In this article, we focus on logistic actions at the close level and innovation to solve the problems of sustaining the Army’s Armoured Amphibious Brigade in large scale combat operations (LSCO) across the archipelago. In particular, we explore the characteristics of the CSS system employed throughout the exercise by 3 Combat Service Support Battalion – codified through the acronym MINDS – mobile, interoperable, networked, dispersed and survivable. Vignettes of key log tasks and functions supporting the Brigade’s offensive and defensive manoeuvres are presented by our Junior Officers; Before a reflection on areas for improvement and the next set of problems in focus for the 2025 warfighter series. This article is written for Australian military professionals who care to understand more about setting the conditions for logistic success in future conflicts. It is a recommended read for tactical and operational military leaders, planners and logisticians across all echelons.

Firstly, Ex BR 24 provided a rather unique opportunity to test close CSS in the context of the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) problem frame (see the NQLD WFX Storyboard). It was the first regional warfighter in 20 years to test a formation in the defence. The exercise design saw 3 Brigade lodge through an amphibious JFEO, march along the restricted Mt Fox Route into an assembly area (AA), then breakout into offensive combined arms manoeuvre in quick succession. A period of high tempo, high intensity offensive and defensive missions followed. With the Brigade complimented by international combat teams from the Japanese Ground Self Defence Force (TF Asahi), US Marines (TF Bloodline) and US Army (TF Blackhawk). The sustainment plan held true to the restrictions planned in exercise design. All classes of supply moved through restricted Sea, Ground and Air lines of communication from the SPOD and APOD in vicinity of Lucinda and Ingham.

3 CSSB approached the NQLD WFX as an opportunity to test new concepts of support tailored to sustaining an Armoured Amphibious Brigade operating across the archipelago. Particularly, how to support LSCO within our current structural readiness – staffing and equipment health. We spent time analysing new threats and the five D’s (demand, distance, duration, dependency and destination) to develop concepts for each CSS discipline that best supported the 3 Brigade’s quick transition through likely phases of LSCO. These concepts built on previous CSSB efforts to retire legacy BMA and static, ground loaded logistic concepts, which are no longer tactically sound for our context. The new concepts also sought to solve problems presented by:

  • a restricted GLOC through Route Fox – a norm when operating across the region,
  • an agreed point with 10 FSU over 100km rear of the CSSB Logistic Manoeuvre Areas (LMAs),
  • dependencies with varying, often minimal, integral CSS capacity, and
  • enemy special forces operating within our battlespace enabled by an active drone threat.

Positively, the warfighter provided an excellent opportunity to exploit the capabilities of our L121 fleet of vehicles. In particular, recent delivery of Hawkei Protected Mobility Vehicles, mounted with section weapons, offered an opportunity to transform convoy and hide defensive posture, along with enhancing C2 for CSS Troops. Extensive use of HX77 Integrated Load Handling (ILH) of flat racks also stood out alongside the utility of L121 bulk fuel and bulk water assets to optimise CSS effects. Let us now explore the new concepts and resultant characteristics of the MINDS CSS system brought to life through the NQLD Warfighter.

Characteristics of the MINDS CSS System

As the CTC-led portion of the Warfighter came to a conclusion, and the Brigade transitioned from blank to live fire, the RSM, WO1 Joshua Mattsson, and I took a moment to reflect on the concepts we had set out to test. We sensed that many of the concepts had been validated and that the Battalion had performed well. Certainly the feedback from the BGs, CTC staff and senior observers indicated we had done some things right… Despite the positive feedback, we knew we needed to ‘bottle the goodness’, as too often do good practices from field exercises fade away through the clutter of barracks routine. We set about trying to describe the characteristics of the CSS concepts the Battalion had just put into practice. After a few hours of brainstorming, the RSM eloquently proposed the acronym ‘MINDS’ to capture the characteristics of the new CSS system. MINDS stands for:

  • Mobile
  • Interoperable
  • Networked
  • Dispersed
  • Survivable

Mobile. Building on previous 3 CSSB efforts, the Battalion continued the push to hold everything ‘on wheels’ in a highly mobile state.

