Introduction

Logistical support for artillery regiments and future divisional fires echelons is a critical aspect of combat service support (CSS) that has not been adequately tested in recent operations or exercises[1]. Sustaining artillery during large scale combat operations (LSCO) involves a range of complexities that are often oversimplified under the term 'distribution', failing to capture the nuances inherent in their execution[2]. To effectively support artillery in LSCO, the Australian Army needs to adapt its logistics approach to address these complexities, ensuring robust and responsive systems for ammunition resupply that meet the demands of modern warfare. Currently, the Australian Army, in its setup and training, is not adequately prepared for the ammunition requirements of LSCO. This paper will explore key considerations for resupplying artillery, focusing on the current challenges in the approach to artillery ammunition resupply and the new challenges posed by the adoption of self-propelled artillery. It will then examine key lessons from Ukraine and conclude with recommendations on how these insights can be adapted to enhance the Australian Army's logistical strategies.

Current Challenges in Artillery Resupply

Resupplying artillery is a multifaceted process involving various organisations, from the Force Support Group (FSG) to brigade headquarters (Bde HQ), the Brigade Support Group (BSG), and A2/A1 echelons. This process demands a high level of integration and synchronisation, far beyond traditional ‘push’ and ‘pull’ distribution concepts[3]. The current challenges include:

1. Materiel complexities: Today’s artillery ammunition is inherently complex due to the increased number of different components, such as charges, fuzes, and shells, that a typical battery may fire. These components exist in uneven quantity, are expended at irregular rates, and demand storage and transport requirements that are unique to other combat arms. Add on top of this the complexities of the gun components, such a barrel life and hydraulic systems. Together these complexities create a difficult challenge for logisticians.
2. Complexity and Integration: Effective resupply requires understanding the concept of fires to anticipate demand accurately, including munition types. This necessitates highly effective communication across logistic echelons from the national supply base through to the fire unit. Communication across levels of command and support is currently hindered by a lack of exposure and training among CSS planners[4].
3. Preparedness and Pre-loading: Sustaining artillery demands the movement of vast quantities of stores, particularly of ammunition. Therefore, allocating dedicated distribution assets to prepare, pre-load, and transport artillery supplies (CLVArty) is essential. This step ensures that stocks are staged forward in CSS nodes to mitigate risks and prevent supply shortages at critical moments[5]. However, this need must be balanced with the requirement to maintain a mobile and resilient logistics footprint capable of surviving in highly contested battlespaces.
4. Doctrine and Terminology: Refining existing doctrine to standardise concepts and terminology is crucial. Establishing basic loads of common CLVArty types based on operational effects will reduce friction between fires and CSS staff, ensuring smoother operations[6].

Key Considerations for AS9 Self-Propelled Artillery Logistics

The introduction of the AS9 Huntsman into the Australian Army will bring new logistical requirements and challenges. Key considerations include:

1. Mobility and Speed: Unlike the Army’s current fleet of towed systems, the AS9 will see artillery move faster and at greater depths into the battlespace. This will necessitate a more dynamic and responsive logistics chain if the Australian Army wishes to realise the potential of the new equipment, as resupply over greater distances will invite unpredictability and friction. Supply units must also be capable of keeping pace with the artillery's movement, requiring logistics assets with enhanced, if not similar, mobility to the AS10 resupply vehicles they will be supporting[7].
2. Maintenance and Repair: Self-propelled artillery, due to its integrated propulsion and firing systems, presents more complex maintenance challenges compared to traditional towed artillery[8]. Logistics units must be equipped with the necessary tools, parts, and trained personnel to perform field repairs and regular maintenance[9].
3. Ammunition Supply: The AS9 can sustain higher rates of fire and accommodate various types of munitions. However, it is important to recognize that both the AS9 and the AS10 Armoured Ammunition Resupply Vehicle (AARV) can only carry a fraction of the total ammunition needed for sustained operations—48 rounds and 104 rounds, respectively[10]. Consequently, efficient resupply methods are essential for maintaining the operational readiness of artillery units. Logistics planners must ensure a consistent and diverse supply of ammunition to keep artillery units fully operational. This requires pre-staging munitions closer to the front lines and improving transportation capabilities to avoid bottlenecks[11].
4. Fuel and Power: Self-propelled artillery requires a continuous supply of fuel and power. This adds another layer of complexity to logistics planning, necessitating fuel supply points and efficient distribution networks to keep the artillery operational[12].

The challenges of introducing the AS9 self-propelled artillery system, such as mobility, maintenance, ammunition supply, and fuel supply, are similar to those experienced in the Ukraine-Russian war. The war has shown the importance of mobility and survivability, integration with ISR, decentralised command and control, and logistical adaptability in artillery logistics. The Australian Army can learn from these lessons to ensure that their logistics chain is prepared for the AS9 system's mobility and speed, can keep pace with rapidly moving fire units, and can adapt to changing conditions and disrupted supply lines. By studying the experiences of Ukrainian forces, the Australian Army can enhance their logistical capabilities and support the AS9 system's effectiveness on the battlefield.

