“No matter how good you are at planning, the pressure never goes away. So I don’t fight it. I feed off it. I turn pressure into motivation to do my best.” 
– Ben Carson (Neurosurgeon and US Politician)

Introduction

Since it’s advent by the Prussian’s, the military staff system has provided a structured body of functions who distil information, develop plans, and provide informed advice to the commander to enable their decision making (Förster, 1996; Rothenberg, 1986). The staff system was developed and introduced to reduce the likelihood of errors that might arise from a single person's judgement, particularly in the high-pressure[1] environment of military operations (Showalter, 2004).

The pressures associated with staff planning are of course not new. Since time immemorial, military planners have confronted pressure in enabling their commander’s decision-making. Whether externally induced through the chaos, friction, chance or uncertainty that is synonymous with war, or internally generated through an inexperienced member mistakenly deleting an annex to the operational order, military planners will almost certainly endure some level of pressure and the resultant human response - stress. In this regard, the environment in which the Headquarters 3rd Brigade plans staff functions is not unique, nor is the requirement to train its personnel in staff planning under pressure. That said, the Headquarters 3rd Brigade plans team offers an apt lens to describe the methods used in 2023-2024 to impose pressure and the effect that pressure had on staff planning, in terms of the challenges it imposes and the benefits it affords via identified lessons.

This article will propose that applying pressure in training is necessary in enhancing performance during staff planning, ultimately leading to more effective decision-making in war. To support this notion, this article will first introduce why training to plan under pressure is necessary through a brief introduction of stress theory and views from military luminaries. Second, aspects of Headquarters 3 Brigade’s experience over 2023-2024 will be discussed to highlight pressures that exist naturally and those which were deliberately incorporated to induce pressure within the staff. Last, this article will offer key lessons for staff working under pressure, based on the Headquarters 3 Brigade 2023-2024 experience.

Applying pressure – A necessary evil

Understanding how pressure and the resulting stress impacts performance is fundamental in appreciating the importance of applying pressure when training headquarter staff. Stress is the body’s response to challenging or threatening situations (pressure), which can either enhance or impair performance depending on the individual’s ability to cope (McEwen, 2007). The “Yerkes- Dodson Stress Curve” below illustrates this relationship, suggesting performance improves with increased pressure, up to an optimal point, after which performance declines (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). This concept is particularly relevant in military contexts, where planners often work under pressure, necessitating staff to possess adequate mental resilience to cope with pressure, remaining within the peak performance realm and avoiding transitioning into overload or breakdown territory.

As a military article, A Clausewitzian view is compulsory and per usual, helpful. Clausewitz offers that the ability to maintain composure and adaptability despite the inherent pressures of war is a hallmark of a capable military planner (Handel, 2001). Unsurprisingly, others, such BA Friedman agree with Clausewitz, asserting that operational success often hinges on the ability to think critically while under pressure. Friedman also asserts that the ability to cope with pressure can be cultivated through rigorous training that simulates the stresses of combat (Friedman, 2017).

In this sense, military units (3 Brigade included) have long sought to improve the resilience2 of their personnel through deliberately mimicking the pressures of war in training. The inclusion of physical discomfort, intense physical activity and generating a perceived threat during training exercises are common examples. Unfortunately, for staff planners, while a competent opposing force who possesses a genuine desire to win undoubtedly induces friction, it does not offer a genuine risk of injury or death (threat). Equally, a poorly developed plan in a largely controlled training environment does not result in an actual loss of lives, or an operational or strategic failure. In other words, the external pressures needed to improve the capacity of headquarters staff to cope with pressure must be achieved through the deliberate application of pressure by other means. With the basis for applying pressure in training and customary Clausewitz plugs established, the methods of applying pressure during staff planning from a Headquarters 3rd Brigade Perspective can commence.

Applying pressure within Headquarters 3rd Brigade.

Throughout 2023-2024, 3 Brigade conducted multiple brigade level training activities, each requiring the headquarters staff to plan formation level actions within a divisional (or higher) scenario. The requirement to plan at the formation level offered the first layer of pressure for the headquarters – Experience.

In early 2024, the staff’s experience varied considerably, partly due to the inescapable posting cycle. The carryover personnel, inclusive of the Commander had in 2023: developed and introduced a new nodal headquarters structure, completed multiple brigade level activities and deployed on operations as a team. Conversely, (some) newly marched in planners, or those who joined the headquarters in the field were junior in their captaincy; had not conducted respective intermediate/advanced courses or had not participated in a formation level exercise previously. Their inexperience limited their ability to understand or visualise what a brigade does, and how it does it. The result was a (natural and unavoidable) regression in performance comparative to where the staff ended 2023. Specifically, many of the hard-learned lessons from 2023 needed to be re-taught, or learned for the first time. Of note, many of these lessons are captured in the last section of this article. For the less experienced, formation level staff planning was a steep learning curve pushing some into overload and toward breakdown almost immediately. Fortunately, the staff adjusted to the requirements of working within a formation headquarters and as staff planning improved, additional pressure was needed to keep the stress levels on the cusp of overload to trigger concurrent performance and resilience growth. Applying additional pressure was achieved through increasing the pace of planning.