  • From the outset, all vehicles were combat loaded to support prioritised critical logistic events and HX77 ILH Cargo vehicles were configured for the march into the AA. The purpose of combat loading for the march was ultimately to enable freedom of action of the Brigade Commander’s offensive manoeuvre plans. It was essential that stores and equipment arriving through the march were kept moving forward to support the Brigade advance, noting less than a third of the 3 CSSB Force Elements (FE) would complete the march by breakout.
  • Once established in our LMAs, CSS FEs aimed to move every 24 hours – our own version of "drive to survive". It was common for FEs to be moving and reaching FOC, or conducting significant log tasks with dependencies, two-to-three times every 24hrs.
  • Every drop of Diesel came via Route Fox and remained on wheels until consumed.
  • High value assets, like fuel and water capabilities, remained highly mobile, spread across the FE nodal structure – able to concentrate when required and disperse quickly IAW standardised contact and break-hide drills.
  • Temporary caching of flat racks generated tempo in the supply system, with six HX77 required to reach-back over 100km to the agreed point every 24 hours. Looking to the future, flat rack caching presents an excellent opportunity for CSS FE supplementation with unmanned/autonomous lift and leader/follower technology to create greater mobility.
  • CSS FE were able to cover long distances across restricted GLOC to connect the fighting force to operational log nodes. The exercise saw CSSB elements travelling further than standard planning distance defined in NATO Capability Codes for a CSSB in support of a Heavy Armoured Brigade.
  • Ultimately, high mobility and reliable communications enabled dispersion and increased survivability.

Interoperable. The Battalion adopted nodal FE structures, with common exchange mechanisms and consistent C2, to enable interoperability internally across CSSTs and externally across echelons:

  • Internally, this enabled quick concentration and task-organisation of CSS FEs at Troop, Section, Team and individual platform levels to support changes in the main effort.
  • At the lower levels, the CSSTs became very efficient at task organising teams and individual platforms to support replenishments with 10 FSU, tactical distribution points (DPs) with the BGs and massed flat rack exchanges of Cl IV defensive stores and Cl V artillery ammunition. Commonality of TTPs and SOPs across the CSSB for core CSS functions (DP, FRT, BCT, convoy drills, transport task, etc) were essential to enable quick reorganisation and efficient execution of log tasks.
  • Externally, our nodal FE structures underpinned the CSST designs tailored to provide ‘primary and secondary support’ to various BGs. This enabled optimised support across F-Ech direct replenishment, through to more traditional DPs with A1 and A2 echelons, and finally to agreed point exchanges with the FSU.
  • Common exchange mechanisms, like the HX77 flat racks were fundamental to increasing interoperability and tempo. Standard replenishment load-outs for BGs were considered early in planning to simplify the logistic demands. Flat rack caching also provided options for reduced signature exchanges between close and integral FE, bypassing the need to co-locate, thus avoiding presentation of a target of opportunity to the enemy. This worked particularly well for Class V artillery exchanges with 4 Regt.
  • Key log actions supporting the Dry Support Bridge (DSB) emplacement by HX77 ILH and PAXMOD lift for occupation of the MDP serve as two key vignettes showcasing CSS FE interoperability.

Enabling emplacement of the Dry Support Bridge – LT Jarrod Johnson

During EX BROLGA RUN 24, 3 Brigade sought to emplace the Dry Support Bridge (DSB) in support of their advance and subsequent clearance of objectives. The DSB emplacement was a tightly synchronised set of actions over a 48 hour period controlled by E9 (BG Dingo) and enabled by multiple supporting elements. The Brigade’s crossing of Keelbottom creek was further enabled by overt actions of BG EAGLE to sell the deception of an alternate crossing point.

