The Director of Practice (DPRAC) is appointed for Defence activities where there is a requirement for safety coordination between unit exercises or range practices, and is responsible for the coordination of range safety for all units and sub-units placed under their control[1]. The role is the key juncture to enable immersive live-fire rehearsal of Army’s raison d’être (and the ADF no less). As such, this article intends to shed light on the ‘dark art’ of DPRAC, to provide insights to future DPRACs when appointed and looking for a start-point beyond doctrine, and discuss how the DPRAC is a tool to enhance training rather than merely an obligation. This article outlines the context of a multinational live fire activity, provides insights to planning and execution, and intends to explain how the DPRAC contributes to enhanced combined arms training when employed and executed to best effect. The article will discuss the intrinsic links between range safety and operational command and control, highlight considerations of the juncture of ADF and Partner Nation range doctrines. Finally, the article speculates on how the DPRAC may be utilised when employing emerging and Operational level effects and the resultant interplay with parallel exercise appointments.

The Context

Over the period 06-13 May 24, 3 Bde led the Brolga Sprint (BS) Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise (CALFX) at Townsville Field Training Area. For this activity, CO 4 Regt RAA was appointed as the Director of Practice (DPRAC) and OPSO 4 Regt RAA was appointed as the Deputy DPRAC (DDPRAC). The activity incorporated Ex SOUTHERN JACKAROO and resultantly included elements of the US Marine Corps, US Army, and Japanese Ground Self Defence Force. The activity was determined to be a Level 8 practice, and as an Integrated range included live fire practices of Tank, ASLAV, M113, 155mm artillery, 120mm and 81mm mortars, Demolitions, Explosive Lane Closures, Battlefield Noise Simulation and a slew of small arms and crew served weapon systems, all in a blend of static and manoeuvre practices. The live fire activity exercised the Brigade Headquarters in its synchronisation of Battle Group tactical actions several times within the eight day period, and was designed as an immersive scenario with live ammunition carried at the ACTION degree of weapon readiness for up to 72 hours. BS CALFX incorporated insertion, defensive routine, delay, the main defensive battle, counterattack and counterpenetration, tactical resupply, and exfiltration under the same live fire conditions. The activity also allowed for junior commanders to receive orders, develop a plan, issue orders, regroup, rehearse and execute, and to only be directed to modify their plan if it strayed outside the safety parameters. In total, 46 different safety traces were utilised by 17 different OICs Practice functionally, many of which were rotational appointments as Battle Groups fulfilled safety appointments for opposite Battle Groups.

DPRAC in Planning

Planning for BS CALFX commenced during Q4 2023 and the intent was clear from inception; commanders and staff officers would be tested to analyse problems and synchronise their actions, as distinct from a common LFX format of the Combat Team Scenario Training Exercise (STX) Lane. The STX Lane would only allow a specific tactical action, on a specific axis with constraints, and would have limited opportunities for freedom of action or discretion of timings or triggers. As such the paradigm shifted for BS CALFX in a highly positive way; subordinate commanders were required to achieve their Commander’s Intent, the tactical orders would provide the triggers, and the range safety hierarchy enabled the plan to be executed with a degree of freedom of manoeuvre. At the lowest level junior commanders integrated the layering of their individual and crew served weapons with AFV and indirect fires; at the middle level this manifested as discretionary application of lethality to lead an ‘enemy’ into a course of action, and at the highest level defeat mechanisms and manoeuvre were applied. This necessitated a harmony between the headquarters controlling the tactical actions (Brigade HQ) and the headquarters controlling the safety hierarchy (DPRAC CP) – or in simple terms, the orchestration and synchronisation of effects. By viewing the practice through this lens the the feasible means by which subordinate commanders would achieve their task was woven into the safety architecture.

Delivering this took in excess of six months to prepare. The planning commenced with the tactical context and then was adapted where required by land range safety constraints. Once the problem set had been framed and range practices drafted, physical folders of range documents and a ‘document checklist’ generated shared awareness and accountability; DPRAC Safety Officers (DSOs) were effective in managing DPRAC workload. Harmony of planning was imperative for the training to achieve its maximum potential and in the DPRAC being able to allow the practices to be fully immersive. Through orders, rehearsals and exercise design DPRAC could allow multiple traces to be open concurrently, with OICs fully aware of how they were required to shape their own practices to facilitate combined arms effects.