In training, the pace of planning is largely set through two factors: Exercise design and the Commander. Exercise design will always be constrained by time and resources, meaning headquarters staff will only spend a matter of weeks in the field each year executing their primary function – planning and executing operations. Limited time in the field results in two things. First, it is impossible to replicate the pressure and stress associated with needing to endure protracted periods of planning like is needed on operations. Second, the time available to train must be ruthlessly maximised to ensure tangible results in building the staff’s resilience to plan under pressure.

In the Headquarters 3 Brigade nodal structure, each node is as small as possible with zero staff redundancy. The 0B node’s principal function is planning, with a (reduced) ability to execute current operations when the 0A node is moving or non-operational. During Exercise Brolga Run, the Commander increased the pace of planning through two mechanisms. First, he directed the 0B node to plan and execute operations concurrently for a protracted period. The responsibility immediately placed additional pressure on the already minimised staff through the requirement to balance effort toward current and future operations in simultaneity. Second, the pace of planning was increased, seeing the staff conduct a full planning cycle every 24 hours for seven days. For context, the staff were previously afforded (on average) 72 hours to complete a full planning cycle. The requirement to balance current and future operations and complete a full planning cycle every 24 hours began to see the staff transition into overload/breakdown territory. In conjunction to the increase in planning pace, the staff were exposed to an increased level of complexity through planning a deliberate brigade defence – arguably, one of the most complex types of operation to plan based on the level of detail and synchronisation required. Linking back to experience, there were very few personnel in the headquarters, inclusive of the Principal Staff Officers who had planned for a brigade in the defence. The combination of an unfamiliar problem set, requirement to balance current and future operations concurrently and an increase in the pace of planning placed staff under significant (perceived) stress. There was development, but there was also degradation in performance to in some cases, near breakdown. The following section will briefly outline the staff’s observable response to pressure being applied, which will give way to the final section – key learning points for staff planners.

The staff’s response to pressure

In order to understand the response to pressure by staff, there needs to be an increased understanding of how the human brain processes information, analyses the information and the outcome from using particular part of the brain. Daniel Kahneman provides a good basis of understanding in his book ‘Thinking Fast and Slow’. The following were the major observed responses to the application of pressure during staff planning:

Reversion to System 1 (Fast Thinking). The reason a headquarters trains, conducts and executes planning is to increase the capability of a planners and Commander’s system 1 processing. It is through exercising the system 2 brain, that greater efficiencies are achieved, however this is only developed through exposure, experience and maturity. As displayed in figure 5, the use of system 2 brain requires an increased effort, which fatigues the member rapidly and as fatigue increases the member will rely on the use of system 1 thinking to achieve efficiencies. Within this zone, errors are increased and senior staff planners together with decision-makers, need to manage the function a lot closer. To be clear, System 1 thinking is very powerful – when sufficient experience exists to draw upon.

Rushed planning. The Staff Military Appreciation Process (SMAP) is a flexible vehicle that guides planning. With experience, understanding and context senior staff planners and Commanders can create abridged versions, accepting risk where appropriate and achieving tempo to exploit opportunities. However, staff planners within an environment of increased pressure and fatigue will attempt to rush through planning to deliver product. They will leverage their system 1 thinking, lazy thinking, through the use of templates, conduct the known tasks of powerpoints, synch matrices and operational orders. This fulfils the staff product is productivity mentality, but comes at the cost of the actual planning.

System 2 as a weapon. In planning, the level of discipline required is not different to the employment of a main weapon system. It has to be controlled, deployed within the main effort and function within a sustainable framework. The use of system 2 thinking is no different when it comes to planning. Planner leads and senior planners need to define when efficiencies can be achieved through system 1, but more importantly when deep thinking and planning needs to occur. An example of this is the development and coordination of a health plan. It will underpin the risk calculus for a mission profile and requires very deliberate attention that involves several enabling and combat functions. Through the understanding of how system 1 and 2 thinking influences planners and ensuring that there is a framework for when to switch between the two, PSOs will be able to maximise the planning function while maintaining healthy pressure.

Key lessons / observations for staff planners when under pressure

As noted, the Headquarters 3rd Brigade experience throughout 2023-2024 is not unique. Equally, the key lessons outlined below are in no way ground-breaking. They are however worthy of review as if we made mistakes, chances are high that they will be made again.