3 CSSB was tasked with the harmonisation of supporting attachments, as well as the transportation of all seven components of the DSB to the bridging site. The first 24 hours saw seven HX77 FE concentrated under L13 to conduct a covert movement of the DSB into cached hides using the ILH and flat rack capability. A deception plan was employed that sought to lower the signature and detectability of the DSB cache location. The next period of darkness saw the seven HX77 return from their positions in northern LMAs to collect the DSB components, along with a specialised 45M, a PAXMOD and Hawkei [PMV-Ls] security vehicles forming the ‘bridging train’. On E9’s que, the complete CSS-led bridging train moved reliably to the bridging site, enabling the successful emplacement of the bridge (eventually) and subsequent crossing of Keelbottom creek.

The highly mobile and interoperable nature of the HX77 crews and the flat rack capability was critical to mission success. The initial caching of the DSB components took less than an hour, with collection less than 25 minutes – all conducted tactically at night under NVGs. An impressive performance by the transport JNCOs leading the HX77 crews in a tactical task critical to the Brigade’s main effort.

 

PAXMOD employment during EX BR 24 – LT Jessen Mitchelmore and LT Quinn Jago

The primary role of the PAXMOD FEs were to support friendly force personnel lift, with a secondary role to support the movement of casualties or Captured Personnel (CPERS). PAXMODS were utilised extensively during EX BROLGA RUN 24 to enable the efficient movement of dismounts between key locations. Often requiring concentration of PAXMOD teams from across the CSSTs, task reorganised under a single mission commander.

Most notable was the one-time lift of TF Blackhawk, consisting of ~120 US Army infantry soldiers, during the covert night occupation of the Brigade’s MDP. This task saw all nine CSSB PAXMODs concentrate under L41 for a 16-hour period. Following unexpected delays to the occupation of earlier FEs, the PAXMOD movement of TF Blackhawk was executed swiftly and covertly to ensure the Brigade occupied before sunrise. Simple control measures, clearly delivered orders and rehearsal with dismounted elements were essential to tactical success. Several other dismounted infantry lifts enabled the generation of tempo in direct support of the Brigade’s offensive manoeuvre.

PAXMODs were also critical in the conduct of battlefield clearance, forming a key capability when paired with Health and Military Police FEs. PAXMODs supported the backload of casualties, both friendly and enemy, from casualty collection points and ambulance exchange points to secure LZs sighted in the LMAs for rotary wing CASEVAC. Further, PAXMODs were the preferred means of moving CPERS along rear LoC to MP processing facilities. The use of PAXMODs in battlefield clearance further enabled friendly forces to rapidly move onto subsequent objectives.

It is important to note that PAXMODs were only suitable for low-threat tasks and do not remove the inherent requirement for protected mobility.

Networked and connected nodes. Building on the nodal FE structure, the Battalion sought to enable these nodes with a communications fit-out that was both reliable and resilient. The Brigade Common Operating Picture (COP) was provided down to CSST HQs through signals wizardry from our RSS. In addition, CSST HQ nodes were enabled by multiple HF data, V/UHF stacks, SATCOM and HF voice capabilities. The nodal communications fit-out allowed a high degree of situational awareness and connectivity across CSS HQ elements, including the ability to see Brigade overlays and control measures, access plans, and use chat functions to confirm task details and threat updates. It also enabled the Brigade’s 24-48hr planning cycle by 'frontloading' Battalion Ops planners and CSST commanders with essential details of the manoeuvre plan in order to anticipate likely CSS tasks. The communications fit- out ultimately enabled a very modular, highly dispersed and reconfigurable CSS nodal arrangement that could surge support and CSS effects as the Brigade’s main effort changed, or the threat environment dictated.