Lastly in relation to planning, early and regular engagement with Land Range Safety (LRS) experts is essential. The advice regarding areas in which DPRAC is not an expert is crucial, as was access and advice for administration such as LRS Management Tool. Including the LRS team on key final planning events and as execution capabilities commence operating ensures that an experienced set of eyes can view the problem set holistically and independently.

DPRAC in Execution

By supporting the exercised headquarters’ planning rather than imposing safety constraints upon it, DPRAC can enable task organised elements to realise the combined arms live fire effect. It is through this lens that a combined arms and integrated/joint practice should give clarity to the role of DPRAC. Time for rehearsals, walkthroughs, integrated practice briefings and the filtering down of orders also contributed to shared understanding, and the time required for these to occur must not be underestimated. Whilst there were instances that the DPRAC was required to be proximal to the point of friction, having a single DDPRAC to command the DPRAC CP (supported by watchkeepers and signallers) the risk of discussions or agreements falling through a diffused staff was minimised, and consistent messaging to OICs and DSOs was assured.

The wrap-around approach, as opposed to scripted and directed events, necessitated flexibility with timings and relied more on correct sequencing and triggering, complicated by the non-existent enemy having the initiative. This was resolved by progression in the battle being triggered at the Brigade HQ intelligence cell, who in turn were trained during the LFX activity due to their requirement to make running estimates and predict enemy actions based off Situation Reports (SITREPs).

Complex, visually striking and large-scale activities such as the BS CALFX are excellent opportunities for public relations and naturally pique the interest of senior leaders, capability managers, industry representatives and civilians. Visitors should therefore be anticipated and supported, however require certain accommodations which may impose on the training value and the DPRAC CP especially at short notice. For the BS CALFX a dedicated visits plan and visits cell was employed to great success. The likelihood for visitors was understood early, and the activity design accommodated specific visits serials. Messaging the aperture for visits and pre-empting the narrative allowed visits to be incorporated without materially impacting the activity itself, and set expectations with prospective visitors that they would not be able to derive their own visit format. The visits cell delivered a daily tour to approved visitors; as a single entity this simplified visitor management, and shielded the DPRAC CP from becoming a fascinator or a help desk. Overall this resulted in visitors having the lowest possible impact on the training value for the training audience, and the lowest potential for consequent safety incidents.

DPRAC and Partner Nations

Australian range doctrine is sometimes perceived internally as obfuscated, convoluted, administratively heavy, and risk-averse. Having incorporated a (knowingly small) pool of multinational partners into the BS CALFX, the author offers that, the detail with which Australian range practices are planned actually enables superior flexibility and realism and facilitates far more complex training to occur at an equivalent risk threshold. Two direct comparisons can be made. For a dismounted small arms practice at least one Partner Nation may only engage from a single firing line, with the safety of other participants assured only by the Range Danger Area; conversely, an Australian manoeuvre element can employ a movement box, with the safety of other participants assured by safety angles and sometimes by overhead fire. Similarly, for artillery practices whilst normal training will usually see rounds fall no closer than 860m, under certain parameters rounds may fall as close as 175m from an occupied position; conversely, the same ammunition from the same artillery equipment in US service cannot be authorised to fall closer than 550m in a like training scenario, and JGSDF indirect fires may not fall closer than 1600m from an occupied position and overhead fires are not permitted. Australian range safety policy provides the opportunity for world-leading immersion and realism in live fire training, and the DPRAC is key to enabling this in the combined arms setting.

The detail and flexibility of ADF range policy does however have its drawbacks, as range planning and conduct differs between participants, even to the point that the Range Danger Area safety traces generated for the same munitions are not always identical between the ADF and Partner Nations. Whilst danger areas are typically generated with pencils on trace paper for ADF ranges and are typically generated on dedicated software for US ranges, the manual process allows for complex requirements such as nearby occupied locations and other constraints to be better accommodated in an ADF trace.