Lessons from the Ukraine-Russian War and Artillery Ammunition

1. Mobility and Survivability: The Ukraine-Russian conflict has underscored the importance of mobility and survivability for artillery units. Self-propelled howitzers, such as the AS9, have demonstrated the ability to quickly relocate after firing to avoid counter-battery fire. For example, Ukrainian forces have utilised M777 howitzers with towed capability and adapted them for rapid displacement, allowing them to fire and move before Russian forces can respond. The conduct of "shoot-and-scoot" tactics however requires that logistic assets are able to keep pace with rapidly moving fire units. It also demands that logistic personnel demonstrate a high degree of proficiency in mounted navigation, camouflage and concealment, radio communications, and tempo in the conduct of distribution points[13].
2. Integration with ISR: The integration of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets with artillery operations has become indispensable on the modern battlefield. Drones and other ISR platforms provide real-time targeting data, enabling precise and effective artillery strikes. Ukrainian forces, for instance, have expertly utilised drones like the Bayraktar TB2 to identify and designate targets for their artillery units, resulting in devastatingly accurate strikes against Russian positions. This enhanced visibility over the battlespace not only exposes fire units but also renders logistical support nodes vulnerable. The dramatic increase in the lethality and accuracy of standard munitions, when combined with ISR capabilities, makes large-scale distribution points untenable and highly susceptible to attack. The Ukrainian conflict has highlighted the necessity of numerous, dispersed distribution points (DPs) and temporal logistics nodes that establish themselves only briefly to conduct resupply operations before quickly retreating to hides or safe areas. This approach underscores the need for a seamless logistics chain to ensure the timely resupply of ammunition and other essentials, vital for maintaining sustained operations in such a volatile environment[14].
3. Decentralised Command and Control: The conflict has highlighted the benefits of decentralised command and control structures. By empowering lower-level commanders with the authority to make quick decisions, artillery units can respond more effectively to dynamic battlefield conditions. For instance, Ukrainian artillery units have operated under decentralised command, allowing them to swiftly adapt to the fluid nature of the conflict. This necessitates robust communication networks and logistical support to ensure that units can operate autonomously while still receiving the necessary supplies and support[15].
4. Logistical Adaptability: The war has shown that logistical adaptability is essential in a high- intensity conflict. Supply lines are frequently disrupted, necessitating the ability to quickly reroute supplies and adapt to changing conditions. Ukrainian forces have had to establish alternative supply routes and use unconventional methods, such as civilian trucks and volunteers, to maintain the flow of critical supplies to the front lines. This flexibility has been vital in overcoming the challenges posed by Russian interdiction efforts and maintaining the operational tempo of their artillery units[16].

The Australian Army can learn from the lessons of the Ukraine-Russian war to adapt its artillery logistics and ensure the seamless and effective support of self-propelled artillery units. By incorporating these lessons, the Army can enhance its mobility, survivability, and lethality on the modern battlefield.

Adapting Australian Artillery Logistics

As the Australian Army prepares to integrate self-propelled artillery systems like the AS9 Huntsman into its operational framework, a significant overhaul of artillery logistics is essential. The adoption of these advanced systems introduces new challenges and opportunities that must be addressed to ensure the seamless and effective support of artillery units in LSCO.

1. Enhanced Training and Exposure: The shift from towed to self-propelled artillery demands a paradigm change in logistics planning and execution. CSS planners and logistics personnel must undergo comprehensive training tailored to the unique requirements of self-propelled artillery. This includes familiarisation with the AS9’s operational capabilities, maintenance needs, and the intricacies of its supply chain. Exposure to real-world scenarios, possibly through joint exercises with allied forces already operating self-propelled systems, will be crucial in building the necessary expertise.
2. Advanced Planning and Simulation: The complexities of sustaining self-propelled artillery in LSCO cannot be fully appreciated without robust planning and simulation exercises. The use of advanced simulation tools can help logistics planners anticipate challenges such as supply chain disruptions, ammunition shortages, and the impact of terrain on mobility and resupply. By simulating various scenarios, the Australian Army can develop and refine logistical strategies, ensuring that they are resilient and adaptable to the unpredictability of modern warfare.
3. Integrated Logistics Networks: The introduction of self-propelled artillery underscores the need for highly integrated logistics networks that ensure seamless coordination across all levels of command and support. Improved communication channels, real-time data sharing, and the adoption of advanced tracking systems will be vital in synchronising supply movements with the operational tempo of artillery units. This integration should extend from the national supply base to the fire units, ensuring that all stakeholders have access to accurate and up-to-date information on supply statuses, maintenance needs, and operational requirements.
4. Modular and Scalable Support Units: Flexibility is key to effective logistics support in the dynamic environments where self-propelled artillery will operate. The creation of modular and scalable support units, capable of being quickly deployed and adapted to various operational contexts, will be critical. These units should be designed to provide tailored support based on mission-specific needs, ensuring that they can effectively sustain artillery operations regardless of the environment. The modular approach, as seen in the U.S. Army's doctrine for the M109 Paladin, offers a proven framework that can be adapted to the Australian context.
5. Adopting Decentralised Logistics Nodes: Drawing lessons from the Ukrainian conflict, the Australian Army should consider adopting decentralised logistics nodes that can operate independently and flexibly within the battlespace. By establishing multiple, dispersed distribution points (DPs) and temporal logistics nodes that can quickly relocate, the Army can reduce its vulnerability to enemy ISR capabilities and enhance the survivability of its logistics network. These nodes should be designed for rapid establishment and teardown, allowing them to conduct resupply operations efficiently before retreating to secure locations.
6. Fuel and Ammunition Management: The increased mobility of self-propelled artillery necessitates a more dynamic approach to fuel and ammunition management. Logistics planners must ensure that fuel supply points are strategically positioned to support continuous operations. Similarly, ammunition resupply must be meticulously planned to maintain the high rate of fire that the AS9 is capable of delivering. This could involve the pre-staging of ammunition closer to the front lines and the use of advanced transportation methods to prevent bottlenecks and ensure timely resupply.
7. Integration of ISR and Logistic Support: The integration of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) with logistical support is becoming increasingly vital in modern warfare. The ability to gather real-time data on the location and status of both friendly and enemy forces allows logistics units to anticipate needs and adjust their operations accordingly. For example, by integrating ISR data into logistics planning, the Australian Army can optimise resupply routes, avoid enemy interdictions, and enhance the overall effectiveness of its logistics operations.
8. Continuous Adaptation and Innovation: As the operational environment continues to evolve, so too must the logistics strategies that support artillery units. The Australian Army must foster a culture of continuous adaptation and innovation, encouraging logistics personnel to develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that address emerging challenges. This could include the use of autonomous vehicles for resupply missions, the development of new fuel-efficient technologies, or the exploration of alternative methods for delivering supplies in contested environments.