Dispersed. Like many other FEs, dispersion was key to avoiding enemy detection and increasing resilience in our nodal FE structure. In addition to the dispersion of high value assets across CSS FE nodes, the Battalion also sought a high degree of physical dispersion. Elements of the 3 CSSB headquarters (0C and 0A nodes) were able to remain separated by over 20km for majority of the Exercise. The Battalion Command node was postured forward to provide C2 support to the Brigade and Battalion main efforts, with 0A maintaining the primary links rearwards to the Brigade Delta node and FSU. The Battalion 0B node remained at Lavarack Barracks coordinating support to our L2 CSST who were task assigned to support OPFOR in the south. The CSST HQs typically maintained two C2 nodes enabling step-up and distributed operations. With CSS Troops occupying hides several kilometres from their CSST HQ nodes when not on task, typically within V/UHF communications range. The total CSSB spread across the LMAs often covered 30 to 40 km. Most CSS FEs were able to posture outside the effective range of most of the tactical armed drones currently seen in the Ukraine/Russia conflict. The dispersed and networked nature of CSS FE in the rear also presented opportunities for deception by changing EMCON levels and switching to night-only operations to mask CSS activities in particular geographical areas.

Flat rack versatility during EX BR 24 – LT Sofia Ferrer

Flat racks carried by HX77s were a critical asset that enabled the efficient movement of stores along extended Lines of Communication in EX BROLGA RUN 24. The movement of flat racks facilitated the emplacement of the Dry Support Bridge (DSB), movement of Class IV stores ISO obstacle construction for the Main Defensive Position (MDP), as well as the cross load and caching of Class V artillery for the M777 gun lines.

A key achievement of the HX77 Cargo FEs was sustaining the movement of all (simulated) M777 rounds fired by 4 Regt to support the Brigade manoeuvre. The simulated rounds were moved through the entire logistic chain via Route Fox to the 4 Regt Gun lines on dedicated CL V artillery flat racks monitored by CTC’s Live Instrumentation System. 3 CSSB HX77 crews were responsible for movement from the agreed point at Hidden Valley to pre-designated cache exchange points for collection by 4 Regt’s integral HX77 assets.

Once the DSB had been emplaced, 3 CSSB were able to utilise the bridge to efficiently move Class IV defensive stores to the MDP in preparation for 3 BDEs transition to defensive operations. Majority of the Class IV flat rack movement was conducted by night, utilising night vision driving in order to stay under the detection threshold. The exercise highlighted the importance of managing driver fatigue and tracking equipment across the battle space to ensure operational efficiency and personnel safety. Overall, the HX77s and flat rack capability proved to be extremely versatile, able to be task organised quickly for distribution of priority supplies needed for mission success.

Survivable. Geographical dispersion mutually reinforced the survivability and resilience of our CSS FE, but it was the adoption of the right combat mindset that ultimately solved the equation for success. Through lead-up training, the Battalion had sought to instil a mantra of ‘fighting sustainment forward and protecting close lines of CSS’. This was a deliberate effort to change negative mindsets and stereotypes around logistics FE that we were ‘soft targets always on the defence’. We sought to break-down and rebuild a more cunning and offensive mindset to improve our survivability in combat across the littoral. Throughout the warfighter we made several advancements in this endeavour:

  • With the introduction of Hawkei PMVs, the Battalion doubled-down on adopting a mounted security posture for both convoy and hide defence. It was common for CSS Troops to be equipped with section weapons, Mag 58, 50 Cal. and the occasional 84mm.
  • When static in a defensive posture, CSS FE sought to present a hard target – one that would pose risk to the enemy SF elements being either decisively engaged or unmasked in an unfavourable area of the AO, dislocated from other support.
  • Our routines and movement patterns aimed to enable operations within the enemy’s targeting cycle and OODA loop. We knew that detection was inevitable, so adopted high rates of movement to prevent the enemy from massing kinetic effects. If we were to be targeted, it would likely require the unmasking of critical enemy weapon systems dedicated to the fight against the manoeuvre BGs.
  • CSS Troop commanders were enabled with threat information, via networked communications, to inform their planning for convoys and task execution.
  • Finally, with the assistance of our Combat Engineering brothers, CSSB developed and secured new routes to enable mobility and ensure the provision of close CSS to the Brigade’s main defensive position. The ability for CSS FE and Engineers to cut new track and maintain existing routes (that became heavily degraded by our continued use) was an important contribution to the survivability of the Brigade.