Whilst the LP 7.3.0 briefly outlines the primacy of doctrine and constraints for Partner Nations when using Australian training areas, the BS CALFX demanded Partner Nation participation when task organised as subordinate to an Australian HQ. Peculiarly, the implications to include the Marine Rotational Force – Darwin (MRF-D) into the practice were different than for the United States Army Pacific Forces (USARPAC), despite their doctrine being internally consistent. There is further friction as OICs and Safety Supervisors are not interchangeable due to differing requirements for briefings and orders to commence firing and as such ADF and Partner Nation practices were required to be segregated from the overall activity in some aspect. This was generally achieved through orchestrating the Partner Nation’s involvement in a suitable manner such as in forward standing patrols or in static defensive ranges. Until an Australian Safety Supervisor can be subordinated to a Partner Nations OIC Practice (or vice-versa) and likewise for a participant, and memoranda for the inter-useability of range planning and execution is outlined on a nation-by-nation basis, this will continue to be the case.

DPRAC in Future

Often, when an activity requiring a DPRAC includes artillery, the artillery commander is appointed as the DPRAC. There are obvious conveniences to this – most notably that the artillery commander is unlikely to be a manoeuvre element commander, and that the safety construct of artillery practices is specialised and not necessarily well understood by other Corps. This is a strawman however, as the artillery commander is the manoeuvre commander’s key representative to synchronise the available Joint Fires & Effects with the manoeuvre plan, and each type of range practice has its own nuance that is only fully understood by those that are able to conduct it. As such, when viewing through the lens described above as the synchronisation and orchestration of an effect, consistent with what commanders and planners at all levels deliver for their own combat/combat support/command support/combat service support remit, General Service Officers of all Corps hold the skill set to fulfil a DPRAC appointment. By definition it is an overarching safety appointment for combined arms or joint activities. Activity schedulers should exercise discretion when appointing or mandating a DPRAC, and consider whether appointing a DPRAC enhances the value of combined arms training, or if it is an opportunity cost to the development of better training due to the administrative burden.

Joint practices – with naval, aviation or Special Operation aspects – have precedent of being incorporated into activities not too dissimilar from the BS CALFX. Whilst requiring an element of subject matter expertise and with some mandated appointments, sea-to-land RAN or air-to-surface RAAF practices incorporating live munitions are intrinsically similar to direct fire and indirect fire practices and as such can be incorporated in a relatively straightforward fashion. Extrapolating, however, is speculating on how DPRAC and similar exercise appointments such as Chief Safety Officer (CSO) and Exercise Director (EXDIR) will manage future capabilities. The doctrine for exercise planning needs to support flexibility beyond the superimposition of direct fire Weapon Danger Zones and close support indirect fires, and the ADF-P 7-series (or yet-to-be-released ADF-I-5 Exercise Planning and Conduct) and LP 7.3.0 may not be ready for such practices.

When training effects spill across domains and have real-world hazards, there must be absolute clarity on which exercise safety appointment is responsible for its safe and effective employment, either at a doctrinal level or on an activity-by-activity basis. How can we live fire safely whilst practicing electromagnetic spectrum denial or cyber, information warfare and space capabilities? How can we rehearse Land-Based Maritime Strike in support of the deployment of an amphibious force? How can we exercise GMLRS or PrSM in concert with Sea Sparrow or Harpoon, for the insertion of an airborne strike package? How can a counter-UAS element validate its ability to protect ground based forces persistently and conduct identification of friend or foe (IFF) if it cannot be force assigned to and manoeuvre with the supported force over an extended period? How can such actions validate their ability to conduct Battle Damage Assessment if not through live fire? Each of these vignettes is intended to provoke thought by experts on how capabilities beyond the combat corps could train past the Command Post Exercise or discrete scripted serials, and test discretion and decision making processes under live fire pressures.

Conclusion

The BS CALFX presented a new methodology to train combat commanders under the pressures of live fire, and did so with Partner Nation inclusion. Adopting new ways of applying range safety underpinned this, and the DPRAC formed a key juncture to support planners at all levels. This article outlined ways in which the DPRAC facilitated enhanced training and benchmarked Australian range safety against some key Partner Nations. The author intended to outline this to a wider audience to catalyse similar, or further novel, approaches to immersive combined arms training and potential opportunities for the future Joint Force, to offer a contemporary perspective on the role of DPRAC, and to provide some further context and assurance to future DPRAC appointees.

MAJ Lachlan McDonald 
OPSO 4 REGT RAA 2024

End Notes