Conclusion

In adapting the logistical framework of the Australian Army to support the integration of self- propelled artillery like the AS9 Huntsman, it is clear that a fundamental shift is required in both doctrine and practice. The complexities of sustaining artillery during LSCO have been inadequately addressed in recent exercises and operations, necessitating a robust and responsive logistics system capable of meeting the demands of modern warfare. This paper has highlighted the current challenges in artillery resupply, particularly the intricate coordination required among various logistical echelons and the unique demands posed by advanced artillery systems.

Drawing on lessons from conflicts such as the Ukraine-Russian war, the Australian Army can enhance its logistics strategies by adopting more integrated, flexible, and dynamic approaches. Key recommendations include the enhancement of training and simulation exercises, the development of modular and scalable support units, and the adoption of decentralised logistics nodes to improve survivability and efficiency in contested environments.

Ultimately, the ability to effectively support artillery in LSCO will depend on the Army's willingness to innovate and adapt its logistics operations to the evolving demands of the battlefield. By doing so, the Australian Army can ensure that its artillery regiments remain a formidable force, capable of delivering decisive firepower whenever and wherever it is needed.

MAJ Sophie Bentley 
BC CSS BTY, 4 REGT

Biography

Sophie Bentley, Major

Major Sophie Bentley is an Ordnance Officer with extensive experience in a variety of logistics roles, including support at the operational and tactical levels. Her career encompasses a broad range of logistics planning roles, both domestically and on operational deployments. Currently, she serves as the Battery Commander of the Combat Service Support Battery within the 4th Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery. Major Bentley has a keen interest in artillery ammunition resupply, with a specific focus on the introduction of the AS9 Huntsman and AS10 Armoured Ammunition Resupply Vehicle into the 4th Regiment, set to commence in 2025.

References

Australian Army. (2020). Army Logistic Training Centre. Retrieved from https://www.army.gov.au/our-work/equipment-technology-and-supplies/army-logistic-training-centre

Crawford, C., & Holmes, J. (2021). Lessons from Ukraine’s use of artillery and fires in the Donbass. Australian Army Journal, 18(1), 16-29.

Crawford, C., & Hughes, M. (2017). The resupply of artillery regiments in high-intensity conflict. Australian Army Journal, 15(1), 73-89.

Department of Defence. (2023, August 11). Self-propelled howitzers give preview. Australian Government. https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2023-08-11/self-propelled-howitzers- give-preview

Department of the Army. (2001). FM 3-09.70: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for M109A6 Howitzer (Paladin) Operations. Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Lee, J. (2018). K9 Thunder: A South Korean Self-Propelled Howitzer for the 21st Century. Military Technology, 42(5), 80-87.

Lee, M. G. R. D. (2022). Self-propelled artillery: A comprehensive study of the system's operation and maintenance. Military Engineering Press.

Additional References

Frelinger, D. R. (2013). The Logistics of Artillery Support in Afghanistan. Military Review, 93(3), 91-102.

Holcomb, J. F., & Meeks, D. P. (1994). Artillery Ammunition Resupply: A Case Study of the Gulf War. Journal of Military History, 58(2), 271-294.

Scales, R. (2004). The Logistics of Artillery Support in Modern Warfare. Military Review, 84(2), 60- 66.

Zakharchuk, V. (2017). Artillery Logistics: Lessons Learned from the Ukrainian Conflict. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 19(1), 1-21.

End Notes