Mastering Distribution Points for classes I and III – LT Beth Hinds

Mastering tactical distribution points (DPs) was essential for the successful transfer of Class I and III supplies from close CSSTs to integral echelons within the BGs. Unlike flat rack exchanges, which can be done with minimal time in location, the exchange of bulk Class I and III water and fuels typically requires direct exchange across bulk liquid assets. For this reason, DPs are a frequent target of enemy attacks as it is otherwise uncommon to have more than one fuel or water asset, which are classified as HVTs, in the same location at the same time.

Key considerations that improved the standard of DPs included, ensuring:

  • the ground is suitable for the number and type of vehicles required
  • security platforms are positioned to provide all round defence
  • that there is sufficient overhead cover from aerial surveillance
  • adequate dispersion and that the vehicles are not visible from main supply routes
  • robust control measures for communications, RV and open/closure times are established and adhered to.

It is also important that procedures for marry up are discussed and rehearsed across CSS echelons prior to deployment. Having common TTPs and SOPs for actions on enemy contact is essential to ensure survivability in the instance a DP is compromised or targeted.

What next for the 2025 warfighter

Reflecting on what the Battalion could have done better in the 2024 warfighting exercise, most fixes and improves have a common trend – they are areas of the support system that remain untested through short duration exercises and remain biased towards legacy approaches for supporting 'small wars of choice', rather than being tailored to support LSCO of necessity. To summarise, the areas for improvement and the set of problems in focus for the 2025 warfighter series include:

  • Force Element structural readiness and implementing systems that enable efficient transition from the ‘raise, train, sustain’ organisational structure to exercise and operational force structures (CSSTs). Improving the structural readiness (personnel readiness, equipment health and collective training competence) of FEs needs to be the daily business of all Officers, SNCOs and JNCOs across the Battalion. With a clear understanding of the functions CSS FE perform both in barracks and once task organised to the exercise and operational force structure.
  • Cargo visibility and demand management across the integral, close and general levels of support, as discussed by the Brigade’s logistic staff.
  • Shifting the concepts for ClIX repair parts pack-ups to better support LSCO. This requires a change to platform sustainment models which have previously sought to optimise sustainment costs within a domestic setting.
  • Refining designs and stockholding policy for general stores and deployable (mobile) warehousing functions.
  • Reverse supply chain, particularly for the backload of captured equipment for intelligence exploitation or damaged equipment for specialist repair.

The ongoing DSR transformation and introduction of new armoured capabilities into 3 Brigade will provide unique opportunities to target the areas of innovation listed above. Just as important to achieving lasting improvement has been the need to generate belief, confidence and competence in our junior officers, soldiers and logisticians. It may come as a surprise that half of the junior officers who have penned the task vignettes in this article, had not completed their logistics officer basic training before participating in the 2024 NQLD warfighter. It is a reminder of the significant potential of our people that can be unlocked through effective training and critical thinking. Training that promotes brilliance at the basics, and indoctrinates combat basics as habits, have put our soldiers and officers on a solid pathway toward mastery of a new system of close CSS. So too did consciously breaking down legacy stereotypes of logistics FE and setting stretch goals like the CSST combined arms live fire shoot in support of the main defensive battle. Always taking the hard right over the easy wrong reinforced the journey of positive change that we continue to navigate.

Finally, I enthusiastically refer you to MAJ Bentley’s article on transforming artillery resupply to continue your professional education on logistics in the context of LSCO. In her article, MAJ Bentley cites the need for ‘greater logistics adaptability, integrated log networks, modular and scalable echelons that are decentralised and able to operate independently, while also massing effects at a chosen time and space’. I wholeheartedly agree. I also trust, based on what was put into practice during the NQLD warfighter, that we are well on our way to redefining a ‘new best practice’ for CSS – one reflecting characteristics of the MINDS CSS system – a new method of operating that appropriately supports the needs of an Armoured Amphibious Brigade operating across the littoral.

 

LTCOL J Long 
CO 3 CSSB