of these C2 nodes to an adversary, leading to targeted attacks. However, only considering RF can be detrimental to the survivability of C2 nodes on the modern battlefield. With developments in multispectral sensors and other forms of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, other forms of signature need to be considered if we are to enhance C2 node survivability in 3rd Combat Brigade (3 BDE).

2. Scope. This short paper will identify the previous way in which we looked at emissions control and identify other areas in which 3 BDE should look to focus effort to reduce C2 node signature in order to increase their overall survivability against a modern adversary.

Aim

3. This paper posits that our current understanding of emissions control is too limiting to fully appreciate the wide range of threats and sensors an adversary can utilise to find and fix brigade C2 nodes. This paper will highlight that the survivability of command posts relies not only on RF management but also on controlling other detectable signatures. Ultimately, 3 BDE should adopt a signature management framework, rather than limiting us to RF emissions control alone.

Current Focus on Radio Frequency Emissions

4. The current application of EMCON is primarily centred on the mitigation of RF emissions, which arise from radios, radars, and other communication systems essential to C2 node functions. These emissions can be detected and located by enemy electronic warfare (EW) and ISR assets, providing critical intelligence on the location and operational status of these nodes. As a result, control measures such as radio silence, the use of secure, low-power communications, and advanced waveforms are utilised to limit RF detection.

Expanding the Scope of Emissions Control to Signature Management

5. While these RF controls are necessary, they are not sufficient on their own to ensure C2 node survivability in modern conflict scenarios. As seen from modern conflicts, the adversary’s ability to detect and identify targets across numerous forms of signature is becoming increasingly dangerous to military elements looking to remain below the detection or targeting threshold. A C2 nodes physical signature, audible signature and thermal signature can be identified just as easily as its RF signature, with modern adversary ISR capable of detecting multiple signatures with a single ISR platform. Signature management is an all- encompassing term that should be used when talking about emissions or signature control and its use in enhancing nodal survivability.

1. Physical Signature. The physical presence of a C2 node can be one of the most visible and easily detectable forms of signature. This includes not only the structures used to build the node but also the specialised equipment and personnel that are generally present. Examples of this include the physical appearance of the type of communications systems used or the appearance of specialised C2 vehicles and personnel, which generally different from that of non-C2 element. Adversaries equipped with high-resolution satellite imagery or reconnaissance drones/aircraft can quickly identify physical features that differentiate a C2 node from non-C2 elements.
2. Audible Signature. Sound can be another key indicator of the presence of a C2 node. The noise generated by vehicles, generators, and even human activity can give away the location of an otherwise concealed element. Although a C2 node may be designed to look like a low value target placed in a building, if generator noise and the sound of radios and human activity is not reduced, an adversary reconnaissance element or ISR platform may be able to deduce the presence of a C2 element.
3. Thermal Signature. Thermal emissions from C2 nodes, especially from heat- producing equipment such as power generators, recently used vehicles and the human body can be detected by infrared sensors. Even at night or in adverse weather conditions, modern thermal imaging technology allows adversaries to pinpoint sources of heat that may reveal the presence of hidden C2 elements. Alternatively, the absence of heat can also be an indicator an element may be trying to hide its presence. This can be true of current thermal blanket and thermal camouflage net technology, which seeks shield the heat signature of the object being covering. Due to the ambient heat in the surrounding environment, the cold spot created by the thermal blanket can give away the presence of such a capability being utilised, likely leading to an adversary apportioning additional capability to identify what is trying to be hidden.

The Signature Management Challenge for 3rd Brigade

6. The signature management challenge is certainly not unique to 3 BDE, however due to our new structure and capabilities under the Defence Strategic Review, may be harder to achieve than some other elements within Army. Armoured vehicles and the requirement to rapidly reposition in the battlespace make signature management (across the four identified areas) especially difficult. Additionally, there is no single person or area responsible for a BDE signature management plan. HQ 3 BDE should look to appoint a signature management planner to plan and coordinate how and what signature the BDE is presenting to the adversary. Although this will take input from the intelligence (S2) and communications (S6) cells, ideally this planner will sit within the operations (S3) cell to ensure synchronisation across all staff and manoeuvre elements.

7. Let us take the BDE 0A node as an example. Its RF signature is unique in that it has wideband and narrow band communications systems available to it, as well as multiple unique radio systems that would differentiate it from a Battlegroup (BG) HQ node (TACP is a good example of this). Further, the acoustic signature created by the running of large generators is different to that of any other node its size and composition. Constant movement and repositioning can also cause a change in the 0A nodes signature that could lead to detection.

8. Some ways in which we can look to manage the BDE 0A nodes’ signature to increase its survivability are as follows:

1. The nodes RF signature can be reduced by using civilian communications systems (such as Starlink or the local telecommunications network) where the tactical and threat situation permit. As evident in the current Russia/Ukraine conflict, by using these types of systems, especially in urban or semi urban environments, it becomes hard to distinguish between a military and non-military target.
2. The nodes physical signature can be severely reduced by occupying pre-existing urban structures and hiding vehicles and communications systems in the local environment. This will also help achieve a reduction in thermal and audible signature, as you would likely use local power sources and heat emitting elements contained within buildings. However, urban occupation isn’t always viable and occupying an urban structure in the middle of a field is likely to increase detectability from adversary ISR.
3. Controlling the thermal signature requires a combination of advanced insulation techniques and the use of materials that diffuse or shield heat emissions. In some cases, strategic placement of heat-generating equipment away from the command post can also help reduce the risk of detection by thermal sensors. Arguably, thermal signature is the most difficult signature to manage.

Conclusion

9. Command post survivability depends on more than just controlling RF emissions. As adversary detection capabilities evolve, it is increasingly critical to adopt a holistic approach to EMCON that addresses physical, audible, and thermal signatures. By incorporating these additional layers of emissions control, military forces can better protect command posts from detection and targeting, ultimately enhancing operational security and effectiveness. This comprehensive approach ensures that command posts remain resilient even in the face of multi-dimensional threats.

  
JR Jenkins 
Major 
3rd Combat Signal Regiment