Don’t be afraid to ask. It may seem obvious, but staff need to continually seek commander’s guidance – Often outside the prescribed back briefs Throughout both 2023 and 2024, there were clear instances where asking the commander for his view on a problem would have saved hours of wasted staff effort and avoidable time pressure. Equally, do not try and ‘guess’ what the commander meant if the guidance was not understood – just ask. There is very little (if anything) that is more important to the commander than getting planning right. In doing so, the staff will be focussed on the right things, at the right time and avoid putting themselves under time pressure when they get it wrong.

Do a plan to plan. Again, this may seem like a no brainer. But when pressure is applied, staff will immediately grab the oars and start rowing toward exhaustion. We instil our people with initiative and drive which is excellent but the first thing they should do is establish a plan to plan that includes rest. Working 18 hours a day is achievable for a week long exercise, but is it sustainable for a month(s) long operation? No. It is simply the imposition of unnecessary stress that will likely lead to exhaustion, breakdown and more importantly – poor planning that will result in mission failure or an unnecessary loss of life.

Staff Officer First, Specialist Second. With the small nodal footprint, there is a requirement for every member of the team to perform staff duties, At times, people can hide behind their specialisation only performing their specific role, especially with enabling functions. The culture of ‘staff officer first’ ensures that concurrent activity is always being conducted and that operational staff can confidently task nodal members to develop orders to maintain tempo.

Close the laptop and get out the map markers. Staff can easily fall into the trap of producing product before the plan is made, often in isolation as a means of self- preservation prior to the next back-brief. Doing so is a doomed path and will inevitably result in having to re- do work to synchronise with other planners (more pressure). Start on a map – as a staff. Look at the problem, sketch out plans and only once the staff are synchronised do the laptops open.

Do not compromise on time for orders release. While you can release an order with (some) information missing, orders need to be released on time. There can be no compromise in this regard. Commanding Officers and Sub-Unit Commanders must be afforded appropriate time to prepare. Fragmentary Orders exist for a reason.

Release Warning Order(s). A consistent comment from Commanding Officers and Operations Officers was the need for early Warning Orders. Release them by any means available. Do not wait for more information. It likely won’t come. Giving early Warning Orders is a win-win. Subordinates can commence planning, and the pressure on staff is reduced as the subordinates have as much information as the staff.

Accept (some) imperfection. Linked to releasing orders on time, the reality is, a perfect order doesn’t exist. The information at hand will always be restricted. There will never be enough time. Remember that largely, subordinates could (if required) execute a plan with only three pieces of information: A clear mission / intent, control measures and an appropriate apportionment of resources (forces, time ammo etc).

Do not blindly follow foundational training. Career courses teach ‘a way’ to conduct staff planning. Remember that not everything is valid every time. Do not waste precious time or effort making elementary deductions that do not feed the planning. Do not blindly produce the world’s neatest PowerPoint slide that will only be valid for the 10 seconds it is displayed in a back brief. Build product that will end up in the Operational Order.

Use the resilience developed wisely. Training staff to cope with pressure (build resilience) is a double-edged sword. They will build resilience to work harder, for longer. They will also drive themselves into the ground thinking that is the right thing to do. The ‘plan to plan’ and direct management by Principal Staff Officers are key mitigations to stop energetic staff destroying themselves.

Principal Staff Officers (PSO) need to drive everything in planning. The PSOs are responsible for setting the dynamic of the headquarters, ensuring a ‘plan to plan’ is done, ensuring staff are not reverting to ‘course-isms’, protecting staff when needed, integrating enablers and fact-checking planning data.

Conclusion

Planning under pressure is a challenging, but essential aspect of preparing headquarters staff. Through a (basic) understanding of the science of stress and how pressure can be deliberately embedded into training, commanders and their PSOs can appropriately introduce and manage the pressure. The resultant stress of their staff is then used as a means to develop the mental resilience and adaptability needed to navigate the complexities of warfare, ultimately leading to more effective decision-making and ensuring Clausewitz is pleased.

MAJ Trevor Williams and MAJ Shaun Close 
BM and S2 – HQ 3 BDE

References

Clausewitz, C. V. (1832). On War (M. Howard & P. Paret, Eds. & Trans.). Princeton University Press.

Förster, Stig. Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the Modern General Staff. Palgrave Macmillan, 1996.

Friedman, B. A. (2017). On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle. Naval Institute Press.

Handel, M. I. (2001). Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. Frank Cass.

Lazarus, R. S., and Folkman, S. (1987). Transactional theory and research on emotions and coping. Eur. J. Personal.

Luthar, S. S., and Cicchetti, D. (2000). The construct of resilience: implications for interventions and social policies. Dev. Psychopathol

McEwen, B. S. (2007). The End of Stress as We Know It. Dana Press.

Rothenberg, Gunther E. "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment," in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1986.

Showalter, Dennis E. The Wars of German Unification. Bloomsbury Academic, 2004.

Yerkes, R. M., & Dodson, J. D. (1908). The Relation of Strength of Stimulus to Rapidity of Habit- Formation. Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology

End Notes